**Bulletin of the George Santayana Society**

No. 36 FALL 2018  
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*Santayana 75, 100, and 125 Years Ago*  

*Ideal Sympathy? The Unlikely Friendship of George Santayana and Frank, 2nd Earl Russell*  

*Santayana on Propositions*  

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The George Santayana Society
2019
ANNUAL MEETING

The Society’s annual meeting will be held in conjunction with the January meetings of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) in New York.

Speakers

*Phillip L Beard*
Auburn University
Emerson, Pragmatism, and Santayana

Commentator
*Glenn Tiller*
Texas A&M University—Corpus Christi

*Brita Stoneman*
Hillsdale College
Forming Harmony: the Rhetoric of George Santayana

*Hector Galván*
Texas A&M University—Corpus Christi
Mindfulness and the Spiritual Life

Chair

*Richard M Rubin*
George Santayana Society

1:30 PM–4:30 PM, Wednesday, January 9th, 2019
Editor’s Notes

The year 2018 has been an active one for the George Santayana Society. Weather prevented two of three speakers from participating in the January meeting in Savannah, but the contributions of all three appear in this issue of the Bulletin. Showing the continuing relevance of Santayana’s thought, Veronica Mueller addresses supervenience and Richard Atkins propositions; former editor of the Bulletin Glenn Tiller comments on both.

In February, the Society joined with the Berlin Practical Philosophy International Forum e.V. to host an internet seminar entitled “The Nature of Spirituality: Santayana and Beyond” (video available at http://berlinphilosophyforum.org/santayana-spiritual-life-webinar-recording/). Moderator Chris Skowroński’s remarks on Santayana’s reticence to condemn Nazi atrocities initiated a two-week email exchange that resulted in two contributions to this issue: a transcription of the exchange and Daniel Pinkas’s translation of an article he originally published in French.

In March, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) and the Santayana Edition hosted the 45th Annual Conference of Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, at which Herman Saatkamp, founder of the Santayana Edition, and I presented papers on Santayana and creativity, both of which appear in this issue.

Continuing the series of biographical sketches of Santayana begun last year, this issue includes accounts of 1918 and 1943 (75 and 100 years ago); and also includes one from 1893 (125 years ago)—the year of Santayana’s metanoia or change of heart.

English biographer Ruth Derham has contributed an article on Santayana’s relationship with Frank Russell, Bertrand’s older brother. Drew Chastain’s article on “Liberating Spirit” takes up the theme of our February webinar and proposes to extend Santayana’s concept of spirituality beyond its original conception. Phillip Beard reviews The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism, the collection of essays edited by editorial board members Charles Padrón and Chris Skowroński and recently published by Brill.

This issue also includes the regular Bibliographic Checklist update compiled by Daniel Moreno with additional contributions from Guido Tamponi.

Three lights in the field of American thought and Santayana scholarship have gone out in the past two years. We honor William G Holzberger, James Seaton, and John McDermott with memorial tributes.

Putting together this issue requires the volunteer efforts of many people. Thanks are due to the editorial board for their hours of editing and proofreading and to the authors for their contributions and their patience throughout the revision process. We offer the result with the hope you find it captures your attention.

RICHARD MARC RUBIN

Editor and President, George Santayana Society
Santayana 75, 100, and 125 Years Ago

Santayana in 1893: the Metanoia

In his autobiography, Persons and Places, 1893 is the only year to which Santayana devotes a full chapter to describe its prominence in his life. That year was a major turning point in his life that he called his metanoia, a change of heart. As he composed his autobiography in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Santayana reflected on this year as a change in his life that dramatically altered the course his life would take. Even so, this metanoia did not immediately produce a change in his career or daily life; it was a change of heart. Its evolution and eventual outcome were visible only over time.

Santayana turned thirty in 1893. This birthday illustrated the transition from youth to adulthood, and he characterized it as both tragic and lyrical. It was tragic in the realization of life’s physical limits and inevitable outcome. And it was lyrical because the acceptance of one’s finitude and the futility of life led to the realization that the objects of human consciousness are timeless, leading him to pursue the celebration of a spiritual life in the midst of finitude and assured finality. These realizations were underscored by several events.

During the summer of 1893 Santayana was in Ávila with his dying father who earlier had tried to hasten his own death. His seventy-nine-year-old father was then financially poor, blind and deaf. This was the first time Santayana had ever seen anyone die. His father’s drawn-out death underscored the inconsequentiality of human life and, for Santayana, “called up a lurid image of what my life in the world was likely to be: solitary, obscure, trivial, and wasted” (PP 424). Returning to Harvard through London and New York, he learned of the unexpected death of his young friend, Warwick Potter, who died from cholera in the harbor of Brest while on board a friend’s yacht. Potter had just graduated from Harvard that spring. Santayana was struck by the finality of a young life ended so soon and without anticipation.

Along with these two deaths, Santayana suffered a different kind of separation from a closeness he had cherished since childhood. His sister, Susana, was “the person to whom I was most attached” (PP 425). She was eleven years older than he, and they shared a sympathetic understanding that began at his birth in Spain and continued through his move to Boston. There was a distinctiveness between them, even in the names they gave each other that may have begun with a smile but lasted through both their lives. Santayana’s birth name was “Jorge,” but she always called him “George”. And his sister’s birth name was “Susan,” and he always called her “Susana”. In 1893 at the age of forty-one she lost her independence in a marriage to a prominent citizen of Ávila, Celedonio Sastre, who was a widower with six children. From that point her life was given over to being a stepmother who was devoted to her husband. Although Santayana visited his sister and family often, there now was a separation between them that had not existed in Santayana’s youth, and unlike when Susana in her youth tried but rejected the life of a nun, this time she was devoted to the everyday tasks of family and community life.
Such experiences might have led Santayana to a despondent and negative outlook on the prospects of one’s own life, and there were certainly undertones of that in his metanoia. However, in his stoic acceptance of the limits and isolation of life, he found a lyrical liberation that would be central to his mature self. As he writes:

“Here, then, were four thoughts merging their currents and carrying me irresistibly towards the same sea: youth was past, friendship had had its day, the future offered me nothing that I cared for, religion and social utopias proposed nothing that I respected. I was driven from the temporal to the eternal, not by any one crisis or conjunction of events, but by the very nature of existence, when this had been honestly faced and frankly admitted.” (PP 426)

Self-knowledge led to accepting the inevitable material base of all life, while celebrating the eternal objects of consciousness. This came with a realization that consciousness was an after effect of physical interactions but had no effect on the events in the world. Indeed, it was a liberation from the world.

As he recommends: give the world endless forms (essences as the objects of consciousness) without letting it deceive you. Enjoy the world, travel, and learn other cultures without being captivated by them. “You give up everything in the form of claims; you receive everything back in the form of a divine presence” (PP 427). Although our consciousness of eternal essences is temporal, their status is not, and Santayana’s notion of the spiritual life was the contemplation of essences, not in momentary reflection, but in a sustained contemplation without the hindrance of supposing the essences characterize the physical world. Such a life is poetic, thematic, and not burdened by everyday constraints.

The result was a slow dramatic change of direction in his life. He was a professor at Harvard, and he continued to be. He continued writing, teaching, traveling, partying and making friends. Yet it was with the realization that he was not at home in the world. He began to plan his early retirement from Harvard. He noted that he “was a teacher of philosophy in the place where philosophy was most modern, most deeply Protestant, most hopefully new; the very things from which, in speculation, my metanoia turned me away” (PP 426).

When he retired from Harvard in 1912 at the age of forty-eight (the same age his father retired as a Spanish diplomat), the world was his, but he was not possessed by the world.

Santayana in 1918: Still in England

Nineteen eighteen was another “all-England” year for Santayana, and even more remarkable (apart from his eleven final years at the Clinic of the Little Company of Mary, 6 Via Santo Stefano Rotondo, in Rome—and a few others), for it being one in which he had only one firm address: 22 Beaumont St, Oxford. As 1917 had come to a close Santayana had confessed to Logan Pearsall Smith that he was thoroughly ill-at-ease with what he had written in the
five volumes of The Life of Reason on revising them, and was, on the whole, dissatisfied. However, by 30 January 1918 he was inspired enough to deliver the Third Annual Henriette Hertz Lecture at the British Academy in London.

The fact that he could speak publicly with such recall and acuity about American philosophical history, in spite of having been away from the USA since January 1912, is noteworthy. The historical fog and monotonous toll of the war with all its restrictions had isolated Santayana geographically in England, but the breadth of his intellectual efforts and interests remained quite expansive. John McCormick has written that the writing contained in the seven pieces (the January 1918 lecture one of them) of Character and Opinion in America (1920) was “among the finest of his works, it is at once personal and objective, neither bitter nor sentimental. It offers a view of the country and a period that could not have been written by any American or foreign traveler, no matter what his gifts” (McCormick 246).

We know that Santayana and Robert Bridges, the British poet who was appointed Poet Laureate in 1915, were in close touch throughout 1918. In fact, they were neighbors.

Bridges lived in Chilswell, within miles and walking distance from Oxford. Three of Santayana’s letters to him have survived. Santayana has written about him in Persons and Places. Nevertheless, as McCormick himself has speculated, and even though there is no written source confirming it, Bridges in all likelihood floated the idea of securing for him (Santayana) a permanent life position at one of Oxford’s colleges. Curiously enough, any mention of Santayana is non-existent in Bridges’ autobiography Good-Bye to All That; and this notwithstanding that its 300-plus pages deal mostly with the 1914-1919 period. Perhaps Santayana’s rejection (or non-response) was still fresh in Bridges’ mind when he published the first edition of the book in 1929. Santayana had already parted ways with Harvard in 1912; was it that difficult really to place himself in a position to have to part ways with Oxford one day?

In a letter of 10 September to Benjamin Fuller, a little more than a year away from the end of hostilities, Santayana wrote that he disliked having “to face suspicious officials, and any unusual difficulties and complications in machinery of travel; so I have remained in my Oxford headquarters now for three years, and expect not to abandon them until the war ends” (LGS 10 September 1918). This would turn out to be the case exactly. At that very moment also, he continued, he was, along with Charles Augustus Strong “contributing to a volume that Durant Drake is getting together in defence of the Old Realism” (LGS 10 September 1918).

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1 Santayana wrote: “[I] have already finished the first volume of the L.of R. and half of S.of B. The latter is written in a very genteel style—only a few lapses into the jargon of American philosophy. But the L. of R. is really scandalous in its confusion, both in language and in thought” (LGS 4 December 1917).

2 The original title of the lecture was “Philosophical Opinion in America,” and was included in Character and Opinion in the United States; With Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America,” (1920) as chapter five, “Later Speculations.”

3 “Three Proofs of Realism”
1918). Santayana was simultaneously finishing additional work on individual “soliloquies”. Thirteen of them would be published in 1919 in *The Athenaeum*, a literary journal in London. He also had to have been at work on polishing the seven pieces (originally given as lectures in England during 1914-1918) that would come out as *Character and Opinion in the United States* (1920). He adds:

I am also deep in a book to be called Dominations and Powers,—a sort of psychology of politics and attempt to explain how it happens that governments and religions, with so little to recommend them, secure such measure of popular allegiance. Of course, behind all this, is the shadow of the Realms of Being. (LGS 10 September 1918)

Santayana was indeed very busy. He ends this letter on a forward-looking note: “Keep the inner fires burning; it will be such happiness for me to feel their genial warmth when we next meet” (LGS 10 September 1918).

The war ended on 11 November 1918. In a letter written in 1919, Santayana left us an account of when he began to sense the war was coming to an end and that the result might not be disastrous:

My own unhappiness about the war disappeared on July 18, 1918, and indeed in a certain sense had disappeared earlier, because although I thought the Germans might win a nominal victory, the Russian revolution seemed to me to have sealed the fate of the German system and its essential ambitions. (LGS 9 March 1919 to Logan Pearsall Smith)

What took place on 18 July 1918? French and American forces counterattacked in coordination, crossing the Marne River, and for the first time in the conflict, the Germans began retreating from the Marne. Such an appreciation of a military phenomenon only reinforces one’s understanding of just how realistic Santayana was.

As 1918 came to close Santayana took stock of the changes that were evident. He wrote to Strong in Italy that he was already planning to make a move to continental Europe, with only “the MS of the “Four Realms” and “Dominations and Powers” in my bag” (LGS 20 December 1918). On the whole, it is clear that though the World War I years of Santayana’s life were filled with an enveloping solitude and uncertainty, he used them well to write extensively and in different formats. He grew as a thinker and as a writer. England had cocooned him in a creative limbo, and he reemerged from it with much accomplished, and many projects alive in thoughts still to be actualized. Out of the ruins of a global conflict, Santayana three days short of his fifty-fifth birthday on 20 December 1918, could express:

What a year this has been for wonderful events! I have often wished we might have been able to talk them over as they occurred, although for my own part I am hardly able to take them in, and all my attention seems to be absorbed by the passing moment, or the immediate future” (LGS 20 December 1918 to Strong).

Santayana would reach Paris some six months later, in June 1919.

CHARLES PADRÓN
Santayana in 1943: War and Royalties

It was not just the quiet and solitude at the nursing home of the Little Company of Mary that caused Santayana to write at the start of his second full year at the Blue Nun’s home, “I have never been more at peace and more happy.” He had reacquired all his books—nine cases. They had been boxed up for three and a half years during the restoration of his former home, the Bristol Hotel (LGS 27 January 1943 to José Sastre González).

As the United States entry into World War II had cut off all correspondence between America and Italy, the only letters Santayana wrote in 1943 that have been found so far are three to his nephew Pepe (José Sastre González). More about these later.

Meanwhile, back in the United States several complications emerged in conjunction with the efforts by Charles Scribner’s Sons to publish the first volume of Santayana’s autobiography, Persons and Places. After working back channels to obtain the manuscript from wartime Italy, John Wheelock of Scribner’s found it on his desk one day in the autumn of 1942. Soon after, Scribner’s submitted it to the Book-of-Month-Club. If accepted, as Santayana’s novel The Last Puritan had been in 1936, the book would receive a major boost to its sales. The Book-of-Month-Club agreed to include the book in its selection, but with the condition that the second volume be published with the first (McCormick 425, Cory 246). Santayana, incommunicado in Rome, was still writing what turned out to be the second volume. He did not originally anticipate a third volume and did not expect the second volume to be published while he was still alive, in part because of its accounts of some of his friends and acquaintances, especially Frank Russell. (See “Ideal Sympathy?” p.12.)

Santayana had attached a note to the manuscript stipulating that his assistant Daniel Cory was to receive all the proceeds from its publication. Cory had quit his job selling furniture to concentrate on writing and needed money. Santayana, of course, did not know any of these details. He did know that his late friend Charles A Strong had “established an International Philosophical Fellowship Fund and arranged that Cory be the first American incumbent for life” (LGS July 1941 to James Bryant Conant). The funds for this fellowship, however, were in England and were being held up by the British government because of the war. Santayana wanted to ensure that Cory had some support in his absence. The high royalties that the Book-of-the-Month club selection promised must have been encouraging, both to Cory and Scribner’s, and at the same time frustrating, because those extraordinary royalties were hostage to Santayana’s isolation. Cory arranged with the Atlantic Monthly to publish three of the chapters for $1000. Scribner’s agreed as long as they were published by April 1943 (presumably to have the chapters appear in the magazine sufficiently long enough before the

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4 Santayana called his residence a “Nursing Home” a few days after he moved in (LGS 17 October 1941 to George Sturgis). Technically, it was a hospital (Calvary Hospital), clinic, and nurse boarding school; but for Santayana it served as what today we would call an assisted living facility.
planned publication of the book in 1944). The Atlantic Monthly did publish the three chapters in the March, April, and May issues of 1943, making them the only works of Santayana published that year (McCormick 424-425).

Other complications arose. George Sturgis, the nephew who managed Santayana’s finances, objected that the potential royalties from Persons and Places might be more than Santayana intended for Daniel Cory to receive. In a letter, he asked Wheelock if it might be advisable to withhold any royalties greater than $5000 from Cory “until confirmation from Uncle George could be obtained on his wish and intent.” In a second letter, written in February 1943, Sturgis wrote that he was objecting “both on my sister’s account and my own, and also on behalf of George Santayana. . . .” (Ironically, Sturgis, who appeared to be protecting his inheritance, died in 1945, seven years before Santayana.) Wheelock explained that in regard to Persons and Places Santayana had assigned all rights to Cory and had also given Cory ownership of all future books. When Sturgis objected that royalties were not books, Wheelock then produced a copy of Santayana’s assignment of royalties to Cory. A compromise was reached. Scribner’s agreed to send Cory $200 a month until Santayana’s wishes could be known (McCormick 426-427). The following year, when communication to Rome resumed, Santayana was able to confirm that he wanted Cory to have “all the royalties to Persons and Places” (LGS 23 June 1944 to Cory).

Wheelock had to handle another objection. Santayana had written in the manuscript that his friend Tom Sanborn “fell into the company of loose women, as at College he had sometimes succumbed to drink—not often, yet disgracefully” (PP 188). George Sturgis’s attorney John Merriam objected that Sanborn’s “proud family” might “resent this description.” So Wheelock altered the passage to say that Sanborn “fell into rather undesirable company, as at College he had sometimes succumbed to drink—not often, yet ungracefully.” The altered version, which Santayana had no way of seeing beforehand, was the one the book contained when it was published in January 1944 (McCormick 430; PP1 196).

The skirmishes over the publication of Persons and Places were insignificant compared to the non-metaphorical battles endured by those living in 1943’s Rome. The year began calmly. In March, Santayana wrote to his nephew Pepe in Ávila: “The winter has been very mild and I have spent it without any mishaps” (LGS 14 March 1943). By May, people in Rome heard air raid alerts as the allies bombed the nearby ports of Civitavecchia and Ostia. The Allies bombed Rome itself on 19 July. Six days later, Mussolini was dismissed as Prime Minister and arrested.

On the same day as Mussolini’s arrest, Pepe wrote to his uncle out of concern about the recent bombings and to express the family’s urging that he come to Spain. Santayana received the letter on 13 August and wrote back immediately. His letter began: “Today, on the day of the second bombing of Rome, I have received your letter of July 25” (LGS 13 August 1944).

Santayana then reassured Pepe that his daily routine had not been interrupted and that he was fairly safe, not only because, as he put it, “I live in a convent which is at the same time a hospital,” but also because the area where he lived in was not a likely target, as it was “in the Gardens south of the Colosseum and the Lateran. If a bomb should fall here it would be by chance and I do believe we will
come out of the war unharmed.” The Lateran includes basilica of St John in the Lateran, the cathedral of the pope. Santayana of course did not know that a few months before this Roosevelt had assured the pope that every effort would be made to spare Rome’s great monumental buildings. 5 He merely surmised that his section of Rome was fairly safe.

Santayana rejected the idea of traveling: “That would upset me much more than the noise of the bombs, or of the anti-aircraft artillery, which is the one that hurts the ears most.”

In his letter to Pepe in January, Santayana had written:

What I regret is that my situation worries you because I am alone at my age and isolated; but we old people are always alone, dreaming about things that no longer exist and unaware of what is happening in the present. This war, however terrible it may be, does not concern me the way the other one did. (LGS 27 January 1943)

At the time of the August letter, the external circumstances had grown worse, but he continued in a similar vein:

Naturally the mind suffers when it hears talk of so many horrors, but at my age, knowing that I am useless, I find solace in my books and my philosophy, as though it were a matter of ancient history. (LGS 13 August 1943 to Pepe)

Here we have Santayana using his philosophic system to reflect upon itself. His ontological scheme and his life’s work had become objects of contemplation—what he called essences. Those dire circumstances—living on rationed food, hearing talk of widespread misery and the sound of bombs raining down pain and death—brought Santayana to a life more spiritual than he would have chosen, but one that suited his preference to sit and watch. The bombs and the suffering became part of the spectacle.

Santayana continued:

Besides, everything that is happening in the world is out of the ordinary. I often remember my father’s ideas and imagine what he would have said about all of this. (LGS 13 August 1943 to Pepe)

This remark is striking. Santayana was then seventy-nine years old, the same age his father was when he died the long painful death that Herman Saatkamp tells us of in his account of 1893. Santayana’s father, Agustin, wrote him many letters as he was growing up in Boston and the letters continued until Agustin died. He encouraged his son not to be disturbed by religious disputes because religions were imaginative expressions and not historical accounts. Agustin Santayana had been a diplomat who saw many of the complications that arose when political positions become hardened and he urged his son not to be swept away by fanaticism (see, for example, Agustin Santayana to GS, 19 January 1876). No wonder

5 The article “Bombing of Rome in World War II” (Wikipedia, retrieved 10 October 2018) quotes a letter to this effect, citing a book, Wartime Correspondence Between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII.
Santayana speculated about what his father would make of the madness of the Second World War.

The madness did not end with the fall of Mussolini. The day after the August bombing the new Italian government declared Rome an open city, meaning the Italians would not defend it. By early September, Italy reached a nominal armistice with the allies. But the German army remained in southern Italy. It occupied Rome in the fall and began rounding up Jews for deportation to the death camps. At the same time, Santayana, in the quiet of his nursing home, wrote his autobiography and *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*.

By the end of the year, the Allies having taken Sicily, had begun to work their way up the Italian peninsula, but snow in December blocked their efforts. Further progress would have to wait until the new year.

RICHARD M RUBIN

References

Santayana, George
Ideal Sympathy? The Unlikely Friendship of George Santayana and Frank, 2nd Earl Russell

The first note that gives sociability a personal quality and raises the comrade into an incipient friend is doubtless sensuous affinity. Whatever reaction we may eventually make on an impression, after it has had time to soak in and to merge in some practical or intellectual habit, its first assault is always on the senses, and no sense is an indifferent organ. (LR2 95)

So wrote George Santayana in his 1906 work *The Life of Reason* on what he called the “instinctive sympathy” of friendship. A perfect illustration of what he meant can be found in his own account of his first meeting with Frank, the 2nd Earl Russell and, at the time, disgraced grandson of the 1st. It took place in Santayana’s room at Harvard University early in November, 1885. Both men were in their early twenties, and Santayana was predisposed to be curious: Frank was the first Englishman he had ever spoken to. The Earl made a strong impression, for not one of Santayana’s senses seem to have been left untouched by the encounter; and his subsequent record of it is anything but indifferent. Of Frank’s reaction we can be less sure. While his new friend would go on to dedicate two full chapters in his memoirs to Frank’s escapades, and create a fictional character in his “memoir in the form of a novel” with him in mind, Frank would reduce their friendship to a mere “acquaintance of long standing” in his autobiography (Russell MLA 120). And yet Santayana said that this friendship, as unusual as it was unlikely, developed quickly from “instinctive sympathy” into “ideal sympathy”: the quality he had identified as describing a deep and lasting attachment (LR2,97). The question is, how? How did the Earl and the Philosopher transcend their differences in culture, class, instinct and temperament to create a friendship that would endure for over forty years? And did they view it the same way? By definition one cannot have “ideal sympathy” on one’s own, and as Santayana’s biographer, John McCormick, portrayed him, Frank appeared incapable of real sympathy with anyone. Even Santayana himself suggested as much at times. Yet, to quote Santayana on the prerequisite of friendship, “nothing must be actual in either friend that is not potential in the other” (LR2 93). How, then, can this apply to them? An exploration of their private letters and papers, in comparison with previously published material, gives the opportunity for a new perspective; casting a light of a different shade on the true nature of this extraordinary friendship, and the impact of it on both men.

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1 The Last Puritan was published in 1936, five years after Frank’s death. Though not factually accurate, Santayana described it as being an emotionally accurate account of his life. As such, the attributes he accredits to “Lord” Jim Delaney, based on Frank as he was in the first few years of their acquaintance, can be taken as an honest reflection of his feelings for him in retrospect.

2 “Friendship might thus be called ideal sympathy refracted by a human medium, or comradeship and sensuous affinity colouring a spiritual light” (LR2 97).
Frank and Santayana were first introduced when Frank was “in exile” in America, following his being sent down from Oxford; apparently for having written an “improper letter” to another undergraduate. For those well acquainted with Santayana’s memoirs, his description of Frank at that meeting will be familiar: “He was a tall young man of twenty, still lithe though large of bone, with abundant tawny hair, clear little steel-blue eyes, and a florid complexion. He moved deliberately, gracefully, stealthily, like a tiger well fed and with a broad margin of leisure for choosing his prey. There was precision in his indolence; and mild as he seemed, he suggested a latent capacity to leap, a latent astonishing celerity and strength, that could crush at one blow” (PP 291). The image is compelling; and the metaphor of the tiger aptly chosen to suggest arrogance, lordliness and danger, with just a hint of Empire thrown in for good measure. It says as much about Santayana and his fascination with the English aristocracy as it does about Frank; a factor which McCormick believes was a significant part of the attraction. It must be borne in mind, however, that this reminiscence was written in retrospect, some sixty years after the event, and, consciously or otherwise, will have been filtered through the lens of everything that would follow and is perhaps therefore not wholly trustworthy as a first impression. And who, one wonders, in this scenario, was the prey? Santayana? Certainly, events that followed might tend to give that impression.

Frank went on that day to make himself at home in Santayana’s room, seating himself on the floor in front of his poorly-populated bookshelves, reading aloud Swinburne’s *Poems* in a rhythmic, monotonous drawl, reminiscent of the reading of a liturgy. If he was trying to impress, it does not sound particularly like a recipe for success, but “I had not heard poetry read this way before,” recalled a captivated Santayana. “I had not known that the English language could become, like stained glass, an object and a delight in itself” (PP 292). And Frank? His fortnightly letters home to his confidential mother-figure, Mrs. Sarah Richardson, wife of Frank’s former Master at Winchester College, and affectionately known to all the boys there as “Mrs. Dick”, demonstrate that his thoughts were rather elsewhere. His visit to Harvard—where all he would say of the “fellows” was that they were “a better set than expected”—had made him homesick: “I begin rather to wish that I was still at Oxford, or saw any chance of going back there: such a

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3 I have chosen to refer to Earl Russell as ‘Frank’ throughout, to distinguish him from his better known and more widely written about brother, Bertrand Russell, who is often referred to in articles simply as ‘Russell’. Apart from when writing to his closest companions, when he would simply use his first initial “F”, Frank always signed himself ‘Russell’, as was his title, but I have observed some confusion arising between the brothers when they are both addressed thus.

4 Later, Frank would tell Santayana that this was not true: the real reason behind his sending down was that his then Winchester College friend, Lionel Johnson, had visited him in Oxford and spent the night in his rooms. For more on this, the relationship between Frank and Lionel Johnson, and other possible underlying causes of Frank’s expulsion from Oxford, see Ruth Derham, “‘A Very Improper Friend’: The Influence of Jowett and Oxford on Frank Russell,” *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies* 37, no. 2 (Winter 2017-2018):271-287.
sudden cutting off from all my pleasant societies and kind friends seems a little harsh”, he lamented. And above all, one friend occupied his thoughts: Lionel Johnson, the “innocent cause” (according to Santayana) of his being sent down from Oxford, and the man he would later introduce to Santayana as “the man I most admire and—[love?] in the world”.6

Not, then, perhaps, the most auspicious of starts. But maybe at this juncture a word or two about Frank’s situation at the time would be pertinent. After the death of his parents—his mother when he was nine, his father 18 months later—Frank and brother Bertran were under the guardianship of their grandparents, Lord and Lady John Russell of Pembroke Lodge. As the eldest, much would have been expected of Frank, but he was wayward and unmanageable. The freedom he had been given under his parents’ unorthodox tutelage had made him arrogant and intolerant of restraint or contradiction. Unable to tolerate the pious atmosphere at “P.L.”, Frank had run away. He was sent to public school: Cheam, followed by Winchester College, and then on to Oxford. The choice of schools reflected his grandparents’ aspirations: Winchester was where the intellectual boys went, and Balliol was the crème de la crème of Oxford. Jowett, the Master, made no secret of the ambitions he had for his young men. To be sent down by him, and in such a manner as to prevent his ever returning, was a catastrophe indeed. Frank was angry and insulted. He always felt himself ill-treated in respect of this event, but his letters to Mrs. Dick in the weeks and months before he first met Santayana reveal another aspect: “I have not the least intention of giving up my aspirations and hopes and ambitions, and as you say of ceasing to endeavour to do exactly what is right—as I see it... I am going steadily, unwaveringly, and unflinchingly to do that which seems to me right in God’s sight, whether men approve or condemn, misunderstand or not—even if it costs me all my friends. I will not be untrue to myself.”7 Such strength of conviction was shored up by the support of the likes of Mrs. Dick, but at the same time, the enforced separation from others opened the door to doubts. Lionel, whose father had, for the second time in their friendship, banned all communication between the two men,8 was in particular “a

5 Frank Russell, Letter to Sarah Richardson, 08 November 1885. E17/3: Booklet of letters received by Mrs Richardson, chiefly from the 2nd Earl Russell, 1885-1886, Winchester College Archives. With kind permission of the Warden and Scholars of Winchester College.


7 Frank Russell, Letter to Sarah Richardson, 24 July 1885, E17/3, Winchester College Archives.

8 The first time had been shortly after Frank went up to Oxford and while Lionel was still at Winchester, when, concerned at the “unhealthiness” of their religious discussion, Captain Johnson had forbidden any further correspondence between them. “Don’t suppose that our friendship is in any way broken,” Lionel wrote to Frank in response, “though it is thwarted by others with good intentions.” Frank’s reaction is typical: “The boy’s parents were very narrow minded and prejudiced Anglicans... Hence the prohibition, which it will be noticed is withdrawn later, with as little reason” (Russell SWR 50).
very great loss to me practically as I was always inclined to submit myself to his judgment, and to a great extent to take his advice.” It had been Lionel’s advice that Frank should join the clergy; a fact he readily imparted to Santayana. The lack of any real sympathy within his own family had left Frank curiously in awe of Lionel, but one wonders, given the following comment, whether he ever really believed himself cut out for confines of the Church: “I look at myself and feel so awfully sorry for myself, such a good sort of fellow, but never able to run smoothly in harness.”9 In such a state of conflicting emotions, Frank would first encounter Santayana. His reflections “laughable enough, but at the same time occasionally painful” were accompanied by a new desire, expressed earnestly to Mrs. Dick, that revealed that despite his protestations of “mutual attraction and respect” with Lionel, there was in fact a lack of broad sympathy in their friendship: “I feel as if I should like some to know me inside, and explain to the world that I am not such a villain as I appear on the surface.” Perhaps, unknowingly, such a person was just about to enter his life.

What, if any, communication there was between Frank and Santayana’s first meeting and their second, in England in the spring of 1887, is not known. Santayana records in his memoirs that on his return to England, Frank had sent him Richard Le Gallienne’s popular work *The Book-Bills of Narcissus,*10 but no correspondence between these two meetings survives, and in the letters of Frank’s English friends, Santayana’s name is not mentioned. So, the next information we have concerns this visit, where Santayana spent several days onboard Frank’s steam yacht, *Royal,* and later visited him at his Hampton bachelor-pad, *Ferishtah,* named for Browning’s recently published poem *Ferishtah’s Fancies* (1884). It was during this time that they really began to know each other, and Santayana’s letters to his friend at Harvard, Henry Ward Abbott, reveal much of the whirlwind he felt himself caught up in:

While at Oxford I hope to meet some more specimens of the English race, thanks to Lord Russell, who has been a godsend to me. I don’t tell you anything about my adventures with him because I have to maintain with you my reputation as a philosopher, and in this respect I have quite lost my reason. When I am safely in Spain again, and can treat the matter objectively, I will make a full confession of my fall—from grace and self-control . . .” (LGS 23 April 1887)

9 Frank Russell, Letter to Sarah Richardson, 01 September 1885, E17/3, Winchester College Archives.

10 Wrongly, as it turns out. This book was not published until 1891. That Frank sent him a copy is not in doubt, but the nature of the gift and its inclusion at this juncture again suggest more of Santayana than Frank. It was a book that George Bernard Shaw had reviewed as being effused with “an assumption of elderly moderation, of gentle tolerance of the follies of passion, of resigned disillusion, of mellow paternal kindliness, which will move those who do not know the truth concerning the author’s age to lay down the volume with a murmured blessing on his kindly voice and on his silver hair” (George Bernard Shaw 84–87). It arrived inscribed “From R.” and was perhaps taken as a compliment by Santayana and as an expression of the way in which Frank viewed him.
In a further letter, Santayana enlarged on his admiration for Frank, calling him “the ablest man, all around, that I have ever met” and describing him as a “splendid creature” about whom “I know I am making a fool of myself” (LGS 20 May 1887).

There are many ways to interpret Santayana’s initial outpourings concerning Frank; and indeed, with the distance of space and time, and the benefit of writing in a more permissive age, there has been much speculation as to the exact nature of their relationship, particularly when viewed in the light of Frank’s prior behaviour. At the time, Santayana’s Harvard friends reached much the same conclusion and voiced their suspicions to him in their letters, provoking an emphatic denial from Santayana that he had been “batting” with Frank, whilst expressing no shame if they should choose not to believe him. But he does ask them not to put “an ignoble and unworthy interpretation” on his comments, “or I shall think that you are blind to everything that enters into my life. ‘My running after Russell’ means ‘my thoughts running after him’; so, after believing that I have been bumming with him, don’t imagine that I have been sniping him. . . When I write in this serious fashion, don’t imagine I am referring to “country matters” (LGS to Henry Ward Abbott, 27 May 1887).

McCormick has interpreted his protestations as those of a man in love. That Santayana went on in the letter to say that in the face of Frank’s “insolent and insulting” treatment of him he found he did not care “a rap” for his own interests, is, according to McCormick, “the classical definition of the state of the mind of the lover” (McCormick 69). It is difficult not to agree with him. But whether this went on to be reciprocated or consummated is another matter. Yet this is what McCormick suggests: “By 1896,” he writes, “there may also have been the memory of an intense physical affair to keep alive Santayana’s loyalty to the wicked earl” (McCormick 119). On what does he base this suggestion?

11 Santayana confided in his notebook that Frank’s “early obscenities” had existed (NIV 35). E.C. Benson, another contemporary of Frank’s, noted in his diary the “indiscreetly public demonstrations by Russell and Sayle of their affection for each other”—Sayle being another recipient of Johnson’s Winchester Letters and a close friend of Frank’s at Oxford (Oates 242).

12 A note or two is necessary regarding the slang terms used: “batting” means carousing or binging, and to be “battered” means to give up to debauchery—a “bat” was also a prostitute and a “bat house” a brothel (Holzberger LGS1 178fn). “Bumming” was common American slang for loafing or hanging out with someone (Partridge 107). “Sniping” I have been unable to find a satisfactory contemporary definition for. The historical definitions that do exist suggest vagrancy—see Routledge Historical Dictionary of Slang, 2006—or relate to the “long bills” (from the bird of the same name) of lawyers known to charge exorbitant fees (Hotten221). As the next line of the letter reads “He has taken me up because he has chosen to do so, and after his fashion has been overwhelmingly kind” it may suggest that his friends had assumed Santayana was sponging or living off him. “Country matters” implies sexual experiences (Hamlet, III.ii.117).

13 The “wicked earl” was an epithet given to Frank as a result of the deviant behaviour of which he was accused in the Divorce Court in his marital disputes with his first wife, Mabel Edith. More on this later…
Initially there are the letters that Santayana wrote during 1887 in which he seemed to question his own sexuality or show greater interest in the sex question in general. In April that year, he wrote from Oxford to Henry Ward Abbott:

I hate my own arrogance and would worship the man who should knock it out of me. Says a Spanish song:

I am searching land and ocean
For a man that I might love,
And whenever my heart finds him
Then he will have found his slave.

Man or thing—it makes no difference—but heaven grant it be no woman. I should like to have you and Ward stay with me at my wife’s—even in the face of possible infidelities—but I shouldn’t enjoy staying at her house myself. (LGS 23 April 1887)

The reference to “possible infidelities”, McCormick says, may have been inspired by proximity to Russell and Lionel Johnson, whom McCormick described somewhat ironically as a “homosexual athlete” (McCormick 63). In December, Santayana wrote to William Morton Fullerton one of a series of letters in which he sought to gain his confidence. In the last one, he questions what a man is to do with his “amatory instincts” once awoken. He outlines the possible options as he sees them and concludes that as “prejudices against [paiderastia] are so strong that it hardly comes under the possibilities for us”, matrimony is the only option (LGS 28 December 1887). McCormick somewhat strangely considers the omission of homosexuality in his list ironic and evidence of his natural inclination (McCormick 71); what, after all, is paiderastia if not a reference to homosexuality. Earlier, he says that Santayana’s sympathetic writing on Dante could not have been done by a “celibate virgin” (McCormick 69). For evidence that Frank was responsible for his deflowering he appears to look no further than Frank’s reputation and the fact that Santayana stayed at his cottage in Maidenhead for four weeks in the summer of 1896, some nine years after these letters were written.

Perhaps it is this that left some reviewers of McCormick’s biography unconvinced. Whilst Munson’s review in The New England Quarterly applauded McCormick, stating that without his biography, the only portrait they would have had of Santayana was an “artful Cory sketch”, it questioned the emphasis on sex in the biography as “catering to contemporary sexual pruriency” (Munson 156). The 1990s were full of speculation about homosexuality in the 1890s (which was then illegal, condemned by society at large as “unnatural”, and punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment with hard labour), particularly as it appeared encoded

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14 Johnson was small and slight, his physical development curiously retarded, and besides a brief flirtation with the gymnasium at Winchester (Russell SWL101), was known to be athletic in no respect other than perhaps with his pen, in his epic discourses on religion in his letters.

15 McCormick believed that either Santayana down-played his homosexual experiences to Cory, or that Cory, anxious to protect Santayana’s reputation, down-played them to others (McCormick 51).
within the written arts. Some of these speculations were accurate and justified; others were less so, missing subtleties that became somehow less appreciable the more acceptable same-sex relationships became. In a review for the *American Historical Review*, Kuntz appears to have placed the relationship between Santayana and Frank in the second category, questioning whether “all the hints of male friendship add up to one homosexual act.” His conclusion was emphatic: “The evidence is not there” (Kuntz 708).

Christopher Lane in another article from the 1990s, “George Santayana and the Beauty of Friendship,” found evidence aplenty of sexual tension in Santayana’s sonnets without having to come down on either side of the question. In fact, in pulling from Santayana’s sonnets references to his “slow descent” with “questionings of nature as I went” he comes to the conclusion that the poems, whilst demonstrating homosexual sympathy, reveal at the same time timidity or cowardice in refusing “To tempt our thoughts on more adventurous wing”, resulting in ultimate disappointment. When taken in conjunction with a letter to Harry Ward written in 1924, in which Santayana says that his sonnets represented “an evasion of experience, on the presumption. . .that experience would be a ghastly failure”, Lane suggests that though the homosexual sympathy was there, Santayana lacked the courage or daring to do anything about it, producing the more familiar restraint that many find in his writing and that has been described as his “fastidious, immaculate asexuality” (Posnock 58).

Whether courage or daring was the issue, the only emphatic comment on the matter came from Santayana himself. To Cory in 1929, he referred to A.E. Housman as “what people nowadays call ‘homosexual’” and then added, “I think I must have been that way in my Harvard days—although I was unconscious of it at the time” and admitted that his knowledge of such things was rather “indirect” (Cory 40). And there the matter must lie. Santayana classified himself a spiritual man; Frank a natural man (Moreno 12). There is no suggestion other than McCormick’s that this position ever changed—that what was possibly “actual” in Frank, remained only ever “potential” in Santayana—and no discernible difference in the relations or interactions of the two friends before and after the supposed encounter.

Their interactions and communications in the intervening years are also indicative of other, broader sympathies. Both men preferred to remain aloof from

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17 Perhaps nowhere more sensitively described than in the study of the Bolton Whitman Fellowship in H.G. Cocks’ *Nameless Offences: Homosexual Desire in the 19th Century*. The group from Lancashire, England, far from cosmopolitan London, or academic Oxford or Harvard, met to “read and appreciate” the works of Walt Whitman. In researching their fellowship through their diaries, Cocks reminds us of a lesson that is possibly just as applicable here: that to view their quite obviously homoerotic writing as a direct expression of repressed desire would also be to misjudge them—something that he says is very easy to do in the modern age—to forget that they lacked the “post-Freudian imperative to act on one’s desires” (161).
society: Frank from a scepticism and dislike of its motives and falseness; Santayana from a sense that he would lose his objectivity—his “philosophical cruelty and independence”—if he became too embroiled (Epstein 322). It was a position incidentally that both shared with Lionel Johnson who told Santayana on their first meeting that “Everything above that [sky]line is right, everything below it is wrong” (PP 300). Santayana would never esteem Johnson as Frank did. In print, he would say of him, “He was a spiritual rebel, a spiritual waif who couldn't endure the truth, but demanded a lovelier fiction to revel in, invented or accepted it, and called it revelation” (PP 301-302). In his private notebook he would be even less restrained: “The age had given him verbal culture and knowledge of literature to raise his effusions to a certain level of refinement and fancy, but he was a spiritual waif <in the world>, half gutter-snipe and half angel, fit only for the back alleys of heaven” (NIV 16). But the sympathy that each had with the other in respect of his own freedom of thought, expression, and act cannot be underestimated. As regards Frank and himself, Santayana noted, “He respected my freedom unconditionally and gladly, as I respected his. This was one of the reasons why our friendship lasted so many years” (PP 298).

Though their backgrounds and personalities were very different, there are common factors in their early years that might suggest why this freedom was so central to their friendship. Both men had undergone sudden and drastic separations from their childhood homes at a young age and had been placed in an environment at odds with their early upbringing: Frank by the death of his parents; Santayana by his father’s belief that there would be greater opportunities open to him with his mother in Boston, than if he remained in Spain (PP 10). In their respective second-homes, Frank felt himself misunderstood, whilst Santayana felt alien; “solitary and unhappy, out of humour with everything that surrounded me, and attached only to a persistent dream-life, fed on books” (PP 145). Two misfits, then, looking for something real. As an antidote to the “polite hypocrisy” of Boston society, Santayana found comfort in ancient literature and philosophy (PP 86); Frank in scientific investigation and experimentation with telegraphy. Nevertheless, coping with the demands of society was difficult for both men. Santayana resolved this by learning that he could take a certain pleasure in it by positioning himself on the outside, looking in; he could conform without getting involved (PP 158). Frank took the exact opposite position: he became and remained a rebel. In their teenage years they both started to find their real affinities in friendships. Both men valued sincerity. It is difficult to imagine that their friendship would have got very far without a sense of pleasure in each other’s company and conversation. Though never frivolous, Frank could be most genial and entertaining when his temper was not aroused. But while both can justifiably be called arrogant, Santayana was acutely aware of what he called his defects—“bodily, passionate, intellectual, and moral” (PP 154)—whilst Frank seemed to possess no such countering force to the free reign of his ego. His position was right—always—and was stated frankly and confidently, and could be accepted or not; but if not, you held little interest for him. Santayana found this forthrightness amusing, yet refreshing, and included it in his portrayal of Frank in The Last Puritan: “The simple truth. What a liberation, what a relief! How easily
a man might square his accounts with the universe if he had the courage to face it” (LP 165).

That is not to say that Santayana always found it easy to cope with Frank’s honest reactions. In *Persons*, he gives a charming description of the episode early in their friendship when, at Frank’s suggestion, he attempted to board his launch by running along the boat-hook, as Frank had just then so easily demonstrated. He only succeeded in falling in the river and pulling Frank in behind him: “Russell flew into an indescribable rage. . . I thought at the time that what maddened him was having been baulked and made a fool of in public; but now that I know him better I believe that he had no idea that he was in the least to blame” (PP 297). Shocked into his default position, of course Frank blamed Santayana, and cut him to the quick with his verbal assault to such an extent that Santayana thought all was over between them, only to find it the next day completely forgotten. For a dispassionate observer, once he had regained his equilibrium, such extreme reactions must have been so outside his own experience as to be positively intriguing.

McCormick says that Santayana “forgave” Frank his faults (McCormick 16), but in fact he did more than that: he *allowed* them. A subtle distinction perhaps, but a distinction nevertheless that would no doubt please our two exacting friends. Of the boating incident, Santayana would conclude, “If he allowed me my inabilities, I could allow him his explosions” (PP 298). It was, undoubtedly, the only way with Frank, but still, it was unusual for him to be so wholly accepted as he was in himself. Only a very few were capable of such love and understanding, of resisting the temptation to try and “manage” him as, Santayana later observed, his wives and lady-loves would do (PP 483). Santayana became “a sympathetic figure in the background” (PP 295). He was not “a nuisance”, and in return Frank made no demands on him either. It was likewise a refreshing change for Santayana: “being indolent but meditative, with eyes for the new scenes before me, I was never better entertained than when neglected. . . Moreover, I was left free and had my own escapades” (PP 295).

As McCormick has noted, another factor that hastened the deepening of their friendship was that they quickly became confidential friends (McCormick 67). Though in saying this McCormick was referring specifically to Santayana being confided in when Frank was suffering from “a bad complication of my ailment” (disguised as rheumatism, but believed by McCormick to be gonorrhoea), this confidence is also exhibited in Frank’s letters, which Santayana, unusually, kept.\footnote{Frank Russell, Letter to Santayana, 15 May 1887, Box 3.8, HRC, University of Texas.} Whilst they mostly concern Frank and his problems, and show very little interest in Santayana himself or his work, collectively they show that Frank was grateful for Santayana, in as much as he was capable of showing it. He was aware that there was often a disparity between what he felt and what he showed others. A letter to Mrs. Dick of 1885 reveals that he did not “always think it necessary” to express his feelings concerning Lionel, for example. In another much later instance Frank was unable to express enjoyment in Bertrand’s company when the
brothers were together in Paris in 1894. But, Frank did let Santayana know he was liked and wanted (PP 295) both by his actions and his repeated appeals to be told when Santayana would be in England and able to visit, to receive the counsel he had formerly sought from Lionel Johnson: “Write me your opinion on all this litigation and let me know when you are likely to be next in London,” he pleaded in a letter of December 1890. “Is it not a sea of troubles for a would-be-reflective philosopher?” Frank invited Santayana into his life in a way that he appears to have done with few others. He took him to meet Mrs. Dick—a compliment afforded to his first wife, Mabel, a handful of very close friends from his time at Oxford, Santayana, and apparently no one else—and to meet Lady Stanley and the Richmond Russells at their family homes. He introduced him to his long-term mistress, Mary Morris, who he could not openly acknowledge due to his complicated marital affairs. Santayana’s opinion of her was important to him. When their first meeting did not go too well, Frank pleaded with Santayana not to dismiss her too quickly (though, characteristically, making the failure of the meeting anyone’s fault but his own): “You did not appreciate Mary—it was the fault of her timidity and of the hurried way in which you saw her. Kindly suspend your judgment as you will see reason to change it...” Then in 1894, it was to Santayana that he turned again when the attractions of Agnes Tobin threatened to destabilise the little happiness he had been able to secure with Mary. Santayana, of course, knew who this new paramour was, despite his reticence to use her name in print. Frank turned up on Santayana’s doorstep on his way to California to convince Agnes’s family of the wisdom of the match, and then spent the next year lamenting the loss of her in his letters, recounting his sudden flight to Paris in search of her when he found she had absconded, and describing the painful blow to his vanity in her abrupt breaking off of the affair.

Santayana did not appear to find any of this a burden; quite the contrary. He was a man able to see and delight in the absurdity of the world, accepting it as a necessary element of all things without judgment or criticism. And what could have been more absurd than the various scrapes that Frank would get himself into

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20 Frank Russell, Letter to Santayana, 15 December 1890, Box 3.8, HRC, University of Texas.
21 Mary appears as “Martha Turner” in Persons (PP 470). Santayana says he met her at Telegraph House in 1891, but he could not have done, as Frank did not take the house until 1896, and his letter to Santayana of 02 January 1896 appears to be in response to their first meeting.
22 Frank Russell, Letter to Santayana, 02 January 1896, Box 3.8, HRC, University of Texas.
23 Agnes appears as “Veronica” in Persons (PP 472). Her identity is hinted at more specifically in Marginalia, (MARG 220) and revealed repeatedly by Frank in his letters to Santayana throughout 1894 and 1895. Bertrand Russell’s letters to Alys at the time reveal that whilst he knew of Mary, he remained in ignorance of his brother’s liaison with Agnes.
24 Frank Russell, to Santayana, 12 August 1894, 19 October 1894, 27 January 1895, Box 3.8, HRC, University of Texas.
as a young man and take so seriously? He gave Santayana years of entertainment in exchange for his sympathetic friendship, and in this respect, Santayana was not his slave or his prey, for this was a real gift; an opportunity, as McCormick has said, to experience “the frightful quotidian morass without getting his boots dirty” (McCormick 119). As a collector of experiences, a man who did not want to do great things, but see them, what an opportunity Frank gave him through his courtroom escapades and turbulent love-life, so delightfully described by Santayana in his memoirs. Santayana acknowledged this to Frank himself: “It seems almost as if I had gathered the fruits of your courage and independence while you have suffered the punishment which the world imposes always on those who refuse to conform to its ways” (LGS 2 January 1912).

Indeed, he may even in his sheer delight at the play that unravelled before him, have been the unwitting author of its title in calling him the “wicked Earl”; an epithet that has hounded Frank into every book and journal in which he has been mentioned since Santayana first announced it.25

Santayana was a frequent and welcome guest at Frank’s residencies over the next decade, particularly Telegraph House, where he would become well acquainted with Frank’s second wife, Mollie, and his third, Elizabeth. Yet, as time went on the relationship between the two men diminished and Frank withdrew. In a letter of 1913, Santayana told his sister, “My visit at the Russells was pleasant enough. I hardly talked with him at all. He no longer tells me his private affairs— the expansiveness and receptiveness of youth are naturally lost in both of us” (LGS 1 October 1913). What had changed? From Santayana’s perspective, very little: “external things and the fashions of the times make very little difference to my thoughts” (LGS to Frank Russell, 20 October 1929). But Frank, he observed, through a dozen years of marriage to the “humble, prudent, and resigned” Mollie (PP 478), his deepening involvement in politics, and the “petty vices, which gave him infinite trouble and no pleasure” had fossilised: “the spark of spirit in him was buried like a prehistoric civilization beneath layer upon layer of ruins” (NIV 41-42). As the gulf between the two men widened, Santayana found himself in greater sympathy with Frank’s wives than with the man himself. “As I had been on Martha Turner’s [Mary’s] side against Mollie, so I now was on Mollie’s side against Elizabeth,” he recalled, when Mollie confided in him Frank’s intention of divorcing her (PP 480). And as Mollie slipped out of the picture, he would find himself drawn inevitably into Elizabeth’s confidence, though not without some

25 I have searched everywhere for the origins of the “wicked Earl”. Santayana implies that it was the title given to Frank by the press at the time of one of his many trials; or at least this is how it has been interpreted. But in not one paper, from the scandalous Star to the serious Times, not one interview, not one publication, and in no other memoir, does it appear, except as referenced to Santayana. In fact, as regards the press, quite the opposite is true: Mabel Edith is seen as the wicked one after their first and second round of litigation for her scurrilous accusations, and Frank’s character vindicated. Frank does not mention it to Santayana in a letter (none that survive, anyway), even in jest, and none of his friends appear to mention it to each other when talking about him. The most that can be said is that Frank, or someone else, may have mentioned it to Santayana in conversation as a whispered piece of gossip; or it could be apocryphal.
sense of its danger when “by rights I am his friend... my position became a delicate and almost a false one” (LGS to Charles Strong, 27 August 1916).

Santayana would claim that his sympathy with Elizabeth was based on his interest in Frank (PP 515). Frank would not see it that way. When Elizabeth left him, he would accuse Santayana of being disloyal for keeping in contact with her (PP 516), just as he would accuse Bertrand. Little wonder then that when Santayana applied to visit him on his final trip to England in 1923, Frank’s curt response would be “do as you like” (PP 518), or that their friendship would be reduced to that “acquaintance of long standing” in Frank’s memoirs, published the same year; or even that a “waspish” tone (McCormick 65) should creep into Santayana’s margin notes when he read it, and a sorrowful, wistful tone into the end of his own memoirs, as if recollecting a long-lost love. The two men would never meet again, though they continued infrequently to correspond. These letters from Frank, the by then ‘vagabond scholar’ did not keep. Perhaps he did not want to recall anything more than the memory of his friend in his youth; perhaps he just had nowhere to put them.

“It is characteristic of spontaneous friendship to take on trust, without inquiry and almost at first sight, the unseen doings and unspoken sentiments of our friends: the part known gives us evidence enough that the unknown parts cannot be much amiss” (PP 516). This was Santayana’s conclusion on friendship when recalling the dying embers of his with Frank. At the same time, he confessed that “without the quickness and simplicity of youth, we should never have become friends” (PP 514), and told Frank, at the end, that it had been “only the momentum of that youthful attachment, which was very deep on my part” that had kept their friendship alive (LGS 20 October 1929). Certainly, it was that stage of their friendship that was most precious to Santayana and that he immortalised in the Last Puritan: “Lord Jim is a bit of my youth preserved. I am much more partial to him than to Mario, who is a compound of several other friends of mine, all less important” (Cory 161). Frank’s response to Santayana’s confession was to express surprise that he should doubt his lasting attachment—not to him, but to Lionel: “to all intimate friends I have always admitted that he was my dearest friend and the greatest influence in my life” (PP 307). That tricky triad of friendship reasserting itself again in this, their last exchange of letters. Santayana’s assertion that the affinity between himself and Frank “lay beneath the surface, and I, at least, felt it at once very strongly” (PP 515) is strangely reminiscent of Frank’s to Mrs. Dick that “there exists a mutual attraction and respect” between himself and Lionel that Lionel appeared to do little to reciprocate. Perhaps, subconsciously, this is why Santayana chose to liken Frank’s poetry reading at their first meeting to stained glass—the same analogy Frank had chosen for his first sighting of Lionel in the library at Winchester. Yet Santayana was grateful for this confession and expressed himself pleased to have it (PP 308). It rounded off their

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26 Santayana notes in a letter to Frank dated 20 October 1929 that he had received his letter of the previous month (LGS 132-3).
27 Frank Russell, Letter to Sarah Richardson, 01 September 1885, E17/3, Winchester College Archives.
friendship to such an extent that on hearing of Frank’s death in March 1931, he was unmoved; his friend had died long ago, he told Cory (McCormick 122). In truth, their friendship had. In their final exchange of letters, they had already said their goodbyes. All wistfulness or bitterness aside, the ideal sympathy between them was gone, and both men knew it.

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Santayana on Propositions

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Focusing on Santayana’s Realms of Being, my aim in this essay is to argue that implicit in Santayana’s work is an account of propositions such that propositions are essences, are possible verbal descriptions of facts but are distinct from facts, are the objects of propositional attitudes, are (qua essences) exemplified when someone in fact uses them to describe facts, and are minimally constituted of two parts, a proper name or a pointer to some substance\(^1\) and a general term to describe what is pointed at.

Does Santayana Have an (Implicit) Account of Propositions?

In his study of Santayana’s philosophy, T.L.S. Sprigge criticizes Santayana’s theory of truth on the grounds that his account lacks anything like the truth-bearers standard to contemporary theories of truth, viz. propositions. For Sprigge, Santayana needs a way not merely to talk about the truth as the totality of exemplified essences but about a truth. As propositions are the sorts of things of which truth and falsity are typically (or non-derivatively) predicated, in order to talk about a truth, Santayana would need something like a proposition to serve this role. Sprigge remarks, “[b]ut what of a truth? Is not this something to which true applies, and is it not also something of the non-psychological sort Santayana favours, a proposition has being whether opined or not, and such as may be opined by many different minds while remaining one and the same?” (Sprigge 164) and,

Santayana does not altogether dispense with the notion of a truth about a fact, for he so describes any component of the truth about it. But this highlights a peculiarity already present in his theory of which he seems hardly aware, namely that there really is no such item for him as a truth simply, but only essences each of which is a truth or the truth about some fact. (Sprigge 165)

The problem is that there seems to be no entity that could serve the role of being a truth-bearer for the predicate ‘is true’ in Santayana’s theory of truth, especially as we find it articulated in the third of the Realms of Being.

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\(^1\) Following John Lachs, I use ‘substance’ in the sense of physical object or individual thing: “‘Substance’ in its proper signification refers to the formed physical world or to significant parts of it” (Lachs 73). Kerr-Lawson (Kerr-Lawson 2003) has criticized this account and rather treats ‘substance’ and ‘matter’ as having the same extension. I shall not endeavor to settle this disagreement here; I side with Sprigge (Sprigge 148) that Santayana uses the words ‘substance’ and ‘matter’ in different senses. Suffice it to say that even if Kerr-Lawson is correct, Santayana needs a word to talk about individual physical objects or things. If the reader prefers, she may substitute ‘physical object,’ ‘material object,’ or ‘thing’ for ‘substance’ throughout this essay.
Angus Kerr-Lawson has come to Santayana’s defense. In his judgment, Santayana does not need an account of propositions. Propositions are “human constructs, representing idealized opinions” (Kerr-Lawson 1997, 104). Accordingly, an appeal to entities such as propositions would open Santayana to the same sort of objection that he raises against the pragmatists. The truth, for Santayana, is not the totality of true opinions at some idealized logical limit of inquiry—the mistake he thinks the pragmatists have made—but is independent of the opinions of any mind.\(^\text{2}\) It is, properly speaking, the description of the totality of exemplified essences. To the extent that we speak of mathematical truths or truths in other idioms, it is only by extension of this more basic conception of truth. By treating truth as having to do with exemplified essences rather than propositions, Santayana retains the de-psychologized purity of his theory, for “there is a taint of psychology in propositions which renders them unsuitable for the realm of truth” (Kerr-Lawson 1997, 105). In a similar vein, Glenn Tiller denies that Santayana’s theory of truth “is somehow tied to either sentences or propositions” (Tiller 2000, 125). On such accounts, “truth is tied to language users. In Santayana’s account, truth is completely divorced from human activity, and this of course includes language use” (Tiller 2000, 126).

These three views are surprising, though. When we turn to The Realm of Truth, the preface contains a series of quotations from previously published works where he has already explained his theory of truth. The very first quotation states, “[t]he truth properly speaking means the sum of all true propositions, what omniscience would assert, the whole ideal system of qualities and relations which the world has exemplified or will exemplify” (RT vi).\(^\text{3}\) In the first chapter, he asserts, “when once any essence falls within the sphere of truth, all its essential relations do so too; and the necessity of these relations will, on that hypothesis, form a necessary complement to a proposition that happens to be true” (RT 3). In Chapter Five, he avers, “an idea or judgment is only true if it reports the truth, and false if it contradicts the truth. That which is true is the proposition, relation, or other essence actually illustrated in the facts” (RT 41). These quotations alone are sufficient to show that Santayana not only believes that there are propositions, but that propositions are bearers of truth and falsity, the objects of propositional attitudes, and stand in logical relations to one another. This is already starting to look very much like the account of propositions widely embraced by philosophers.

That three such eminent scholars as Sprigge, Kerr-Lawson, and Tiller should overlook this is surprising, but it is also understandable. There are at least two explanations for it. First, Santayana mentions propositions mainly in passing.

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\(^\text{2}\) Is this a mistake that entails a worry about propositions? There is still the essence of what would be believed in the logical long run of inquiry, and there is nothing contrary to thinking that that essence might be instantiated in any believer—and so that she would have a true belief. Consequently, while it might be confused to define truth in terms of the logical long run of inquiry, it does not follow that there is any error in thinking that some propositions are true and presently believed. My thanks to Jessica Wahman for this thought.

\(^\text{3}\) I take Santayana to be making the claim that the truth is the sum of all true propositions and then glossing this conception of the truth as what omniscience would assert.
nowhere explicitly developing a theory of them. As Sprigge remarks, “[h]e says very little about propositions, and when he does use the word it is unclear what he means by it” (Sprigge 164). Second, as all three note, to the extent that Santayana treats of something like propositions, they are regarded as essences. As such, they are treated more generally under the topic of essence than under the topic of truth. To this extent, Kerr-Lawson and Tiller are correct that Santayana’s treatment of the truth primarily has to do with essences, but one cannot conclude from this that there are not propositions that are themselves true or false, especially if propositions themselves are essences. Let us, then, try to dig into Santayana’s work in more detail to see if we can extract an account of propositions.

Propositions as Descriptions

The first point to note about Santayana’s account of the proposition is that propositions are a sort of description. This is perhaps most evident if we consider two quotations from the preface of The Realm of Truth side-by-side:

The truth properly means the sum of all true propositions, what omniscience would assert, the whole ideal system of qualities and relations which the world has exemplified or will exemplify. (RT vi)

Opinions are true or false by repeating or contradicting some part of the truth about the facts which they envisage; and this truth about the facts is the standard comprehensive description of them. (RT vii)

A fact just is the exemplification of qualities and relations (or essences) in matter (see Sprigge 170). Some material facts might be best discerned by and expressed as the moments of spirit (like thoughts, feelings, and decisions) that they generate. But the realm of spirit is only conceptually distinct from the realm of matter (like the recto and verso of a sheet of paper or the concavity and convexity of a curve—see RT 47), so that any alteration in the realm of spirit has a corresponding alteration in the realm of matter, just viewed from a different side. Therefore, the distinction between matter and spirit, does not interfere with the clear inference from these two quotations that the sum of all true propositions and qualities and relations the world has or will exemplify is the standard comprehensive description of the facts.

It is important not to confuse facts with events. The murder of Caesar on the Senate floor is an event. In that event, an infinite number of essences are exemplified. A fact is just a part or aspect of the total event. The fact is the exemplification of an essence. The event is a set—an infinite set—of facts. The fact, as we shall see, can be expressed in a proposition. The event could only be described by an infinite conjunction of propositions.

4 Moreover, an anonymous referee of this essay helpfully notes Scepticism and Animal Faith has almost nothing to say about propositions and that there are no entries in the Letters for the term ‘proposition.’
Propositions are descriptions—or, more accurately for reasons we shall see shortly, possible verbal descriptions—of facts. I will say more about propositions and facts later. Note that Santayana has not said propositions are descriptions believed by someone or descriptions that someone has made. Sprigge, Kerr-Lawson, and Tiller are correct that Santayana wants a non-psychological theory of truth. Nonetheless, propositions are descriptions that could be believed by someone. Propositions are the possible objects of various propositional attitudes (belief, judgment, opinion, etc.). Whether anyone in fact believes, judges, etc. some proposition is a separate question. I will return to this point (that it is a fact that, for example, the cup is blue and it is a fact that Diana judges the cup is blue) later.

In a passage quoted earlier, Santayana states, “that which is true is the proposition, relation, or other essence actually illustrated in the facts” (RT 41). This suggests that propositions are not the sole bearers of truth; relations or other essences may be bearers of truth, too. In another passage, he mentions verbal descriptions, apparently in contrast with other sorts of non-verbal descriptions (see RE 67). Santayana’s qualification about verbal descriptions is noteworthy. Truth is a property of propositions and propositions are descriptions, but it does not follow from this that propositions are the only sorts of descriptions that are truth-apt. If we regard propositions as specifically possible verbal descriptions, then there may be other non-verbal descriptions that are also truth-apt. For instance, a map of the New York City subway system, one might claim, is a possible description of the factual relations between the actual subway stations themselves. But maps can be inaccurate. They may fail to note that some stations are closed; they may be out of date; they may contain mistakes attributable to errors by the mapmaker. I suspect that Santayana recognizes that while propositions are descriptions they are not the only sorts of descriptions. Moreover, it seems Santayana admits truth is a property of these other sorts of descriptions, too. In that case, truth is properly a property of descriptions in general. Propositions, as a sort of description, are true or false but are not the sole bearers of truth and falsity.5

This forces a dilemma. On the one hand, we may restrict the conception of a proposition to possible verbal descriptions of facts and allow that other descriptions may be non-verbal. In that case, we may claim either that those non-verbal descriptions of facts may be true or false or we may claim they are rather subject to other sorts of assessment (e.g., accuracy or inaccuracy) rather than truth and falsity. Alternatively, we may expand our conception of a proposition to any sort of description whatsoever, so that diagrams are a sort of proposition. My own inclination would be restrict the conception of a proposition to possible verbal descriptions of facts and to hold that non-verbal descriptions are subject to other sorts of assessment than truth or falsity. As already noted, however, Santayana himself holds that non-verbal descriptions may be true or false, and he must hold

5 As another example of someone adopting a view along these lines, William James holds that ideas can be true or false, even if the idea is not a proposition. His example, in Pragmatism, is the idea of a person who imagines the workings of a clock.
this for his theory of the truth to make any sense at all. It seems clear that propositions are possible verbal descriptions of facts. As my concern is not specifically with truth, I will set aside the question of whether non-verbal descriptions are truth-apt.

One more point before proceeding: the phrase ‘verbal descriptions’ could be misleading if we take ‘verbal’ as ‘word. The cup is blue and la copa es azul are the same proposition even though they use different words and are in different languages. ‘Verbal’ must be taken in some other way. One way might be in the sense of name, whether singular or general, so that ‘blue’ and ‘azul’ are the same name, if different words, for essences in a certain range of hue, chroma, and luminosity. Another way might be to take “verbal description” as “description by virtue of the meanings of words.”

Whichever way it be taken, it is because propositions are possible verbal descriptions of facts that they are essences. Essences do not exist in the sense of being instantiated in matter. This does not preclude their having being, however. Santayana holds, “[t]he realm of essence is comparable to an infinite Koran—or the Logos that was in the beginning—written in invisible but indelible ink, prophesying all that Being could ever be or contain” (RE 22). Essences are substantive possibilities of thought. They are substantive in the sense that they have their

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6 This more latitudinous conception of a proposition seems to be what is operative in the claim that truth is the sum of all true propositions, glossed in such a way to include those qualities and relations omniscience would assert (RT vi).

7 I borrow the phrase ‘substantive possibility’ from Peirce. Peirce invokes it to refer to qualities—associated with Peirce’s category of Firstness—specifically. Tiller (Tiller 2008) suggests, pace Lachs who associates Peirce’s category of Firstness with Spirit, that Firstness may be more akin to essence. Tiller though is suspicious of drawing tight parallels between Peirce’s categories and Santayana’s realms, and rightly so. Although I am borrowing this phrase from Peirce and he uses it to refer to qualities qua Firstness, this would be misleading if taken strictly because propositions are substantive possibilities of thought (in the sense I will use that phrase in relation to Santayana) but are also representational and so instances of Thirdness, in Peirce’s categorial scheme (for which reason I add the qualifier ‘of thought’ to ‘substantive possibilities’). In my judgment, it is to run headlong into error to try to translate directly between Santayana’s realms and Peirce’s categories. Nevertheless, I do think there are interesting resonances between Santayana’s realm of essence and Peirce’s conception of the phaneron as whatsoever may come before the mind howsoever. This is consonant with Lachs’s statement that “[a]nything of which we can be directly aware, any immediately presented object of our thoughts is an essence” (Lachs 1988, 65), though “we can” is too strong because human minds might be incapable of thinking some essences. I am less inclined to embrace Lachs’s statement that “[e]ssences are timelessly self-identical forms or characteristics,” both because it suggests the self-identity is what is timeless whereas it is the essence that is timeless or eternal and because treating essences as forms or characteristics suggests they are possible characteristics of material objects whereas they are better regarded as possible objects of thought. For this same reason, I am disinclined towards Richard Butler’s definition of essence as “the quiddity of any being whatsoever” (Butler, 87). There is the essence of a square circle even though no material object could possibly have that characteristic. I do not mean to suggest that Lachs himself falls into this error—he states, “essences are independent of both thought and existence” and notes things
characters independently of what anyone may think about them. “The principle of essence,” Santayana tells us, “is identity; the being of each essence is entirely exhausted by its definition [in the sense of] the character which distinguishes it from every other essence. Every essence is perfectly individual” (RE 18). But essences are not substances in the Aristotelian sense of composites of form and matter, for which reason they do not exist: “No essence, not even this essence of existence [viz., reality qua the fullness and indestructibility of being] has any power to actualize itself in a fact” (RT 10).

Essences are possibilities in the sense that they contain all that Being could ever be or contain. Importantly and notably, however, Santayana argues that essence is not possible being because the word “‘possible’ is slippery and treacherous” (RE 26). This seems patently contradictory to his characterization of essences as what Being could ever be. But there is no contradiction so long as we are clear about the conceptions of possibility that Santayana is criticizing. He is critical of three such conceptions: possibility as imaginability; possibility as what is exemplifiable in matter; and possibility as what is logically consistent. For the first, some essences are not presently imaginable to us even though they might be imaginable in the future or to some other more intelligent species. For the second, there are some essences that have not been exemplified and even could not be. To the third, even if the idea of a square circle is logically inconsistent, we still think of square circles when we reason like so: Squares have four angles; circles have no angles; so, there are no square circles. But that means a square circle qua object of possible thought (namely, the thought of their impossibility) is an essence. This gives us a hint as to how essences are possibilities: Essences are possibilities in the sense that they are possible objects of intuition (whether human or not), which is, “acquaintance with essence…whether it be passive, aesthetic, and mystical, or on the contrary analytical and selective, as in reasoned discourse; because at every point demonstration or inference depends for its force on intuition of the intrinsic relation between terms” (RE 4). And this quotation is sufficient to show that terms, propositions, and inferences are themselves essences, since they are those things we are acquainted with in analytic, selective, reasoned discourse.

With the claims that propositions are possible verbal descriptions of facts and that they are essences now established, it behooves us to examine more closely their relationship to facts. But briefly before doing so, I should also note that Santayana’s characterization of propositions as possible verbal descriptions of facts and of descriptions as the bearers of truth and falsity is also consistent with his expressivism and noncognitivism (see Tiller 2000 and Heney 2012). Normative judgments are not propositions because they do not describe but recommend. Since normative judgments are not propositions or descriptions of any sort and propositions or descriptions are the bearers of truth, it also follows that they are not truth-apt. As Daniel Moreno writes, “in morality, religion, or philoso-

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8 This should not be conflated with the claim that the realm of essence is exhausted by those essences exemplified by the realm of matter, on which see the previous footnote.
phy...there is no such thing as the truth, at bottom, insofar as they do not make asseverations regarding facts, but rather express preferences of an individual or of a society” (Moreno 74).

**Facts and Propositions**

I have already noted that propositions are possible verbal descriptions of facts. This is consonant with Santayana’s treatment of belief as being primarily directed toward things independent of thought (see Tiller 2000, 83–84). Since propositions are descriptions of facts, and beliefs are propositional attitudes, beliefs are primarily directed towards facts. However, propositions are not to be conflated with facts. As previously noted, a fact is the exemplification of an essence (or set of essences) in matter. But these facts are transitory. As Santayana avers, the material world is in constant flux. What subsists is the essence of the fact, and that essence is a true proposition. The essence is then assigned to a fact in a retrospective judgment: “Facts are transitory…and when they have lapsed, it is only their essence that subsists, and that, being partially recovered and assigned to them in a retrospective judgment, can render this judgment true” (RT vii). The fact is the exemplification of some essence in matter. A proposition is a possible verbal description of that exemplification, and it is true just in case the essence was exemplified by the substance indicated by the proposition (I will say more about indication later). The possible verbal description of that exemplification is itself an essence, viz. a proposition. That (propositional) essence is the object of propositional attitudes, such as belief and judgment.

There might seem to be a serious problem in treating propositions as possible verbal descriptions of facts. It is that there are (true) propositions that do not seem to describe facts because they do not appear to describe essences exemplified by matter. For example, *Pegasus does not exist* appears to be a proposition and is true. But what fact does it describe? One way to answer this question is to hold that there are negative facts and propositions describe those facts. This could be taken in two ways, however. In the first way, *Pegasus does not exist* could be a negative fact in the sense that the essence of being a winged horse named Pegasus has not been exemplified by matter. But this will not work if, as I have indicated, facts just are the exemplification of essences in matter. In the second way, it could be that there is an essence of not being a winged horse named Pegasus and that essence is exemplified by matter. Indeed, it is exemplified by everything! In this case, *Pegasus does not exist* describes the fact that everything exemplifies the essence of not being a winged horse named Pegasus. Arguably, this is the very position Santayana adopts when he notes,

> the essence actually realized in the facts may be not merely unwelcome or uninteresting; it may be nameless altogether and inconceivable. Every name and every concept which bewildered man will impose on those facts will then fit them imperfectly; and being without intuition of their true essence, he will call them vague facts, formless, elusive, or defective. (RE 124)

Admitting such “negational” (so to speak) essences to be exemplified may seem unparsimonious, but Santayana holds no truck for the principle of parsimony: “In
the study of nature philosophers are much influenced by the love of economy. They wish to have as few ideas as possible . . . . [This impulse] is an extension of the dogmatic impulse involved in action by which the most conspicuous essence given in sense is taken for the essence of the object encountered” (RE 126).

Still, there might seem to be a second problem in treating propositions as possible verbal descriptions of facts. It would seem to imply that (pure) mathematics, as not being about facts, does not traffic in propositions, either. Moreover, it would seem to follow that works of fiction, while describing characters, do not use propositions to do so. Again, this is because such statements do not purport to describe essences instantiated in matter. But this is exactly right. Mathematics does not traffic in propositions but in suppositions and what follows from those suppositions. Mathematicians do not propose that we believe that \( p \) but ask us to suppose that \( p \) and examine what would follow under such suppositions. Further, while we are wont to say that it is a \textit{fact} that \( p \) follows from supposition \( S \), this is not a fact in Santayana’s sense. What it rather means is that it is a logical truth that \( S \) entails \( p \). And even this is a misnomer given Santayana’s conception of truth, as a logical truth has to do with assignments of \textit{supposed} truth-values such that on every possible assignment the formula is found to be true. Logical truth has nothing to do with whether an essence is exemplified by matter and even less to do with possible verbal descriptions of it.\(^9\) For this reason, Moreno writes, “neither in logic nor in mathematics is there room for the truth, as both address merely the relations between essences, so in this sense one can speak of \textit{formal correctness} at best” (Moreno 74). Similarly, novelists do not propose that we believe, for example, James lived in a giant peach but ask us to imagine that James lived in a giant peach, and imagining in this way is not far removed from the supposing that mathematicians ask us to do.

There may be other problems here. For example, it is unclear how Santayana can account for the apparent propositionality of counterfactuals such as \textit{if Napoleon had won Waterloo, then we would all be speaking French} or statements along the lines of \textit{if I were to put this butter in the oven, then it would melt}, since such statements do not purport to describe events (and so facts). Are these, like the statements of mathematics, not propositions at all? Also, Santayana may have difficulty accounting for future contingents as propositions, once again because such statements are not (or, at least, not obviously) descriptions of essences exemplified by matter. Also, depending on our views of vagueness, we might justifiably wonder if some vague statements—e.g., 1,000 grains of sand is a heap—are propositions at all. Does matter exemplify vague essences (as Santayana suggests in a passage earlier quoted), and if so does it also exemplify, for example, the essences both of being a heap and of not being a heap? Another issue concerns

\(^9\) None of this is to deny that these mathematical essences qua substantive possibilities of thought can be illustrated in matter, and when they are so illustrated they are true. For instance, is true that when I add three apples to my basket already holding five apples, I have a total of eight apples. This fact illustrates the mathematical essence \( 3 + 5 = 8 \), but the mathematical essence itself insofar as the mathematician takes an interest in it has nothing to do with my apples (on this see also Sprigge 174–175).
disjunctive propositions. It is true that either I am now at home or I am now at the movies, but only one of the disjuncts is true. Is the entire statement a description of the facts or just one of the disjuncts? If just one of the disjuncts is a proposition, how can we assign a truth-value to the entire proposition? Or do I exemplify the disjunctive essence of being either at home or at the movies? These are questions I will not endeavor to answer here, but in my earlier comments and in what follows there are some hints at ways Santayana might respond to these worries.

All of that said, we must take care not to conflate propositions qua possible verbal descriptions of facts with propositions qua verbal descriptions of facts. Suppose it is a fact that a cup is blue. This fact could be described in any number of ways: the cup is blue, the cup is purple, the blue thing is an elephant, and so on. Only one of them describes the fact even though any of them could possibly describe the fact, that is, even though any of them could be used by someone to describe the fact. The one that describes the fact is a true proposition. The ones that possibly describe the fact—that is, that could be used in an effort to describe the fact—but do not describe the fact are false propositions. But as one can have true or false beliefs depending on whether the propositional content of the belief describes the fact or not, so also for any fact must there be any number of propositions that could be used to describe the fact. Some of those possible verbal descriptions are false. Other ones are true. Nonetheless, all of them are possible verbal descriptions of the fact (to continue with the example) of the blue cup, and all of them are propositions.

Importantly, these possible verbal descriptions are requisite for us to be able to talk about past—or future (recall above the problem of future contingents)—facts. Santayana remarks, “description in words or other signs is indispensible for making an essence an object of intent when it is no longer, or not yet, an object of intuition” (RE 114). It is because the realm of matter is in constant flux that we need propositions in order to talk about facts not present. In his discussion of complex essences, Santayana remarks, “the attempt to describe certain essences instead of simply inspecting them has some justification and meets with some success. There are memorable ideas which we may wish to revive” (RE 67). One way to revive those ideas is by re-imagining them, as when I recall a tune by “playing” the melody through the mind’s ear, so to speak (why should we focus so on the mind’s eye?). This is a “less artificial” sort of remembering “by the innate phonography of the psyche” (RE 68). Another way to remember past facts is by describing them in propositions. To continue with the previous analogy, “written music is a means of reviving melodies; the phonograph is another; and even verbal descriptions and similes may not be useless in suggesting mental essences and distinguishing them clearly in their own category” (RE 67, emphasis added).

This present account of propositions as possible verbal descriptions of facts may be perplexing, however. On the one hand, I have affirmed that facts are the exemplifications of essences. Propositions are possible descriptions of those facts and are themselves essences. But how are propositions themselves exemplified? First, note that as propositions are distinct from facts, they are not identical to the fact. Facts are transitory and propositions are not. Also, some propositions are
false. Second, it follows from this that facts do not automatically imply the exemplification of the proposition. There can be facts (the exemplification of essences) without the exemplification of verbal descriptions of those facts. But what the exemplification of an essence (a fact) does entail is that the fact could be described by someone, and so the proposition describing it could be exemplified. A proposition is exemplified when it is in fact used to describe a fact. Nevertheless, it is the very possibility of verbal description that is the proposition, and it is for this reason that propositions are essences. Note that this is a non-psychological view of propositions. Propositions do not require minds that actually believe or endorse them. The fact brings about the possibility of the verbal description of that fact whether anyone ever uses the proposition to describe it or not. The proposition itself is exemplified when someone does use it to describe a fact. Nevertheless, the proposition describes the fact whether or not anyone ever uses it to describe the fact.

This is noteworthy because aside from it being a fact, say, that some cup is blue, it is also a fact that Diana judges that some cup is blue. This entails that there is an (propositional) essence not only of the fact that some cup is blue but also of the fact that Diana judges that some cup is blue. This also entails that there is a (propositional) essence of the fact that I judge that Diana judges that the cup is blue. And now that you have read (or heard) this, of the fact that you judge that I judge that Diana judges that the cup is blue, and so on ad infinitum, since there is also the possible description of you judging that I judge, etc. Three points are in order. First, this is exactly what we should expect given the possibility of semantic ascent, even aside from the matter of judging. If the cup is blue, then it is true that the cup is blue. And if it is true that the cup is blue, then it is true that it is true that the cup is blue, and so on ad infinitum. Second, this is no problem for Santayana’s theory of essences, since the realm of essences is infinite. Third, although there is always the possibility for such ascent, it does not follow that the propositions are exemplified since they may never be used as descriptions. It follows from this that unexemplified propositional essences are not part of the truth even if some of them are truths. This apparent paradox is readily explained.

10 John Lachs appears to suggest facts and true propositions are identical when he quotes Santayana as stating truth is simply fact described under the form of eternity (1988, 50) and states, “[l]et us suppose that an owl hoots near my house one night. That it did is a fact or a truth about the world” (ibid., 141). But here it is important to keep in mind three points. First, Santayana does not regard propositions as the sole bearers of truth but any description may be a bearer of truth. Second, Santayana thinks every essence is itself a description (see RE 67). Third, we must distinguish between a truth and the truth. Now, if omniscience could have before its mind the totality of essences ever exemplified, it would have a comprehensive description of the facts. That is the truth. Note, though, that the realm of essence is not exhausted by propositions. Propositions are possible verbal descriptions of facts but not the sole descriptions of facts, and it does not follow from this that these propositional essences are ever used to describe the facts. It is a separate fact that someone uses some such possible description to describe a fact, and it is only when the proposition is so used that it is exemplified.
away by the fact that Santayana has a restrictive theory of the truth that need not readily map on to all of our uses of the predicate ‘is true.’

**Analysis of Propositions**

Thus far, we have seen that Santayana has an account of propositions, that propositions are truth-apt, that they are essences, that they are possible verbal descriptions of facts, that they are true when they describe the facts (whether anyone uses them to describe the facts or not), and that propositions are exemplified when someone in fact uses them to describe facts. Let us now turn to Santayana’s analysis of the proposition itself. Santayana implies that propositions have a logical form or structure, and the passage in which he remarks on it is particularly striking for reasons that will become clear momentarily. To appreciate it, we first need to get a grasp on the classical theory of the proposition. The classical theory of the structure of propositions traces its roots back to Aristotle. It is that every proposition consists of a subject, a copula, and a predicate. Typical examples are *snow is white*, *grass is green*, and *the cup is blue*. There is clearly a grammatical basis for such an analysis. However, in a series of comments on how “[l]ogic is a refined form of grammar” (RT 33), Santayana remarks grammar is biased. The suggestion seems to be that in refining grammar, logic rids itself of the biases of grammar. One such bias is the gendering of nouns and adjectives in languages such as Spanish and French. Santayana notes, “grammar need never have adopted so fantastic a sexual analogy,” but it did so because “sexual images are arresting and highly provocative…and [so] will count for more in the play of description than does the strict truth of the object” (RT 33).

Another case of grammatical bias consists in the distinction between grammatical subject and predicate. Santayana avers, “the relation of subject to predicate is founded on the circumstance that some words are proper names, and merely demonstrative, like a pointing index finger; other words are names of essences, without traceable physical being” (RT 33, emphasis added). The distinction between pointing index finger-like words and words naming essences is the ground for the grammatical distinction of subject and predicate: “The proper name, indicating and holding down, as it were, the physical object that concerns us in action, becomes the grammatical subject; and the names of such essences as this subject shares with other things become the grammatical predicates and adjectives” (RT 33–34, emphases added). Given the context of the statement as being about grammatical biases in logic, Santayana’s point is that Aristotle’s analysis is a consequence of a sort of grammatical bias, a grammar that “registers admirably the education of the mind” but which is itself founded on a more fundamental logical structure of pointing to or pinning down an object and describing it.

What I find particularly striking about this claim is the account of the proposition implied by Santayana’s comments—that propositions consist of both a pointer such as a proper name and a general term—is exactly Charles S. Peirce’s theory of the proposition. On Peirce’s mature analysis of propositions, propositions minimally consist of two parts. He writes, “one cannot better define a proposition (as distinguished from the assertion whereby one assumes responsibility for its
truth) than as a representation of which one part serves, directly or indirectly, as an index of its object, while the other part excites in the mind an image of the same object” (R 491:5) and “a proposition consists of two parts, the predicate, which excites something like an image… in the mind of its interpreter, and the subject, or subjects, each of which serves to identify something which the predicate represents” (R 280:31–32). In typical propositions of the sorts with which philosophers are usually concerned, one part of the proposition is an index, which functions roughly like a pointer to some thing (an object, an event, the environment, etc.), and the other part is a rheme or term, such as swims, eats, hits, human, dog, plant, etc. The rheme is what “excites in the mind an image of the same object.” In a proposition such as that is blue, “that” is the index which pins down the substance described, and “is blue” is the rheme, which excites images of blue things.

This Peircean analysis is exactly the sort of analysis of propositions Santayana is implying. The Aristotelian analysis of the proposition is a result of a grammatical bias. Logic, as a refinement of grammar, is rid of this bias and analyzes the proposition into a pointer to some substance and a general term attributing essences to that substance. In fact, Peirce himself makes many of the same claims Santayana does. With respect to logic being a refinement of grammar, Peirce remarks that the copula is logically inessential because the grammars of other languages allow it to be omitted and he does not “regard the usages of language as forming a satisfactory basis for logical doctrine” (EP 2:309). Similarly, Santayana affirms, “[b]y one of the uses or abuses of the word is, one thing is often said to be another. This absurdity (as a pure logician might think it) flows out of the natural relation of essences with things and serves clumsily to express it” (RE 66). In short, the copula is not logically necessary; its apparent need in the classical, Aristotelian theory of propositions rather flows out of a natural relation of essence and matter and only “clumsily” expresses it. All we really need is a way to pin down the substance and a term to express the essence of it.

Moreover, much as Santayana remarks that the first part of a proposition is a proper name or a pointing finger (what becomes the grammatical subject) and the second is a name for an essence (what becomes the predicate), Peirce states that in a proposition there is one part “which excites an icon in the imagination [and] is the predicate. The [other] part which indicates the object or set of objects of the representamen is called the Subject or Subjects…each of which can be replaced by a Proper Name or other Monstrative Index” (EP 2:172) and “the perceptual judgment I have translated into ‘that chair is yellow’ would be more accurately represented thus: ‘<> is yellow,’ a pointing index-finger taking the place of the subject” (CP 7.635).

Interestingly, when we turn back to The Realm of Essence, the chapter titled “Essences as Terms” distinguishes between two kinds of essences as names (recall, from above, I recommended that we think of ‘verbal’ in the sense of ‘name’ rather than ‘word’). The first kind of name is “normally given to things rather than to essences, and are then proper names; that is they are indications like a gesture, designating a natural object without describing it” (RE 108). The second kind of name is applied to essences,
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as, for instance, to the triangle or to beauty; and then these names are inaptly
called general. I say inaptly because they do not designate classes of things,
but in designating an essence they leave open the question whether any or
many things exist describable by that term. Names then [i.e., when they ap-
ply to essences rather than things] designate not particulars but universals.
(RE 108–109)

This application of names to essences, Santayana tells us, is what “permits rea-
soning.” As we learn in The Realm of Truth, it is these two kinds of names that
comprise the structure of propositions.

We must tread carefully here, though. Consider the proposition that is blue.
The first term—that—is the pointer which pins down the substance. The second
term—is blue (recall that the copula is inessential)—tells us something about
the substance. But these terms are distinct from the proposition itself. All three of
them—the two terms and the proposition—are their own essences. This is im-
portant because by it Santayana sidesteps the entire problem of the unity of the
proposition. That problem is how it is that a set of terms—e.g., {blue, that, is}—
becomes unified into a proposition—e.g., that is blue. For Santayana, there is no
question of how these terms become unified into a proposition. Each is its own
essence. As essences are individual (as explained earlier), they are unitary even if
complex. Accordingly, the proposition that is blue is already unified as assuredly
as a shade of blue is already a unitary essence even though it consists of some
chroma, hue, and luminosity.

This consideration might seem to raise another problem, however. If proposi-
tions may be complex but are still unitary, it would seem as though the two prop-
ositions the cup is blue, on the one hand, and Diana judges the cup is blue, on the
other, are each their own essences and those two essences are themselves distinct
from the proposition that is their conjunction, viz. the cup is blue and Diana judg-
es the cup is blue. But as we treat the truth-value of the compound proposition as
defined by the truth-functional relations between the two atomic propositions,
should not we regard the compound proposition not as an essence but as a relation
between essences? But I do not think this is a problem for Santayana’s account.
When we treat the truth-functional relations between the two atomic propositions
as defining the truth-value of the compound proposition, we need only treat the
atomic propositions which are part of the one unitary essence of the compound as
if they were themselves propositions and as if they had their own essences separ-
able from the compound proposition.

There are other related problems here. One problem arises from (apparent)
propositions that combine descriptive and normative claims. Consider If Max has
done something immoral, then John will be angry. First, is this a proposition at all?
That depends on whether it describes a fact. Does it? We could treat the condi-
tional disjunctively as either Max hasn’t done something immoral or John will be
angry, but this only raises a problem noted earlier, viz. whether there are disjun-
tive facts. Second, how do we ascribe a truth-value to the conditional, or can we?
May we treat the antecedent as if it were a proposition even though it is not? Here
we run up against the problem of mixed inferences. If valid inference requires
truth preservation and normative judgments are not truth-apt but the statement
italicized is treated as a proposition and is true, then inference on the conditional with the additional premise “John will not be angry” will result in an invalid argument. Similar issues arise with respect to the Frege-Geach problem. Nonetheless, as these questions are primarily concerned with truth and the scope of propositionality rather than Santayana’s account of the proposition more generally, they are not questions I shall endeavor to answer here. They are, though, questions any comprehensive account of Santayana’s theory of truth in relation to his account of propositions must countenance.

Summary

The account I am attributing to Santayana is the following. Some essence is exemplified by matter. The exemplification of that essence is a fact. Any fact could possibly be described. The possibility of that description of the fact is a proposition. As a mere possibility of description, the proposition itself is an essence. That essence is exemplified when someone endeavors to describe the fact by stating the proposition. When someone does state the proposition, the proposition has a double function for that person. First, the proposition indicates some substance. This is the first part of the proposition, the proper name or pointing index finger. Second, the proposition says something about the substance indicated; it describes an essence of the thing pointed at. This is the second part of the proposition.

A true proposition is one such that the essence described in the second part of the proposition is exemplified by the substance indicated in the first part of the proposition. A false proposition is one such that the essence described in the second part of the proposition is not exemplified by the substance indexed in the first part of the proposition. These descriptions of substances are true or false whether or not anyone ever uses them in a judgment, i.e., whether or not the proposition itself is ever exemplified. A judgment—the exemplification of the proposition itself—is true just in case the proposition is true and false just in case the proposition is false. Again, however, the truth and falsity of the proposition is entirely independent of any judgment, since the proposition qua essence is an eternal and immutable possible object of judgment.
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Santayana, George


Levels of Animal Life:  
George Santayana and a Purely Naturalistic Model of Supervenience

This essay, for which the author won the Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize for 2017, is a revised version of a paper delivered before the George Santayana Society at the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association on 5 January 2018.

Contemporary supervenience theory leads to two different theses: metaphysical and epistemological. The metaphysical thesis of supervenience asserts the existence of a dependence relation between two sets of properties while the epistemological thesis explains the nature of this relation (Kim 1984, 176). Whether or not a philosopher explicitly embraces a version of the epistemological thesis, there is always an epistemological attitude. Supervenience theorists in twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy of mind conclude that psychophysical supervenience gives metaphysical assurance that the dependence of mind on matter exists. That many philosophers accept supervenience as a plausible relation between the body and the mind is important for at least two reasons: (i) the version of supervenience that is often posited in philosophical discussions suggests that the supervening set is reducible to its base and (ii) while supervenience theorists do not explicitly offer an epistemological thesis about the relationship of the mind to the body, the implied reducibility constitutes an epistemological attitude. As this reducibility is logically implied by any epistemological thesis, adopting the assumption of reducibility suggests that the manner of reduction can always be known. How you would know what a reduction would consist of is exactly what any epistemological thesis would explain. So many philosophers of mind adopt both the metaphysical thesis and, by implication, a version of the epistemological thesis along with the reducibility that comes with it. This reducibility limits attempts to resolve puzzle of the mind-body problem by excluding the intentional and purposive qualities of subjective experience necessary to solve it (Wahman 46–47). These reductive implications of the metaphysical and epistemological theses can be avoided by turning to the view of George Santayana. In what follows, I suggest that Santayana’s materialism offers an example of non-reductive psychophysical supervenience as well as the necessary epistemological attitude. I conclude that Santayana’s spirit-psyche relation

1 There is one metaphysical thesis, which says that if domain A supervenes on domain B then anything that happens in A has a corresponding event in B (but not necessarily the other way around). If mind supervenes on matter, then for every mental event there is corresponding physical event. The epistemological thesis says the corresponding event can always be found and explains how this can be done. The epistemological thesis can have more than one version.

offers a generative account of supervenience within a naturalistic framework that obviates the mind-body puzzle by combining a non-reductive metaphysics with the non-reductive epistemological attitude of animal faith.

The Materialism of George Santayana

Santayana’s materialism is important in two respects. First, because he insists that matter is existent, but that there are also other modes of being which are fundamentally different from matter, he in effect advocates for a non-reductive materialism. Secondly, his materialism is useful because it requires a certain epistemological attitude: the attitude of animal faith.

In order to fully understand Santayana’s philosophy, it must be noted that he takes substance—all that is changeable and causally influential in the world—to be basic; thus, it is the sole constituent of the material world. He departs from tradition when he denies the importance of having an adequate definition of matter in itself (SAF viii). Thus, his materialism insists on taking matter for granted without ever needing to give an account of its true nature. This insistence allows Santayana to develop a natural philosophy that accommodates the common-sense fact of matter’s existence as well as the acknowledgement of the limits of natural knowledge. Santayana develops his natural philosophy by differentiating four ontologically separate realms of being: matter, essence, spirit, and truth. He delineates these realms of being not to create a new system of philosophy, but to revise and clarify the most important of the traditional commonsense categories of thought (RB 826). The realms he delineates are separate categories and used to describe the dynamic natural processes present in the material realm and encountered by the human animal (RB 831). The cosmos that we live in is generated by the realm of matter; the immaterial aspects of the physical objects we encounter are essences; truth is a catalogue of what has happened and what will happen; and spirit is the living act of consciousness in each individual animal, stripped of material considerations.

As Angus Kerr-Lawson notes, Santayana consistently rejects any attempt to explain essence, spirit, or truth in terms of matter (Kerr-Lawson 48). More precisely, Santayana emphasizes that all of the realms of being are independent from each other and does so by returning to the fact that matter is constantly in flux while the realms of essence and truth are unchangeable. This contrast, however, enables Santayana to develop ties between the realms without having to reduce the non-material realms to the realm of matter. A central example of the non-reductive status of the realms is the difference between essence and existence. The realm of matter forms the groundwork for all spatio-temporal existence;

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3 To clarify, Santayana posits these realms in order to introduce a novel way of understanding and thinking about the known natural world, not to create something previously unknown.

4 The exception here is the realm of Spirit. Since the spirit depends on matter, it is driven by matter and therefore is also in motion. This is evidenced by the constant progression of thoughts and ideas from moment to moment of natural life.
therefore, to exist is to be an object in space and time. Even a thought, perception, or feeling (any moment of the realm of spirit) occurs at a particular time and place as it is generated by a material psyche. Since essences are not created by matter, they are ontologically prior to matter and ultimately unaffected by matter, they are non-existent universals in a natural category of thought (Kerr-Lawson 51). Ultimately, essences are eternal while matter, always in flux, is change itself. It would be an inappropriate hypostatization of essence to attribute to it the power to induce change that matter has in the natural world. Santayana’s strict definition of existence opens the way for ontological categories (namely, essence and truth) that have being but are non-existent. This non-reductive ontology points ahead to the supervenience relation.

Even though Santayana is a thoroughgoing materialist, he still acknowledges the immaterial qualities, products, and ideal implications of the natural world. He seeks to discover how discourse can be connected to the material world in a way that will cure people of illusions. In this quest, he rejects wholesale the snare that he says philosophy fell into “when, in modern times it ceased to be the art of thinking” (SAF 254) and tried to become the science of thought. To understand how Santayana’s philosophy avoids this trap, I turn to the epistemological attitude of animal faith.

Santayana’s natural philosophy is an attempt to express the conditions of the material universe as they affect creatures capable of consciousness and spirituality. He is adamant that it is not the task of natural philosophy to justify the assumption of an existing world, but to carry it out consistently and honestly so as to arrive, if possible, at a conception of nature by which the faith involved in action may be enlightened and guided (RB 194). This conception of nature defines knowledge as the act of combining data into experience with the confirmation of knowledge lying in the corroborations of opinions and repeated experiences. For Santayana, the prize of his philosophical system is the affirmation of knowledge about the natural world, which is only possible through a reasonable attitude towards nature, including one’s own. Thus, the animal faith involved in action enables the individual to make sense of both the material and immaterial aspects of lived experience.

Animal faith “expresses the idea that certainty about transitive beliefs is impossible.” (LGS 16 March 1952 to Richard Colton Lyon) Santayana grounds animal faith in skepticism. By suspending all previous beliefs (including belief in himself), he is left only with the contemplation of the single essence given to the mind. By doing this exercise, he clears away all dogma and shows that no amount of certainty about an existential claim is possible. Santayana concludes that what one typically takes to be certain knowledge is actually faith—belief in things we need to know. Thus, any knowledge of the natural world is not certain, but a combination of moments of intuition into a reliable and meaningful experience, which is taken to represent things and events that exist independently of experience. However, because such knowledge is derived from beliefs “unavoidably implicated in action,” knowledge of the natural world may be presumed to be true. It is the habituation of past experience (memory plus a belief in an existing world) that one relies upon to show that one knows something about the world. Most
importantly, the central conviction of animal faith builds on familiarity and trust to the persuasion that there were events happening before the present moment and that there will be events that follow it. Taken as the solution to the epistemological question at the heart of Santayana’s philosophy, (Levinson 296), animal faith is the unverifiable belief that things in the natural world will continue as they have been; it is the attitude with which to approach the world in order to make sense of the intellectual gaps in human existence. It is an unscientific yet highly useful hypothesis that makes living life bearable and regulative.

Through his materialism Santayana affirms the primacy of matter while simultaneously acknowledging a non-reductive psychophysical distinction that can sustain the metaphysical thesis of the supervenience relation. He also supplies the appropriate accompanying epistemological attitude of animal faith with which to approach the non-reductive categories of experience. I will next apply the non-reductive aspects of his materialism to the differentiation principle of the two levels of animal life: the spirit-psyche relation. I suggest that the spirit-psyche relation is a non-reductive supervenience relation because it incorporates generation rather than simply strict causation.

The Spirit-Psyche Distinction

Discussions surrounding the mental aspects of animal life often refer to a soul that is supposed to be wholly constituted by either material or immaterial constituents (RB 570). Santayana seeks to avoid defining the living soul as thus abstracted from its place in the natural order because it would lose the intensity of movement and capacity for intellectual inquiry that makes it necessary to animal life. To avoid the equivocation of the concept of a soul as strictly physical or strictly psychological, Santayana draws a division between the two planes of mental life in both animals and humans: the spirit and the psyche. The primary plane, the psyche, is a habit of matter; a pattern of activity that generates the intellectual presence, the spirit. That the “spirit is a product of the psyche” (RB 567) illustrates the hierarchical aspect of the generative relation as well as verifies the existence of a dependence relation in Santayana’s philosophy of mind. That the psyche is defined as the specific form of physical life inherited as habitual dispositions of the body and the spirit defined as the spark of light (LGS 29 July 1942 to Ezra Loomis Pound) that falls upon anything (read consciousness) suggests the irreducibility of spirit to matter.

To characterize the psyche as brute lived existence would be a reasonable interpretation of Santayana’s picture of organic life. The first and essential function of the psyche is to keep a sentient, material organism alive. Because of this fundamental biological role of directing the search for food and shelter, the psyche is the self-maintaining and reproducing structure of an organism. Santayana says that it as much a habit of matter as the way seeds are predetermined to grow into organisms of a specific a type (RB 331). Through exercising its propensity to

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5 Santayana describes the soul as what the psyche turns into when the spirit awakens within it.
struggle for life in the gradual growth of the animal, the psyche creates the equilibrium by which the organism lives. Thus, it quite literally is the fundamental organizing principle of life that sustains and organizes animal or human life. The psyche may be regarded as the expression of the dynamism of matter in an animal.

Animal life however, does not consist solely in materialistic growth and movement. The lived experience of both humans and animals consists of instinc-
tual reactions operating inseparably alongside a series of conscious acts. This additional mental set, dependent upon the psyche for its existence, leads to sen-
tience in animals and to sapience in humans. Santayana gives the name ‘spirit’ to this “emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought” (RB 331); and generally speaking, he is referring to consciousness. The spirit is the conscious perception by an animal that apprehends essences through acts of intuition, thus marking “the inner difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead” (RB 572). In other words, the intellectual role of the spirit to perceive existent objects is necess-
ary because it is an action that the psyche alone cannot perform.

That Santayana conceives of the spirit as having its own realm of being af-
firms its ontological separateness. Nevertheless, it does not constitute a ghostly other world, even though it is experienced as distinct from matter. The founda-
tions of spirit are planted unequivocally in nature; and, because of its natural ori-
gins, spirit necessarily has interests in the material world forced upon it by the psyche. Although the realm of spirit is intrinsically different from the realm of matter, it operates on the same field of intentional objects. This overlap is neces-
ary because the spirit by itself is not a source of change in the natural world; as a properly intellectual power that arises inside the animal organism it cannot gene-
rate or guide matter. Santayana clarifies this by talking of the self:

Our selves, our organisms or persons, un-doubtedly play a more or less effi-
cacious part in physical events….A man habitually identifies himself as much with his body as with his spirit…the difference between myself as a transcen-
dental centre or spirit and myself as a fact in the world is, in one sense unbridgeable…because they are realizations of the same fact in two incomparable realms of being. (RB 564)

This is to say that matter and spirit operate on the same aspects of material life in separate leveled realms of being. The spirit or consciousness that augments natural movements is opposed to the psyche yet depends upon the psyche for its existence. That there is an observable difference between the functions of the spirit and the psyche does not give us an occasion to deny the difference between matter and mind. When the material body reaches a certain degree of organization and responsiveness it naturally requires a further mental set to apprehend all moral and intellectual terms, and hence the spirit is generated.  

Santayana’s characterization of the generative relationship between psyche and spirit as one of generation rather than strict logical dependence is distinctive

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6 This is not to say that Santayana takes the psyche as temporarily antecedent to the spirit, rather it could be argued that he considers them to be temporally contemporaneous.
because he expands the psychophysical in such a way as to avoid the mechanistic implications of the “physicalist trap” (Wahman 29). He writes:

By that useful trick of exact adaptation and imitative sympathy, the psyche has automatically generated spiritual sympathy and true intelligence, without in the least requiring these gifts or profiting by them. A purely ideal consciousness of things not hers has sprung up within herself. She has given birth to a spirit that potentially in its intellectual vocation, infinitely transcends her (RB 613)

Here, it is clear to see that the spirit not only grows from the psyche but transcends it by virtue of its own unique and irreducible character. By subscribing to the growth metaphor of generation, Santayana yet again illustrates the irreducible difference between the spirit and the psyche, the latter being a function of the material basis of animal life. Rooted in a robust materialism, any involvement of an animal in the natural world involves a tacit and unprovable belief that substance exists. Belief in substance becomes a belief in nature when that substance is taken to be permanent, organized, and predictable (Wahman 63). Matter is the sole power of change in the universe, and, in the midst of this flux, animal organisms develop smell, sight, and hearing in order to adapt themselves to the external world and to learn what is beneficial for them. The animal forms habits to aide in its survival by retaining what it has learned (RB 613). Such habits constitute the repeatable mental discourse of the animal that is born of matter: the psyche. Once it has been realized, the psyche continues to grow and adapt for the duration of the animal’s life, constantly remaining elastic with regard to its surroundings. As matter generates psyche, so too is spirit an indirect yet contemporaneous outpouring proper to an existence in flux. Spirit augments the animal’s life by giving it a mind with which to interpret the world. Santayana acknowledges that tensions, movements, and unities are natural to the realm of matter and purports that these active forces serve to generate the lives of the psyche and of the spirit. These two lives come together in the life of the animal, therefore, as lived experience shows, a peace between them has been established. For, as Santayana points out, “peace between disparate things does not come by assimilating them” (RB 610). Assimilation through reduction to material facts would destroy the spirit. Harmony through generation recognizes the non-reductive categories of spirit and psyche as well as demonstrates the dependence relation between the two levels of animal life.
Generation Applied to the Concerns about Supervenience

In light of the expansion to include generation as a form of dependence, I close by showing how the augmented approach to the dependence relation alleviates the concerns with supervenience raised at the outset. In review, these concerns are: (i) the supervenience that is needed in several recent philosophical discussions leaves open the possibility that the supervening set is reducible to its base; and (ii) while supervenience does not offer an epistemological thesis about the dependence relation, in light of (i) the epistemological attitude that accompanies supervenience is the expectation that the supervening set is reducible to its subvenient base.

Given the discussion above, within a robust naturalism the move towards reductive tendencies is straightforward yet still unpalatable on phenomenological grounds. Since reductionism is unacceptable, we can then ask as Angus Kerr-Lawson does, “What sort of account or definition or clarification of these important categories is to replace the reductive definitions?”

I now look at Santayana’s spirit-psyche distinction as a substitute for the strictly logical entailment that often characterizes modern supervenience.

In order to resolve the reductive metaphysical concern about supervenience, a restructuring of thought is in order. Mere causal relations are exhausted by dependence, but supervenience is not. Therefore, something more is needed. Using strict causation to describe the relationship between an object and the reason for its existence doesn’t capture the full weight of Santayana’s claims about the spirit and psyche. The fact that Santayana is a thoroughgoing materialist yet still holds that the realms of being are ontologically distinct offers the necessary non-reductive metaphysical basis to sustain a purely naturalistic supervenience relation. The relationship between the spirit and the psyche is that of consciousness and its physical source. By locating this relationship within a robust materialism, Santayana utilizes a dependence relation that affirms the same thing. Generation enriches supervenience because the harmony between the mind and the body (like

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7 It could be argued that using the term ‘supervenience’ to discuss Santayana’s realms of being is incompatible with his description of the realms as purely conceptual distinctions. I use the term supervenience, as a description of causal relation, in order to acknowledge Santayana’s insistence that there is no appearance of spirit without some accompanying change in the matter that underlies it.

8 Kerr-Lawson answers this question by offering Santayana’s ontologically distinct categories of matter, truth, and spirit. Because each of these are distinct, they cannot be reduced in terms of the others (Kerr Lawson 47).

9 Kim 1997 acknowledges that epiphenomenalism is sometimes forwarded as an explanation of the nature of the dependence relation. If considered epiphenomenalistic, Santayana’s naturalism would seem to fall prey to the usual objections. I do not engage with this in detail in this paper but maintain that the spirit-psyche distinction would humanize epiphenomenalism, making it more palatable for engagement.
the spirit and the psyche) is more than just the sum of their parts. Angus Kerr-Lawson suggests that:

as a partial account of the nature of spirit, the notion of supervenience is more congenial to Santayana’s account of mind. . . . [Santayana] would call for an explicit confirmation of what the supervenience theorist might believe: that hidden psychic causal factors in the realm of matter (in some sense of ‘cause’) generate spirit. One can deny causal potency to spirit without removing causation altogether from the discussion. (Kerr-Lawson 58)

As seen here, Santayana’s account of mind allows the use of generative causation without needing to assign to spirit potency in the natural world. Generation is the reason for something’s existence, and, with this additive relation of growth, it becomes different from a merely causal relation. The structure of Santayana’s thought runs as follows: the realm of matter generates psyche which generates spirit. Santayana’s use of generation takes into account the irreducible nature of spirit while still affirming the atemporal primacy of matter. Generation allows that the differentiation in material properties gives a corresponding differentiation in the supervening mental properties without the move to reduction that is suggested by strong supervenience. Using generation to augment the causal framework of supervenience alleviates the reductive metaphysical concerns and creates a picture of the mind-body interaction that matches lived experience.

It is important to note that the focus on matter doesn’t close off the appeal to an explanatory notion of supervenience; rather, it shifts the focus of the nature of the dependence from strict logical entailment to causal generation. This shift is crucial because while consciousness is often defined in terms of its intentionality, its identity to a brain state, or the idea that it could be reduced solely to behavioral terms (Kerr-Lawson 50), Santayana rejects these strict characterizations of consciousness and insists on dealing with the actual felt sentience of lived experience as an intrinsic part of his natural philosophy. Santayana’s assurance that his distinctions of lived aspects of human life are truly part of his non-reductive naturalism is useful in addressing the concerns with the epistemological thesis of supervenience.

Santayana’s materialism and the further ontological categories he distinguishes provide a setting for understanding action and employing pragmatic analysis (Coleman xlv). This analysis of the felt sentience of lived experience is made possible and plausible by the appeal to animal faith. An animal does not need literal knowledge of existence in order to live its daily life, because, for Santayana, to engage in animal faith is to trust in the data that existence gives in intution. Because belief in materiality transcends any one intuition, when the limits of immediate knowledge are inevitably reached, the animal leaps trustingly from immediate intuitions to more encompassing generalizations. The belief that nature

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10 Mereological supervenience is taken to be a pervasive fact.

11 This change in terminology begins to address the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness, but immediately raises legitimate, broader questions about Santayana’s ontology. Answering these questions however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
does truly manifest itself enables the skeptical philosopher overcome doubts about the existence of the natural world. Animal faith is thus an epistemological attitude that enables us to come to terms with the dependence relations operative in the world. This faith is not in what can be proven, but in what cannot be helped but to be believed (Wahman 58). Animal faith recognizes that the actual understanding of the interaction between the animal and the world, the spirit and the psyche, the mind and the body is one of tentative purchase. Ultimately, by rooting knowledge in material interaction, Santayana’s appeal to animal faith guards against the reductionist tendencies to which his system may have seemed vulnerable due to its empiricist heritage (Coleman xlv). Focusing this discussion on the generation of the spirit by the psyche in Santayana’s materialist philosophy gives us the rich and illuminating epistemological attitude of animal faith with which to approach the dependence of the mind on the body.

To conclude, I have argued that there is solution to a problem posed by contemporary philosophy of mind that can be extracted from the philosophy of George Santayana. If supervenience is regarded as a strictly causal relationship, then mind can easily be reduced to matter. But Santayana regards psyche (the material counterpart of mental life) as not just causing spirit (i.e., producing something in the same ontological domain), but as generating spirit (producing something that is a completely different form of being). With this added notion of generation, Santayana alleviates the metaphysical and epistemological concerns found in many recent theories of supervenience. He offers a non-reductive naturalistic supervenience combined with the accompanying epistemological attitude of animal faith. Attention to the way the two levels of animal life are related eliminates the worrisome possibility of reduction of mental properties to physical ones and furthers the possibility of a purely naturalistic model of supervenience.

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Generated Spirit and Propositional Truth: Comments on Mueller and Atkins

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In the preface to Realms of Being, Santayana makes a well-known remark about his system of philosophy: “Openness too, is a form of architecture” (RB xviii). Part of the meaning of this remark is the idea that his ontological categories of essence, matter, truth, and spirit function as both the starting points and the limits of all our inquiries. Since his philosophy aims to clarify the primary categories of human thought, to comprehend a reality is to ultimately regard it as falling under one or more of the categories he distinguishes. Certainly, the categorial scheme Santayana constructs is capacious, even infinite in at least one direction. Yet he leaves for others, in particular those in the special sciences, the task of discovering some of logical, material, or psychological realities framed by his conceptual architecture.

The open conceptual architecture of Santayana’s philosophy sometimes attracts sympathetic readers for the same reason it repels critics. While some object that it leaves too “many doors open both in physics and in morals”, others see the possibility of finding a supportive home for one philosophical theory or another (RB xviii.). Various commentators, writing on a range of philosophical issues, have tried to find a place within Santayana’s conceptual architecture for theories that he might not have explicitly defended or developed in much detail.

Such is the case with both Veronica Mueller and Richard Atkins. While Mueller sees in Santayana’s system support for a particular theory of the mind-body relationship, Atkins claims to find in Santayana’s philosophy a hitherto unnoticed theory of propositions. Both present plausible philosophical theories that for the most part conform to the contours of Santayana’s conceptual architecture.

There is, however, a general difficulty that any sympathetic reader of Santayana must face when attempting to connect his philosophy to more recent philosophical theories: his ontological categories are so broad that they can prima facie appear to offer positive support for a theory when in fact they do not. The open conceptual architecture of Santayana’s system is inviting, but some philosophical theories are better situated within it than others. With that caveat in mind, I turn first to Mueller’s thesis that Santayana’s ontology supports a preferred interpretation of the supervenience relation between matter and spirit. I then turn to the theory of propositions that Atkins finds in Santayana’s philosophy.

Generated Spirit: Comments on Mueller

Mueller asserts that contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind often appeal to a notion of supervenience that encourages a reductive account of consciousness. In her view, this is a problem since reductive approaches fail to capture the intentional and moral aspects of experience. Since they fail in these ways,
Mueller objects that they hamper our attempts resolve the mind-body problem. She finds in Santayana’s philosophy a more plausible treatment of the phenomenal character of consciousness, as well as an ontology and epistemology that do not tend toward reductionism.

Mueller is correct to see in Santayana’s philosophy a richer account of consciousness than is typically found in recent discussions of the philosophy of mind. For one of the abiding themes in his philosophy is the spiritual life in all its emotional texture and depth. He would urge that along with the intentional and moral aspects of consciousness, reductive theories of mind fail to capture essentially all of the ways spirit expresses itself in human life.

What is of greater interest to Mueller, however, is the way in which Santayana describes the spirit-psyche relationship. She contends that he is able to avoid both strong and weak forms of reductionism. She defends this claim by noting that he rejects the thesis that psyche causes spirit and instead appeals to the term ‘generation’. Addressing this point, she writes: “the spirit-psyche relation is a non-reductive supervenience relation because it incorporates generation rather than simply strict causation” (p. 44). Now, if we assume that the notion of generation does not permit a reductive analysis of the spirit-psyche relationship, a fact which Mueller apparently takes for granted, then it is reasonable to conclude that Santayana does not fall into the typical supervenience trap. He can maintain that the material operations of the psyche are the source of spirit, but that spirit nevertheless retains a conceptual autonomy and ontological reality distinct from that of matter. Further, with causation removed from the spirit-psyche relationship, the epistemological attitude that “supervenience is the expectation that the supervening set is reducible to its subvenient base” is shown to be groundless (p. 47).

I believe Mueller has the basic picture of Santayana’s account of the spirit-psyche relationship correct. Her central point, that he claims that matter is generated and not caused by spirit, is textually accurate and could be a first step toward an alternative to reductionist theories of supervenience. However, what is less clear in her discussion of Santayana’s philosophy are 1) some of the underlying reasons that explain why he accepts a non-reductive but emergent account of spirit, and 2) how far her proposal goes toward shedding light on the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness while maintaining a ”purely naturalistic model of supervenience” (p. 49). My comments on Mueller that follow are mainly directed toward the first point. With regard to the second point, I briefly note the implications for the hard problem, which I believe are minor, as well as the implications for Santayana’s ontology, which I believe are major.

Mueller argues that Santayana’s appeal to generation instead of causation has the consequence of ruling out strong or fully reductive supervenient formulations of the spirit-psyche relationship. That might be true, but it is also unsurprising given that logical entailment between facts is precluded at the outset by Santayana’s rejection of necessary truths. Thus, it is not principally the notion of generation that bars necessary connections between spirit and psyche. For even if we insist on saying psyche causes spirit, this would not, for Santayana, result in logically necessary connections between spirit and psyche. In fact, it would seem closer to the truth to say that the main reason why Santayana rejects causality as
the correct way to describe the spirit-psyche relationship is not because of concerns over strong supervenience, but rather because the word ‘cause’ implies a temporally antecedent event followed by a consequent event, whereas the actuality of spirit is contemporaneous with the generative processes of matter. The main issue, however, is that for Santayana spirit emerging from matter is but one phase of material existence, and “existence being contingent, truth will be contingent also”, including the truth about whatever generative connections there are between spirit and psyche (RB 408).

In an earlier version of her paper, Mueller had claimed that Santayana’s non-reductive account of spirit is the “inevitable” consequence of his ontology. The term has since been removed from her paper and I believe rightly so. For it appeared to suggest that Santayana’s position on the spirit-psyche relationship is somehow a direct consequence of his ontological categories. However, there is nothing in Santayana’s categorial scheme that makes the emergence of spirit from matter an inevitability, whether spirit be caused or generated by matter. That fact is that the open architecture of his ontology is compatible with other hypotheses regarding the nature spirit. For example, Santayana asserts that panpsychism is a “conceivable hypothesis,” even though he rejects it (RB 375). Indeed, if we were to take Santayana’s ontology as universal categories of being and not merely the primary categories of human thought, then it seems we should be more inclined to accept a Spinozistic view of the mental, such as the one advocated by Chalmers, where consciousness is accepted as a basic ontological reality along with mass.¹

Allowing that more than one theory of mind is compatible with Santayana’s ontology, it follows that the emergence of mind from matter is not a corollary in his system. Rather, it is specific theory that is compatible with his ontology and one that rests on considerations secondary to his categorial scheme. Unfortunately, Santayana’s reasons for accepting emergentism are less obvious than one might wish. He offers only some hints as to why he is an emergentist. The following passage from Reason and Common Sense is representative of Santayana’s reasons for holding that spirit emerges from only from animal bodies:

How fine nature’s habits may be, where repetition begins, and down to what depth a mathematical treatment can penetrate, is a question for the natural sciences to solve. Whether consciousness, for instance, accompanies vegetative life, or even all motion, is a point to be decided solely by empirical analogy. When the exact physical conditions of thought are discovered in man, we may infer how far thought is diffused through the universe, for it will be coextensive with the conditions it will have been shown to have. Now, in a very rough way, we already know what these conditions are. They are first the existence of an organic body and then its possession of adaptable instincts, of instincts that can be modified by experience. (LR1 127)

¹ According to Chalmers, the science of mind is to progress by giving up on reductionism and instead looking for bridging laws between the different kinds of fundamental realities. See Chalmers 2003.
Since our only way of determining when a being is conscious is by "empirical analogy", we are constrained to limit our attribution of consciousness to animal bodies. Although Santayana is sometimes willing to countenance the notion that feeling may accompany vegetative life, and he even strains the imagination by occasionally hypothesizing that spirit might lead a disembodied existence (RB 565, 590; LR3 140), his considered view is that "to add a mental phase to every part and motion of the cosmos is...an audacious fancy. It violates all empirical analogy" (LR1 279). And he is modest in his speculations about spirit. "Beyond this planet and apart from the human race," he writes, "experience is too little imaginable to be interesting" (LR3 153). In sum, while spirit might exist in forms of matter other than animal minds, since we are familiar only with spirit on the human scale, Santayana regards it as an emergent reality attributable only to animal bodies similar to our own.

I close my comments on Mueller by asking how far we might see Santayana as furthering our understanding of the hard problem of consciousness. It seems that if we accept that he is an emergentist, then the mystery of how matter emerges from consciousness remains all but untouched. We have a change in terminology, from 'cause' to 'generate', indicting how the spirit-psyche relationship should be temporally construed, but nothing more. That said, if Mueller is right in her interpretation of spirit-psyche relationship, then I believe broader questions about the completeness of Santayana's ontology are immediately raised.

Santayana is best categorized as an epiphenomenalist. He did not like this categorization since the term 'epiphenomenal' implies that body and mind are two substances. Yet as the term is used it in contemporary discussions it accurately describes his view that spirit is generated by the body but is itself impotent. Spirit is a "parasite," Santayana states, but we might think it is a highly paradoxical one since he holds that "[it] consumes nothing of the substance on which it lives" (LGS 1:115). This view of the mind-body relationship has been widely criticized. Some philosophers, such as Kim, take a strong line and maintain that epiphenomenalism and eliminativism amount to the same thing.\(^2\) Santayana would of course emphatically disagree with this equation. Nevertheless, many people find epiphenomenalism counter-intuitive. Philosophers who accept it usually do so reluctantly and as a last resort. Santayana was no reluctant epiphenomenalist, but there are indications that he struggled to formulate his theory.\(^3\) For these reasons, critics urge that is an open question whether we can genuinely comprehend a spiritual reality that is generated by matter but does not possess any sort of generative powers of its own. Here one might be tempted to criticize Santayana's ontology


\(^3\) In a 1917 letter to Charles Strong, Santayana wrote that while working on a paper that discussed "existence", "consciousness", etc...I have run up against points which have puzzled me and made me vacillate in my own views' (LGS 2:288). In an earlier letter to Strong on the same topic, he wrote that 'to say that, as sensuous and poetic manifestations, they [i.e. moments of spirit] do not exist seems to me a hopeless torturing of language.' (LGS 2:10)
as follows: it comes from nothing, since for him there is no explaining the existence of matter, and it goes nowhere, since the dynamism of matter terminates in a non-dynamic actuality.

If we reject the notion of an ontological parasite that consumes nothing of the substance on which it lives, then either additions or novel modifications to Santayana’s four-term ontology will be required in order to explain the spirit-psyche relationship. Indeed, this would appear to be the case even if we set aside concerns about epiphenomenalism. For while Santayana accepts the existence of matter as a brute fact (“Apologia Pro Mente Sua” PGS 505), he does not similarly regard the emergence of spirit from psyche. For him, the emergence of spirit from psyche, unlike the existence of matter, is theoretically explainable. And it seems clear that any explanation of the spirit-psyche relationship will have to go beyond observing that the existence of matter is the ground for the actuality of spirit. A richer ontology is required in order to explain how spirit emerges from matter, assuming this fact is explainable. In sum, while Mueller may have correctly characterized Santayana’s spirit-psyche relationship as one of generative emergence, this characterization has the consequence of raising questions about the completeness of his ontological system as a whole.

**Propositional Truth: Comments on Atkins**

Richard Atkins’s paper “Santayana on Propositions” is a welcome foray into an underdeveloped area of Santayana’s philosophy. He argues that Santayana possesses a previously unnoticed theory of propositions. The fact that Santayana has a theory of propositions is remarkable, Atkins claims, not only because other commentators on Santayana’s philosophy have overlooked it, but also because the theory, as Atkins presents it, is remarkably well-formed and conventional. As he puts it, once the pieces of Santayana’s theory of propositions are assembled, it looks “very much like the account of propositions widely embraced by philosophers” (p. 27).

Atkins makes a compelling case that Santayana’s ontology contains the conceptual resources for a theory of propositions. However, as with Mueller’s discussion of supervenience, I do not think the theory of propositions that Atkins delineates neatly fits within Santayana’s ontological architecture. There are at least two basic problems that cast doubt on the theory Atkins presents. One problem is that the theory does not appear to consider Santayana’s doctrine of non-literal or symbolic knowledge. A second problem also concerns literalness, specifically, erroneously taking some of Santayana’s statements literally when they are metaphorical and rhetorical, and then presenting the literally-interpreted statements as unmistakable yet somehow overlooked support for a theory of propositions. Taken together, these difficulties make doubtful Atkins’s assertion that Santayana has a theory of propositions similar to the one widely embraced by other philosophers. Atkins’s paper touches on many fine points regarding Santayana’s treatment of propositions; however, in what follows, I focus my comments on these two problems. I begin with the second, which points to a difference in textual interpretation.
In the preface to the *Realm of Truth*, Atkins finds what he takes to be incontrovertible evidence that Santayana held a theory of propositions. He notes, for example, Santayana’s claim that “the truth properly speaking is the sum of all true propositions” (RB 402). Finding other, similar statements, Atkins summarily concludes that “[t]hese quotations alone are sufficient to show” that Santayana believed there are propositions and that these “are bearers of truth and falsity” (p. 31). Atkins notes that several of the quotations he cites are from works published before *The Realm of Truth*, works in which he claims—somewhat doubtfully given the origins of the *Realm of Truth*—that Santayana had already “explained” his theory of truth (p. 27). He finds it “surprising” that these statements have been overlooked and hypothesizes that Santayana’s theory of propositions has been overlooked by other commentators because Santayana says comparatively little about propositions and tends to talk about them as essences rather than as part of a theory of propositional truth. However, I suggest the statements in the preface to the *Realm of Truth* that Atkins highlights have not been overlooked by past commentators—after all, the quotes are featured prominently in the preface of the book and are well known from Santayana’s earlier works—but rather have been given an interpretation different from Atkins’s.

To be sure, the quotes that Atkins’s cites, taken a face value, certainly do appear to support the theory of propositions that he defends. However, the quotes must be read with caution. For Santayana also makes statements in the same preface that contradict the ones Atkins draws our attention to, such as: “truth is not an opinion, even an ideally true one” and “no opinion can embrace it all [i.e. the truth]” (RB 403-4). Atkins is no doubt aware of these statements. One way to remove the apparent inconsistency amongst the them is to hold, as he does, that “Santayana has a restrictive theory of the truth that need not readily map on to all of our uses of the predicate ‘is true’ ” (p. 36). Accepting this view, we can then say that the quotes Atkins appeals to apply only to Santayana’s theory of propositional truth, while the other quotes, which deny that truth has anything to do with propositions, refer only to Santayana’s theory of ontological truth.

This solution sounds reasonable, but the main problem with it is that Santayana’s overarching aim in *The Realm of Truth* is to delineate an ontological account of truth. As noted, Santayana does occasionally refer to propositional truth in *The Realm of Truth*, and these references call for explanation; but the central thesis of his book is that truth is an ontological reality distinct from descriptors of any sort. Given this thesis, I suggest that the quotes Atkins cites to support his position are not meant to be taken literally and so are not conclusive evidence for a theory of propositional truth. For example, when Santayana states that “truth properly means the sum of all true propositions, or what omniscience would assert,” he is not explaining how truth is inextricably linked to propositions or assertions or God. Rather, he is attempting to formulate his ontological theory of truth in lan-

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4 I say “somewhat doubtfully” since Santayana originally intended his ontology to consist of three realms: essence, matter, and spirit. *The Realm of Truth* was a relatively late addition to the original three and Santayana strongly suggests that it was not developed to his complete satisfaction (LGS 6:48-49).
guage familiar to critics. He is trying to establish the unitary ontological reality of the truth as opposed to “‘truth’ in the abstract sense of correctness” (RB 403). So, when Santayana states that truth is “that standard comprehensive description”, he does not literally mean that truth is a description, for this would contradict his central thesis. The purpose of such statements is rather to help formulate and put in more familiar terms an ontological account of truth that has nothing to do with descriptors and everything to do with comprehensiveness and objectivity.

Accepting that Santayana’s statements about truth being a “comprehensive description” of facts are rhetorical ways of motivating his ontological account of truth, we are still left with the problem that Sprigge first raised about a lack of anything like “a truth” in Santayana’s philosophy. Of course, there is nothing contradictory in holding that Santayana’s statements about truth being bound up with descriptions are rhetorical and also holding that 1) he needs a theory of a truth and 2) that his philosophy, as Atkins claims, has the resources for formulating such a theory. However, any such theory will be secondary to Santayana’s ontological account of truth. It will not, as Atkins contends in a comment about non-verbal descriptions, be required for Santayana’s ontological account “to make any sense at all” (6). On this point, Santayana’s position is the opposite of Atkins’s. For Santayana maintains that if “there were no absolute truth, all-inclusive and comprehensive and eternal”, then our opinions (and non-verbal descriptions) could not be more or less correct (RB xv). For this reason, ontological truth is a precondition for any theory (propositional or otherwise) of a truth and not vice versa.

Atkins claims that for Santayana propositions are “truth-apt” or capable of being true or false. More specifically, as Atkins puts it, a proposition “is true just in case the essence was exemplified by the substance indicated by the proposition” (p. 32). While the notion of propositions being truth-apt is common parlance in contemporary discussions of propositional truth, the notion is not so easily grafted onto Santayana’s philosophy. A couple of obstacles stand in the way of doing so. First, Atkins asserts that a proposition is an essence that “describes [a] fact whether or not anyone ever uses it to describe [a] fact” (p. 35). This leads to an unusual consequence for Santayana’s philosophy, namely, that there will be propositional truths that are not part of the ontological realm of truth since there will be unexemplified true propositions. Atkins dismisses this odd consequence by pointing to Santayana’s restrictive theory of “the truth.” However, the difficulty is not so easily removed for Santayana maintains that essences, including essences that define propositions, are “never true intrinsically” (RB 448). Contrary to Atkins’s assertion about unexemplified propositions being true “whether anyone uses them to describe the facts or not” (p. 36), Santayana holds that an idea, such as one in propositional form, “can be true or false only if it reports or contradicts some part of the truth: and in order to do this it must be other than an inert essence...It must be a judgment affirming a given essence of an ulterior objects” (RB 448). Atkins is right that for Santayana “the proposition qua essence is an

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5 This point seems to be at the heart of Sprigge’s complaint that there is no such thing as ‘a truth’ in Santayana’s system. Sprigge worries that Santayana breaks too sharply from the
eternal immutable possible object of judgment”; but it does not follow, as Atkins infers, that “the truth and falsity of the proposition is entirely independent of any judgment” (p. 39). For unlike actual judgments that, according to Santayana involve an indexical element, propositions qua essences do not involve an indexical element. To insist otherwise is for Santayana to maintain an insufficiently de-psychologized view of propositions. In short, given that propositions are neither true nor false until used in an actual judgment, Santayana’s view of propositional truth conflicts with the theory Atkins defends.

The second difficulty for Santayana’s theory of propositions as Atkins presents it is that it appears to imply a traditional correspondence relationship between the essences used as descriptors in a proposition and the essences instantiated by matter. However, Santayana’s theory of knowledge is founded in part by rejecting the traditional understanding of correspondence. In his view, “[o]ur worst difficulties arise from the assumption that knowledge of existences ought to be literal, whereas knowledge of existences has no need, no propensity, and no fitness to be literal” (SAF 101). Since knowledge is symbolic rather than literal, propositions are not true by mirroring the essences of matter. Discussing this point, Santayana states: “the images of sense used to describe those objects are not found there, but are created by organs of sense in the observer: and the syntax of thought by which these appearances, which in themselves are pure essences, are turned into predicates of substance, is a mere expedient of human logic” (RB 458).

One implication from Santayana’s doctrine of symbolic knowledge is that if we insist truth-apt propositions involve a qualitative correspondence between human cognition and the essences of ontological truth, then we are saddled with something approaching an “error-theory” of truth since we will be wrongly taking mere expediens of human logic for truth (RB 455). In order to avoid this implication, Santayana’s doctrine of symbolic knowledge must be seen as a presupposition of his theory of propositions; and this will set his theory apart from most others. It will also align it more closely with pragmatic accounts of truth.

If we take Santayana’s doctrine of symbolic knowledge as a presupposition of his theory of propositions, then many of the concerns that Atkins raises are either answered or cast in a new light. Take, for example, Atkins’s worries about vagueness. He wonders if vague statements can be true for Santayana and, if so, if this means matter exemplifies vague essences. However, in Santayana’s view, there is no vagueness in the realm of matter and so none in the realm of truth. Nor is the intuition of an essence, be it propositional or some other form of representation, ever vague in itself. For Santayana, the notion of vagueness applies only to symbolic knowledge. He holds that vagueness is “an adventitious quality, which a given appearance may be said to possess in relation to an object presumed to have other determinations” (SAF 94-95). The other worries Atkins raises, such as those about counterfactuals or disjunctive statements, should also be seen as issues to

Moore-Russell tradition which invokes the notion of a “stack of [propositional] truths and falsehoods, which become objects of judgments” (Sprigge.169).
be worked out in a theory of symbolic knowledge or, more generally, in a theory of signs. This last claim might be congenial to Atkins given that he has shown how, for Santayana, propositions are but subset of “descriptions in general”—that is, kinds of signs—and the remarkable similarities he finds between Santayana’s and Peirce’s analyses of propositions.

In a chapter in The Realm of Truth on the “interplay between truth and logic,” Santayana argues, as Atkins notes in his paper, that there is no truth in logic or mathematics. What Santayana means is that logical consistency is not the same as ontological truth. In a side note, however, he allows that “there is a kind of truth internal to discourse” and he adds that he has “no desire to quarrel with mankind for using words as they chose, and talking truth also in cases where there is only consistency” (RB 426). Atkins has showed that Santayana’s philosophy allows us to say something similar about propositional truth. This sort truth will not be “internal to discourse,” but truth in the signs and symbols of human cognition. Propositions, insofar as they supply the content for beliefs, will be true insofar as they successfully guide our actions. Santayana once disparaged the pragmatic account of truth as failing to capture the “underlying truth” and promoting only the aforementioned “abstract relation of correctness” (COUS 155). Yet, if we don’t wish to be quarrelsome, we must recognize and explain the fact that we often speak of “a truth.” It is to Atkins’s credit that he goes a long way toward showing how this might be accomplished within the open architecture of Santayana’s system of philosophy.

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Santayana, George


Santayana on the Holocaust and the Nazis

On Friday 16 February 2018, the George Santayana Society in conjunction with the Berlin Practical Philosophy International Forum e.V. held a seminar on the internet on Santayana and spirituality. A video of the seminar is available at http://berlinphilosophyforum.org/santayana-spiritual-life-webinar-recording/.

During the seminar, Chris Skowroński, the moderator, raised the issue of Santayana’s lack of explicit comments on the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis. Following the seminar, Professor Skowroński raised the issue again in an open letter to Herman Saatkamp. This generated a series of email messages in the two weeks that followed. Daniel Pinkas and I had been discussing for some time making a translation of his essay “Santayana, le judaïsme et les Juifs.” During the email exchange, Daniel Pinkas agreed to work on the translation. What follows is an edited version of the email exchange, which serves as an introduction to the translated essay, which follows on page 69. The editing of the email messages consists of dropping many references to immediate personal circumstances; correcting spelling, word omissions, and obvious typographical errors; and inserting textual citations.¹ To preserve the spontaneous flavor of the discussion, there is no spelling out of abbreviations nor standardization of spelling, capitalization, and abbreviations where the context make the meaning obvious or where more than one variant is in common use.

Richard M Rubin

Subject: Santayana on the Holocaust and the Nazis
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2018 17:25:46 +0100
From: Chris Skowronski <skris65@gmail.com>
To: Herman Saatkamp <hermes3798@outlook.com>
CC: Pinkas Daniel (HES) <daniel.pinkas@hesge.ch>, Richard M. Rubin <rmrubin@acm.org>, Flamm, Matthew C. <MFlamm@rockford.edu>, Glenn Tiller <glenn.tiller@tamucc.edu>, Michael Brodrick <michael.brodrick@gmail.com>

Dear Herman,

I come back to our exchange of thoughts during yesterday's seminar. I still claim, apparently against you, that Santayana was silent on the Holocaust and the Nazi atrocities although he had time after the war to freely publish something, esp in DP.

I have checked the indexes of DP, PP, and Letters, vol 7 and 8, and I have found not a single word on this.

¹ The scholarly concern to preserve everything in original correspondence exactly as it was has not been strictly adhered to. Nevertheless, everything that appears here was written in the email exchange by the original correspondents and has been reviewed by them. In some cases, they have suggested omissions or provided footnoted supplements to the edited text. A draft of the complete original exchange may be obtained upon request.
Could you enlighten me, please, where Santayana criticized directly any of these two?

Btw; I am still thinking why Santayana devoted so much energy to criticize liberalism instead of Nazism; he could have done it, for example, in an appendix in *Dominations and Powers* or something. I think such issues are important if we discuss the spiritual and moral aspect of Santayana's philosophy. I simply think that Auschwitz was the worst thing the humanity has produced and there's something wrong for a humanist to be silent on this, whatever his spirituality might say or not say.

This aspect is also important to me for this reason: should we, philosophers related to Santayana, be kind of public philosophers and if so, does it mean it's our obligation to openly discuss the most important topics of the day. Our *Terrorism* conference in Berlin seems to have given positive answers to these questions.²

It was great to see you, Herman, again.

Chris

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On Sat, Feb 17, 2018 at 9:08 PM, Herman Saatkamp

<hermes3798@outlook.com> wrote:

Chris,

Here is a quick, off the cuff, response.

You may not know my ancestral Jewish background, and that I am an honorary, life-time member of a synagogue in Margate, New Jersey. (One rabbi joked that they were the only ones who would accept me because of my views of religion and god—perhaps similar to that of Santayana). At Stockton University, we had the largest Holocaust Resource Center in the U.S. and were honored by Yad Vashem as having the largest number of holocaust memorial events of any center in the world.

Hence, I share your views about the horror of the Holocaust. But I also understand Santayana’s views and his naturalistic approach as well as his isolation in Rome during this period.

However, there is an extensive chapter in McCormick’s biography on Santayana and Ezra Pound, particularly pp 405-430 that provide insight into Santayana’s views and his disagreement with Pound and others regarding fascism. Santayana sees war as a natural outcome of societies and the atrocities as a part of that. He was appalled by the atrocities of WWI on all sides and said so along with comments about the depravity of wars.

While in Rome, he was largely isolated from news regarding the WWII and any letters sent were censored or not delivered. In a 1950 letter to Corliss Lamont he noted that he was never a fascist, but he noted the societal order that Mussolini initially brought to a chaotic Italy, and only later came the disaster of Mussolini’s dictatorship.

When he wrote to Pepe Sastre in 1943, Santayana noted that WWII did not cause him as much difficulty as WWI no matter how terrible WWII was because “I scarcely read the newspapers, and I am in good health, much better than when I

² See the review on p. 115.
lived in hotels” (LGS 27 January 1943). “Naturally the soul suffers when one
hears of so many horrors, but at my age, knowing that I am useless, I console
myself with my books and my philosophy, as if the present were ancient history”
(LGS 13 August 1943—see “Santayana in 1943, p. 8). Throughout his life, he
maintained his sense of Spanish heritage and his view that he was an outsider, a
traveler in a world where he did not belong. The Spanish sense of tragedy is a part
of his philosophy, poems, short stories, and literature. He was offered Roman
citizenship during the time of Mussolini but he turned it down retaining his Span-
ish citizenship. Even in America, he was true to his roots, never becoming an
American citizen.

In addition, the censorship of his autobiography regarding comments about
friends, and the need from the U.S. government to know of any comments about
the war, etc., were limits on what he could say or write.

Although, like you, I find the lack of renunciation of the Holocaust tragic, I be-
lieve what Santayana would say is that from a naturalistic historical perspective, it
could be seen as similar to other events in history. When the Christians recaptured
Spain in 1492 and began the inquisition, the Jews were killed or removed from
Spain, their graveyards were desecrated and tombstones turned into rubble (as in
Nazi Germany and elsewhere). In the U.S., slavery and the Civil War produced horrifc aspects of the worst of human nature. Santayana at his age saw this as
one of the deplorable aspects of human nature that will likely continue to repeat
itself. His individualism and naturalism caused him not to see it as so different
from the overall history of human beings or of animal life in general.

My hope is that he is wrong and there may be ways of changing the course of
human history, but I fear he may be right. As much as we have worked to change
the racism in the U.S., to build a clear equality for races and gender, it appears
now that we are taking clear steps back and white nationalism is on the rise, just
as it is in some European countries.

From the perspective of history, Santayana may be right. But my hope is that
societies (not just individuals) can improve, honor individual lives as well as
building societies where more people prosper and recognize our commonality.
Santayana was not optimistic about such progress, and thought the American and
democratic liberal affirmation of essential progress through capitalism and democ-
ratric governments should be seen through the light of history, as one aspect of
human history that will inevitably change, give rise to other societal tendencies,
as well as make possible the best of human life as well as the most deplorable
aspects of human life.

I have actively engaged in trying to reshape American history in a progressive,
liberal fashion. But I have to admit that the current trend in the U.S. is clearly

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3 The genocides currently going on throughout the world are potentially on a scale of the
Nazi holocausts and if continued could be even greater. HS

4 I began working in the Civil Rights movement in the early 1960s, led elements of the
Open Housing movement in both Louisville, Kentucky and in Nashville, Tennessee. I re-
sponded to the request by Dr. King for those trained in non-violence to assist in Memphis,
Tennessee during the garbage workers’ strike, but I arrived the day after Dr. King was mur-
dered. I was part of what Dr. King called the “ground crew” in organizing demonstrations
moving us backward. The racism and desire to limit who can vote, while building an oligarchical government, are not things I anticipated in all my activities. Perhaps Santayana, if he were beside me, would be smiling and simply saying “think about it and decide what is most important for you.”

After all, I am now retired and useless, with perhaps a decade of good living in front of me if I am fortunate. I must leave to others whatever changes may be in the offing for the U.S., Europe, and beyond, and perhaps I should do what Santayana did: observe it, but not participate.

Perhaps he is right and I am wrong. Progress in human society may be very limited and the undercurrents of the worse of human nature are never far below the surface of human and societal activities.

At the same time, there are clearly aspects of life that make it worthwhile and even delightful. Those are the aspects one cherishes, particularly in one’s final years.

Best,
Herman Saatkamp

On Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 4:56 AM,
Richard M. Rubin <rmrubin@acm.org> wrote:

Chris, Herman, et alia,

In the letter to Lamont that Herman cites, GS wrote:

I was never a Fascist in the sense of belonging to that Italian party, or to any nationalistic or religious party. But considered, as it is for a naturalist, a product of the generative order of society, a nationalistic or religious institution will probably have its good sides, and be better perhaps than the alternative that presents itself at some moment in some place. That is what I thought, and still think, Mussolini’s dictatorship was for Italy in its home government. Compare with the disorderly socialism that preceded or the impotent party chaos that has followed it. If you had lived through it from beginning to end, as I have, you would admit this. But Mussolini personally was a bad man and Italy a half-baked political unit; and the militant foreign policy adopted by Fascism was ruinous in its artificiality and folly. But internally, Italy was until the foreign militancy and mad alliances were adopted, a stronger, happier, and more united country than it is or had ever been. Dictatorships are surgical operations, but some diseases require them, only the surgeon must be an expert, not an adventurer. (LGS 8 December 1950)

Notice that only reference to the Nazis is the oblique one in the phrase "mad alliances." As for Germany, Santayana had already written during World War I, in EGP, which he agreed to have republished in 1939, that its "national creed...has

and in meeting with officials. Throughout my career, I aided organizations working for racial and gender equality, including meeting with every President of the U.S. or members of their administration since Jimmy Carter. HS.

5 See p. 61.
its martyrs by now by the million, and its victims among unbelievers are even more numerous" (EGP 83). Did he have to say more?

The unpublished screenplay that McCormick included as an appendix to his biography shows regret about antisemitism.

Although the references are indirect, they show Santayana was not entirely indifferent. Should he have made a more forceful denunciation? Santayana was Santayana. There were Italians far less educated than he who knew Mussolini was a bad man long before Santayana acknowledged it. As Herman said in the seminar, it is important to study Santayana, but that doesn't mean you have to follow him.

Richard

From: Flamm, Matthew C.
Sent: Saturday, February 17, 2018 10:37 AM
To: Chris Skowronski <skris65@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Santayana on the Holocaust and the Nazis

Hi Chris:

Having recently tried to write an extensive analysis comparing Heidegger and Santayana I well appreciate the ethical injunction to consider the question of relative silence on the Nazi atrocities (the infamous "Black Notebooks" were just coming out when I was full throttle in the middle of the project).

I suspect maybe Herman is thinking of informal contexts, letters and so forth, where Santayana gestures at the subject, but agreeing with you, I think it's a case of relative silence there (and, as Herman said himself, a troubling tendency to suggest that the whole phenomenon was somehow "natural" or part of the proverbial order of things).

Wonderful seeing you electronically yesterday Chris, thanks again and hoping we can connect again soon, best,

Matt

On Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 11:39 AM, Chris Skowronski <skris65@gmail.com> wrote:

Dear Friends,

thank you for a very vivid discussion about the issue. Esp, Herman, thank you for your very interesting and long email.

Let me conclude all this in points, and their order is accidental;

1. Richard; you quote Santayana saying “internally, Italy was until the foreign militancy and mad alliances were adopted, a stronger, happier, and more united country than it is or had ever been. ”

In reply, I am recalling Matteo Santarelli's discussions (he presented a text on the Mafia for the Terrorism volume and I very often meet him in Berlin to discuss) in which he said (and he studies Italian mafia issues for years) that one of the reasons the Italian mafia was born and got influence and still has a great influence amongst the population over there, was the brutal way Italy was united or rather, southern Italy was conquered by the North starting in the 19th century. I remem-
ber him saying that the mafia people reiterate that what they do is perhaps morally bad, but the (Italian) State is still much worse, it and gives much fuel for the mafia 'ethics'. All this, if true, contradicts Santayana’s claim about a happy united Italy

2. Herman and Richard

There is hardly any connection, in my question, between the Italian Fascism and the Nazis's Holocaust. I asked only about the latter, esp. that Santayana had a wonderful occasion to do it a few years AFTER the war, that is, while publishing DP, adding even one page of an appendix or something like this. That's why I don't buy the argument about the censorship during the WWII and his talks with E. Pound in the 1940s.

On the other hand, I understand some of Herman's explanations and I must admit (criticizing myself now) that it's perhaps very easy to criticize Santayana from today's perspective, especially that I am innocent as to seeing a war, except the martial law in Poland in the 1980's (seeing indeed tanks on the streets and machine-gun equipped soldiers watching us, secondary school boys and girls, during breaks on our schoolyard). He witnessed hell from all the quarters around so.....well, anyway, I still seem to think it's Santayana's weakest point anytime we talk about him as a moralist and a sage that should offer a sort of ethical approach towards life in the social context. Perhaps, on the other hand, his view that war and killing is something natural is a strong philosophy from the point of view of an individual approach to life and as to how to deal with the tragedies around...some kind of a Stoic approach in a new version

3. Matthew

I think you will agree that, fortunately, Santayana cannot be compared to Heidegger in this respect. I know that the head of the Heidegger Society resigned in the wake of the publication of the Black Notebooks in which Heidegger's antisemitism looked central, and much more central than previously thought. Fortunately, no dilemma of this sort is in front of our president, Richard Rubin.

4. Herman and Richard

I wish Appendix C (McCormick) had been published in DP

5. Herman

You say: “there are clearly aspects of life that make it worthwhile and even delightful. Those are the aspects one cherishes, particularly in one’s final years.” Please, do not say/write that you are useless anymore...

best wishes to all

Chris

On 2/18/2018 7:31 AM, Herman Saatkamp wrote:

Although my personal and professional life, and political views, are quite different from that of Santayana, I do think there is more to admire about his life and work than there is not to admire. Particularly in this time of change when America will soon no longer be the dominant political and economic world power, and China will most likely rise to that position, Santayana's work may be the most important work of any philosopher who has lived and taught in the U.S.
Chris, you should remember that in the U.S. during the time of his writing his autobiography, there was considerable censorship of remarks about Jews. America turned away many, many Jewish refugees during this time, even with the knowledge of the Holocaust and what was happening to Jews, homosexuals, mentally challenged children and adults, gypsies, and any opposition to fascism. Even in Persons and Places, the entire section on Spinoza, where Santayana refers to him as his “master and model” (I believe those are the words), was removed from publication and was only reinstated in the critical edition. D&P was taken from notes Santayana began at Harvard and made over a very long period of time. Scribner’s was anxious to have another book from Santayana (since two were major sellers for the company and they wanted more, and Daniel Cory needed funds as well). As a result, D&P remains a bit disorganized and a collection of thoughts written through several decades. It was published after Santayana’s death, and you can read the letters that relate to it.

Best,
Herman Saatkamp

On 2/18/2018 8:32 AM,
Herman Saatkamp wrote:
I believe I remember seeing the document for Appendix C when I was at the HRC transcribing and reading the material that Daniel Cory had sold to them.

Best,
Herman Saatkamp

On Feb 23, 2018, at 9:47 AM,
Daniel Pinkas <daniel.pinkas@hesge.ch> wrote:
Dear Friends,
I have been following with interest, but from the sidelines, your exchanges about Santayana on the Holocaust and the Nazis. It so happens that my brother is here in Geneva this week, and we have had so many time-consuming family matters to attend to, that I have been unable to participate in the discussion.

As Richard knows, there is a short chapter in my book (in French) on Santayana titled “Santayana, Judaism, and the Jews” (see p. 69), so I have thought a little bit about some of these matters, and I intend to share these thoughts with you as soon as things calm down.

In any case, many thanks, Chris, for organizing the Webinar; it was very enjoyable to hear and see you all, although I wish I had prepared a little more my interventions.

All the best,
Daniel
De : Herman Saatkamp <hermes3798@outlook.com>
Envoyé : vendredi, 23 février 2018 16:59:24
À : Pinkas Daniel (HES)
Cc : Chris Skowronski; Richard M. Rubin; Flamm, Matthew C.;
     Michael Brodrick; Glenn Tiller
Objet : Re: Santayana on the Holocaust and the Nazis

Daniel,

Will appreciate your joining the conversation.

There are several books on Harvard’s anti-Semitic features during the time that Santayana was there. They too are quite intriguing and capture views found in American academia at the time.

Best,
Herman Saatkamp

On Feb 27, 2018, at 2:06 AM,
Pinkas Daniel (HES) <daniel.pinkas@hesge.ch> wrote:

Herman,

Harvard's anti-semitic features(cf. T.S. Eliot) are one ingredient , but you have to add a Spanish-catholic traditional element and then sprinkle with French Maurrassian ideas in order to get Santayana's particular brew.

Best,
Daniel

From: Herman Saatkamp <hermes3798@outlook.com>
Date: Tuesday, February 27, 2018 at 7:15 AM
To: "Pinkas Daniel (HES)" daniel.pinkas@hesge.ch
Cc: Chris Skowronski <skris65@gmail.com>, "Richard M. Rubin"
    <rmrubin@acm.org>, "MFlamm@Rockford.edu" <MFlamm@rockford.edu>,
    Michael Brodrick <michael.brodrick@gmail.com>, "Tiller, Glenn"
    Glenn.Tiller@tamucc.edu
Subject: Re: Santayana on the Holocaust and the Nazis

Even so, Santayana’s individualism resulted in a number of lifetime Jewish friends, and he hosted many well-known Jewish students in his room at Harvard as they discussed socialism, etc. Even when the Jewish students were relegated to live in separate dormitories, etc., that were given slanderous names by others including the President of Harvard.

Best,
Herman Saatkamp

On Feb 27, 2018, at 12:13 PM,
Tiller, Glenn <Glenn.Tiller@tamucc.edu> wrote:

Thanks to all who have contributed to this post. I have always been vexed by Santayana’s anti-Semitism. There is no basis for it in his moral philosophy. His philosophical criticisms of Hebraic religion (or Protestantism) is one thing, but his singling out of Jews (“my doctor, who is a Jew, and a very nice man” and so forth) is another. I once discussed this issue with Richard Lyon and asked him if he ever heard Santayana make anti-Semitic remarks. Our conversation went beyond San-
tayana and anti-Semitism, as I was also speculating why Santayana said virtually nothing about US slavery and the plight of black folks in America. For the record, I have posted Richard [Lyon]’s email reply to my email (not included) below. Richard’s email shows that Santayana was sadly still prone to making casual anti-Semitic remarks even after WWII, when he presumably knew about the concentration camps and the mass killing of Jews.

Best,
Glenn

January 20, 2010
To: Glenn Tiller
Subject: anti-semitism: further comments

Dear Glenn:

I think of only one passage in my meetings with GS in which he referred to a Jew. He told me one afternoon that he had received a letter the previous day from a young man who asked if he might come to see him together with his girlfriend. The man's name, GS said, was obviously that of a Jew. He had responded with a note telling the young man he would be glad to have his visit—and that of your "fair friend." He chuckled then, amused by his irony in calling a Jewish princess "fair." But the joke was not funny and not clever, and while it may have been a mark of advancing senility (hard to believe) it was clearly a mark of his tendency to categorize "the Jew." My suggestion that Santayana's animus against the Jews may have derived from his opposition to worldly self-serving, overweening ambition, would require support by quotation from his letters—and there are several adjectives he deploys which seem to indicate that vice as one attributed to Jews. But against the old usurer stereotype we need to notice the behavior, let's say, of white male Caucasian Americans. Why not go there if you want models of go-getting self-interest? For too many years the U.S. national anthem has been "I'll Do It My Way." If you want to hear the hum and buzz of greed try Wall Street. A long time ago, on learning of Santayana's attraction to Celine, I meant to track down his writings. I never did, and I see now, based on your reports, that I was well-served by remaining in ignorance. I'll write again soon with some comments about the issues you raise in your last paragraphs.

Best wishes, Dick

On 2/27/2018 12:19 PM,
Herman Saatkamp wrote:

Glenn,

Dick and I had similar conversations. Glad you preserved it in emails.

Best,
Herman Saatkamp
Santayana, Judaism, and the Jews

About 15 years ago, I published what happened to be the first book in French on George Santayana since the publication of Jacques Duron’s monumental La Pensée de George Santayana (1952). The book was titled Santayana et l’Amérique du Bon Ton (Santayana and Genteel America) and contained a longish introduction to Santayana’s philosophy, six of Santayana’s best-known essays on America and American philosophy translated for the first time into French, as well as the following short essay on “Santayana, Judaism, and the Jews”. In the preface, I explained that “th[is] essay, published as an appendix, examines a rather unsettling facet of the philosopher and represents, besides, a modest contribution to the study of the cultural and psychological roots of anti-Semitism. It goes without saying that, as an admirer of Santayana’s work, I would have preferred not to have to write it, but it is a subject on which it was impossible for me to remain silent.”

The following pages are devoted to a troubling, perhaps even painful, aspect of Santayana’s character and thought, namely his relationship to Judaism and to Jews. On this point, Santayana’s distinctive insight and lucidity, his ability to imaginatively adopt alien perspectives, often give way to conventional prejudice and contempt. Opinions on this matter tend to differ somewhat, however. For John McCormick, Santayana’s biographer, “his position with respect to the Jews . . . was tainted by prejudice unworthy of a man of his fineness in other matters, and scarcely comprehensible in the man who wrote The Life of Reason and The Realms of Being (McCormick 1991, 359). He notes that “Santayana accepted the conventional anti-Semitism of the Boston and Cambridge of his youth” and that “the Catholic training and his strong Spanish inheritance . . . reinforced [this] all-but universal American prejudice” (McCormick 1987, 214), adding that “the best that can be said of [Santayana’s anti-Semitism] is that it was not of [Ezra] Pound’s stripe” and that “it is modified by evidence in the marginalia in several of his books that he reconnoitered and skirmished with the tendency” (McCormick 1987, 214-215). Horace Kallen, who was Santayana’s Jewish assistant at Harvard, sees things somewhat differently: “There is a distinction to be made. Santayana’s condemnation of what he called the Hebraic tradition . . . had nothing to do with living Jews as such. As it happened . . . most of the students who were meaningful to him and to whom he was meaningful, were Jews” (Lamont 38-39). As for Anthony Woodward, he considers that “Santayana was not anti-Semitic in any deeply damaging sense” (Woodward 109), sanctioning, incidentally, the disturbing idea of an irrational, yet innocuous, hatred of a group, race or religion. Be that as it may, the appalling reaction of French Heideggerians following the “revelations” of Heidegger’s embrace of Nazism and anti-Semitism, their utter inability to face the facts and draw philosophical consequences from them, provides the very example of what is to be avoided in such cases.

Santayana’s autobiography provides a good starting point for an inquiry into his relationship to Judaism. At the beginning of chapter II, entitled “My Father”, Santayana wonders about the origin of his name (inviting a psychoanalytic, Lacanian, reading of this passage). The name Santayana, he explains, derives “by
phonetic corruption” from the name of a small village in the Cantabrian Mountains originally called Santa Juliana and today Santillana. This village is near Santander and the village of Espinosa, from which Spinoza’s family came. Now, Spinoza is undoubtedly the most important modern philosopher for Santayana, his “master and model” (PP 235) in terms of recognizing the natural foundations of all human life and morality and respecting the authority of natural facts. Santayana reports that his friend and translator, Don Antonio Marichalar, “half in banter and half in compliment finds in those seaside mountains . . . the native soil of Spinoza and of myself” (PP 11). The way Santayana reacts to this suggestion is revealing: “[If I cannot be mentioned without a smile in the same breath with Spinoza for greatness of intellect, he cannot be compared with me for Spanish blood. He was a Jew” (PP 11). The remark is almost comical in the way it reflects a Hispanic obsession with “purity of blood”. Allow me to refer here to chapters II and III of the first volume of Léon Poliakov’s L’histoire de l’antisémitisme (1981), in order to understand the historical and social reasons for this obsession, its effect on the nobility mania and on traditional Spanish “pride”, as well as the way in which the cult of “pureza de sangre” sustains the loathing of Jews. Let me simply recall that the statutes of purity of blood, the purpose of which was to eradicate from Spanish soil any trace of Judaism, established an extremely strict legal hereditary discrimination against any Spaniard carrying (or presumed to be carrying) a drop of Jewish blood; the obsession with pureza becomes understandable in light of the fact that the descendants of those condemned by the Inquisition (to the stake or to reconciliation with the Church) are decked out, for several generations, by infamous distinctive signs (such as the sambenito, the garment of shame), are prohibited from holding public office and are excluded from all the benefits or advantages to which “Old Christians” could lay claim. An individual suspected of heresy was offered the following choice: “If he professed right to the end the purity of his faith and denied his fault, he became a negativo and was burned, if he gave in and admitted an imaginary fault, he was saved - but at the price of perjury and disgrace for his family” (Poliakov 180-181). This also explains the huge costs and efforts put into establishing one’s “non-belonging to the Jewish race” just as it explains the advent of the linajudo, or “lineage digger”, who made a living out of terrorizing and pressuring people by threatening to include their names in the list of “Jewified” (enjuivé) families. Finally, in terms of the psychology of individuals, anti-Semitism in Spain at the time fills, with disarming transparency, one of its traditional functions, namely to provide non-Jews with an object of comparison that can be demeaned at pleasure, allowing thus an effortless swelling of their self-esteem. Three brief texts quoted in Poliakov’s book shed light on the link between Spanish “pride” and the infamy of being Jewish in Spain. An anonymous Franciscan writes in 1586 that “in Spain there is not so much infamy in being a blasphemer, thief, vagrant, adulterer, sacrilege, or in being infected with any other vice, than in descending from the lineage of the Jews, even if the ancestors converted two or three hundred years ago to the holy Catholic faith” (Poliakov 191). The polemist Geronimo de Zevallos stigmatizes in 1635 “the men of lowly status who not only want to equal but surpass [the people of quality] thanks to an acto de limpieza [certificate of purity] which they could obtain easily because no one knew them, and which fills them with such vanity and such arrogance that there is
not a noble caballero nor lord whom they would hesitate to discredit and cover with infamy, as no limpio [unclean] (Poliakov 193-194). Montesquieu, finally, in his Persian Letters, suggests not without irony a possible link between the contempt of Jews (and later of “Indians” and “Blacks” in the New World), which raises one's self-esteem by contrast, and the economic decadence of Spain from the 17th century on:

Those who live in continental Spain and Portugal feel enormous pride if they are what are called old Christians; that is to say, that they are not descended from those who, over the course of the last two centuries, were persuaded by the Inquisition to embrace the Christian religion. Those who live in the Indies feel no less gratification in reflecting that they can claim the sublime virtue of being, as they put it, white-skinned. No sultana living in the seraglio of the great lord has ever taken such pride in her beauty, to equal the pride that the oldest and ugliest rogue in a Mexican town takes in his olive-white skin, as he sits in his doorway with folded arms. A man of such consequence, a creature of such perfection, would not work for all the gold in the world; he would never bring himself to compromise the honour and dignity of his skin with any base, mechanical labour. (Montesquieu 105-106)

Santayana's remark about his Spanish blood is followed, as might be expected, by some genealogical considerations:

My grandfather was born in the province of Santander, though not at Santillana and ... his wife and my father were born at Zamora, in Leon, my grandmother having the distinctly Portuguese or Galician surname of Reboiro: so that my ancestry on my father's side points distinctly to north-western Spain, and Celtoiberian blood; while my mother's origins were as unmistakably Catalanian and Balearic: rooted, that is, in those northeastern shores that look towards Provence and towards Italy and have linked Spain for many ages with the whole Mediterranean world. Through Christianity and through commerce culture if not blood certainly flowed into that half of my ancestry from the ancestry and true home of Spinoza. (PP 11)

Of course, these remarks about the “purity” of his origins can in no way establish what they are supposed to. First of all, because tracing back genealogical tracks in a multi-ethnic country such as Spain had been for centuries, let alone in a commercial crossroads such as Catalonia, is a particularly risky exercise. Santayana seems to recognize this implicitly when he observes that the maternal and Catalan half of his ancestry was certainly imbued with “[the] culture if not blood ... from the ancestry and true home of Spinoza”. Santayana's display of certainty concerning the “purity” of his Ibero-Celtic origins is all the more suspect since he admits, in the following paragraph, that he does not know anything about his paternal ancestors (“so that I know nothing of my ancestry beyond [my father's] own time” (PP 12). Other elements could be added to this case's file: old French chronicles note the existence of very important Jewish communities in the region between Burgos, Leon and Santander where the towns of Espinoza and Santillana are precisely located; there are many Jewish surnames with a Galician and Portuguese consonance; there are even Jewish Santillanas. Even the alluring filiation he
fancies between himself and the *picaro* Gil Blas de Santillana (“whose blood I should rather like imagining I had in my veins” (PP 12)) could backfire against him on the question of the Hispanic purity of his blood, given the many connections that have been traced between the picaresque novel and the world of the Marranos and Conversos. In short, if the claim of “racial purity” has been, at least until relatively recently, a widespread cultural reflex in Spain, in Santayana’s case, it involves a level of inconsistency, ignorance or bad faith unworthy of a philosopher.

According to Bertrand Russell, one of the permanent features of Santayana’s writings on religion is the attempt to purge Christianity of everything that it derives from Judaism (Russell 122). While some passages partially invalidate this view (LR 450-453; IW 157-164), Santayana’s attitude towards the “Hebrew tradition” remains nonetheless clearly determined by the conventional Christian view of an opposition between the Law or the Letter (Jewish) and the Grace or the Spirit (Christian), between an old Alliance, particularistic and averse to genuine spiritual values, and a New Covenant, which “supersedes” the Old one and institutes the Church as *verus Israel*. According to this traditional way of seeing, God’s covenant with the Hebrews came to an abrupt end because of the purely formal and self-serving obedience that this “stiff-necked people” gave to the letter of divine law. The New Covenant did not merely extend to the Gentiles the possibility of a relationship with the Creator, thus abrogating the national or ethnic mediation that characterized the Old Covenant; it announced that salvation (or simply well-being) could in no way be deserved, since every human being was a sinner whom only supernatural help could redeem.

The recognition that such an interpretation of God’s covenant with the Hebrews is biased, controversial, and ultimately offensive has certainly been an important factor in the recent development of Jewish-Christian dialogue, as has the always opportune reminder that the “election of Israel” is much less a reward for antecedent merit than a kind of freely agreed marriage contract binding the parties by relationships of love and obligation. One of the reasons why the concept in question seems insulting is obviously that it entirely obscures the role that spirituality or, if you like, grace plays in the Jewish religion.

It is in the context of this anti-Hebraism (largely present, let us note, in the Enlightenment) that Santayana’s texts on the “Hebraic tradition” must be read. The main reproach he addresses to this tradition is its “worldliness”, that is to say, its excessive concern for mundane affairs and interests, its “political”, unspiritual nature. In *Reason in Religion*, he incriminates, in particularly malicious terms, its “material aspirations”, and holds it responsible for the two major vices peculiar to religion—fanaticism and superstition—which have tainted religious feeling in the West. He asserts that, unlike the Greeks who recognized the more or less fict-

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1 See for example Yirmiyahu Yovel, *The Other Within*, chapter 16. "Marrano" (literally, pig) designates a Spanish or Portuguese Jew of the late Middle Ages who was forcibly converted to Christianity, but secretly adhering to Judaism.

2 See LR 47-48: “What was condemnable in the Jews was not that they asserted the divinity of their law, for that they did with substantial sincerity and truth. Their crime is to have denied the equal prerogative of other nations’ laws and deities, for this they did, not from
tious status of their divinities, the Jews conceived of their God as a power intervening materially in the course of history and granting glory, prosperity, and longevity in return for a meticulous respect of the commandments prescribed by His law. Santayana concludes, tellingly, that “[h]ad the Jews not rendered themselves odious to mankind by this arrogance, and taught Christians and Moslems the same fanaticism, the nature of religion would not have been falsified among us and we should not now have so much to apologize for and to retract” (LR 48). Thus, all true Christian spirituality is necessarily derived from the pagan element which has “completed and immensely improved” (LR 65) the Hebrew tradition in which the first Christians had their roots. If one extends Santayana’s thought, even the Inquisition’s sectarianism and fanaticism stem from the “Hebraic element” of Christianity!

In *Reason in Science*, however, the relationship between Athens and Jerusalem seems to be reversed. Santayana notes the “sterility of the Greek example” (LR 449-450) as opposed to the “mighty example” of the Hebrews who “showed far greater moral cohesion under the pressure of adversity” (LR 450). Thus, Santayana recognizes that “Hebraism has put earnestness and urgency into morality” and that “the Christian principle of charity . . . owed a part of its force to the Hebraic tradition” (LR 451). However, no sooner have these concessions been expressed than the text gives way to traditional prejudices and stereotypes, especially in the affirmation that “this virtue of charity, on its subtler and more metaphysical side, belongs to the spirit of redemption. . . . The pure Jews can have no part in such insight, because it contradicts the positivism of their religion and character and their ideal of worldly happiness” (LR 451).

Santayana, it is true, occasionally questions the schematic opposition between a “worldly”, legalistic Judaism and a “spiritual” Catholicism, but always by way of suspecting Catholicism of being as “mundane” as Judaism, and never by considering a possible Jewish spirituality. Thus, Santayana tells in his autobiography of his “sad disillusion” in regard to the late marriage of his sister (who had entered a convent in Baltimore and left without taking her vows): this marriage proved to him that she lacked that “contempt for the world “that is an integral part of any authentic spiritual life. This disillusion carries over, to a certain extent, to Catholicism itself:

Was Catholicism, in principle, much better than Judaism? Wasn't it still worldliness, transferred to a future world, and thereby doubly falsified? The critical insight or intellectual scruples, but out of pure bigotry, conceit, and stupidity. They did not want other nations to have a god. [...] No civilized people had ever had such pretensions before.” One is tempted to reply that no civilized people had ever been monotheistic before; perhaps one of the logical consequences of monotheism is that a god who is not God is simply an idol.

3 The paragraph on the "Sterility of Greek example" ends as follows: "Classic perfection is a seedless flower, imitable only by artifice, not reproducible by generation. It is capable of influencing character only through the intellect, the means by which character can be influenced least. It is a detached ideal, responding to no crying and actual demand in the world at large. It never passed, to win the right of addressing mankind, through a sufficient novitiate of sorrow."
Jews frankly cared for nothing but prosperity, and their delusion was only that they could make a short cut to prosperity by smashing the Golden Calf and being faithful to circumcision and Sabbaths, or alternately by charity towards widows and orphans. In Christianity the idea of prosperity is abandoned for that of salvation in the world to come; […] the goal, as conceived by the materially pious, remains as with the Jews an impossible security amid impossible splendours. (PP 425)

In other words, Santayana suspects the “otherworldliness” (meaning detachment from the world) of many a good Christian of being simply an “other-worldliness”, that is, another way of attaching to the world.

To the dual Hispanic and Christian source of Santayana’s prejudices, we should add a third component: anti-Semitism was (in McCormick’s words) a “widespread and almost automatic response” in the United States and England from the Victorian era to (at least) the end of World War I, and Santayana was determinedly influenced by the anti-Semitic prejudices he encountered, both in literary and social circles.⁴ But this is an aspect I will leave aside, to address the question of whether Santayana’s condemnation of the “Hebraic tradition” somehow extended to Jewish persons as such. According to Horace Kallen, who had been his assistant at Harvard, and who was himself a Jew, the answer, already mentioned at the beginning of this article, is clearly negative: “the condemnation of what he called the Hebraic tradition was part and parcel of the intellectual rejection of a world of flux and change and drama and salvation, in favor of the well-ordered Hellenic world. It had nothing to do with living Jews as such. . . . Jewishness is a sin, but you love the sinner” (Lamont 38-39).

The reality, unfortunately, is more complex, and Santayana’s correspondence and autobiography are interspersed with remarks that reveal how difficult it is to draw the line between “anti-Hebraism” and outright anti-Semitism. A few examples will suffice to show this. In December 1913, Santayana stayed in Florence and spent a dozen days with the art historian Bernard Berenson. This stay, explains Santayana, “was not satisfactory on the whole; the climate of Florence at that season—December—is beastly, and the expatriated anemic aesthetes and the Jews surprised to find that success is not happiness made a moral atmosphere not wholesome to breath” (LGS, 2 123-124). In his 23 September 1926 letter to John Jay Chapman, a notorious anti-Semitic Harvard graduate who had offered him the presidency of “The Aryan Society”, we once again find Santayana stereotyping the “Jewish spirit”, which he confesses he does not like, “because it is “worldly, seeing God in thrift and success” (LGS, 3 295)⁵. In the passage of Persons and Places dedicated to his friendship with Harvard fellow student Charles Loeser, Santayana reports that Loeser “at once told [him] that he was a Jew, a rare and blessed frankness that cleared away a thousand pitfalls and insincerities” (PP 215). Santayana continues thus: “What a privilege there is in that distinction and in that

⁴ On the prevalence of anti-Semitism in both the United States and Britain and its effect on Santayana's attitudes, see McCormick 1987, 359-367.

⁵ Somewhat surprisingly, William Holzberger considers that this letter contains Santayana's "most redeeming statement on the matter of racial prejudice" (LGS 3, l).
misfortune! If the Jews were not worldly it would raise them above the world; but most of them squirm and fawn and wish to pass for ordinary Christians or ordinary atheists” (PP 215). When the book was published in 1944, John Hall Wheelock, Chief editor at Scribners, received indignant letters concerning this passage. When Wheelock urged Santayana to change it, he responded as follows:

I see that my expressions about the Jews, if taken for exact history or philosophical criticism, are unfair. But they were meant for free satire, and I don't like to yield to the pretension that free satire must be excluded from literature. However, in this case and at this moment, when, as you say, the Jews are supersensitive, I am glad to remove anything that may sound insulting or be really inaccurate. Now for me to speak of “most” Jews, is inaccurate, since I have known only a few; and “squirm” and “fawn”, if not taken as caricature, are insulting words. I propose, then, that you delete those three words and let the passage read as follows: If the Jews were not worldly it would raise them above the world; but many of them court the world and wish to pass for ordinary Christians or ordinary atheists.

This preserves the spirit of what I said: a certain suggestion of a vocation missed. For that reason I prefer it to the emendation suggested by you, which concedes too much. The Jews have become of late not only sensitive but exacting. I wish to be just, but I don't want to “squirm and fawn” on my side also. (LGS 7 104)⁶

But given the letter's date (1944!), isn't the annoyance that these lines betray hardhearted—indeed “superinsensitive”—perhaps unforgivably so? One could of course point out that some of the reproaches that Santayana targets at “most” (or “many”) Jews are very similar to those that observant Jews have addressed to those of their coreligionists who eagerly yield to the temptation of assimilation. In Gershom Scholem's writings, for example, one finds harsh reproofs of “Jews who attempt to escape from themselves” (Scholem 111). Scholem writes about the “the annihilation of Jewish identity by the Jews themselves” (Scholem 110), “the ease with which the higher cultural layer of the Jews disavows its own tradition” (Scholem 84) and even (in a letter to Hannah Arendt), about “their quasi-demonic zeal for worldly affairs” at the expense of a clearly assumed identity (Scholem 216). But if both Santayana and Scholem criticize the tendency to sever traditional roots, their evaluations of the tradition out of which assimilated Jews tend to disengage themselves are obviously opposed. True, for Santayana “the better of [the Jews] pine for Zion, no matter how dominant their position may be in liberal Europe and America” (PP 502), but “to yearn for Zion” is to yearn for something that is not deemed particularly worthy.

Santayana thus imprisons the Jew in an insoluble double bind: on the one hand, the “Hebraic tradition” and those attached to it are, as we have seen, open to criticism; on the other, the “cosmopolitan” Jews who abandon this tradition are not less objectionable; therefore, whatever they do, the Jews are blameworthy. Scholem highlights an analogous phenomenon of inextricable “double bind”—

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⁶ Note that none of the envisaged changes in wording were made in the next editions.
which, by the way, has always seemed to me a most reliable criterion of true anti-Semitism—when he describes the attitude of large portions of the German elites before the Second World War who “demanded that Jews renounce their inheritance to the point of granting a premium for defection, while at the same time many scorned the Jews precisely for their excessive willingness to forsake their roots” (Scholem 85).

In the very year that Hitler came to power, Santayana wrote a text that Henry Levinson charitably describes as “a gesture that may well signal his agonized conscience contending with its own humiliating, shopworn Christian anti-Semitism” (Levinson 266). In a reflection on the regime of Pax Romana (or Pax Britannica or Americana), where diverse “nations” or “peoples” preserve their “language and laws and religion under an imperial insurance” (DP 452), Santayana cites the history of the Jewish people as a representative case of the possibility of safeguarding a moral and spiritual integrity:

The Jews are a most wonderful instance of a people preserving its moral identity for two thousand years without any territorial possessions. Their fate has been hard, and the sentiment they have aroused in their gentile neighbors has not been kindly. The prejudice against them, however, has been religious rather than political; and even the difficulty they have encountered in establishing a « National home » in Palestine was due largely to the fact that their Holy City is also a Holy City for Christians and Moslems, with the two latter in possession, and at first alone disposing of military force. But suppose these circumstances had been different. Nothing would have then prevented the Israelites, scattered all over the world, from maintaining everywhere their religion and language, and preserving in Jerusalem a sanctuary where all the ceremonies of their Law might have been carried out. Round this sacred nucleus of race and religion, a complete body of arts and sciences, manners and domestic laws might have grown up; and this without army or navy or police or local jurisdiction. It would have sufficed that the common law, in whatever other countries they lived, should have allowed them possession, as private property, of enough land for their synagogues and dwelling-houses; and especially licence to educate their children in their own schools, in their own language, up to the highest studies which they should wish to pursue. And I do not think a truly imperial authority, preserving a Roman Peace all the world over, would have any reason for denying any nation these moral liberties. (DP 452-453)

Another possible testimony of a late struggle of the philosopher (then 87 years old) against his own prejudices can be found in a 1951 letter to Hirsch Gordon, who had sent him his book on Caro. Santayana thanked him in these terms: “It was a happy thought on your part to send me your book . . . , which I have read through with special interest, as I have never come across any such vivid picture of what the life and mind of Orthodox Jews has been until recent times in Europe and the Levant. It was evidently far more severe and studious, far less a life 'in the

world' than that of the secular Christian clergy was during the same ages. I feel clearly for the first time how little of the 'merry' life of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance affected the Jewish population” (LGS 8,363). With regard to the haunting accusation of worldliness that runs through Santayana's anti-Hebraic remarks, these lines seem to indicate a courageous realization of the discrepancy between what he had written for years on this subject and Judaism in its historical reality and diversity. But the depth of such a realization can be questioned when, immediately after granting Gordon that “[his] indignation at the persecution of the Jews is natural and just” (LGS 8, 364), we see him trying to justify by considerations of “political necessity” the expulsion of the Moors and Jews and the rigors of the Inquisition.

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Post-scriptum: Although, on the whole, I stand by my guns as far as Santayana's anti-Semitic prejudices are concerned, I would not write today the last sentence of my text. It is unjust to accuse Santayana of “trying to justify . . . the expulsion of the Moors and Jews and the rigors of the Inquisition.” I was expressing my indignation at Santayana's chilling lack of indignation at the tortures applied by the Inquisition. But Santayana was not justifying anything; he was explaining that there is a “sort of rationality” in what he clearly recognized as “religious madness” (LGS 8, 364). Whence the difference? I have come to take somewhat more seriously Santayana's attempt to adopt in his thinking the "spiritual stance", a thoroughly cognitive and supremely veridical outlook characterized by “disintoxication from . . . the influence of values” (PSL 30). Santayana asks himself whether “morality [is not] a worse enemy of spirit than immorality” (PSL 84). “Spirit is no respecter of persons” (PSL 32); it is “homeless” (PSL 52); “its proper function . . . is to see things . . . under the form of eternity, in their intrinsic character and relative value, in their transitivity and necessity, in a word, in their truth” (PSL 33). It is “the faculty . . . of seeing this world in its simple truth” (PSL 42), substituting “perfect candor and impartial vision” for “animal arrogance” and “moral fanaticism” (PSL 31). Any ecstatic culmination of spirituality would be “the negation of every human wish and idea” (PSL 76-77). Such a radical spiritual outlook is not conducive to indignation: as Spinoza, Santayana's "master and model" (PP 235), famously said: “Sedulo curavi humanas actiones non lugere, non ridere, neque detestari, sed intelligere.”8 As I read again Platonism and the Spiritual Life in preparation for the webinar that took place on February 16th 2018, and later pondered Chris Skowroński’s question about Santayana’s silence concerning the Holocaust, I could not but be struck by the utter inhumanity of the spiritual stance as Santayana characterizes it. Or rather, by how

8 Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, chap.1, sect. 4: “I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at them, nor to hate them, but to understand them.”
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utterly inhuman it would be, were it not for our animal/human interests and preferences, and the intrinsically intermittent character of spiritual moments, factors that necessarily thwart the spiritual person's ideal of perfect impartiality and absolute objectivity. Santayana not only fully recognizes this; he is, among modern philosophers, the one who best describes the multiple ways in which animal and spiritual lives entwine.

References

Santayana, George
The two articles that follow are based on presentations given at the George Santayana Society session at the meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP) in Indianapolis on 9 March 2018. The theme of the conference was “Ethos and Creativity.”

Santayana: Culture and Creativity

Introduction

Santayana presents us with a dilemma regarding the relationship between individuals and their culture, and that dilemma becomes even more challenging when coupled with how creativity is possible, if it is. What is the dilemma?

To begin with, Santayana is a thoroughgoing naturalist. Basically, accepting that whatever happens in the world is the result of natural causes and, if a complete science were possible, all events could be explained through the natural sciences. However, because all living beings view the world from their particular perspective rooted in their specific embodiment, Santayana does not believe a complete science is possible because it would have to be neutral in perspective. If all animal activity, including the human animal activity, is the result of natural causes and circumstances, then how may one reasonably develop one’s individuality and how is it possible for one to be creative? At the very least, this dilemma is puzzling.

In addition, spirit or consciousness is an offshoot of natural causes and not a causal event. Yet, for Santayana, spirit is able to grasp the eternal in a natural, temporal world, and may escape the everyday concerns, aspirations, and desires of animal life. How is this possible if all events, including spirit or consciousness, are the result of natural causes in a physical world?

I will explore these questions and attempt to find an approach that mirrors my understanding of Santayana and his remarkable focus on reason, spirit, and individuality.

Culture and the Individual

Historically, philosophers and social scientists have long been captivated by the relationship between the individual and societies. Our cultures focus on societal regularities, activities, customs, as well as the rules for antisocial behavior. We know that individuals are dependent on our culture and our culture is dependent on individuals. But exactly what is the relationship? More pointedly, when should individuality take precedent over societal standards, and when should societal regularities take precedent over individual behavior?

Aristotle, one of Santayana’s models, noted that man is a social animal basically in three ways: by nature, by necessity, and for intellectual development and
growth. But even if we are obviously social by nature, how one demonstrates the relationship between individuals and their culture is not simple.

Historically, there are a number of traditional answers. Here are a few basic accounts of different views. Utilitarianism argues that the good of the whole outweighs that of the individual. The overall good of the majority takes precedence over the good of individuals, while fostering as much good for the majority of individuals as is possible. Rawls’ sense of justice places a priority on the least-advantaged in society. His Difference Principle, putting it simply, notes that any difference in a society between the most-advantaged and the least-advantaged should have a positive benefit for the least-advantaged. In other words, societies have always had the least-advantaged among them, and any enhancement we give to the most-advantaged in our society should be justified by an increase in the enhancement for the least-advantaged. Social functionalists have also noted the priority of the society over the individual in that each person is formed by society. The importance of culture in our individual development is clearly reflected in the case studies of isolated and feral children (raised in the company of other animals) showing the importance of human social interaction and association for the development of individual personality. Marx and Engels saw the relationship as dialectical, where the interplay between individuals and their culture is found in history showing alienation and the subjugation of individuals in a society; and they focused on the role of individuals and groups in transforming their culture while being shaped by it. Basically, we are caught in a dilemma of views that focus on how our cultures create individuals and views that note how individuals create society.

Santayana’s approach is basically that both accounts are essential, and the tensions between them are natural.

**Naturalism and the Individual**

Santayana’s naturalism, sometimes he calls it materialism, is well-known. Yet, it does seem to have developed over his lifetime and finds its fruition in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and in his more fully developed *Realms of Being*. His naturalism is like a musical theme where one may find the notes and rhythm in his first compositions, even in *The Sense of Beauty* (as Arthur Danto noted in his introduction), and one then finds the full symphonic expansion in his later works. At one point, Santayana refers to himself as perhaps the only true naturalist in contemporary society.

Santayana’s view of naturalism can be captured in a few points:

1. Whatever happens in the natural world is natural, the result of physical causality.
2. Natural explanations provide our understanding of the world, and in an ideal world viewed from eternity without individual perspec-
tive (one that does not exist in reality), such explanations would reveal all causality in the universe.

3. As individuals, we are born at a certain time and place, and live our lives in cultures that cascade from natural causes.

4. As individuals, we are also born in a particular body (or psyche) that has natural properties and which in interaction with the material world leads us to actions, friendships, and communities.

5. Even so, our natural being, our psyche, may give rise to consciousness or spirit, that is an offshoot of natural causes but is an aftereffect and not causal. As a result, Santayana’s naturalism or materialism is a non-reductive materialism with several realms of being: matter, spirit or consciousness, essences, and truth (which is a subset of the realm of essences).

This last point is important and needs emphasis because it is what turns Santayana’s naturalism into a non-reductive materialism, and it is what sets him apart from others of his time who called themselves naturalists. In his review of Dewey’s *Experience and Nature*, he sets himself apart from Dewey, calling his review “Dewey’s Naturalistic Metaphysics.” Santayana writes:

> A naturalist may distinguish his own person or self, provided he identifies himself with his body and does not assign to his soul any fortunes, powers, or actions save those of which his body is the seat and organ. . . . Naturalism may, accordingly find room for every sort of psychology, poetry, logic, and theology, if only they are content with their natural places. (DNM 674)¹

When consciousness or spirit is taken as substantial or material on its own account, it becomes metaphysical. Santayana believed he avoided this type of metaphysics and Dewey did not.

Santayana’s naturalism, although perhaps more fully developed than that of other naturalists/materialists of the 20th century, only heightens the questions about the relationship between the individual and society. And there is further puzzlement. His criticisms of governments, of democracy, of international wars and developments, of contemporary industrialism and its impact on the least-advantaged (the proletariat), may lead one to think that the fate of human beings is not likely to be positive. But near the close of his life he counsels a pleasant calmness regarding the future of human life and of our societal structures. How can this be?

To be honest, I am not sure I have an answer to these issues for Santayana, or for myself. But let me give it a try by addressing a few questions.

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¹ Also quoted in McCormick 266-267, which the reader may wish to consult for the biographical and historical context.
What Is the Fate of Human Life?

Here are a few important questions regarding the possible destiny of human life.

Are there innate, heritable traits in human nature that determine our actions and development?

Santayana in a few places seems to write as if every human being were born as a clean slate on which society or culture writes. In other places, he talks about innate characteristics that we are born with and that society then shapes and builds individuality. I will take this latter view as his more mature outlook.

For example, in “The Birth of Reason,” Santayana writes about the spirit or intellect that transcends the world as a genetic, heritable trait:

The intellect which transcends the world ideally is a function of the animal soul genetically; and it is a perfectly natural animal function, like all natural self-transcendence in generation, perception, expectation, and action. (BR 51-51)

As Jim Ballowe notes in “The Intellectual Traveller” (Ballowe 158), Santayana was not merely the world’s guest; he was a “small yet integral part of it” (BR 52).

If there are heritable traits as the foundation of animal actions and beliefs, how are these shaped by society and cultures and how is creativity and imagination possible?

Since we have no choice in when, how or to whom we are born, what choices do we have? The social customs come before us, and we basically are shaped by the language, science, government, and social mores of our time. If we are fortunate enough to be educated, we learn other languages, about other societies, other customs of behavior, and other governmental structures. We can empathize with other cultures and even acquire their languages and some of their customs, but we are rooted where we were born.

Santayana often refers to governments as being like the weather. One can sometimes predict weather changes and climates, as one can sometimes do with governmental and social structure changes. Every kind of weather may have some benefits as well as disbenefits, and the same is true of governments. Hence, for Santayana, the task is to find the weather and government with the most benefits and best suited for you to live there, much like the rest of the animal kingdom tries to do. All of this is a part of the natural course of animal development.

So, where do individual freedom, responsibility, and choice come in? One possible answer is that it does not. We have no choice in being born, and we live in a world we did not choose, therefore why should we think we can choose our future?
However, for Santayana, he is more open to change and not just accidental change, but change that is the result of natural causes. To understand Santayana, one has to turn the tradition of rationalism on its head. One must understand that what we call reason and intelligence are physical and the result of physical causes. Our consciousness is a reflection of the physical causes, and sometimes a good reflection and other times not so. For many, perhaps most philosophers, consciousness is seen as a driving force in decisions and actions, but for Santayana consciousness or spirit is an off shoot of our psyche (our physical being), and it may provide a practical reflection of what is actually occurring, but it can also be deceptive. One may think that reason has control over one’s decisions until our physicality makes it clear that reason and consciousness do not. As when a pianist is totally absorbed in the music and expresses that she/he was one with the music, not aware of anything beyond it, even though the complex movements of her/his fingers, feet, arms, and more are integral to the performance. Or when one is knocked unconscious but still lives with one’s body continuing to adapt and adjust to changing circumstances. And sometimes our physicality deceives us in our reflected consciousness, as when one believes that positive thinking may be the cause of being healed from a disease rather than understanding the underlying material cause. Our physical destiny becomes apparent when death is on the doorstep and one has little or no control over what is happening to one or one’s destiny. Providing support for Santayana’s views are the current research that basically indicates consciousness of decisions comes after we begin to act, and that, even as Santayana indicates, consciousness is not constant but rather sporadic and that most of our actions occur without our being conscious of them. Stephen Hawking cites neurologist Ben Libet of the University of California, San Francisco, who found that the brain’s processes occur nearly half a second before a person consciously decides to begin an action. In other words, there are action-specific electrical activity in the brain that precedes any awareness of a decision being made to act (Burton 2016).

But even in these circumstances, psyche may give rise to spirit or consciousness that is not bound by the temporal causality of the physical world. Contemplation of essences enables one to escape, temporarily, the natural environment. This is true not only for human beings but for other animals as well.

If our psyches are embodied with heritable traits and shaped by the physical environment and culture we live in, how is creativity possible?

Imagination is rooted in our psyche. Instead of reasoning directing our actions, reasoning is a derivative of our physical being. It provides insight into our natural desires and actions, sometimes perhaps acting as a good lawyer to justify our actions, but conscious reasoning or even conscious imagination are not the determining factors in creativity. Imagination and creativity are elements of our spirit, that is, reflections of our natural being. To understand our awareness of creativity, purpose, imagination and all conscious activity, we need to understand that the roots, the basis for such activities is our psyche, our physical being.
For Santayana, consciousness and its objects are celebrations of our being, and as in poetry and art, we should see them as reflections of the natural world. Philosophy is an art, celebrating the objects of our spirit, the eternal nature of essences that make possible a spiritual life that is the flowering of our physical being into a consciousness not bound by the natural contingencies of our world, but in the right circumstances and with the right psyche, can contemplate the eternal.

Hence, for Santayana, although he is a thoroughgoing naturalist, he finds in consciousness, that is, in spirit, something beyond the natural. He finds the eternal, even if in brief, momentary moments. And he strives for that spiritual life found in as many contemplative moments of consciousness that can be strung together in a period of time. But he knows all along that these moments are just that, moments. And one cannot live apart from one’s natural circumstances and psyche which brings all animals back to a world of action and doing. Hence, creativity in life, music, art, and any forms of consciousness is rooted in our physiology and is motivated by actions and celebrated, if at all, in consciousness.

What is our destiny and what can we do about it?

Not all physical circumstances promote spiritual life and celebration. Santayana was not optimistic regarding what had occurred in the twentieth century:

The contemporary world has turned its back on the attempt and even on the desire to live reasonably. The two great wars (so far) of the twentieth century were adventures in enthusiastic unreason. They were inspired by unnecessary and impracticable ambitions; and the “League” and the “United Nations” feebly set up by the victors, were so irrationally conceived that they at once reduced their victory to a stalemate. What is requisite for living rationally? I think the conditions may be reduced to two: First, self-knowledge, the Socratic key to wisdom; and second, sufficient knowledge of the world to perceive what alternatives are open to you and which of them are favourable to your true interests. (PP 542)

Notice, he does not talk about changing the world or acting for the betterment of human beings. He even adds “so far” when mentioning the two world wars. Rather the task is knowing oneself, presumably not just from the perspective of consciousness, but from the perspective of one’s nature reflected in consciousness and the sciences. And an understanding of the world that enables one to identify and act in one’s true interests.

This is very individualistic, perhaps open only to the few with such abilities and circumstances. His account of capitalism and democracy basically suggests that they are ways of taking advantage of large classes of people so that a smaller class may have more advantageous positions and opportunities, and he sees that as the root of the dissolution of both.

For Santayana, there is no absolute standard for what is good for the individual or cultures. He found himself in a world that he described as “undigestible”,

OVERHEARD IN SEVILLE
and as he aged and found the climate and culture that favored his own best interests, he turned to what he referred to as the spiritual life.

And as the feeling of being a stranger and an exile by nature as well as by accident grew upon me in time, it came to be almost a point of pride: some people may have thought it an affectation. It was not that; I have always admired the normal child of his age and country. My case was humanly unfortunate, and involved many defects; yet it opened to me another vocation, not better (I admit no absolute standards) but more speculative, freer, juster, and for me happier. (PP 539)

The world will face upheavals, wars, repression and remarkably despicable actions by individuals and by governments and cultures. But those same natural causes can give rise to societies that also foster greater support for individuality of many kinds. In the paragraph that has the marginal heading, “But earthquakes do not destroy the earth,” he writes:

The very fact, however, that these evils have deep roots, and have long existed without destroying Western civilization, but on the contrary, have stimulated its contrary virtues and confused arts,—this very fact seems to me to counsel calmness in contemplating the future. (PP 546)

How Is Such a View Relevant for Our Current Time?

Let me posit a few assumptions that may not be shared by all.

1. We live in a time when governmental democracies were growing and prospering over the last two centuries, but where they are now declining, and more countries, including the U.S., are becoming more nationalistic, less global in interests, and less inclined to endorse the inevitability of progressive democratic governments.

2. Accompanying nationalism are rising expressions of racism and anti-Semitism. Horrific genocides continue today with little recognition: Bosnia, Rohingya refugees, the Nuer and other ethnic groups in South Sudan, Christians and Yazidis in Iraq and Syria, Christians and Muslims in the Central African Republic, Dafuris in Sudan, and more. In the U.S. there now appears an openness to white nationalism that stems from our early beginnings with slavery, and denying citizenship based on the color of one’s skin. Our current presidential administration focuses on an American nationalism and seems intent on withdrawing from international issues and global concerns. Other countries seem to be having similar tendencies toward nationalism. I am thinking of the recent elections in Austria, Germany, Britain, Hungary and Poland.
3. More people are feeling disenfranchised in democratic governments. As if their votes do not count. America has a disturbing voting record with only a small percentage of eligible voters that show up at the polls.

4. Along with the growing nationalism and populism, there is less confidence in democracy. The columnist David Brooks notes:

   As Yascha Mounk writes in his book “The People vs. Democracy,” faith in democratic regimes is declining with every new generation. Seventy-one percent of Europeans and North Americans born in the 1930s think it’s essential to live in a democracy, but only 29 percent of people born in the 1980s think that. In the U.S., nearly a quarter of millennials think democracy is a bad way to run a country. Nearly half would like a strongman leader. One in six Americans of all ages supports military rule. (Brooks 2018)

5. Controlling our own destiny may seem more out of reach as the world becomes more integrated through scientific advances, through communication systems that are reshaping the world, and through the development of weapons of mass destruction that are in the hands of a few decision makers.

6. During such times, it is remarkable that there are significant movements pressing forward to represent those who have been left out of the progressive democracies including LGBTQ, MeToo, TimesUp, Parkland students, and many more. But will their impact last?

7. There is a growing rise of autocratic governments, some of which have moved forward in significant ways economically, culturally, and militarily. I am particularly thinking of China.

   In such circumstances, Santayana’s view may be the wise one. That is, find the place you are most at home, where your interests are best met, where the cultural climate best suits your true interests. Whether that be a more contemplative life as envisioned by Santayana, or a more active life geared to reshaping governments, science, arts, sports, education, or whatever.

   Perhaps his naturalistic account is correct, but that does not mean we are not free to act or to make choices. It only means that understanding the causes of our actions and our choices is not rooted in reason, argument, or judgment. Rather, reason, argument, and judgment are rooted in our physiology and the natural world and culture shaping our natural interests. If one wants to understand the causal structure of our actions, one turns to a physiological explanation structured in particular environments. Hence, scientific research attempting to explain complex animal action includes human action. Our reason, argument, and judg-
ments are reflections of these physical occurrences. As reflections they are more like poetry in providing insights into what is actually occurring in our physical selves and the material world. Depending on our environment and our psyches, we may have a range of freedom, as most complex animals do. Hence, self-knowledge and understanding the excellence of others remains paramount, but the standard approach of philosophy in which conscious reasoning and judgment are determinants of our actions is misdirected. They may or may not reflect what is physically driving our actions, but when they do reflect the reality of our lives in the undercurrents of our physicality, they provide insights into what causes our actions. Each animal, including humans, has an excellence that can be appreciated but is unlikely to be achieved fully in such a world. In an ideal world, the task would be to create an environment that permits each animal to achieve that excellence, but the world is not naturally harmonious, and conflicts of interests make the ideal world impossible. Even so, if one can find an environment that fosters one’s excellence more than other environments, there one should try to make one’s home as Santayana did.

I end with a quote from Santayana:

Morality is something natural. It arises and varies, not only psychologically but prescriptively and justly, with the nature of the creature whose morality it is. Morality is something relative: not that its precepts in any case are optional or arbitrary; for each man they are defined by his innate character and possible forms of happiness and action. His momentary passions or judgments are partial expressions of his nature but not adequate or infallible; and ignorance of the circumstances may mislead in practice, as ignorance of self may mislead in desire. But this fixed good is relative to each species and each individual; so that in considering the moral ideal of any philosopher, two questions arise. First, does he, like Spinoza, understand the natural basis of morality, or is he confused and superstitious on the subject? Second, how humane and representative is his sense for the good, and how far, by his disposition or sympathetic intelligence, does he appreciate all the types of excellence toward which life may be directed? (PP 234-235)

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Santayana, George:


Character and Philosophic Creativity—the Example of Santayana

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Introduction

How can philosophic inquiry be creative? If you place philosophy in the sphere of either history or science, then its aim is discovering the truth, not inventing something new. It might be noted that such primarily cognitive disciplines as history, science, and philosophy are not austere intellectual vocations. People engage in them because something about them fires the imagination. But the imagination can be fired by such inanimate natural objects as soaring clouds, violent storms, and majestic mountains without deeming them creative. For creativity to be present there needs to be some expressive element. 1 It turns out that the ways histories are written and even the ways scientific discoveries come about tell you something about the character, orientation, and intellectual milieu of the people who produce them. In history, for example, the selection of facts, the locus of emphasis, and style of narration reflect both the personality of the historian and the interests of his or her audience. Although there have been some efforts to ridicule the social contextualization science (which, as a matter of principle, seeks to shun cultural bias), 2 if you were to compare the biological and medical writings of Francis Crick, Charles Darwin, William Harvey, and Galen you would find vastly different styles of presentation, problems confronted, bodies of knowledge assumed, and audiences addressed—in other words, the writings tell us much about the circumstances in which the writer flourished. In philosophy, the choice of questions asked, the categories distinguished, the terms employed, and the manner of presentation all tell us much about the social, political, and religious context of the writer and often reflect the philosopher’s life history. The ways in which philosophy conveys an ethos—the spirit of a community, era, or individual—are part of what make it creative. The other part is the way in which the concepts of a philosophic system permeate the lives of the writers, the readers, and the wider community. The following account illustrates how, in case of Santayana’s life and his work, philosophy is necessarily imaginative and evocative.

1 Wallace Stevens’s poem “The Idea of Order at Key West” conveys the notion that it is the human observer who can make natural objects seem expressive.

2 The most notorious example is when the physicist Alan Sokal published a hoax review in a Duke University Press journal purporting to show that quantum gravity is a social and linguistic construct.
My title includes the word ‘creativity’ as an acknowledgment of the theme of the conference, but it is a word that Santayana himself used much less often than its affiliated terms ‘imaginary’ and ‘imagination’. Santayana would have readily embraced the notion of the philosophic imagination and it is in that sense I plan to discuss how, in Santayana’s view (and my own), a philosophic system can be regarded as an expression of the character and circumstances of the person who produces it and to illustrate how Santayana’s philosophy came out of and helped shape his individual ethos.

The idea that philosophy can be regarded as a form of personal or cultural expression is not new, though Santayana may have been one of the first philosophers to explicitly acknowledge it about his own work. Albert William Levi, in his fine book, *Philosophy as Social Expression*, showed that placing a philosophic system in its historical, cultural, and personal circumstances does not diminish the philosopher’s efforts by reducing them to antecedent conditions. Rather, it deepens appreciation of the philosophy by recognizing it as a high moment of the human spirit. As Levi himself put it:

All three things exist: ideas, agents, and social contexts, and the best history of philosophy is, I believe, constituted by the careful consideration of the interrelationships between them. . . . Texts, I think, do not exhaust their own meanings. There is always a historical grounding and a web of personal and social events that give them wider and deeper significance. (Levi 16)

Levi’s book focused on philosophers who epitomized their time and place: Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, and GE Moore. But Santayana was typical neither of his era nor of his various milieus. At a time when philosophic writing was becoming more focused on precise argumentation, he wrote philosophy filled with metaphor, allusion, and irony—so much so, that John Dewey entitled his review of one of Santayana’s books “Philosophy as Fine Art” 3 (Dewey 1928). At a time when philosophy was becoming more and more the product of academic professionals, Santayana had become a professor, according to his own account, “almost accidentally” and he left the profession as soon as he had the financial wherewithal to live on his own. At a time when many of his major American contemporaries and immediate predecessors were promoting some variant of pragmatism, Santayana called pragmatism a “heresy.” So in Santayana’s case, it is imperative to show how his philosophy was an outgrowth not just of his age and the cities he lived in, but also of his character.

Santayana was in several ways a great philosopher of the imagination. Reading any page of his works makes that obvious, as the tropes, metaphors, and playfulness that abound in his prose display a fertile and creative imagination. The imagination also figured prominently in the subject matter of his writing. It played a key role in his epistemology and, in his extensive critical writings, he

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3 Santayana’s works are hardly devoid of precise arguments and clear ideas. A 1910 essay by Santayana steered Bertrand Russell away from GE Moore’s ethics by convincing Russell that Moore’s theory was logically confused.
analyzed and celebrated some of the human imagination’s greatest works. Levi calls attention to these two aspects of the imagination in an essay that begins by saying, “The problem of the two imaginations haunts the development of Western epistemology” (Levi 1964, 188). By the two imaginations, Levi meant, on the one hand, the faculty that plays an essential role in all cognition and, on the other, the products of the “seething brains” of madmen, lovers, and poets. To characterize the first he quoted Aristotle, who said of imagination, “It is not found without sensation or judgment without it” (De Amina 3.3; Levi 1964, 188). To characterize the second he quotes Theseus’s speech at the start of Act five of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, in which “the Lunatic, the Lover, and the Poet” are said to be “of imagination all compact.” The madman sees devils everywhere, the lover sees Helen of Troy in an ordinary-looking woman, and the poet

Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven.  
And, as imagination bodies forth  
The forms of things unknown, the Poet's pen  
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing,  
A local habitation, and a name.  
(Levi 1964, 188; Shakespeare 5.1.1843-1847)

Levi used Kant to elucidate the difference between the two imaginations, seeing the first as predominant in The Critique of Pure Reason and the second in The Critique of Judgment. In Santayana, it would be fair to say that it is the imagination of the poet that holds sway over the body of his work, but also that he makes much of the continuity between the two—seeing the wide-ranging poetic imagination as an outgrowth of the imagination that infuses every moment of experience.

What follows proceeds in the order of tell then show. I first give a summary of my argument that Santayana’s philosophy expressed his life and was deeply enmeshed with it and then exhibit a series of quotations to illustrate it.

The main argument

Santayana clearly thought of himself, and even relished his role, as an outsider—as an observer. This orientation helps explain why he alone of the classic American philosophers ventured to write an autobiography. The title, Persons and Places, suggests that what the three volumes contain are his recollected observations of people he knew and places he lived in or visited. For someone who regarded himself primarily as an onlooker, it is natural that a core element of his philosophic system is the panorama before the isolated observer that remains even when he doubts all existence, including his own. For this panorama, or for any idea, impression, or feeling given to consciousness, Santayana used the term ‘essence’.

Essences do not exist, so the imagination is free to explore them, entertain them, or indulge in them without being concerned about whether they are actual.

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4 The image is from A Midsummer Night’s Dream. See further along in the paragraph.
Reality, however, intrudes upon this reverie and forces the individual to believe that certain things do exist and, therefore, exemplify the essences that make up the content of perception. To these unavoidable beliefs in things like food, shelter, dangers, and enticements, Santayana gave the name ‘animal faith’. The physical things that are objects of these beliefs make up what Santayana called the realm of matter. To the consciousness that has those beliefs and an imagination that is free to stray from them, Santayana gave the name ‘spirit’. Spirit and matter are two dimensions of existence. They are different, but not separate dimensions. A conscious intuition, which is a moment of spirit, and the corresponding bodily events in the sense organs, muscles, nerves, and brain can be regarded as different aspects of the same event. The essences that correspond to what happens in either existing realm constitute the realm of truth.

Animal faith does not abandon the imagination, it merely tames it. Santayana’s epistemology breaks down into two parts: external observation and the imaginative reconstruction of what goes on in another mind. The latter he calls literary psychology. But the imagination comes into play not just when we understand other people or when we imagine what babies or animals are thinking. Even the most scientific investigation demands that the inquirer develop an imaginative sympathy with how things work in order to arrive at genuine understanding. Organizing data, developing hypotheses, designing experiments, and interpreting results all require imaginative construction.

As all human knowledge and experience depend on the imagination, philosophy is no exception. What this comes down to is that reality is what it is. The cosmos is what it is. But every sentient creature views the world from a local and private perspective. Different views emphasize different aspects of world. Philosophy, which is an attempt to build a systematic view of what the universe is, of what is in it, of how we know it, act in it, and feel about it, emerges out the life and culture of the individual who develops it.

The consequence of Santayana’s philosophy is that there is no one final philosophy. Each person has a unique way of framing the world. That the structure of perspective is personal is the reason why Santayana wrote that the categories he found important—his four realms of being—were intended to help him clean “the windows of his soul” (SAF vi-vii). The philosophic imagination then, (or, if you prefer, philosophic creativity) is the construction of ideas (including conceptual categories, such as Santayana’s realms), methods, and arguments that enable an individual to assimilate as many aspects of experience as possible.

If Santayana is right, then philosophy does not discover anything new, the way scientific or historical investigation might, rather it expresses a world view from the angle of a single individual in a systematic manner. The emphasis shifts from philosophy to philosophy. For Plato it is the construction of a well-ordered society run by the people who most deserve to rule. For Descartes, it is establishing the grounds under which empirical science might proceed. For Dewey, it is building a democratic society in which all institutions promulgate the democratic ideals of maximizing individual freedom and well-being and organizing our collective concerns for the welfare of individuals, families, communities, and the environ-
ment. For Santayana it is to enable the individual to best come to terms with his or her worldly circumstances, so as to live as well as the world might allow.

**Santayana as an outsider**

Santayana’s outsider stance is well known. His father brought him from Avila, Spain to Boston at the age of eight. He was placed with kindergartners for a year so that he might learn English. His father could not adjust to life in America and soon returned to Spain. Jorge, who was then newly called George, was not without friends, but he summed up his memory of life in America as a boy with the following:

> I know that my feelings in those years were intense, that I was solitary and unhappy, out of humor with everything that surrounded me, and attached only to a persistent dream life, fed on books of fiction, on architecture and on religion. (PP 145)

So from his early years Santayana was drawn to the life of the imagination. The discomfort revealed in this passage lay at the core of Santayana’s personality. In many ways, it guided his life. He continued:

> A certain backwardness, or unwilling acceptance of reality, characterizes my whole life and philosophy, not indeed as a maxim but as a sentiment. (PP 145)

As he matured, George came to rely on humor, irony, and conviviality to take on the world that initially presented itself as alien. At Harvard, Santayana was quite active socially. He performed in the Hasty Pudding revue and helped found the Harvard Lampoon. But he did not give up his role as an outsider. His Spanish heritage gave him something of an exotic aura. This foreignness was part of what drew the 20-year-old Frank Russell to him. Russell, with whom Santayana remained fascinated for many decades, was visiting from Oxford with a tutor. The fascination must have been mutual, because Russell listened to Santayana’s dispassionate description of the social strata and bleak landscape of Harvard and, soon afterward, William James told Santayana that he had made quite an impression on Russell. Santayana wrote in his autobiography:

> The impression I had made was that I was capable of receiving impressions. With young Russell, who completely ignored society and convention, this was the royal road to friendship. (PP 292)

This quotation suggests two things: first that Santayana was a keen observer and listener; and second that, as Santayana could attract someone as unconcerned with society and convention as Russell, Santayana himself held no high regard for convention or fashion, though his eschewal of such things displayed itself in a less flamboyant manner than Frank Russell's (see “Ideal Sympathy,” p. 12).
Solitary in Germany

Although Santayana’s direction in life was uncertain at this stage, he was quite clear about what pleased him. He could manage quite well when alone. Friendships and social life were welcome adjuncts to his solitary enjoyments, but not his primary focus. An illustration of how he would seldom be bent by politeness or conventional sociability is seen in account of how he failed to learn to speak German. He arrived in Gottingen in the autumn of 1886 with the idea of improving on his scanty German. His landlady’s daughter gave German lessons to foreigners. But, as Santayana, described the episode:

I learned enough to understand lectures and formal conversation from the first; but there was no one with whom I could begin to talk, and with my dislike of drudgery, I turned rather to deciphering for myself, with the help of a grammar and a dictionary, texts that were worth reading on their own account . . . . I made good progress of a sort, for my own ends, but without thoroughness; and my tongue remained torpid and my inflections inaccurate. (PP 253)

Two months later he was in Berlin. His landlady and her friends were talking about him. But then, Santayana tells us:

Her daughter observed that I was in my room and could hear them through the thin door. "Der versteht ja nichts," her mother cried ["He understands nothing"] and went on wondering at my solitary life, that I went out for a walk alone and all the rest of the day sat working in my room. I understood every word perfectly; but in conversation I was helpless; there were no people with whom I cared to talk; and my punishment was that I never learned to speak the language. (PP 253)

Solitary in philosophy

My solitary life! Is it any wonder that Santayana might begin his exposition of his ontology with solitary musings of a skeptic seeking to find some solid foundation for his beliefs by doubting everything until he finds something he cannot deny? This process approaches its end when the skeptic reaches the point of thinking only he exists and that the spectacle presented to his mind of history, of other people, and of places is only a fabrication of his imagination. This spectacle with all its weight of nostalgia and regret, of hope and fear may well be an illusion. Santayana said there are three ways to overcome this concern. The first is to die, so that the possible illusion disappears completely and is followed by no other. The second is to replace one spectacle or panorama with another, so that you have the illusion of movement—of progress or regression—or correction of an error. This replacement is how life normally proceeds, because we take what appears to us to stand for actual things and events that affect us both overtly and inconspicuously. The third possibility is the great discovery that you can entertain the panorama before you without any regard to whether it represents anything that
exists. Bear in mind Santayana’s inveterate “unwillingness to accept reality,” as we read the following from *Scepticism and Animal Faith*:

Deceit itself becomes entertainment, and every illusion but so much added acquaintance with the realm of form. For the unintelligible accident of existence will cease to appear to lurk in this manifest being, weighting and crowding it, and threatening it with being swallowed up by nondescript neighbours. It will appear dwelling in its own world, and shining by its own light, however brief may be my glimpse of it: for no date will be written on it, no frame of full or of empty time will shut it in; nothing in it will be addressed to me, nor suggestive of any spectator. It will seem an event in no world, an incident in no experience. The quality of it will have ceased to exist: it will be merely the quality which it inherently, logically, and inalienably is. It will be an ESSENCE. (SAF 73-74)

**The magnitude of the imagination**

The moment at which doubt becomes extreme is the moment when the imagination becomes the freest. Remember the unhappy boy who was “attached only to a persistent dream life” (see p. 93). To see the magnitude of influence the imagination had on Santayana, we need only look at his description of it in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*:

We have memory and we have certain powers of synthesis, abstraction, reproduction, invention,—in a word, we have understanding. But this faculty of understanding has hardly begun its work of deciphering the hieroglyphics of sense and framing an idea of reality, when it is crossed by another faculty—the imagination. Perceptions do not remain in the mind, as would be suggested by the trite simile of the seal and the wax, passive and changeless, until time wear off their sharp edges and make them fade. No, perceptions fall into the brain rather as seeds into a furrowed field or even as sparks into a keg of powder. Each image breeds a hundred more, sometimes slowly and subterraneously, sometimes (when a passionate train is started) with a sudden burst of fancy. (IPR 7-8).

This celebratory description appears to regard the imagination as a faculty that takes us to places remote from ordinary understanding of the world and other people. But such ordinary understanding is impossible without the imagination. This requirement is first apparent in the case of what Santayana calls literary psychology—the perception of mental life. Santayana distinguishes scientific from literary psychology:

Scientific psychology is a part of physics, or the study of nature; it is the record of how animals act. Literary psychology is the art of imagining how they feel and think. Yet this art and that science are practised together, because one characteristic habit of man, namely speech, yields the chief terms in which he can express his thoughts and feelings. Still it is not the words, any more than the action and attitude which accompany them, that are his
understanding of the words, or his sense of his attitude and action. These
can evidently be apprehended only dramatically, by imitative sympathy; so
that literary psychology, however far scientific psychology may push it back,
always remains in possession of the moral field. (SAF 252)
The introduction here of the moral sphere indicates that it is through the imagina-
tion that we are able to discern the life of spirit:

When a man believes in another man’s thoughts and feelings, his faith is
moral, not animal. Such a spiritual dimension in the substances on which he
is reacting can be revealed to him only by dramatic imagination. (SAF 221)
This identification of the moral field with the spiritual dimension may seem
anomalous to those who read a work like *Platonism and the Spiritual Life* as sep-
ating morality from spirituality. But what is important here is that discernment
of spirit is fundamentally an imaginative process and it forms a key part of Santaya-
na’s epistemology. Knowledge that comes primarily from observation may be
accurate as far as it goes. It is always based on mental symbols—the contents of
our perceptions and calculations—that are not the same as and, for all we know,
do not resemble the things they represent, however accurately, and so observa-
tional knowledge is only approximate. But in imagining another mind, when we
get it right, the ideas that we use to represent the ideas of the other or the feelings
we have when we are accurately empathetic are identical to those experienced by
the other person:

Knowledge of discourse in other people, or of myself at other times, is what
I call literary psychology. It is, or may be, in its texture, the most literal and
adequate sort of knowledge of which a mind is capable. (SAF 173-174)
The strength of imagination as a tool of knowledge extends beyond the discer-
ment of mental life. All genuine understanding of the world comes not just from
the gathering of facts, but by creatively assimilating observations into a picture
that conveys a feeling for the way nature works:

Signs identify their objects for discourse, and show us where to look for
their undiscovered qualities. Further signs, catching other aspects of the
same object, may help me to lay siege to it from all sides; but signs will
never lead me into the citadel, and if its inner chambers are ever opened to
me, it must be through sympathetic imagination. (SAF 106)
Not just understanding others, but grasping the intricacies of anything requires
imaginative penetration. Moreover, it is sympathetic imagination. You must feel
the way nature moves from the inside. It is what Einstein must have meant when
he said his aim was to learn the secrets of the “Old One.” But it is not only grand
scientific insights, painstakingly wrought philosophic systems, or the comprehen-
sive visions of great art and literature that reveal the imagination at work. Every
moment of experience—every perception, memory, and expectation—is an imagi-
native, which is to say creative, act. Santayana, rather than fret about the gap
between the mundane moments of imagination and the great ones, took the great
moments as natural outgrowths of the ordinary.
The truth and moral reconciliation

To conclude from the preceding that philosophy is creative because all experience has an imaginative element is all well and good, but hardly satisfying. This conclusion does not tell us how philosophy is creative. The answer for Santayana is that it is when philosophy teaches us how to live—that is when philosophy guides us to creatively adjust to the world. Such adjustment requires the understanding that observation and imagination make possible. Understanding the truth about both mental life (spirit) and physical reality (matter) are of fundamental importance to what might be regarded as Santayana’s overriding moral project. An often-repeated quotation is his observation that “there is no cure for birth and death save to enjoy the interval” (SE 97). To follow that maxim, you have to be clear about what you enjoy and what possibilities there are for fulfillment. In other words, you must come to terms with your situation in the world and the depths of your own desires so that, in learning what the world can afford you, you can strive to live as well as you might. This coming to terms also involves facing up to the troublesome constraints under which life is often lived may require a deepening of spiritual insight.

There has been much discussion about spirituality as a way of leaving the world—of the imagination as unfettered by the constraints of reality. But here is a quotation from Santayana’s autobiography which suggests how seeing things apart from their momentary existence helped Santayana get by in the wake of loss. Looking back from the 1940’s on his days in England during World War I, he recalled the time when he revisited England in 1923. His friend of forty years, Frank Russell, had become estranged. Howard Sturgis, an old friend and relative through his mother’s first marriage, had died a few years earlier, sometime after Santayana had fallen away from him:

Was I sorry Howard was dead. No, but I was glad he had lived. . . . I . . . felt only the melancholy that pervades a world where everything is transitory. By that time I was inured to the cyclical character of all my friendships, that set a period to the best of them, sometimes a very brief one. For me this involved no estrangement, no disillusion; on the contrary, the limits of each friendship perfected that friendship, insured it against disaster, enshrined it in the eternal. Spirit can immortalise events without being able to prolong them. It can virtually survey all seasons at every season. (PP 514)

Santayana’s account of how he coped with the death of one friend (and, by implication, the distancing of another) illustrates the moral worth of the spiritual attitude. Friendships cannot last forever. They are formed amidst the swirl of activity wrought by the material world. But when death or estrangement brings a friendship to a close, it is framed by its duration and also by its character. The value—the moral payoff—of this framing is that it consoled him by reconciling him to the hard facts, showing the value of what had been. Santayana’s account also illustrates the interplay between his philosophy and his life—not only how the philosophic system grew out of his habits of mind, but also how the philo-
phy fed back into those habits, reinforcing them and giving them a clearly worked out conceptual home. In the *Realm of Essence*, Santayana described how aesthetic experience takes something momentary out of the flux of life and focuses on the everlasting qualities that delineate what it is: its essence. This transformation is the heart of the spiritual attitude. What Santayana described abstractly had personal and immediate value in his reaction to the death of Howard Sturgis. The framing of their friendship fixed something inherently transitory, so he could see it less as the loss of something perishable and more as something good residing forever in the eternal realm of truth.

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References


Santayana, George


5 The account of Santayana in 1943 (see p. 8) tells of a similar case in which Santayana’s handling of troublesome events exhibited the union of his philosophy with his life.
Liberating Spirit from Santayana’s Spectatorial Spirituality

George Santayana’s conception of spirituality—which John Lachs has called the “spectator” view of spirituality (Lachs 1988, 12)—points to contemplation of the eternal as the ideal of a spiritual life. What we contemplate is understood to be eternal, not because anything lasts forever, but because, for whatever happens, it is forever true that it has happened, and to appreciate that is to view things under the aspect of eternity.\(^1\) Within his materialist metaphysics, such contemplation of the eternal is the only transcendence available to us, since we are ultimately subject to the eventual death of our animal vehicle and there is no supernatual world beyond this one. But then Santayana rejects the idea that continued life, in this world or in a world beyond it, is even a spiritual ideal, tracing this need instead to animal instinct. The animal desire to live is “unspiritual” precisely in that it fails to appreciate the spiritual ideal of transcendence of the world. For Santayana, the spiritual life is one of renouncing\(^2\) one’s attachments in relation to any world, a detachment from one’s contingent circumstances performed through the repose of disinterested contemplation, attainable in Stoic fashion even while enduring action (AFSL 294-5). Such is Santayana’s expression of a transcendent conception of spirituality reconciled with a Darwinian sense of reality, spirituality as the savoring of one’s own spectatorship.

Santayana’s account can be seen as an instructive experiment in philosophizing about spirituality which, however, misses the opportunity to articulate a form of secular spirituality\(^3\) that is more immanent, or this-worldly, in orientation. While I acknowledge with many others that Santayana abounds with eloquent spiritual insight, in this essay I target Santayana’s theoretical distinction between psyche and spirit, indicating why it should be abandoned in favor of a view that identifies spirit with at least some part of psyche (discussed in the next section). Without rejecting the role that a transcendent orientation and renunciation of the world can play in the spiritual life, this theoretical move expands what we can understand the spiritual life to be, enabling the incorporation of a genuine commitment to life into spirituality. Santayana asserts that the desire to live is unspiritual, but this produces too narrow a view of the spiritual life, suppressing the heart of spirituality, while distorting his understanding of attitudes relevant to spirituality such as charity and piety (discussed in the subsequent section).\(^4\)

\(^1\) We can also appreciate our own existence in this way in order to achieve ‘ideal’ immortality: “By becoming the spectator and confessor of his own death and universal mutation, he will have identified himself with what is spiritual in all spirits and masterful in all apprehension; and so conceiving himself, he may truly feel and know that he is eternal” (LR1 161).

\(^2\) Santayana reflects on renunciation as a spiritual theme at (PSL Ch. XXV) and (RB 823).

\(^3\) I say more about secular spirituality before the end of this introductory section.

\(^4\) In this way, I join a line of commentators presenting pointed criticisms of Santayana’s approach to spirituality, including (Tejera 1989), (Gouinlock 1998), and (Rubin 2018). It is
To introduce this paper’s angle of criticism, I’d like to identify two theses inherent in Santayana’s approach to spirituality. I would say that a broadly secular approach can easily agree with what I’ll call Santayana’s “dependence thesis,” or the view that spirit is dependent for its existence upon what he calls “psyche” (or our physical being). The secular naturalist can easily accept that there could be no spirit were it not for material natures that can produce it. But Santayana’s approach involves an additional claim, which produces tension with the first. I’ll call this claim the “opposition thesis”, the view that spirit and psyche are utterly distinct, having not just different, but opposing, characters. He says that our animal being produces our survivalistic involvements with the contingent and everchanging world, while moments of what he calls “spirit” (or mere consciousness) can subsist disinterestedly apart from worldly engagement, satisfied to contemplate what is experienced when disburdened of psyche’s anxious worldly endeavors. Santayana can be understood to assert that, given what spirit is—defined in opposition to psyche—being spiritual or living the spiritual life is just to be in these spectatorial consciousness moments, so that to engage the world is by definition unspiritual.

In other words, the spirit being perfectly contemplative, should seem so: as it can do nothing, it should not writhe to do anything; . . . Spirit is vision; unspirituality is attachment. (AFSL 301)

If you accept Santayana’s dependence thesis but reject his opposition thesis, you can expand the concept of spirit to include at least some aspects of psyche. This expanded idea of spirit provides a foundation for an expanded conception of the spiritual life, which includes greater appreciation of attachment to life. This allows for a form of spirituality that does more to embrace the animal self and the world in which spirit finds itself. While Santayana’s conception of the spiritual life centers on contemplation of the immaterial content of conscious experience, this orientation to the immediate qualities of experiences (essences) without regard for the existence of what they stand for would not be the same as a spiritual orientation that values attachment to the world. I call such a spiritual orientation “immanent” because it is grounded in what actually exists.

rather difficult to summarize Santayana’s approach to spirituality, or critiques of it, but to indicate briefly a main criticism provided by each (though each of the critiques is rich with nuance), Tejera wonders whether Santayana is consistent in viewing the spiritual life as a form of practical disengagement (508); Gouinlock charges Santayana with failing to avoid his own criticism of Spinoza (2, 8); and Rubin says that “the main thrust of my objection is that it would be a pity if love of life were not a fundamental part of the spiritual life” (129), Rubin’s point being right in line with my own. Thomas M. Alexander’s critique of Santayana is described in the final footnote of this paper. Those who take Santayana’s view of spirituality to be more on target include (Lachs, 2006, esp. Ch. 14) and (Brodrick 2008). In contrast with my critique developed here, Brodrick (2011) asserts that “if it means anything special at all, [spirituality] must mean the opposite of worldliness” (20).

5 Here I’d like to acknowledge the extensive and very helpful observations made by an anonymous reviewer regarding my articulation of Santayana’s views about spirituality and my own way of identifying contrasts. It is hoped that the remainder of this paper will
Before I pursue this critique in what follows, I would like to note two ways in which Santayana nonetheless provides a good methodological model for philosophy of spirituality. First, Santayana aims to anchor an account of spirituality in its root term, ‘spirit.’ To consider a parallel, it would be odd if a philosophy of morality didn’t pursue a central objective of elucidating what ‘moral’ means. Second, Santayana’s secularist challenge is to define ‘spirit’ in a way that is not beholden to religious or supernatural commitments. This definition illustrates another methodological highlight: the attempt to spell out spirituality in a secular framework. I call this “methodological” because, even if one is not a committed naturalist, like Santayana, much can be learned from the exercise of grasping spirituality absent supernatural or religious claims asserting the divine, the miraculous, the afterlife, or the separate existence of the soul. In a letter to Daniel Cory, Santayana himself remarks on the novelty of a secularist approach to spirituality:

I ought to be regarded as myself an outsider to the Spiritual Life; I have at best only a partial insight and sympathy in that field; yet, if I am able to work out my idea, it will be a contribution of some importance to the subject, because no one I know of has ever conceived it consistently from the naturalistic point of view and shown its justification on that basis (LGS 4 July 1935; emphasis in original).

I endorse this approach (Chastain 2017), and in that regard Santayana is an inspiration. It may be that some core elements of spirituality can be more clearly identified through a secular method. My main point here against Santayana is ground my introductory remarks, and at the very least provide helpful points of departure for further dialogue about the nature of spirituality and Santayana’s views about it.

6 Philosophy of spirituality is an emerging area of philosophy that, among other things, attempts to clarify what spirituality is as conceptually distinct from particular religious traditions and from the ethical notion of human flourishing. See the introduction to The Philosophy of Spirituality, eds. Heather Salazar and Roderick Nicholls (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, forthcoming).

7 For this reason, John Dewey’s (1934) identification of the ‘religious’ without religion gives philosophy of spirituality less terminological direction, while retaining connotations of the word ‘religion’ that may be worth avoiding. At the same time, Dewey’s spiritual vision of pursuing the realization of ideals in this world is in harmony with my immanentist critique of Santayana in this paper, as is Dewey’s interest in avoiding ‘dualisms,’ though I will not pursue these connections here.

8 But, to be clear, this by itself does not entail a need to reject literal religious or supernatural beliefs, or to describe supernaturalism as unspiritual, as Santayana explicitly does—see (RB 588) and (AFSL 369), where Santayana criticizes cosmic animism and belief in immortality of the soul, respectively, characterizing such views as worldly rather than spiritual. If a commitment to life or a desire to live is spiritual, a view that the more immanent spiritual orientation I am arguing for can embrace, then desire for an afterlife in a supernatural realm counts as spiritual as well, even if such a desire turns out to be based on fiction. In any case, the central point of the philosophy of spirituality isn’t to decide what is real, but to explore what spirituality involves across all of its varieties, whether religious, supernaturalistic, or neither.
that a more *immanent* variety of secular spirituality needs articulation to balance out his own *transcendent* spectatorial conception.

**Psyche & Spirit**

Over several decades of philosophizing about spirit, Santayana’s basic handling of the concept is remarkably stable. Here is a formulation of the distinction between psyche and spirit as it appears in his later work *The Realm of Spirit*:

> Avoiding, then, this poetical word, the soul, laden with so many equivocations, I will beg the reader to distinguish sharply two levels of life in the human body, one of which I call the *spirit*, and the other the *psyche*. By spirit I understand the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything—the ultimate invisible emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought. On the other hand, by the psyche I understand a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behaviour. This psyche is the specific form of physical life, present and potential, asserting itself in any plant or animal. (RB 331; italics in original)

For Santayana, psyche is the sum total of the organism’s functioning, an organization of structure that came about through whatever natural laws were at work in the history of species. Spirit is simply the consciousness that emerges from psyche so that psyche, or the organism, becomes aware to a lesser or greater degree of its surroundings and itself. Santayana emphasizes, however, that mere consciousness, or spirit, does not add a new power to the animal’s repertoire, which is to say that spirit has no power of its own. Spirit is merely aware of the show taking place, without its own interests and unable to exert its own influence. Any causal influence is always performed by psyche. Still, while spirit has no control over the show, Santayana contends that awareness of what is taking place does add value to life that it would not otherwise have. According to Santayana, consciousness or spirit makes possible a joy in our own awareness, involving a spe-

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9 It has been wondered by Justus Buchler (AFSL 66-72) whether Santayana, over his lifetime, oscillates between favoring the life of reason, committed to achieving a harmony among one’s worldly ideals, and favoring the more detached spiritual life. Douglas M. MacDonald (1972) has since argued that, regardless, the two kinds of life need not be understood as being in conflict within Santayana’s system. That aside, here I am only concerned with his understanding of what the spiritual life is, not how high of a priority he places on it throughout his life.

10 For an illuminating exposition of the ambiguity in Santayana’s use of the concept ‘psyche’ and how these various uses work together systematically in Santayana’s philosophy, see (MacDonald 1976). For more on psyche, and also the relation of psyche and spirit, also see (Sprigge 1995, Ch. V). Both commentators note that Santayana could have been more clear in spelling out the various ways in which he uses these concepts.
cial awareness of harmony, wholeness, unity, depth, or definiteness of experience.\textsuperscript{11}

As a point of critical clarity, I am not assessing whether Santayana’s distinction between psyche and spirit is helpful for the philosophy of mind. In her recent work, Jessica Wahman (2015) argues for the enduring relevance of Santayana’s psyche/spirit distinction to the ongoing dispute between reductivist and non-reductivist theories of mind.\textsuperscript{12} Wahman observes that Santayana’s distinction does not deny, in a reductivist manner, what has been called by David Chalmers (1995) the “hard problem of consciousness.” This is the seemingly insurmountable problem of explaining how physical organismic operations like that of the brain (part of what Santayana calls psyche) can give rise to our first-person, subjective experience (spirit). I’m personally inclined to accept Thomas Nagel’s (1986) pessimism about our ability to bridge the gap between internal and external perspectives on the mind (and on many other philosophical topics).\textsuperscript{13} With Nagel, I see greater wisdom in respecting the nature of the problem than in proposed solutions; but, whatever the best approach to that problem, the critique of the usefulness of Santayana’s psyche/spirit distinction for the philosophy of spirituality intersects at a different angle.

The first of two problems I’d like to note is that, in his descriptions of spirit, Santayana regularly arrogates a number of qualities to spirit that it cannot make sense for spirit to have as mere consciousness. Throughout Santayana’s writings, spirit takes on a number of traits—spirit is sprightly and playful, curious and prone to wonder, appreciative of knowledge and harmony, and also appreciative of freedom and rest when liberated from psyche’s worldly engagements. But how can spirit, as mere supervenience upon psyche, exhibit any of these qualities without it being the case that psyche is also, and more foundationally, the one exhibiting these qualities? Santayana often makes this point about other aspects of psyche, particularly when it comes to psyche’s negative experiences:

But how can the spirit have woes? Consciousness can actualise pain, as it can actualise anything; but is not the ground or reason why one thing hurts and another pleases: this ground lies in the contractions and instincts of the body. If then we say the spirit suffers from the deceits of the flesh, we must look for the rebellion against such deceits in the body itself, which requires a certain steadiness if it is to feed the spirit. The woes of the spirit are then not its own, but those of the natural life it illuminates, and whose colour (being colourless) it is said to take. (AFSL 297)

But then these same observations should apply to spirit’s play, wonder, and peace states. If Santayana always consistently asserted that spirit is only the “light” of

\textsuperscript{11} Santayana uses different descriptions in different writings. For greater detail on what he means by ‘unity’ or ‘union,’ see The Realm of Spirit, Ch. IX (RB 768-825).

\textsuperscript{12} See esp. Chs. 5 and 7. Wahman also indicates how Santayana’s philosophy of mind is relevant to psychotherapeutic theory and practice.

\textsuperscript{13} See esp. Chs. II and III. Angus Kerr-Lawson (2001, 37) also notes this thematic similarity between Santayana and Nagel.
consciousness, this problem wouldn’t arise. There would be, on one side of the distinction, what psyche is doing, and then, on the other side, spirit’s awareness of what happens as a powerless witness. Then whatever moods or aspirations or enjoyments arise in the individual would be psyche’s, and any awareness of that would be spirit’s. This idea of spirit as light or witness could be called the “thin” conception of spirit, which Santayana most faithfully adheres to in those places where his focus is more limited to what we would today call the philosophy of the mind. But where his discussion turns more fully to the nature of the spiritual life, his concept of spirit readily becomes more “thick,” borrowing from psyche’s states, but without Santayana acknowledging it.

In this discussion of the characteristics of intuition (or spirit) in *The Realm of Spirit*, at least two of these characteristics—“vitality” and “cognition”—could not be something distinct from psyche as mere consciousness, but could only be something psyche does that spirit witnesses, if we maintain Santayana’s thin conception of spirit. That is, as mere light of consciousness, there is nothing in spirit which can take on these qualities. As for vitality, he says that “the sensitiveness is physical, the intuition spiritual; the one establishes, the other expresses, a vital harmony in the movement of things” (RB 659). But this still locates vitality firmly within the physical, which spirit’s intuition only expresses. As for cognition, in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, Santayana is clear that even the basic apperceptive unity of consciousness, providing unified focus to attention, is all psyche’s doing, along with any attendant cognitive processes of perceiving, reasoning and understanding (SAF 281-5). At the very least, a combination of the two mental factors must be acknowledged. If spirit’s light is able to purify psyche into flame, it is

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14 Such as in (SAF Ch. XXVI, “The Discernment of Spirit”).

15 Kerr-Lawson (2005, 35) also makes use of the thin/thick distinction in this way. And Santayana himself uses the thickness metaphor for this purpose: “Pure awareness or consciousness suffices to exemplify spirit; and there may be cold spirits somewhere that have merely that function; but . . . the human spirit, having intent, expectation, belief, and eagerness, runs much thicker than that” (SAF 275). Santayana acknowledges thickness of spirit when he understands spirit to be the expression of some particular individual’s psyche, but he does not acknowledge thickness in the general concept of spirit that operates to support his spectatorial spirituality. To respond to an anonymous reviewer, I don’t believe that I’m ignoring that Santayana presents his concept of spirit as a conceptual distinction rather than a division in nature. The problem is that Santayana’s conception of the spiritual life as contemplation is supposed to be guided by his concept of spirit as awareness, but his description of the spiritual life involves a selection of various somehow preferred states of psyche. Then one wonders, why those states? Why not instead emphasize, for instance, psyche’s fear and trembling, as Kierkegaard’s conception of spiritual life does? Nothing about the thin concept of spirit as awareness enables us to decide which states of psyche characterize the spiritual life. It could be said that spirit as mere awareness produces an ideal of contemplative repose for the spiritual life, but that’s only if we agree in advance that spirit is best defined as awareness.

16 For instance, where he says, “Intuition, when it thoroughly dominates animal experiences, transmutes it into pure flame” (SAF 288).
still psyche that produces the fuel for the flame, so that the flame is the thick spirit that is part psyche. So it is not as if all the credit for our most profound spirit moments could go to pure spirit.

Perhaps spirit as mere light of consciousness can be regarded as a function\(^\text{17}\) that enables psyche to achieve new heights. It is surely humanity’s amplified capacity for reflection that distinguishes \textit{homo sapiens} from other animals. But this function would not be a special part of subjective life that belongs to spirit as opposed to psyche. \textit{What} we experience inside would all be psyche. It is psyche that is vivacious, curious or appreciative of rest, and perhaps higher order reflection can intensify such psychological predispositions, but if we want to give any content to what spirit is on a thicker conception that goes beyond mere awareness, this must be acknowledged as some part of psyche.\(^\text{18}\) Otherwise, it is not clear how Santayana has avoided the dualism of earlier philosophers that make spirit or soul a kind of stuff all on its own.\(^\text{19}\)

A second problem helps to explain why such a skilled philosopher would find himself with the first problem. This problem is that, in his characterization of the opposition between psyche and spirit, Santayana is really just operating on a mythology that produces a leaning toward transcendence in advance of his characterization of spirituality. In his overall system, Santayana provides a value-laden account of human existence that degrades animality and nature in a Hobbesian and Schopenhauerian way,\(^\text{20}\) and which also involves a valuation of the mental

\(^{17}\) Wahman clarifies how consciousness can serve a function without being viewed as causal or as having its own internal mechanism, arriving at this conclusion: “spirit’s role or function may be understood distinctly from the material behavior of psyche while, in effect, it is the actualization of a very complex aspect of psyche’s own functioning” (110).

\(^{18}\) Yet another problem is this: how can Santayana know, based upon introspection and the science available, what exactly reflection or higher order consciousness contributes to human life, as opposed to what comes about through developments in psychological capacities independent of developments in consciousness?

\(^{19}\) In his dissertation on Santayana, Richard Paul DeTar argues that Santayana’s duality between psyche and spirit does not amount to dualism, which DeTar describes as “a duality which is \textit{unresolved} and problematic, one which divides the world into two different spheres of reality, the relation and interaction of which does not make logical sense, or at the very least requires more effort to figure out than it seems to be worth” (1998, 22; emphasis in original). While I’m not accusing Santayana of substance dualism, like that found in Descartes, I do believe we have to admit that what I’m calling Santayana’s ‘opposition thesis’ produces a duality that is “problematic” and “requires more effort to figure out than it seems to be worth.”

\(^{20}\) For instance: “The world is not respectable; it is mortal, tormented, confused, deluded forever” (PSL 303). Santayana’s negativity to our state of nature was likely intensified by Darwinism, but more recently, it has been argued that Darwinism need not lead to disenchantment with the world (Levine 2008). In response to an anonymous reviewer, it is interesting that Santayana is not so negative toward our material existence in his life-of-reason mode, but this negativity reliably wakes up whenever he switches to reflection on the spiritual life. This may lend support to the conclusion that there really are two Santayanas after all.
over the bodily that hearkens back to the Greeks, who Santayana relies upon heavily as a model for both the life of reason and the spiritual life. Santayana, of course, makes it a central element of his system of philosophy to deny that we can have a truly literal understanding of the human mind, or of material reality in general, since all knowledge is mediated symbolically—so Santayana is theoretically within his rights to expound on human life metaphorically. But, granting that we’re all bound to describe reality and our own mental life in symbol and metaphor—as we have learned from the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999)—if Santayana’s own proposed literary psychology favors one conception of spirituality over another, it can’t go unaddressed.

In this regard, it’s instructive to interrogate a story of psyche and spirit presented by Santayana in explicitly mythological terms, and then I will explain how it illustrates both the first and second problem with Santayana’s distinction. In Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies, Santayana casts psyche as the toiling mother, and spirit (referred to as “intuition”) as the sprightly son, a bit of storytelling which it is illuminating to quote at length:

> Intuition is not a material organ of the Psyche, like a hand or an antenna; it is a marvelous child, far more alive than herself, whose only instinct is play, laughter, and brooding meditation. The strange child—who could have been his father?—is a poet; absolutely useless and incomprehensible to his poor mother, and only a new burden on her shoulders, because she can’t help feeding and loving him. He sees; which to her is a mystery, because although she has always acted as if, in some measure, she felt things at a distance, she has never seen and never can see anything. Nor are his senses, for all their vivacity, of any use to her. For what do they reveal to him? Always something irrelevant: a shaft of dusty light across the rafters, a blue flame dancing on the coals, a hum, a babbling of waters, a breath of heat or of coolness, a mortal weariness or a groundless joy—all dream-images, visions of a play world, essences painted on air, such as any poet might invent in idleness. Yet the child cares about them immensely: he is full of sudden tears and of jealous little loves. “Hush, my child,” says good mother Psyche, “it’s all nonsense.” It is not for those fantastic visions that she watches: she knits with her eyes shut, and mutters her same old prayers. She has always groped amidst obstacles like a mole pressing on where the earth is softest. . . . She is artful but not intelligent, least of all about herself. For this reason she can never understand how she gave birth to such a thankless child. She hardly remembers the warm ray from the sun or from some other celestial source which one day pierced to her heart, and begat there this

21 Santayana’s vision of the contemplative spiritual life is partly drawn from Aristotle, who gives supreme value to the intellectual activity of contemplation when he says, “This activity is the most excellent one: the intellect is the most excellent of the things in us, and the things with which the intellect is concerned are the most excellent of the things that can be known” (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7.1177a20-22).

22 See SAF Ch. XXIV, “Literary Psychology”.

strange uneasiness, this truant joy, which we call thought. Seeing how quick and observant the brat is, she sometimes sends him on errands; but he loiters terribly on the way, or loses it altogether, forgets what he was sent for . . . Yet there are moments when she relents, when her worn old hands rest in her lap, when she remembers and wonders, and two cold tears trickle down from her blind eyes. What is the good of all her labour? Has it all been, perhaps, for his sake, that he might live and sing and be happy? . . . But he forgets her in his selfishness, and she can never, never understand him.

(SE 223-4; emphasis in original)

Presented here explicitly as fable, this narrative rendering of the dependence thesis and opposition thesis guides the analysis of psyche and spirit that Santayana employs throughout his work, illustrating both of the problems I am describing. The first problem, again, is that Santayana takes spirit to introduce a new quality to subjective life—here he is focused on the sprightly, aimless and observant qualities. However, earlier in the same chapter just before he enters into this fable, Santayana asserts that “it is . . . absurd . . . to profess that [spirit] could exist, or be a spirit at all, if it were not the spirit of some body, the voice of some animal heart” (SE 219). So, why is it that when we get to the fable, the son is able to express various subjective states that do not give voice to the animal psyche? Relating to this, how can the child be “far more alive than” the mother? And how could the child care, with his own sudden tears and jealous little loves, about things the value of which psyche cannot understand? That is: first, how could spirit care about its own things; and second, how could psyche not also care about these things? Santayana should surely be allowed some poetic license, but the objection here is that the paradox in the poetic presentation is also present in his more formal philosophical handling, and my suspicion is that the fable is just Santayana’s underlying philosophical thought process made more clear.

The second problem is that psyche, or our animal nature, is cast in a degrading light, so that we are prompted in advance to view our animal nature as something that it is desirable to transcend, just as it can seem preferable that the aimless, celebratory butterfly transcend the earthy caterpillar. Poor mother psyche is a blind and unintelligent mole, toiling without vision and is worth something perhaps, but owing only to the incomprehensible child she’s unwittingly spawned. This demeaning description is still somewhat more sympathetic than Santayana’s more Hobbesian moments, in that here our animal nature is at least a devoted, if

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23 This mother/son metaphor for psyche/spirit is revisited explicitly at (PSL 270), where the mother becomes a ‘foster-parent.’

24 And third, in Santayana’s more formal analysis, spirit isn’t supposed to be capable of caring at all (for instance, AFSL 291), but is really just a witness, a constraint on his concept of spirit that Santayana regularly violates—a ‘sleight of spirit’ you might call it—in order to dive back into his more mythological understanding of the psyche/spirit distinction. Santayana’s contention that spirit cannot care is a core oddity of his approach to spirituality, and the seed of paradox. Even though some conceptions of the spiritual path present a destination in which one is wholly disinterested, it’s quite another thing to restrict spirituality to a definition indexed only to this kind of spiritual destination.
confused, mother. But then the gender assignment—psyche as “she” and spirit as “he”—bestows upon psyche the symbolic integration of nature/earth/animal/woman, a masculinist code in the Western philosophical and religious tradition for something having lower value than whatever is represented by the complementary set of symbols: culture/heaven/human/man. Contrast this with indigenous spiritualities, like that of the Lakota, which praise mother earth in humbling gratitude, even while revering father sky, a loving embrace of nature that also finds expression in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s *Nature*.

Also interesting about the fable of mother and son is that it casts spirit in a negative light as well. The son’s wanderings are irrelevant and aimless, and he is a thankless, selfish brat. In spirit’s love of contemplation and flights of fancy, there is an impious forgetfulness of what grounds spirit in reality. We might take this to be Santayana’s candid assessment of how spirit first emerges in all of us, at first playful and aimless, only later possibly overcoming this immaturity in a more disciplined life of reason or a spiritual life. But what satisfies spirit in this tale is what Santayana says satisfies spirit at the more mature stage as well—to be distinterested, detached, and disengaged from worldly affairs in the purest possible aesthetic contemplation of what appears to consciousness. On Santayana’s view, spirit never loses its distaste for the distractions of the world, nor a disdain for the world itself.

Most interesting about this fable of mother and son is the depiction of psyche and spirit as inherently ill-suited for harmony with one another. There is truth in this, in that we all struggle with appetites, impulses, pains and discomforts that are clearly bodily in origin, but Santayana’s fable suggests that it is always true that spirit is at odds with our lowly animal psyche, which in turn produces a conception of spirituality that can only find satisfaction in transcendence. A broader, deeper conception of spirituality can encourage us to identify with and embrace our animal self and our natural environment, fostering a more earnest piety and love of life than does Santayana’s spectatorial view.

**Attachment & Renunciation**

Accessing the Catholic tradition of his Spanish roots, Santayana uses Saint John of the Cross to illustrate the central role of renunciation in the spiritual life:

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25 This ancient patriarchal conceptual framework has received trenchant critique from feminist philosophers, a critique that, in feminist philosophy of religion, helps point the way to a more immanent spiritual orientation. See for instance (Saiving Goldstein 1960), (Christ 1991), and (Raphael 1994). One lesson Christ draws from her analysis is that “it must not be assumed that religion is always an attempt to escape the flux of life” (94); and Raphael observes that “feminist spirituality … locates female sacrality in biological and imaginative fecundity and in the daily creativity of domestic life … The very immanence of this sacral experience is the locus of its value and religious meaning” (520).

26 I provide a close examination of the central role that healing plays in the spiritual life of a Lakota wicasa wakan (holy man) in my forthcoming paper “Becoming a Hollow Bone: Lakota Respect for the Sacred.”
The spirit can never be altogether spiritual, or morally other than a caprice of blind Will, until it has traversed the Dark Night described by Saint John of the Cross, and adopted his motto: Nothing Nothing Nothing. It is only on this understanding that all things may be understood without confusion, loved without disgrace, and touched without infection, or that a life of action, for the spirit, can be a life of prayer. (RB 823; emphasis in original)

In his motto, Saint John addresses the world as nothing and, in doing so, renounces the world. In Santayana’s philosophical handling, this renunciation is achieved by becoming spectator through contemplative detachment, raising our contingent, passing life to an essence understood in its eternal truth, a stance which Santayana says is exemplified in Christ: “The idea of Christ thus represents the intrinsic ideal of spirit; that is to say, the acme of disinterested intelligence and disinterested love” (ICG 645). To achieve disinterested love and contemplation, the individual entering into the spiritual life must first have contempt for the world (PSL 303), ultimately loving it only as something contemplated, not as something to which we cling.27

On the reasoning that the spiritual ideal is renunciation through contemplation, Santayana chastises those who have too strong a desire to live:

It may indeed be said that no man of any depth of soul has made his prolonged existence the touchstone of his enthusiasms. Such an instinct is carnal, and if immortality is to add a higher inspiration to life it must not be an immortality of selfishness. What a despicable creature must a man be, and how sunk below the level of the most barbaric virtue, if he cannot bear to live for his children, for his art, or for country! (LR1 147)

Here, Santayana explicitly states his view that the desire to live is unspiritual:

Psyche, having organized the vital functions of the human animal, begins to ask itself what it is living for. The answer is not, as an unspiritual philosophy would have it: In order to live on. The true answer is: In order to understand, in order to see the Ideas. (SE 227)

Spectatorial contemplation of ideas is set in clear contrast to what he views as an opposed animalistic mode. But Santayana’s assessment is clearly hyperbolic, ignoring the spirituality that can be discovered in the human desire to live. Of course, a desire to keep living needn’t be at odds with a desire to live for others, as Santayana assumes above, nor can we assume that it is a purely instinctual or

27 But I wonder why, if we are on a spiritual path to complete renunciation, we should not also renounce contemplation, including any interest in what Santayana calls our ‘ideal immortality’ (see fn. 1). I would also question the linking of contemplation and renunciation—it’s not as if contempt is a necessary cause or result of contemplation. It would also be worth thinking through whether George Dickie’s interrogation of the aesthetic attitude has application to Santayana’s vision of the spiritual life, and what the implications would be: “In general, I conclude that ‘disinterestedness’ . . . cannot properly be used to refer to a special kind of attention. ‘Disinterestedness’ is a term which is used to make clear that an action has certain kinds of motives. Hence, we speak of disinterested findings (of boards of inquiry), disinterested verdicts (of judges and juries), and so on” (1964, 60).
carnal desire. One could, upon conscious reflection, affirm the value of life and then want to continue being a part of it, an affirmation of life which seems to me to lie within the sphere of the spiritual, a sphere which Santayana’s conception doesn’t capture in its entirety.  

Santayana argues that we could not place a value on life if we did not already desire it: “nothing but the momentum of life, already accidentally working in myself . . . could possibly demand life” (SAF 280). For Santayana, this seems to be enough to establish that a desire for life could only be justified by appeal to base animal instinct. But note that one could also affirm the value of life in a more general way, while not caring for one’s own immortality at all, which would remove the suspicion of instinctive egoism. One could hope that others live on—even unspecified others to whom one is unattached—having a willingness to sacrifice oneself based upon a reflective commitment to the beauty and wonder of the general creative spontaneity of life as something profoundly sacred. Santayana disagrees that there is something worthwhile to commit to here, but it is hard to see anything more than a blanket prejudice against the world driving his conclusion. In one place, where Santayana is describing how his own approach is both like and unlike the Indian spirituality of the Hindu tradition, he says he “cannot follow” the Indians in the importance they place on potentiality—or what I just described as the creative spontaneity of life—remarking that “potentiality is not an ideal, but a blind commitment” (PGS 569). But to call it a blind commitment is only to deny without argument that potentiality can be viewed as an immanent spiritual ideal.

Santayana does not deny that spirituality involves love, but he requires that truly spiritual love be disinterested, even while acknowledging that the spiritual life involves a radical expansion of love beyond one’s own personal attachments. He calls this expansive spiritual tendency “charity,” which for Santayana is sympathy for all forms of life which spirit can contemplate in its inexhaustible capacity to appreciate all things under the aspect of eternity. Of course, on an approach like Santayana’s which eschews attachment, this charity cannot be a real concern for the lives of others, but only a delight in taking on the kaleidoscope of perspectives across all subjectivities. Santayana takes the spiritual playground to be oriented toward the transcendent rather than the immanent, but he may very well be getting the source and orientation of spiritual charity wrong. Though it may be a function of higher order consciousness that enables one to imagine what it would be like to be conscious as another lifeform in situations rather different from

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28 Robert Solomon’s more recent experiment in secular spirituality (2002), which takes seriously words such as ‘spirit’ and ‘spirituality’ as Santayana does, has more of the immanent orientation I am urging, including a genuine affirmation of life, while also grounding spirituality in our robust psychological states, not in mere consciousness.

29 It could also be said that Santayana’s ideal of contemplation without commitment to life is spiritually empty (to play off Kant’s well-known aphorism in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”).

30 See Santayana’s discussion of charity at (LR1 129-136) and (RB 783ff).
one’s own, the state of imaginative enjoyment of other forms of life would need to be attributed to psyche. Also, it seems more sensible to say that genuine love of life, rather than contemplative renunciation, is what drives our spiritual sympathy with a neighbor, a pet cat, a dragonfly, or a tree. A reflective ability to be detached from one’s own circumstances may allow this sympathy, but something one detects in the other attracts the psyche to enact this reflective communion. It can’t be mere consciousness that drives us to sympathy, or the mere imaginative projection of consciousness onto something else that attracts our sympathy. Pure spirit does not care.

In *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, Santayana presents his well-known pronouncement that the spiritual life is a disintoxication from values (248). One implication of this idea is that the spiritual life in itself is not attached to the relative conventions of any given time or place, which is to say that spirit isn’t provincial, enabling universal spiritual charity. But another implication of this idea is, again, that spirit has no desire in itself to live, as he emphasizes further on in the same work:

> Spirit must have some organ; but when once aroused it does not look in the direction of its organ or care at all about preserving it. (PSL 260-1)

and:

> Quantity is not a category important to spirit; . . . it is indifferent to duration, because it lives in the eternal . . . It is not anxious, like an animal soul, hounded by curiosity and fear, to dominate and possess everything. (PSL 293)

This supposed indifference that spirit has toward its own animal self limits Santayana’s conception of yet another spiritual attitude—piety. In the earlier *Reason in Religion*, Santayana distinguishes piety and spirituality as different parts of religion, rather than viewing piety as playing a more central role in spirituality. Piety produces attachment, placing a value on the worldly or animal causes and conditions of spirit, while spirituality is the part that is unattached, aspiring, looking upward to the ideal:

> Spirituality is nobler than piety, because what would fulfil our being and make it worth having is what alone lends value to the being’s source. Nothing can be lower or more wholly instrumental than the substance and cause of all things. (LR1 117)

For Santayana, piety is certainly associated with the spiritual life, in that we are forced to recognize what I’ve called the dependence thesis—that there could

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31 But one wonders if Santayana more precisely means a disintoxication from ‘uses’ (or, perhaps, from instrumentalism), as indicated in another place where he states that the “objects of spirit” are “essences not things, values not uses” (AFSL 296). This would make more sense in that the spiritual life, or at least psyche’s pursuit of it (AFSL 291), involves valuing a contemplative state, and in the detached state itself there is still a sense of value. It seems that what’s more important to spirituality, for Santayana, is the disinterestedness or practical disengagement of that contemplative state.
not be spirit were it not for our animal being (PSL 278). So, ultimately, “Piety
must never be dislodged: spirituality without it is madness” (PGS 572). But this
appears to be the extent of Santayana’s piety, an ontological observation about
spirit’s material dependence. He maintains that spirit is still most satisfied, like
the ungrateful son, by the ideal of total freedom from its material base, even if it
cannot be achieved except through total annihilation of one’s spirit. It’s a back-
handed and begrudging piety that cannot embrace spirit’s conditions, treating this
only as the animal psyche’s anxious attachment. In his indictment of piety, Santa-
yana again accesses the fable of mother and son: “We sometimes find that the
mother we love is not the mother we should have liked; and spirit at every turn
has that painful experience” (RB 669). But again, this only accentuates the nega-
tive, in service to a conception of spirituality that is exclusively transcendent in
orientation.

When reflection brings our cherished attachments under the aspect of eternity,
this at the same time makes those attachments all the more precious. When we’re
forced to acknowledge that whatever is valuable about spirit springs from some
aspect of psyche, this makes psyche as precious as spirit itself. Wouldn’t a more
balanced conception of spirituality view the affirmation of psyche’s attachments
as a spiritual virtue that enables us to satisfy a spiritual yearning to find psycho-
logical connection and grounding, so that spirit can feel at home in this world?
My ultimate recommendation is that we abandon Santayana’s psyche/spirit dis-
tinction, at least for the purpose of philosophizing about spirituality. Instead,
we should view spirit as an aspect of psyche, not as a distinct mode of being.32
Yearning to be a free spirit is only one element of a spiritual life. Genuine spiritu-
ality is found in the oscillation between transcendence and immanence.33

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32 If spirit is identified with some part of psyche, then spirit also can’t be viewed as essen-
tially “homeless” owing to our capacity for detachment (PSL Ch. XV).
33 My critique resonates with Thomas M. Alexander’s (2000) own more sympathetic cri-
tique of Santayana’s conception of the spiritual life. Appealing to the practical side of Bud-
dhism, Alexander states: ‘Contemplation and practice work together to generate a life that is
‘liberated.’ And this may be contrasted to Santayana’s philosophy which tends to keep the
spiritual and moral lives disjointed or, at best, irrelevant to each other” (Alexander 2000, 14).
I would add that, more than just joining the spiritual and the moral, what’s needed is to
bring together two complementary aspects of spirituality itself, which is both contemplative
and committed to life. Reflecting this broader conception of spirituality, I believe, Alexan-
der elsewhere comments on Santayana’s statement that “Spirit is the witness of the cosmic
dance” (RB 562; emphasis in original), observing that “unlike Santayana, I think it also
‘dances,’ else how could it be a ‘witness’?” (Alexander 2013, 284, fn. 1).
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When it comes to political matters, Santayana could be incisive, poignant, or puzzlingly aloof. Better at reflecting on past disasters than analyzing present ferment, he was expert in summary dismissals of absolutism, both philosophical and political, as in this conclusion of a chapter of *The Life of Reason*: "Theodicies that were to demonstrate an absolute cosmic harmony have turned the universe into a tyrannous nightmare, from which we are glad to awake again in this unintentional and somewhat tractable world" (LR3 190).

Imbued with wit and a cautious optimism ("progress" is one of its most frequent substantives), Santayana's *The Life of Reason* appeared in 1905. This "somewhat tractable" moment was nonetheless rife with mayhem and assassination, the time of Joseph Conrad's novels of terrorism, *The Secret Agent* (1907, about English anarchists) and *Under Western Eyes* (1911, about a Russian terrorist and his erstwhile friend, who betrays the assassin to the state). It was an era of murderous bombings: Conrad fictionalized an apparent attack on the English Royal Observatory in 1894 in *The Secret Agent*; other notorious bombings were the Haymarket affair in Chicago, in 1886; and the bombing of the Los Angeles Times, in 1886; and the bombing of the Los Angeles Times, in 1910.

But the turn of the twentieth century was an especially dicey time to be head of a state. The event that seems to inform the fiction of *Under Western Eyes* is the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. This event became typical of its age and, in a number of features (an assassin's failed attempt on his target followed shortly thereafter by another's lethal success), the Czar's murder resembled the era's most notorious assassination: the murder of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Other high level assassinations of the era included the murder of French president Marie François Sadi Carnot, who was stabbed by an Italian anarchist in 1894; Empress Elisabeth of Austria, also stabbed to death by an Italian anarchist in 1898; King Umberto I of Italy was shot by an anarchist in 1900; American President William McKinley was killed by an anarchist in 1901, making him the third American president assassinated in less than four decades. In June 1903, the King of Serbia, his wife, and various other ministers of state were ambushed and summarily shot by a faction of the Serbian Army, an event that may be read as a gruesome, nationalistic (or terrorist, depending on one's affiliations) prologue to 1914 (Clark 10), when a Serbian teenager, a member of a nationalist cell called "the Black Hand" shot the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife in Sarajevo, lighting the fuse of the conflagration that would end at least four empires (The German, the Austrian, the Russian, and the Ottoman) and kill over twenty million people.

In one of the more concise and decisive essays in this volume, *The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism*, Herman Saatkamp confesses bewilderment at
Santayana's fatalistic commonplace of using *weather* as a metaphor for political realities. Any voter, let alone activist, is likely sympathetic with Saatkamp, but I am not sure bewilderment is conclusive, even as I consider that in 1925, in the heyday of his peripatetic period, situated in a hotel in Rome, Santayana composed *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*. It is one of his most elegant and fugal essays, Bach-like and modernist at once. Outside, it was fascism. In that year, Mussolini called a grandiose halt to his brief period of constitutional rule and declared himself "Il Duce." None of this is treated in any direct, or even glancing, way by Santayana. Rather, in chapter eleven of *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, he proposes an Epicurean-sounding, apolitical definition of spiritual life (in Santayana's terms, aspirant and calm, not in any way mystical), saying that while "apostles" may be worldly, "devotees of spirit" are not. This detached tone dissipates somewhat by the end of the chapter as he finally says "the value of spiritual life must be judged by reason." Spirit, as Santayana dialectically defines it, depends on contingent circumstances but contemplates [with] an uncontingent calm. For those who value political action, this position may seem remote and irresponsible. However, on almost any modern subject—think abstract painting or air travel—Santayana is tough to mine for prescriptions. Santayana is more an aid to contemplation, not purveyor of road maps for the soul.

Reading Santayana against a current (twenty-first century) topic thus demands reflective collation and imaginative dialogue. The best essays in the volume do this, but those essayists who are most dubious that Santayana has much valuable to say about sectarian, industrial, or terrorist violence—Saatkamp and Mendiata—are valuable contributors to the ultimate discussion.

In this collection's many-pathed conversation, the mission implied by the volume’s title seems a different challenge than the one often taken up by the essays. Over half of them barely use the word ‘terrorism’. I freely confess that the idea of "an age of terrorism" in the book's title seems especially daunting, but the project seems to have been undertaken with no benchmark definition of ‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’ that the contributors could then take or leave, on payment of an explanation of their choice. The volume is divided into three parts, and the third part seems most likely to directly apply some of Santayana's terms—barbarism, fanaticism, and egotism—to terror itself. Ironically, these essays mention the words ‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’ the least and their arguments do not directly engage Santayana's idea of the life of reason.

Santayana's career-long political ambiguity seems to have funneled many of the essayists here into his late, naturalistic (in the dark sense of Dreiser, not Dewey) work *Dominations and Powers* rather than the sunnier *Life of Reason*. The volume could thus well have been called *The Age of Terrorism in the Light of Dominations and Powers*, as Santayana’s last (1951) book is cited about equally as much as *The Life of Reason* and it serves as the foundational text for more essays here than does *The Life of Reason*. The opportunity to see *The Life of Reason* as a document of its own era of terror is not taken up by any of the authors of this still provocative and educational volume. Rather, the typical effort is to see what Santayana, selectively considered (the First World War volume *Soliloquies in England* is another frequent source), can say about contemporary political un—
rest and unreason, with an eclectic assortment of topics (drone warfare, the Italian mafia, the fall of the Berlin Wall, a conversation of Habermas and Derrida), with international terrorism often a blurry presence in the essayist's rear-view mirror.

The rationale for frequently citing *Dominations and Powers* is plain: it is Santayana’s most explicitly political book. But it is also where Santayana himself strikes an elegiac, valedictory attitude toward the younger self that wrote *The Life of Reason*. That said, *The Life of Reason* itself is not merely an evasive sublimation of conflict or even a neo-classical guide to peace with industrial progress, but a definition of reason which is as modern and challenging in its way as Freud's:

> The Life of Reason is the happy marriage of two elements—impulse and ideation—which if wholly divorced would reduce man to a brute or to a maniac. The rational animal is generated by the union of these two monsters. He is constituted by ideas which have ceased to be visionary and actions which have ceased to be vain" (LR1 6).

Reason in Santayana's terms is less a completed instrument than a goal, a historical development that is still growing, or should be so.

The most successful essays in the volume are those that dare to slow down and specify their concerns about either Santayana or contemporary history. One of the best essays which critically reviews Santayana developmentally across several of his works is Till Kinzel’s “Santayana, Self-Knowledge and the Limits of Politics.” Kinzel argues that Santayana’s conventional distance from political strife is a potential virtue, and that there is limited philosophical or political benefit to glibly undermining (à la Nietzsche) ordinary and natural comforts, not especially consumerist satisfactions, but what Santayana identified as the objects of animal faith. Rather, a contemplative attitude rooted in the ordinary may be useful in making a calm assessment of politics, making sectarianism and absolutism less likely. The essay develops the idea that Santayana’s implicit attitudes toward worldly affairs may be more decisive than his explicit confrontations with political ideas. Still, this essay is typical of several of the essays that are excellent in their thoughtful review of Santayana in that it ultimately does not collate its claims with any analysis of terrorism in a history of our own moment.

One of the more creative essays in the volume, Matteo Santarelli's "Dewey, Santayana, and ‘Ndrangheta: Understanding a Complex Phenomenon," is especially case-specific, even though it skirts the issue of international terrorism by examining a branch of the Italian mafia called “‘Ndrangheta.” The essay develops a fruitful contrast of Deweyan and Santayanan terms, arguing that Santayana’s terms “factional” and “enterprise” militancy, developed in *Dominations and Powers* are more dynamic and multidimensional than Dewey's more conventional moral judgments in the face of organized crime.

Matthew Caleb Flamm’s "Liberalism and the Vertigo of Spirit: Santayana’s Political Theodicy" is a candidate for definitively expressing the tenor of the whole book in that it has a strong review of Santayana's changes of mind from his pre-First World War aestheticism to his darker skepticism post Second World War, but it demurs to engage the idea of terrorism with much specificity. It also tries to account for the rumor, strong in historical scholarship of Santayana, that he is a political conservative. This claim, while consistent with some points of Santaya-
na's distrust of democracy and liberalism, never seemed to suit someone so skeptical of absolutes and utterly inimical to the fundamental, idealist psychology of historical conservatism. Flamm attributes the distortion to Russel Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* (1953) and then convincingly argues that Santayana's pragmatic sense of government makes him a dubious conservative. A sympathetic critic of Freud, Emerson, and cubism, more adventurous philosophically than his contemporary pragmatists, while sharing and rejecting parts of their paradigms, Santayana makes an odd addition to the 1950s gallery of social conservatives.

The volume's more direct attempts to define terror are in its first section; but, even there, the idea is sometimes treated as self-evident, with several essays having the tone of American airport conversations in the era of colored-coded alerts in the mid-2000s. "Terror" activity is tacitly understood with the acrid aura of the September 11, 2001 attacks at the edges of these analyses. The assumption that "terror" should be understood through the propaganda of Al Qaeda c. 2002 (or is typically carried out by people with similar motives, now) occludes some alternatives that might have made the contemporary history in the book more incisive: most "Jihadist" terror attacks are not performed in America, or even in Europe, but in countries with majority Muslim populations, and in countries often destabilized by American military interventions. With these ironies in mind, an essay that has compelling insights into the amorality of drone warfare is "Assassination Nation: The Drone as Thanatological Dispositif," by Eduardo Mendieta, but while the essay is more historical than some here, it only mentions Santayana briefly (quoting passages of *Dominations and Powers*) at its outset, and then largely leaves him behind.

In America itself, terror means not only "Jihadist" violence, but hate crimes against Muslims, and also against Jews and LGBT people, among others. According to new FBI data, the number of hate crimes in America has risen steeply over the past two years (Berman). One source of real, general terror is gun violence, which kills as many Americans as automobile accidents. Many Americans live with state governments that often propose, despite overwhelming evidence from the rest of the civilized world, that the only solution to gun violence is a civilian arms race that will move into spaces like classrooms, parks, and bars. Each citizen may become then an instrument of what Santayana called (as Santarelli teaches us here) "faction militancy."

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Citizens who become faction militants are the central figures in Conrad's novels of terror. He is also interested in the collateral damage done by bombers or assassins in seeking, or finding their targets. In *Under Western Eyes*, the target of assassination is the almost comically unsympathetic Minister of State who had distinguished himself as the "President of the Repressive Commission." Many readers root for his demise, until, typical of Conrad's cost-benefit analyses of violence, the bomb that kills the minister is an indiscriminate pulverizer, which kills not only the minister, but also a host of bystanders who, moments before, had gathered to investigate the impact of a failed bomb. The novel then becomes a meditation on the morality and choices of Ruzamov, a friend of the assassin (Haldin), as Ruzamov becomes an informant for the Czarist government. Chilly
and affectless, Ruzamov undergoes an almost Christian transformation at the novel's end in response to a sister's grief for her lost brother.

Conrad bases the central event in *The Secret Agent* on an attempt of a bomber to target the Royal Observatory in London in 1894. It is uncertain that the Observatory was the actual target, because the bomb went off, killing its courier (a known French anarchist), in Greenwich Park. In Conrad's novel, the courier Stevie, a mentally deficient teenager, is ignorant of what he does, but the Observatory is definitely the target, and he is killed by a premature detonation of the bomb. To blame is the courier's brother-in-law Verloc, who had given the boy the bomb to place. The observatory, the site of the global standard of time itself, becomes for the novel's anarchists a handy symbol for technical civilization and reason, which the anarchists mean to undermine. Curiously, the plot was set in motion at the behest of an unnamed foreign nation's embassy, who hired Verloc to stage a bombing to actually attract more police attention to anarchists, making Verloc and his cohorts a curious subspecies of opportunists. Both Conrad novels about terror end with an implication—and *Under Western Eyes* risks sentimentality in this—that without empathy and agápe, sectarian violence, let alone international war, is likely.

The early twenty-first century has several historical dynamics in common with the early twentieth century. Capitalism is enormously dynamic, but stronger as an engine of speculation, division, and exclusion than of production, employment, and egalitarianism. National governments that have been relatively stable for a half century begin to quake under a variety of sectarian forces; some drift ominously toward authoritarianism or fascism. In the absence of shared, rational affirmations, many people nurse resentments, and rally around narrow surrogates for unifying identities; national or ethnic flags may suffice, or people otherwise fall for toxic either-or claims: if reason ever fails, then a private superstition must be superior.

Santayana's *Life of Reason* suggests a way that creativity, compassion, and reason could be united: "Reason as such represents or rather constitutes a single formal interest, the interest in harmony" (LR1 267). We extend Santayana the favor of assuming harmony, a word he often used almost literally to mean a musical relationship between thoughts, could also mean empathy between laboring people. *The Life of Reason*, seen again in its own era of terror, Conrad, and rumors of war, still compels a vital question: how fidelity to nature, as scientific candor and a shared ground of experience, can be consistent with social harmony, with a respect for a variety of excellences and our pursuits of them, and with beauty. This good collection of essays, in its eclectic diversity, suggests by turns the desirability and the difficulty of that prospect.

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William G. “Bill” Holzberger died on October 25, 2017. After completing his Ph.D. in American Literature at Northwestern University, he joined the faculty at Bucknell University in 1969, teaching American Literature until he retired as Professor Emeritus of English in 1997 and remained an active scholar for many years. We met when I was General Editor of the Works of George Santayana in the late 1970s and Bill became the Textual Editor of the Santayana Edition starting in the early 1980s.

As Textual Editor, he worked closely with the Santayana Edition staff to produce the volumes of the critical edition. Together, we learned much about the technical and scholarly aspects of both critical and documentary editions.

When Daniel Cory died in 1972, his wife Margot Cory became Santayana’s literary executor. Bill and his wife Annegret spent a week with Mrs Cory in Merano, Italy shortly after her husband’s death and the friendship they formed with her lasted until she died in 1995.

Bill was an avid Santayana fan and, through the support of the Santayana Edition and its staff, he was able to devote more of his time and expertise to Santayana’s works. The eight-book edition of The Letters of George Santayana highlighted his research and dedication to understanding Santayana’s life and literature. He received the Morton N. Cohen Award from the Modern Language Association for his work on the letters. He and the Santayana Edition staff produced the notes, historical material, and textual introductions to each of the volumes. Without Bill Holzberger’s dedication and work, the edition would not have been possible.

Much of Bill’s work on the critical edition was done from Bucknell University. The Santayana Edition was headquartered at the locations of my various university appointments in Florida, Texas, and Indiana. Communication from a distance was sometimes complicated in the days before email, fax, and even overnight mail, but Bill worked carefully with the staff and with me to resolve any concerns. Bill Holzberger’s clarity in writing and his dedication to the overall project helped to overcome even the most complicated editorial issues. From the late 1970s until 2003, I traveled to Bucknell University following the American Philosophical Association meeting. There, we would spend a week or more working together on Santayana edition issues and, as a result, we became life-long friends. Bill and his family periodically visited Dot, me, and our family in Florida, Texas, and Indiana.

Both of us loved classical music and one of Bill’s greatest joys was opera. He mentioned during one of his visits that if he had life to live over again, he would like to be an opera singer. He loved to sing and his excellent baritone voice was distinctive and warm. He was a founding member of the former Lewisburg Opera Ensemble.

On April 24, 1965, he married Annegret Meseke, of Bremen, Germany. Together they celebrated 52 years of marriage. Annegret cared for Bill at their home during the last years of his life until he entered a nursing home. She is the model
of a spouse caring for her life-long love. In addition to Annegret, Bill is survived by one son and daughter-in-law, Stefan and Jennifer Holzberger (both graduates of Bucknell University); one daughter, Rebecca Holzberger; and two grandchildren, Ethan and Amy Holzberger.

William G Holzberger will be remembered for his dedication and contributions to Santayana scholarship, his remarkable diligence in historical background, and the patience and attention to detail he gave to each volume of *The Works of George Santayana*. For those of us who knew him best he will also be remembered for his warmth, disciplined scholarly outlook, love of opera, and dedication to his family.

HERMAN SAATKAMP

**James Seaton**

Professor James Seaton, Department of English, Michigan State University, died 29 March 2017. Born in 1944 in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, he received his undergraduate degree from the University of Illinois and earned a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature (with a major in Greek and Latin and minors in 17th Century French and English) from the University of Iowa. He began teaching in the Humanities Department at Michigan State University in 1971. Nine years later he was a professor in the Department of English, and he taught until the last month of his life.

His major published works include *Cultural Conservatism, Political Liberalism: From Criticism to Cultural Studies* (University of Michigan Press, 1996) and *Literary Criticism from Plato to Postmodernism: The Humanistic Alternative* (Cambridge University Press, 2014). He edited *The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy and Character and Opinion in the United States* by George Santayana (Yale University Press, 2009), writing the introduction and one of the four critical essays accompanying Santayana’s text.

Seaton wrote the introduction to the forthcoming critical edition of Santayana’s *Three Philosophical Poets*. His background in classics and European literature made him ideal for this task. He was a smart and caring colleague who visited the Santayana Edition several times to discuss the work of the Edition, to present papers, and, two times, to participate in the Midwest Pragmatist Study Group.

Seaton published several articles in *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the George Santayana Society* and *Limbo: Boletín de Estudios Sobre Santayana* and was a regular book reviewer for *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Weekly Standard*. His public humanities work provided opportunities to discuss Santayana’s writing, influence on, or similarities to other writers. With a broad range of expertise in literature and criticism and a keen interest in the place of humanities in a healthy culture, Seaton could present Santayana’s contemporary relevance to readers outside academic philosophy of the sort to whom Santayana himself appealed during his lifetime.

MARTIN COLEMAN
John McDermott

John McDermott, University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Humanities and Humanities in Medicine at Texas A&M University, died on Sunday 30 September 2018. Born on 5 January 1932 in New York City, he earned his undergraduate degree from St. Francis College in Brooklyn and his Ph.D. from Fordham University. He taught at Queens College, CUNY, Fordham University, and Stony Brook University, SUNY, for twenty-five years, before moving to Texas A&M in 1977 to become Head of the Philosophy Department. His scholarly career contributed much to reviving the study of Classic American Philosophy. He was a master teacher who introduced students to philosophical reflection in texts, in culture, and in themselves. His edited volumes of The Writing of William James, The Philosophy of John Dewey, and The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce still provide a deep grounding for students and scholars of this philosophical tradition. He was the General Editor of 12-volume The Correspondence of William James, a critical edition of the utmost importance to scholarship in American humanities.

McDermott was a charter member of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy and a vital supporter of the Santayana Edition. In 1983, he first approached the founder of the Santayana Edition, Herman Saatkamp, about moving the Edition to Texas A&M University, where it finally arrived in 1985. In 1998, when Saatkamp accepted a dean’s position at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), McDermott served as Project Director and Principle Investigator of the Santayana Edition until the project followed Saatkamp to IUPUI the following year. Complementing the profound and committed efforts of Saatkamp, William Holzberger, Angus Kerr-Lawson, and Marianne Wokeck, the loyal support of McDermott has contributed substantially to several successes of the Edition.

In 1992 McDermott commented on a presentation at the Annual Meeting of the George Santayana Society, and there he remarked, that “[o]ften lost in commentary on Santayana’s version of America was his contention that a deep, native philosophical wisdom abided in America as found outside, nay, in spite of the academy” (McDermott 12). McDermott noted approvingly “Santayana’s affection for the obvious as over against the precious,” and went on to state that he tried to live in a way expressive of such affection. He explained that to live this way is to appreciate the undergoing of the experience as much or in some cases more than the outcome. He was referring to events that “either by plan or by surprise are of such affective quality, that they constitute for us indelibly ‘felt horizons’ and a perpetual ambience, which potentially bathes all of our subsequent experience” (McDermott 13). He called this the upshot, as opposed to the outcome, of an experience. This experiential upshot that pervades all subsequent experience is intimately familiar to students and colleagues who knew and loved John and learned from his ability to reveal reflective riches in the ordinary.

MARTIN A COLEMAN
John McDermott was the embodiment of American philosophy: intelligent, vital, caring. In the years when American philosophy was unappreciated, he was a lone voice crying in the wilderness. He kept James, Dewey and Royce alive and fought to return the profession to its historic mission. He combined a keen aesthetic sense with urban practicality. His colleagues loved him and even his adversaries paid him grudging admiration. He was a teacher and deserves the gratitude of thousands of his students whose lives he touched.

JOHN LACHS

John McDermott’s personality could fill a classroom, lecture hall, and sometimes a university. He lived life intensely through celebrations, conflicts, scholarship, friendships, and passions. Periodically, he would ascribe his personality to his Black Irish heritage. We were colleagues since the late 1960s and I was with John through some of the most difficult times in his life as well as the most delightful. His strength was to emerge from difficulties as a better person with a clearer sense of self and his place in the community. In addition to his remarkable professional accomplishments, he will be remembered for the many philosophical, social, and personal lessons he taught his students and colleagues.

HERMAN SAATKAMP

Like the American pragmatists he admired, John McDermott cherished context, connection, and community. He would introduce himself with an extended hand, a name, and a question: “What’s your story?” His own stories were often about other people’s stories, and he used them to build communities. A life-long New Yorker, John adopted Texas almost instantly by collecting stories that informed what he called his “neighborhoods.” He encouraged his students to keep journals for him—to share their stories. Was there more than a bit of the theater about John? Of course there was. That was part of what we loved about him. There were his props: his fedora, his pipe, his suits (invariably singed by tobacco cinders), his habit of grasping the tie of a conversation partner to make a point—these were tools of an accomplished performer, a master of a broad transactional approach to teaching that spilled out of the classroom and into the wider world. He saw the possibility of community even in his critics. His response to a young commentator whose remarks were uninformed and hostile? “I have friends here,” he said simply and with a smile, implicitly inviting his critic to join them. He will be missed. We will not soon find a better keeper of our stories.

LARRY HICKMAN

References

Bibliographical Checklist
Thirty-Fourth Update

The items below supplement the references given in George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880–1980 (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982) prepared by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. and John Jones. These references are divided into primary and secondary sources. Except for the book reviews and dissertations, the following articles and books are classified according to their years of publication. Readers with additions or corrections are invited to send these by email to bulletin@georgesantayanasociety.org.

The editors send a special thank you to Daniel Moreno for his time and effort in researching and compiling most of the entries for this year’s update and to Guido Tamponi for several additional entries.

Primary Sources

2006

"Selected Poems": 294-297.

Secondary Sources

2018

The Life of Reason in an Age of Terrorism. Edited by Charles Padrón and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński. Leiden and Boston: Brill and Rodopi. 266 pp. This book contains the following articles:

“Forgetting and Remembering History: Memory and Self-Identity”, by Jaquelyn A. Kegley.
“The Life of Reason and Terrorism: Strategies”, by Herman J. Saatkamp,
“Managing Necessity: Santayana on Forms of Power and the Human Condition”, by Katarzyna Kremplewska.
“Santayana and the (Postmodern) Spirit of Terrorism”, by Luka Nicolic.
“Santayana, Self-Knowledge and the Limits of Politics”, by Till Kinzel.
“Santayana on Americanism”, by Daniel Moreno.
“Liberalism and the Vertigo of Spirit: Santayana’s Political Theodicy”, by Matthew C. Flamm.
“A Happy Snow-Flake Dancing in the Flaw’: Reflections on Santayananan Alternatives and Surviving a New Dark Age”, by Nóra Horváth,
“Barbarism Begins at Home: Santayana and Barbarism in Art and Life”, by Giuseppe Patella.
“Santayana on Pluralism, Relativism and Rationality”, by Andrés Tutor.
“Santayana’s Idea of Madness and Normal Madness in a Troubled Age”, by Cayetano Estébanez.
“Santayana’s Philosophy of Education against Fanaticism and Barbarity”, by Krzysztof P. Skowroński.


2017

2016

2014
2008

2001

1993

1958

Reviews of Santayana Books

Dissertations/Theses
2016
# Some Abbreviations for Santayana’s Works

Page numbers in articles refer to the critical edition of Santayana’s work, if it has been published, unless otherwise specified in the references for a particular article. For a list of the volumes of the critical edition that have been published, see the next page. Authors are strongly encouraged to refer to the critical editions. These abbreviations should be used for citations only. To refer a work in the text, authors should spell out its name.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSL</td>
<td>Animal Faith and Spiritual Life, ed. John Lachs</td>
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<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Birth of Reason and Other Essays</td>
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<tr>
<td>COUS</td>
<td>Character and Opinion in the United States</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>POEMS</td>
<td>Complete Poems</td>
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<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Dialogues in Limbo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNM</td>
<td>“Dewey’s Naturalistic Metaphysics”</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Dominations and Powers</td>
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<td>EGP</td>
<td>Egotism in German Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTB</td>
<td>The Genteel Tradition at Bay</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>The Idea of Christ in the Gospels</td>
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<td>IPR</td>
<td>Interpretations of Poetry and Religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGS</td>
<td>The Letters of George Santayana</td>
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<td>LP</td>
<td>The Last Puritan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LR</td>
<td>The Life of Reason</td>
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<td>LR1</td>
<td>Bk. 1, Reason in Common Sense</td>
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<td>LR2</td>
<td>Bk. 2, Reason in Society</td>
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<td>LR3</td>
<td>Bk. 3, Reason in Religion</td>
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<td>LR4</td>
<td>Bk. 4, Reason in Art</td>
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<tr>
<td>LR5</td>
<td>Bk. 5, Reason in Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARG</td>
<td>Marginalia</td>
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<td>OS</td>
<td>Obiter Scripta</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGS</td>
<td>The Philosophy of George Santayana, ed P A Schilpp</td>
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<tr>
<td>POML</td>
<td>Physical Order and Moral Liberty, ed. J and S Lachs</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Persons and Places</td>
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<td>PP1</td>
<td>The Background of My Life</td>
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<td>PP2</td>
<td>The Middle Span</td>
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<td>PP3</td>
<td>My Host the World</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Platonism and the Spiritual Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Realms of Being (one-volume edition)</td>
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<td>RE</td>
<td>The Realm of Essence</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>The Realm of Matter</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>The Realm of Truth</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>The Realm of Spirit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Scepticism and Animal Faith</td>
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<td>SB</td>
<td>The Sense of Beauty</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Soliloquies in England</td>
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<td>Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy</td>
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<td>TPP</td>
<td>Three Philosophical Poets</td>
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<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Winds of Doctrine</td>
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Bibliography of the Critical Editions of Santayana’s Works

Listed in order of publication. Citations should refer to these editions.

For the *Letters* and the *Marginalia* the volume numbers are given below to indicate date of publication, but please note that the preferred method of citation omits the volume number.

For the *Letters*, the preferred citation format is:

LGS to [recipient], [date in dd Month yyyy format]

The recipient or date is omitted if the text explicitly refers to it. In either case, there is no comma.

For the *Marginalia*, the preferred citation format is:

MARG [author]. [work] [page number in the author’s work]

The page number may be omitted if Santayana has three or fewer marginalia in the work. The author or work is omitted if the context makes the reference clear.


Submission Guidelines

The editors of *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* invite submission of articles and essays about George Santayana from any discipline. Letters to the editors (not exceeding 300 words) are also welcome. The editors may request revisions before a piece is accepted for publication. Upon acceptance, authors will be expected to approve editorial corrections. Previously unpublished manuscripts are preferred and simultaneous submission is discouraged. Authors typically may expect notice of the status of their submission within three months of submission. Submissions are accepted all year with a March 1 deadline for inclusion in a particular year’s issue. These guidelines may be updated from time to time. To download the latest guidelines go to [http://georgesantayanasociety.org/submissionguidelines.pdf](http://georgesantayanasociety.org/submissionguidelines.pdf).

Manuscript Style

- Manuscripts should be submitted electronically as e-mail attachments to submissions@georgesantayanasociety.org.
- Manuscripts should be double-spaced and in an editable file format such as Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx), Rich Text Format (.rtf), or OpenDocument Text (.odt).
- Manuscripts should be prepared for blind review. Identifying information should not appear in running heads, footnotes, references, or anywhere in the manuscript. Identifying information in footnotes or reference may be replaced with blanks or dashes.
- Manuscripts should be prepared according to *The Chicago Manual of Style, 17th edition* guidelines. See also: Manuscript Preparation Guidelines and Preparing Tables, Artwork, and Math.
- Footnotes should be reserved for substantive comments, clarifications, and ancillary information that would interrupt the flow of the main text. These should be kept to a minimum.
- Textual citations should conform to author-date system described in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. The author followed by the date (if the author has more than one work cited) and the page number should appear in parenthesis within the text wherever such a reference is needed. In block quotations, the parenthesis appears at the end just after the last punctuation mark in the block. For citations within the text, the parenthetical citation should be after any closing quotation mark but immediately before the final punctuation mark, unless the final punctuation mark is a question mark or exclamation point that belongs inside the quotation.
Example with date:
(James [1898], 175)
Bracketed date indicates that the reference occurred in the original edition, even though a later edition or reprint is listed in the references.
Example without date (author has only one work cited):
(Royce 144)
Note that the dropping of the date is an exception to the Chicago guidelines.

- If you use an edition or version other than the original, the date of the date of original publication should be in brackets before the date of the edition you are using. If a passage is different in a later edition or found only there, the date in brackets should be the date that the passage first appeared. If it is the edition you are citing, then the date in brackets should be left out.
- A reference list should be provided at the end of the manuscript, specifying which edition is used. Note that in author-date style, the date immediately follows the author’s name and is followed by a period.
- References to classical writers, such as Plato and Aristotle, should use standard page numbers.
- References to Santayana's works should use the standard abbreviations found in recent issues of Overheard in Seville (e.g., SAF for Scepticism and Animal Faith) followed by the page.
- If a quotation from a Santayana work is taken from a critical edition and only critical editions are cited, the work need not be included in the reference list, as long as you use standard abbreviations. If you cite non-critical editions or non-Santayana material, then you should include the abbreviation of the work in your reference list and simply indicate that the critical edition is the one referred to:

LR1 Critical edition
- An author may use an abbreviation to refer to another author's work by preceding the bibliographical listing of the work with the abbreviation. For example,


- If there is only one reference with an abbreviation for an author, list that reference alphabetically by the abbreviation. In the case of multiple references with abbreviations for the same author, list the references indented under the author’s name and alphabetically by the abbreviation.
- If an abbreviation or the author’s name alone is used in a citation, do not put comma before the page number. If the date is included, place a comma after the date.
- In citing a reference to a work identified by an abbreviation that contains essays by more than one author, if the context does not make clear who the
author is, include the author’s name before the abbreviation. For example: (Hartshorne PGS 153).

- The preferred way to cite one of Santayana’s letters is to use the abbreviation LGS followed by the date and “to [recipient].” If either the recipient or date is given in the text, it may be left out of the citation.

- Wherever possible, references should be to authoritative scholarly editions, such as *The Works of George Santayana* (MIT), *The Collected Works of John Dewey* (SIU), *The Works of William James* (Harvard), *The Jane Addams Papers* (UMI), etc. **An author not in possession of a particular scholarly edition should encourage his or her institution’s library to acquire it or borrow the work through interlibrary loan.** Authors should notify the editor if, after such efforts, they still do not have access to a particular authoritative edition. Note that some of the critical editions of Santayana’s works are available in modified PDF formats that enable accurate page number citation.

- Research articles and essays should be no more than 8,000 words.

- Authors should divide their manuscripts with appropriate section headings. Section headings may use paragraph styles Heading2, Heading3, etc. We do not recommend subsections, unless some obvious contextual reason calls for them.

- Except for block quotes, use no paragraph style other than Normal set to double space and to indent 1 inch before the first line. (These settings are for submission. They are not the settings for publication, but following these guidelines simplifies the transition to publishable form.)

- For block quotes, either change the paragraph to have no first line indent and to be indented on the left one inch, or use a style based on Normal that implements those changes.

- Use block quotes for any quotation longer than three lines (roughly 225 characters including spaces).

- Submissions should include a brief description of the author’s background and work for use in a contributor’s note.

- Any permissions necessary to print any part of a submission are the responsibility of the author to obtain.

- If you refer to a theoretic position with a label (e.g. pragmatism, romanticism, phenomenology), explain the meaning of the term in the context or your article. Do not capitalize such labels.

- Submitted manuscripts and communication regarding submissions should be addressed to submissions@georgesantayanasociety.org. Correspondence about matters other than submissions may be addressed to bulletin@georgesantayanasociety.org
Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize

The George Santayana Society offers the Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize in tribute to the late Professor Kerr-Lawson’s outstanding contributions to Santayana scholarship both as longtime editor of Overheard in Seville: the Bulletin of the George Santayana Society and as the author of many articles that appeared in the Bulletin and in other publications. Kerr-Lawson was an early participant in the George Santayana Society.

The prize is available to a scholar not more than five years out of graduate school for an essay engaging or rooted in the thought of George Santayana. We encourage applications from graduate students and junior faculty members. Authors may address any aspect of Santayana’s life and thought. We welcome essays that relate his thinking to other figures in the American tradition and beyond and to contemporary social, cultural, and philosophic concerns. Relevant themes include materialism and naturalism, realism and Platonism, metaphysics and morals, and issues connected to American culture and intellectual history.

The winner will receive $300 and be invited to present the winning paper at the Society’s annual Eastern APA meeting in early January. The winning essay will be submitted for publication in the edition of Overheard in Seville that follows that meeting. In the coming year the winner will be notified by September, 2019. Authors should prepare submissions for blind review (no exposing references to the author within the composition) and send electronically in Word, ODT, or PDF format to: submissions@georgesantayanasociety.org. The subject line of the email should read: “Kerr-Lawson Prize Submission, [author’s name].” The deadline for submissions is 21 May 2019.
Overheard in Seville

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More pages for the George Santayana Society and the Santayana Edition are at http://santayana.iupui.edu/.