RACE QUESTIONS, PROVINCIALISM, AND OTHER AMERICAN PROBLEMS

EXPANDED EDITION

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swept away for a time by an agitating idea. But the individual Californian himself is suspicious of mobs. The agitations in question proved transient. Even the constitution, designed to give the discontented whatever they most supposed they wanted, proved to be susceptible of a very conservative construction by the courts, and public opinion in California has never been very long under the sway of any one illusion. The individuality that we have described quickly revolts against its false prophets. In party politics, California proves to be an extremely doubtful state. Party ties are not close. The vote changes from election to election. The independent voter is well in place. Finally, through all these tendencies, there runs a certain idealism, often more or less unconscious. This idealism is partly due to the memory of the romance due to the unique marvels of the early days. It is also sustained by precisely that intimacy with nature which renders the younger Californians so sensitive. I think that perhaps Edward Rowland Sill, whose poems are nowadays so widely appreciated, has given the most representative expression to the resulting spirit of California, to that tension between individualism and loyalty, between shrewd conservatism and bold radicalism, which marks this community.

In asking me to address this Society, your Secretary was well aware that I have no right and no desire to pass judgment upon any of the more technical problems which are peculiar to the profession of physical education. But there are problems which are common to your profession and to that region of inquiry to which I am most devoted. These common problems, in fact, interest all who are concerned in the welfare of humanity, and who in particular aim to further the welfare of our country. I refer to those problems of moral education which, in the present time, assume new and difficult forms in American life. I am well aware that those of you, and of your numerous colleagues, who have been most earnest in furthering the cause of physical education, not only in our land, but in Europe, have always laid great stress upon the close relation of sound physical training to good moral training. And we all know how, from primitive times, mankind have used various forms of physical exercise as a

An address before the Boston Physical Education Association [Royce's note].
part of the discipline which tribes or, later, nations or, in our modern days, civilized men generally, have regarded as fitted to form whatever well-rounded types of individual character the various stages of human culture have admired. Physical training has repeatedly had, in the past, a place in the religious life of various peoples, and systems of secular training have often so much the more followed analogous lines. Chivalry in Europe, Bushido in Japan, were systems of conduct which were inseparable from various plans for physical training. Today most of you lay constant stress upon your function, not only as teachers who care for the health, for the physical growth, and for the accompanying intellectual development of your pupils, but as instructors who contribute what you all believe to be a very significant part of the moral education of the youth of the country. The social organizations known as Young Men's Christian Associations are the expression of explicitly religious motives, and are unquestionably intended for an ethical purpose. But they regard their gymnasiums as an essential part of their work. And this is but one example of the recognition of a close linkage between physical and moral training,—a linkage which you all believe to be important, and which most of you consciously emphasize in your own practice.

The problems of moral education are common, then, to you and to your colleagues in other branches of education, of inquiry, and of social work. I myself, as a teacher of philosophy, have lately been led to consider some of the problems of ethics with especial reference to the present state of our American civilization. I have supposed, therefore, that you might be interested if I now attempt to state some of these problems in a way to suggest their possible connections with your profession. I make these suggestions very tentatively. As a student of philosophy, I have, indeed, my rights as an inquirer into ethical questions. But, when I try to tell you my view about how some of these questions relate to your calling, I at once run the risks which any man runs who attempts to connect his own views with those of others, by appealing to his fellows regarding the matters in which they are expert while he is not expert. But, in any case, I shall try to keep to the ground that is common to your calling and to mine. You all of you are interested in what some of you may call the philosophy of physical training. I am professionally concerned with philosophy. And so I want to meet you upon this common basis of your interest and mine in the questions which concern what I may call the moral philosophy of your calling.

I shall begin by asking what we mean by the moral training of an individual man.

This question we can best attempt to answer by sketching a moral ideal,—an ideal of what, as I suppose, we all, more or less consciously, desire any moral agent to become. If we define this ideal, then the moral training of an individual will be defined as the training that is best adapted to help that individual to approach this moral ideal.

The ideal human moral agent, as I assert, is a man who is wholeheartedly and effectively loyal to some fitting object of loyalty. This first statement of the moral ideal may seem vague to you. I hasten to explain a little more precisely what I mean.

I have chosen the good old word "loyal" as the word best adapted to arouse, with the fewest misleading associations, that idea or the moral life which I believe to be rationally the most defensible. But, of course, my own usage of the word "loyal" must attempt to be more exact than the traditional usage is, because such popular words are always applied somewhat recklessly; and the loyalty that I have in mind when I employ this term is something that I try to conceive in as exact a fashion as the subject permits. "Loyalty," as popularly understood, has always meant a certain attitude of mind which faithful friends, lovers, soldiers, or retainers, or which martyrs dying for their faith have exemplified. Plainly, a good many different sorts of people and of deeds have been called loyal. And, if you view the matter merely upon the basis of a comparison of a few widely various instances of loyalty, you may be disposed to say that the moral quality in question is too wavering and confused a feature of character to be fitly used as a type of all moral excellence. Cannot robbers be loyal to
their band, slaves to their master, mischievous boys to the comrades whose pranks they incite and applaud, but whose names they refuse to tell to any teacher? Is loyalty, then, always a trait of the morally wise or of the good? Is it a typical virtue? Is it not rather an accidental accompaniment of goodness or, at best, a special form which goodness may sometimes take?

I answer that all these just-mentioned instances of loyalty—even the loyalty of the robber to his band—involve some morally good features. My own definition of loyalty as a fundamental virtue is inter-related, first to emphasize these good features, which even the blindest forms of loyalty exemplify, then to separate these good features from their accidental setting, and then to define the ideal toward which all the forms of loyalty seem to tend. I will therefore proceed at once to characterize loyalty as it appears in its most typical instances and on higher levels.

Loyalty, as I view the essence of this trait, means, in the first place, a certain attitude of mind which we can best understand by considering cases of strong and hearty loyalty as they occur in the life of a mature and highly trained man. This loyal attitude makes a man give himself to the active service of a cause. This cause is one which the loyal man regards, at the moment of action, as something beyond his own private self, and as larger than this private self, as vaster and worthier than any of his private interests. And yet, for the loyal man, his whole private self meanwhile seems inspired by the cause, so that, while he is engaged in his loyal activity, his eyes, his ears, his tongue, his hand, his whole strength, exist, for the time, simply as the organs of his loyalty. When a man is loyal and is actively engaged in his loyal undertakings, he is keenly and clearly conscious, therefore, of a strong contrast, and yet of an equally strong unity, present in his life and in his deeds. He himself, the natural man, with his desires and his private interests, with his muscles and his sense organs, with his property and his powers—he is there in the world, and he knows this natural self of his, he is definitely aware of it. For loyalty—is never mere self-forgetfulness; it is self-devotion. And you cannot devote yourself unless you are aware of yourself. The loyal man lives intensely, vigorously, personally; and over against this natural self of his is his cause,—his side in a game, his army in combat, his country in danger, or perhaps his friend, his beloved, his family, humanity, God. He is conscious of this cause; and so the cause is, in great part, sharply contrasted with this private self of his. It is outside of him,—something vast, dignified, imposing, compelling, objective. Were he not aware of this sharp contrast between himself and his cause, he could not be loyal; for without the contrast the whole affair would be merely one of his private interests and passions. The cause meanwhile is itself no mere thing amongst things. It has at least the value of a person or of a system of persons. It is always, in fact, for any deeply loyal man, something which is at once personal and superpersonal, as your family and your country are for you. One cannot be loyal to merely inanimate things as such. And yet, on the other hand, loyalty always views persons in their deeper relations to something that seems larger than any one human personality or than any mere collection of persons can be. Thus your family is, for your family loyalty, more than the mere collection of its members; and the Joseph of the story was loyal to his brotherly and to his filial ties, and not merely to the various individual brethren.

Well, this contrast of the natural man and of his imposing and objective cause is a fact of which the loyal man is keenly conscious. Yet, despite this fact, he is just as conscious that by his deeds he is always reducing his contrast ever afresh to unity. So long as he is indeed active, wide-awake, effectively loyal, he exists only as servant of this cause. The cause, then, is not only another than his private self; it is in a sense his larger self. Despite the contrast he becomes one with it through his every loyal deed. His private self is its willing instrument. The cause inspires him, acts through him. Loyalty is a sort of possession. It has a demonic force which controls the wayward private self. The cause takes hold of the man, and his organism is no longer his own, so long as the loyal inspiration is upon him.

Such, I say, is, in the briefest language, a general characterization of the characteristic loyal attitude as it exists in its strong and maturely developed forms, and especially in the moments of our effectively loyal conduct. The boys, loyal to their mates, have the beginnings of
loyalty, often in evanescent forms. The simple-minded folk who do not reflect are not always so keenly conscious of their loyalty as more thoughtful folk may be; but all the more are they able to prove their loyalty by their deeds. The fully mature and reflectively devoted man knows his loyalty, and is possessed by it.

For loyalty, as you see, is essentially an active virtue. It involves manifold sentiments,—love, good-will, earnestness, delight in the cause; but it is complete only in motor terms, never in merely sentimental terms. It is useless to call my feelings loyal unless my muscles somehow express this loyalty. For my objective cause and my inner private self, in case I am loyal, are sharply contrasted. I have to think of both of them, if I am to be loyal; but they must be brought into unity. Only my deeds can accomplish this result. My loyal sentiments, if left to themselves, would merely emphasize the contrast without giving life any acceptable unity. Loyal is that loyalty does. Hence the loyal attitude is one which especially interests any teacher who is concerned with what his pupil does. The nature of loyalty, then, in the pupil should interest any teacher of physical training who is considerate of the moral aspects of his calling. To be sure, on its higher levels,—in its ideal expressions,—loyalty goes over into regions where mere physical training seems to be very remote from the forms of loyalty that are in question. For loyalty, as I hold, includes in its spirit whatever has been meant in the past by the various inner virtues of sentiment, by charity, by high-mindedness, by spiritual training. It includes these virtues because the loyal act needs and expresses the loyal sentiment. But loyalty combines the sentiments with all the active virtues,—with courage, with patience, with moral initiative,—according as these are needed in one situation or in another. Yet on even its highest levels loyalty has its physical expression. For one is loyal through his deed. If I were here to define the moral ideal in terms of the Pauline virtue of charity, as described in the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, we should have indeed some difficulty in pointing out within the limits of this paper the various intermediate steps by which this lofty spiritual virtue of the apostle is linked, as of course it is indeed linked, with the motor activities whereby our organism expresses our will. But when I now define the moral ideal directly in terms of the loyal attitude, you all see at once how nobody can be effectively loyal unless he is highly trained on the motor side, and unless his ideas and his moral sentiments have long since won their way to an elaborate expression in the deeds of his organism. And so it is indeed plain that surely one way, at least, to prepare a man for a loyal life, is to give him a careful and extended motor training, such as organizes his conduct in harmony with his nobler sentiments. This you all see; and you know that the Japanese long ago saw it also, so that an essential part of their training in Bushido—that is, in their ancient code of chivalrous loyalty—was a training in the physical arts of a Samurai. Our very first view of loyalty suggests then a sense in which physical and moral training may be closely related. But before we estimate what this relation means we must get a fuller notion of what loyalty itself means.

II

I have so far only characterized the general attitude of the higher types of loyalty. Loyalty such as has now been defined may of course take countless special forms. And these forms may appear to be in conflict with one another. In practice the expressions of loyalty do in fact often conflict with one another. The loyal are often quarrelsome. Men can be equally devoted servants of their various causes and yet pass their lives in trying to kill one another. But, since I have so far emphasized the central significance of loyalty as a moral ideal, you may well wonder whether I am indeed right to make loyalty thus central. And so you may well ask me what I have to say, as a moralist, regarding those conflicts of loyalty of which so large a part of the history of mankind has consisted. When equally loyal people are found fighting together, when the heroic devotion of all that a man has and is to the cause which he has chosen as his own appears to demand of him that he should fight and perhaps slay his fellow-man,—well, as you may next ask, in such cases, Who is right? And, if loyalty is indeed any guide to right conduct, why should loyalty counsel me, as it so
often seems to do, to oppose and to condemn the loyalty of my fellow? Must there not then be some higher moral principle than that of loyalty,—some principle in terms of which we can find out who is right when two forms of loyalty contradict each other's claims, while each pretends to be the only true loyalty? After all,—as you may insist,—have I shown in the foregoing why the robber ought not to be loyal to his band? Have I shown what wise loyalty is as distinguished from slavish or base loyalty? Have not countless crimes been committed in the name of loyalty?

To such questions I at once answer that, in making loyalty central as a moral principle, I mean to define loyalty in a sense which in the end will make explicit what the true and implied meaning of all loyalty is, even in the cases where loyalty, like love in the proverb, is blind. I defined the loyal attitude as something characteristic of a certain type of personal life. I have said that the genuinely moral attitude is always one of loyalty. I have meant, and I shall indeed stoutly insist, that nobody has reached any morally ideal position who is not, in his more active life, loyal to some cause or to some system of causes. I maintain that without loyalty there is no thoroughgoing morality; and I also insist that all special virtues and duties, such as those which the names benevolence, truthfulness, justice, spirituality, charity, recall to our minds, are parts or are special forms of loyalty. My theory is that the whole moral law is implicitly bound up in the one precept: Be *loyal*. But I freely admit that many men who have been enthusiastically and effectively loyal to various causes, and who in their personal lives have won as mature a notion of loyalty as they were capable of getting, have nevertheless often committed, in the name of loyalty, great crimes. And you may well ask how I explain this fact. You may well wonder how loyalty can be a central moral principle, when lives that were as loyal as the men in question knew how to make them have often been morally mischievous lives.

My answer is that our loyalty leads us into moral error only in so far as we are indeed often blind to what the principle of loyalty actually means and requires. And such blindness is, as men go, human enough and common enough. The corrective to such errors, however, is not the introduction of some other moral principle than that of loyalty, but is just the discovery of the internal meaning, the true sense of the loyal principle itself. Whoever is loyal loves loyalty for its own sake. Let him merely bethink him of what this love for loyalty means, and he will be led to that definition of the precept: Be *loyal*—to that definition, I say, which gives to this principle its true scope.

Loyalty, namely, is a common good,—I might say that it is the common good of morally trained mankind. This, however, does not mean that all men ought to define in the same monotonous terms the causes to which they are to be loyal. There is a diversity of causes. There is one spirit of loyalty. In the spirit of loyalty, viewed just as a personal attitude, lies the only universal solution of the problem of every private personality. What am I here for? So a man may ask himself. And the rational answer is: You are here to become absorbed in a devotion to some cause or system of causes. Your devotion must be as thorough as your effective power to do work is highly developed. Herein alone lies the solution of your personal problem. In case you are loyal to nothing, your existence as a private individual will remain to you a mysterious burden, which you may learn to tolerate, or even, if you are lucky and thoughtless, to enjoy, but which you can never discover to be anything of rational meaning unless you take yourself to be a centre of activity of which some spiritual power to which you are loyally devoted makes use. And this power must be much bigger and worthier than your private fortunes, taken by themselves, can ever become. If such a spiritual power, such a cause, such a god stronger than you are, enters you, possesses you, uses you, and finds you its willingly loyal instrument, then you, just as you, have an office, a function, a place, a status, a right, in the world. This your right will become manifest to you only through your loyal deeds. You will work in the spirit of your cause. Your powers will be dedicated to the cause, and the otherwise miserable natural accident that there you are, with just your sensations, your ideas, and your physical organism, will become transformed into a notable event in the great
world,—the event that precisely your unique service of your chosen cause has come to pass by your own will.

Loyalty, then,—the general spirit of loyalty, I now mean,—is a common good of mankind. It is the only good the possession of which makes any man's being thoroughly worth while from his own more rational point of view. Now, if this be so, loyalty, taken in its universal meaning, is just as much a true good in the world when my neighbor possesses it as when I possess it. If once I am wide-awake enough to grasp this fact, I shall value my neighbor's loyalty just as highly as I do my own. He indeed will be loyal to his cause, I to mine. Our causes may be very diverse, but our spirit will be one. And so the very essence of my spirit of loyalty will demand that I state my principle thus: Be loyal, and be in such wise loyal that, whatever your own cause, you remain loyal to loyalty. That is, so choose your cause, and so serve it, that, as a result of your activity, there shall be more of this common good of loyalty in the world than there would have been, had you not lived and acted. Let your loyalty be such loyalty as helps your neighbor to be loyal. Despite the diversity of the individual causes—the families, countries, professions, friendships—to which you and your neighbor are loyal, so act that the devotion of each shall respect and aid the other's loyalty.

This simpler statement of the true meaning of the principle of loyalty enables us at once to see that, when in the past loyalty has led men into crimes,—that is, into needless hostility to other people's loyalty,—it has done so, not because the men were loyal, but because they were blind to what their own loyalty signified. If they loved loyalty for its own sake (and this they did in case they were indeed loyal), then they valued loyalty not as their private possession, but for its own dear sake, as a type of spiritual activity, as a sort of human interest, that makes human life morally worth while for any man who shares this spirit. If they had remembered this fact, and if they had seen what the fact meant, they would have respected in their neighbors' lives every form of genuine loyalty, wherever they met with it. And then they would have seen that the spirit of our true loyalty is never opposed to the existence of our neighbor's loyalty. Charity, benevolence, and—simplest of all—plain fair play are tendencies that are thus to be ethically defined and deduced from our central principle. All such virtues are expressions of that loyalty to loyalty which I have now defined as the genuine and enlightened incorporation of the loyal spirit. Wherever a soldier has honored the heroism and devotion of his enemy, this honor, if it has taken practical form, has been an instance of loyalty to loyalty. One soldier fights for one cause, the other for the other. But each may, even as warrior, respect his opponent's loyalty. Let the spirit of this loyalty to loyalty spread amongst us, and it will, indeed, in no wise mean that we shall all individually serve the same causes. We must have our various causes, just as we have our various families. And no man's loyalty ought to consist wholly in a devotion to the same causes that other men serve. Loyalty is, for each man, something personal, individual. And yet, as I insist, the spirit of loyalty is a common good for all men. Each man must solve his own problem of life by means of his own form of loyalty. But the one cause that we shall all have in common will be the cause of loyalty to loyalty; that is, we shall all be disposed to make all men more loyal. Every man's individual devotion to his own cause will be just his own, but his example of loyalty, his eagerness to be the instrument of his own cause, will be a help and not a hindrance to his neighbors in the fostering of their individual form of the loyal spirit. Let this spirit of loyalty to loyalty grow amongst us, I say, and then we shall, indeed, rejoice in the loyalty of foreigners to their own nations instead of despising them for having the wrong country to dwell in. Let this spirit of loyalty to loyalty become universal, and then wars will cease; for then the nations, without indeed lapsing into any merely international mass, will so respect each the loyalty of the others that aggression will come to seem inhuman. And instead of war there will then remain only the sort of cheerful rivalry amongst our various forms of loyalty which at present is finely represented by good sport when fair play prevails. For in true sport one's loyalty to one's own side exists as immediately expressed in deeds which fully respect the opponent's loyalty to his own side, and which involve that
loyalty to the rules of the game, and so to the common loyalty of both the opposing sides, which constitutes fair play.

III

Thus, if you please, I have sketched for you the basis of a moral philosophy. The rational solution of moral problems rests on the principle: Be loyal. This principle, properly understood, involves two consequences. The first is this: Have a cause, choose a cause, give yourself over to that cause actively, devotedly, whole-heartedly, practically. Let this cause be something social, serviceable, requiring loyal devotion. Let this cause, or system of causes, constitute a life work. Let the cause possess your senses, your attention, your muscles—all your powers, so long as you are indeed active and awake at all. See that you do not rest in any mere sentiment of devotion to the cause. Act out your loyalty. Loyalty exists in the form of deeds done by the willing and devoted instrument of his chosen cause. This is the first consequence of the commandment: Be loyal. The second consequence is like unto the first. It is this: Be loyal to loyalty. That is, regard your neighbor’s loyalty as something sacred. Do nothing to make him less loyal. Never despise him for his loyalty, however little you care for the cause that he chooses. If your cause and his cause come into some inevitable conflict, so that you indeed have to contend with him, fight, if your loyalty requires you to do so; but in your bitterest warfare fight only against what the opponent does. Thwart his acts where he justly should be thwarted; but do all this in the very cause of loyalty itself, and never do anything to make your neighbor disloyal. Never do anything to encourage him in any form of disloyalty; in other words, never war against his loyalty. From these consequences of my central principle follow, as I maintain, all those prepositions about the special duties of life which can be reasonably defined and defended. Justice, kindness, chivalry, charity—these are all of them forms of loyalty to loyalty.

Even while I have set forth this sketch of a general ethical doctrine, I have intentionally illustrated my views by some references to your professional work. But at this point I next have briefly to emphasize the positive relations which physical education may have and should have to the training of the loyal spirit. Here I shall simply repeat what others, more expert than I am, have long since, in various speeches, set forth.

The first way in which systematic physical training of all grades and at all ages may be of positive service in a moral education is this: Loyalty, as we have seen, means a willing and thoroughgoing devotion of the whole active self to a chosen cause or to a chosen system of causes. But such devotion, as we have also seen, is a motor process. One must be in control of one’s powers, or one has no self to give to one’s cause. One must get a personality in order to be able to surrender this personality to anything. And since physical training actually has that relation to the culture of the will which your leaders so generally emphasize, while some physical expression of one’s personality is an essential accompaniment of the existence of every human personality,—for both of these reasons, I say, the training of physical strength and skill is one important preparation for a moral life. There is indeed a great deal else in moral training besides what physical training supplies; but the physical training can be a powerful auxiliary. Here I come upon ground that is familiar to all of you, and that I need not attempt to cover anew with suggestions of my own. The positive relation of good physical training to the formation of a sound will is known to all of you. The only relatively new aspect of this familiar region that may have been brought to light by the foregoing considerations is this: Loyalty, as you see, on its highest levels involves the same general mental features which are present whenever a physical activity, at once strenuous and skilful, is going on. As a skilful and difficult physical exercise demands that one should keep his head in the midst of efforts that, by reason of the strain, or of the excitement,—by reason of the very magnitude and fascination of the task, would confuse the untrained man, and make him lose a sense of what he was trying to do, even so the work of the effectively loyal person is always one which requires that he should stand in presence of undertakings large enough to threaten to cloud his judgment and to crush
his self-control, while his loyalty still demands that he also should keep his head despite the strain, and should retain steady control of his personality, even in order to devote it to the cause. Loyalty means hard work in the presence of serious responsibilities. The danger of such work is closely similar to the danger of losing one's head in a difficult physical activity. One is devoting the self to the cause. The cause must be vast. For its very vastness is part of what gives it worth. I cannot be loyal to what requires of me no effort. But the consciousness of the vastness and difficulty of one's cause tends to crush the self of the person who is trying to be loyal. And a self crushed into a loss of self-possession, a self no longer aware of its powers, a self that has lost sight of its true contrast with the objects about it, has no longer left the powers which it can devote to any cause. Mere good-will is no substitute for trained self-possession either in physical or in moral activities. And self-possession is a necessary condition for self-devotion. When the apostle compared the moral work of the saints to the running of a race, his metaphors were therefore chosen because of this perfectly definite analogy between the devotion of the trained organism to its physical task and the devotion of the moral self to its cause. In both classes of cases, in loyal devotion and in skilful and strenuous physical exercise, similar mental problems have to be solved. One has to keep the self in sight in order to surrender it anew, through each deed, to the task in hand. Meanwhile, since the task is centred upon something outside of the self, and is a serious and an imposing task, it involves a tendency to strain, to excitement, to a loss of a due self-possession, to disturbance of the equilibrium of consciousness. The result is likely to be, unless one is in a state of physical or of moral training, just a primary confusion of self-consciousness accompanied by fear or by a sense of helplessness. Against such a mood the mere sentiment of devotion is no safeguard. To hold on to one's self at the moment of the greatest strain, to retain clearness, even when confronted by tasks too large to be carried out as one wishes, to persist doggedly despite defeats, to give up all mere self-will and yet to retain full self-control,—these are requirements which, as I suppose, appear to the consciousness of the athlete and to the consciousness of the moral hero in decidedly analogous ways. And in both cases the processes involved are psycho-physical as well as psychical, and are subject to the general laws of physiology and of psychology.

Hence, when the teacher of physical training regards his work as a preparation of his pupils for the moral life, he can and should take account and take advantage of these analogies. His art is indeed one only amongst the many arts that contribute to moral training. But he may well insist that the organic virtues that he aims to establish in the bodily activities of his pupils are not only analogous to the moral virtues, but, in the loyal, may form a literal part of those virtues, since virtue exists either in action or in those results of training which prepare us for right action. To say all this implies no exaggeration of the importance of such physical education as is actually given at the present time. The whole question is one, not of inevitable or of fatal results, but of the good work that may be done, and of an alliance of the motives of physical and of moral training such as may take place if the teacher of physical training is alive to the higher possibilities of his calling.

IV

The second way in which physical training may serve the purposes of moral training is a more direct way. It is the one which Dr. Luther Gulick had in mind when he lately asserted in a paper in the School Review that "athletics are primarily social and moral in their nature." Dr. Gulick is well known to you as one of the protagonists in the cause of the moral importance of physical education; and you know his main argument. Social training, in boys about twelve years of age, naturally takes the form of the training which gangs of boys give to their members. A gang of boys with nothing significant to do may become more or less of a menace to the general social order. A gang of boys duly organized into athletic teams, in the service of schools, and of other expressions of wholesome community activity, will become centres for training in certain types of loyalty. And this training
may extend its influence to large bodies of boys who, as spectators of
games or as schoolmates, are more or less influenced by the athletic
spirit. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same considerations apply to the socially
organizing forces that belong to college athletics. The plans of those
who are engaged in physical education may therefore well be guided,
from the first, by a disposition to prepare young people to appreciate
and to take part in such group activities as these. Thus both the phys-
iological and the intellectual aspects of physical training would appear
to be subordinate, after all, to the social, and in this way to the moral,
aspects of the profession. In speaking of these moral aspects, one
would not even emphasize, as much as many do, the central signifi-
cance of the self-denial, of the personal restraints and sacrifices, of
the morally advantageous physical habits, which attend athletic train-
ing. One would rather more centrally emphasize the view that athletic
work is not merely a preparation for loyalty, but that in case of the
life of the organized athletic teams, and in case of any physical training
class of pupils who work together, the athletic work is loyalty it-
self,—loyalty in simple forms, but in forms which appeal to the
natural enthusiasm of youth, which are adapted to the boyish and
later to the adolescent phases of evolution, and which are a positive
training for the very tasks which adult loyalty exemplifies; namely, the
tasks that imply the devotion of a man’s whole power to an office that
takes him out of his private self and into the great world of real social
life. The social forms of physical training in classes or in teams re-
quire, and so tend to train, loyalty.

Physical training may then be so guided as to be a direct training
in social loyalty. Your secretary has kindly put into my hands, during
my preparation of this paper, two German monographs whose au-
thors insist, in somewhat contrasting ways, upon this directly impor-
tant office of the teacher of physical training as a teacher of loyalty
and upon the value of play, of systematic gymnastics, and of athletic

sports, as a training school for loyal citizenship. Both of these mon-
ographs are written under the influence of the spirit of militarism, one
of them especially so; and you know now why I should view milita-
rism as a decidedly blind, although often very sincere and intense,
form of loyalty,—a form which will vanish from the earth whenever
men come to an enlightened sense of what loyalty to loyalty implies.
But one has to use, for the best, such types of loyalty as now prosper
amongst men; and the good side of militarism is indeed the devotion
that goes with it, even as the bad side of militarism is due to its im-
plied suspicion that the loyalty of the foreigners to their country’s
cause is somehow in essential opposition to our own loyalty. This sus-
picion is false. It breeds wars, and is essentially stupid. But loyalty is
loyalty still, even when blind; and I prefer blind loyalty to the sort of
thoughtless individualism which is loyal to nothing. In any case our
two authors are right in insisting that loyalty and physical training
are closely linked by ties which ought to be recognized by those who
are planning and conducting the general system of national edu-
cation. So much, then, for the second positive relation of physical edu-
cation to the cause of general morality. Here, again, it is true that
physical education can furnish only a portion, and a decidedly limited
portion, of the means and motives whereby true loyalty is trained in
the young, and whereby it may also be supported in older minds. But
teachers who engage in your profession have a good right to insist
upon this direct social significance of their work. They do well to in-
sist also that they can and do train such direct loyalty, not only in the
work of athletic teams, but in successful class-work of all kinds, such
as the teachers of physical training can direct.

V

The third positive relation of physical training to moral training is
suggested by what I have said about the need of an enlightened form
of loyalty. Merely blind loyalty may do mischief; but it does so, we
have said, not because it is loyalty, but because it is blind. It turns
into enlightened loyalty in so far as it reaches the stage of loyalty to
loyalty,—the stage where one certainly does not tend merely to take over into one’s own life and directly to adopt the special cause that one’s neighbor has happened to choose as his own, but where one regards the spirit of loyalty, the willingness to devote the self to some cause, as a precious common moral good of mankind,—a good that we can indeed foster in our neighbors even when their individual causes are not our own, or are even, by accident, opposed to our own. I can respect, can honor, I can help, my neighbor’s family loyalty without in the least wishing to become a member of his family. And just so I can be loyal to any aspect of my neighbor’s loyalty without accepting his special cause as my own. He may be devoted to what I cannot and will not view as my individual cause; and still, in dealing with him, I can be loyal to his loyalty.

Now I have already pointed out that the spirit of loyalty to loyalty is finely exemplified by the spirit of fair play in games. For true fair play does not merely mean conformity to a set of rules which chance this season to govern a certain game. Fair play depends upon essentially respecting one’s opponent just because of his loyalty to his own side. It means a tendency to enjoy, to admire, to applaud, to love, to further that loyalty of his at the very moment when I keenly want and clearly intend to thwart his individual deeds, and to win this game, if I can. Now in the complications of real life it is hard to keep the spirit of loyalty to loyalty always alive. If my passions are aroused and if I hate a man, it is far too easy to think that even his faithful dog must be a mean cur, in order to be able to be so devoted to his master as he is. And real life often thus confuses our judgment through stirring our passions. But it is a very precious thing when you can keep your head so clearly as to be able to oppose even to the very death, if needs must be, your enemy’s cause, even while you are able to love his loyalty to that cause, and to honor his followers for their devotion to their leader, and his friends for their fidelity to him.

Now it is just such loyalty to loyalty that can be trained in true sport very much more readily than in real life, because, in sport, the social situation is simple. And because the spirit of fair play, in an athletic sport, can constantly express itself by definite physical deeds, and because the passions aroused by wholesome athletic contests ought never to be as blind, as violent, or as enduring as those which real life unhappily so often fosters, the training in fair play ought to be much easier in the world of athletic sports than the training of loyalty to loyalty is in our daily life,—much easier, much simpler, and much more definite. Hence, if games were in all cases rightly conducted, if confusing passions were properly kept from unnecessary interference with the joyous devotion of the players to their respective sides, if the general physical training of all those who are to engage in school and in college sports were conducted from the first by teachers who had a serious interest in the moral welfare of their classes,—well, if these conditions were realized, physical education ought to contribute its important share to what we have now seen to be the very crown of human virtue; namely, to the spirit of loyalty to loyalty,—to the spirit that honors and respects one’s very enemies for their devotion to the very causes that one assails. The result should be the spiritual power to appreciate that common good for which even those who are mutually most hostile are contending. We human beings cannot agree as to the choice of our individual causes. We can learn to honor one another’s loyalty.

The spirit of fair play, as trained in such sports as are founded upon a systematic physical and moral preparation for the strains of contest, ought then to be made a fine preparation for the very highest and hardest forms of loyalty, as such loyalty is needed for the great world’s social work. The spirit of fair play, as applied in the larger social life, has been called of late by a rather poor, if popularly effective name,—the now familiar name “the square deal.” The name is poor, despite the intent of the distinguished moralist who is responsible for its recent popular usage, because it is a name derived from games of chance, and because it suggests that the true spirit of loyalty to loyalty is sufficiently shown when you merely avoid any interference with your opponent’s agreed right to his share of the chances of the game. But true loyalty to loyalty involves a spirit that goes much further than this. It involves an active and effective positive respect,—yes, love, for loyalty, wherever you meet with it, even if the loyalty
that you honor inspires those very deeds of the opponent which you most are required by your own cause to thwart. Now this active and practical honor for the loyalty of your opponents is no mere external ornament of the chivalrous virtues. It is simply the very essence of all the highest virtues. Higher civilization depends upon it. True justice, which certainly involves very much more than "the square deal," true charity, truthfulness, humanity,—these are all the embodiments of loyalty to loyalty. And in real life this form of virtue is at once the most valuable and the hardest.

Here, then, is an opportunity for the teacher engaged in physical training to set before his pupils the highest of human ideals in an extremely practical way, and in close connection with definite physical activities. If a man is loyal to the loyalty that he has seen,—has been expressed in the activities of the playground, the gymnasium, and the athletic field,—he ought to be helped toward that loyalty to unseen loyalty which constitutes the soul of rectitude in great business enterprises, the heart of honor in our national and international enterprises.

And yet this great opportunity, which the teacher of physical training possesses, is, as I need not say, attended by great and insidious dangers. Do the modern sports of our intercollegiate and interscholastic teams uniformly tend toward the encouragement of loyalty to loyalty? Is not this great moral opportunity of physical education far too much wasted, through the accidents and the excesses of our present educational system? To ask this question is to remind you of numerous recent controversies whose grave significance you all know. Great opportunities do not necessarily mean great successes. The corruption of the best may prove to be the worst.

VI

And with these words I am indeed brought to the central problem amongst all those with which this discussion is concerned. I have set forth the three sorts of positively helpful relations that a sound physical training can develop in its bearing upon the work of moral training. First, because skilful and serious physical exercise involves true devotion, a sound physical training can help to prepare the organism and the personality for loyal types of activity. Secondly, physical training, in so far as it is a part of the life of a social group, can more directly aid the individual to learn to be loyal to his group. Thirdly, physical training, in so far as it can be used to give expression to the spirit of fair play, may be an aid toward the highest types of morality; namely, to those which embody that spirit of loyalty to loyalty which is destined, we hope, some day to bring to pass the spiritual union of all mankind. I have pointed out that all these three forms are simply possible forms in which the moral usefulness of physical training may appear. There is nothing that fatally secures the attainment of any of these three results. All depends upon the spirit, the skill, and the opportunities of the teacher, and upon the awakening of the right spirit in the learners. Instead of these good results, a failure to reach any of these three sorts of good results, in any tangible form, is in case of any given pupil or class of pupils perfectly possible. And, as we have just seen, the failure of certain forms of athletic sports to further, in certain well-known cases, the high cause of loyalty to loyalty has of late been far too conspicuous. Can one who approaches this topic from the ethical side suggest to you any way in which you may hope, as a body, to do more than has yet been done to make physical education morally serviceable? To this question I venture, as I close, to suggest very fragmentary answers.

In judging of the practical ideals that people cherish regarding their calling and regarding its results, one may make use of a tentative method which is likely to be at least partially enlightening. We all of us have had, in our lives, what may be called our typical great experiences,—our moments when life reached for the time its highest expression, the maxima of our curve of existence. Poets love to talk about such moments; romancers dwell upon them in narrating their stories; our own memories glow when we recall our own moments of this general type. A conversion or a sudden relief from great sorrow, a homecoming, the reunion of lovers long parted, the moment of hearing the first cry of some newborn infant,—these are familiar instances of what may be such maxima in the curve of experience of
this or of that human being,—glorious discoveries of new success or of great attainment. Well, our personal and our professional activities, our avocations and our vocations, our exercises and our sports, are characterized each by its own type of maximal experiences. And you can tell something about the moral character and the deeper significance either of a person or of an occupation when you hear some typical report about what was, from the point of view of this person or of this occupation, the type of experience which seemed, in its own place and setting, to have such a maximal character.

It has occurred to me to suggest, as one way of estimating the moral value of those experiences which one person or another may associate with athletic activities, an examination of some of the reports that experts, who also happen to be authors, have given of what to their minds seemed to be the truly great moments of athletic activity,—the moments when one most deeply experiences what, to himself personally, the whole business in the end means. Of course our daily life has to be lived, whatever our profession, upon a somewhat commonplace level. And it is upon such levels that, after all, we have to win many of the best moral results that devotion can bring into our lives. But just as love is for a lifetime, but the stories of love’s triumphs centre about the exaltations of the moment when two souls first find each the other, so it is our general custom to conceive the moral values of everyday life in terms of our memory or imagination of the great instants of life.

"Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;"
says Keats; and one knows at once to what sort of exaltation he refers. This maximum of experience stands for a type of consciousness in terms of which the poet conceives all the long hours and days through which he devoted himself to Chapman’s Homer.

Well, I have asked myself, how do expert athletes conceive the maximal moments of their lives as athletes? With what exultation are they filled when they contemplate their greatest attainments? Tell me that, and I can do something to comprehend their moral attitude toward their work, and the perils and the uses of this attitude.

Of course, any one who tells, in an expert way, a story of athletic triumphs, will depict, in lively fashion, the moment of victory. And, of course, the exultation of victory, taken by itself, has somewhat uniform characters, such as any boys’ story of sports or any lively newspaper picture of a great game will portray. I need not dwell upon the fact that victory in any contest is keenly joyous, and constitutes a maximum point in the curve of experience, and that whoever writes a lively sporting story keeps you in suspense for a time, as the spectators at the game are kept in suspense, and then thrills you with the elemental delight of the victorious solution of the problem of contest, as the cheerful romancer lets the lovers agonize awhile, and then indeed somehow startles you with the perfectly familiar thrill of discovering that their hour of joy at length arrives. Such incidents are aesthetically attractive; but they are not the sorts of maximal experiences that I now have most in mind. For my present purpose, I want to know whether, as the expert recalls the moment of his highest athletic attainment, he thinks of anything besides victory, and whether this other feature, besides victory, which at such great instants he has before him, and which he later recalls, is of the nature of a morally significant enlargement or fulfilment of any higher self, so that the memory of this maximum is indeed any sort of moral inspiration in later life.

Let me quote to you at once the report of an expert, in which he tells of a great athletic experience of his own, associated, as it was, with no little peril. In the year 1896 Philip Stanley Abbot, a Harvard graduate of the class of 1890, was killed by an accident during an attempted ascent of Mt. Lefroy, in the Selkirs. He was a man of great intellectual promise and power, and an experienced and devoted mountain climber, whose death left mourning a very wide circle of friends. In a memorial of Abbot that was published in the annual report of the Sierra Club of California, there is printed a passage from a letter which he once wrote to a friend about his first Selkirk expedition,—an expedition antedating by some time the final and fatal attempt to ascend Mt. Lefroy. The passage has the interest that Abbot, who was a scholar and a moralist, as well as a mountain expert, had
long found in his mountain climbing a moral inspiration, which
aided him in the hard work of his practical life. He was no pleasure-
seeker and no boaster. He had chosen his Alpine avocation because
he found in it a moral support that, to his mind, justified its peril.
Was his judgment sound in this particular? Well, let him tell his own
tale:

"Palmer's old theory, that the nearest approach that we can make
toward defining the sumnum bonum is to call it 'fulness of life,' ex-
plains a great many things to me. Once we came out at seven o'clock
upon the crest of a snow mountain, with two thousand feet of rather
difficult snow work before us, when I had expected plain sailing,—
and the daylight had already begun to fade. At the bottom of the two
thousand feet we were, as it proved, still five miles from home; but
we could have camped there. But where we were there was nothing
more level than the roof of a house, except the invisible bottom of an
occasional huge crevasse, half masked and half revealed. I had been
feeling lifeless all that day, and we had already had nine hours of
work. But the memory of that next hour is one of the keenest and
most unmixed pleasures I have carried away,—letting one's self go
where the way was clear, trusting to heels alone, but keeping the ice-
axe ready for the least slip,—twisting to and fro to dodge the cre-
vasses, planning and carrying out at the same instant,—creeping
across the snow-bridges like snails, and going down the plain slopes
almost by leaps,—alive to the fingertips,—is a sensation one can't
communicate by words, but you need not try to convince me that it
isn't primary. However, this by the way."

You will all recognize this, I take it, as a maximal experience of a
type that belongs to what one might call the lucid athletic activities,
wherein the highest exertion, the completest devotion of the self to
the end in hand, are accompanied by the clearest sense of the social
relation to one's fellow-workers, and so by the fullest self-assertion,
self-expression, or, as Abbot calls it, by the fulness of life.

Now are all the great sports equally characterized by such lucid
self-possession at the maximal moments,—by such complete union
of the active self and its object that skill, devotion, and success are all
equally clear facts of consciousness just when the loftiest height of the
experience is reached? That is a technical question which I have no
right to try to answer upon my own authority. But, when I turn to
the ordinary sporting story, I find that the highest height is said to be
reached, in the mental life of some sports, just when, amidst the plau-
dits of vast crowds, in the intoxication of relief from suspense, in the
exhaustion of the completely worked out organism,—when, I say, at
such an instant,—the higher centres refuse to function definitely, and
the victorious hero turns into an automatic physical mechanism, that
somehow, half consciously or unconsciously, accomplishes in a blind
way the crowning deed of triumph, while a sort of aura of glorious
and confusedly blessed sensations flickers dizzily and massively in the
place where the hero's mind had before seemed to dwell. In a recent
sketch by Mr. Ruhl, "Left Behind," the success of the hero in a mile
footrace culminates in a kindly but subconscious automatism on the
hero's part, whereby he turns at the moment of winning, catches in
his arms his fainting and defeated rival as the latter crosses the line,
and carries him, then, to the tent near by. What followed, while the
hero worked to revive his prostrate fellow-contestant, is thus de-
picted: "Outside the crowd cheered and howled, and pushed up
against the canvas walls, and from the distance came the boom of the
band, marching to them across the field. He [the hero working to
revive the defeated rival] swabbed on witch hazel desperately—
panting, dizzy with excitement and happiness, and a queer happy-
weepy remorse. The Other Man opened his eyes and blinked.

"'Bill,' he grinned the best he could, and held out his hand, 'I guess
we've been fools long enough.' Then he got tired again. 'It was a great
race,' he said, without opening his eyes. The hero replies, 'Yes! yes.'
He meant," continues our author, "that he thought it had been long
enough. Somehow he couldn't remember any words. And then the
crowd came in."

Now contrast these two maximal moments of athletic experience:
in the one, the self alive to the finger-tips with devotion and triumph,
joyously laboring side by side with its comrades amidst the beautiful
and merciless fields of snow, and just above the half visible depths of
the crevasses; in the other, the self with its "queer happy-weepy remorse," confused, automatic, kindly, but maudlin. These are, I say, two maximal experiences, each to be remembered for a lifetime. Each has its obvious physical and psychological conditions. Each is quite in order in its own context. I have, of course, no objection to offer to the existence of either of them, when it comes to the man who has earned it and who has his right to it. But the contrast suggests at once a fair question. On the whole, since we are prone to estimate our lives and our daily work so much in terms of such maximal experiences, let us ask then which forms of sport, other things being equal, are, on the whole, likely to be best adapted to the steadiest sort of moral training,—those whose highest heights are reached in a state of "happy-weepy remorse," amid howling crowds and dizzy confusions of consciousness, or those sports whose loftiest hours or moments of triumph leave the self "alive to the finger-tips," not with mere muscular sensations, but with the sense of clearly conscious devotion, of self-possession, and of exalted, yes, genuinely spiritual, mastery of something that, however hard or perilous, seems to be worth mastering. All kinds of sport have, no doubt, their functions. I am, as you see, venturing to answer here no technical questions; nor do I doubt that there are maximal moments in the lives of all of us when we are, in Shelley's phrase, "dizzy, lost, yet unbewailing." Yet, on the whole, I can venture to say that, educationally considered, and especially from the point of view of moral education, those forms of sport must be best whose highest moments leave one as clearly in possession of himself, and of his loyal relations to his mates and his rivals, as the physical exhaustions attending these highest moments permit.

Now this word about the experiences attending sport is meant here simply to make definite this closing suggestion regarding the conditions that must aid in keeping either a set of class exercises in gymnastics or a sport upon a high level as a means of moral education. What your athletic exercises need, in order that they may attain a high grade of moral efficacy, is a set of social conditions such as tend to clear-headedness rather than to confusion, such as at their highest point shall lead to Abbot's and Professor Palmer's fulness of life rather than to the flood of "happy-weepy remorse" or of other enjoyable destructions of moral equilibrium. For loyalty means clear-headedness; and you all regard sound wits, skilful and definite activities, lucidity, as mental traits that are to be trained by the greater part of all those class exercises and all those sports that you yourselves most admire. The evils, however, of the recent school and college sports have resulted, so far as I can see, almost wholly from the unsound social conditions which have been allowed to surround and to attend both the intercollegiate and the interscholastic games. For the ethics of sport have come, through the recent social conditions, to be influenced, both directly and indirectly, by the confused and unprincipled sentiments of great crowds of people, and, in general, by the intrusion of enthusiasms whose origin is due to the fact that too many people have been interfering in mass, in thoughtless ways, through the press, or through the presence of excited and cheering multitudes,—have been interfering with the moral education of our youth. Nobody can learn loyalty from mobs. The Harvard Stadium is an admirable place when it is not too full of people. But when it is full of people it is a bad place for the moral education of our athletic youth, just because, by the size of the crowds that it collects, it encourages, even in the most highly trained men and even in the most intelligent and skilful of sports, ideals that inevitably centre far too much about those poorer sorts of maximal experiences to which I have made reference and too little about that type of fulness of life which Philip Abbot glorified. Every athletic reform at Harvard must aim to minimize not so much the athletic as the social perils of modern sport.

But you, the teachers engaged in physical education, are fostering the sort of athletic life that flourishes in small, clearly defined, well-organized social groups. Whether class work or games are made prominent in this or in that part of your teaching, you are all working to combine in your pupils skill, devotion, loyalty of the individual to his community, and, whenever you have an opportunity to insist upon fair play in difficult situations, you are teaching loyalty to loyalty.
My purpose in this paper has been to suggest the correlation of your work with that of others who are engaged in moral education. Loyalty to the community and loyalty to loyalty,—and both of them expressed, not in confused sentiments, but through clearly conscious deeds,—these are the traits that the teacher of morals must inculcate. You see the task. I have suggested its dangers. I am sure that you, “alive to the fingertips,” are ready for your share of the perils of our great modern educational effort to find our way to the high places of the Spirit.
FOOTBALL AND IDEALS

Illustrated Magazine has asked me to restate some of my theses for his readers. He has himself seen my previous article. He knows what my position is. In requesting me to present the matter in a way that can make any sort of appeal to his readers, he is aware that, in some respects, I am an opponent of views that are now the ruling views amongst these readers. He cannot expect that, being what I am, I shall be able to affect these opposing opinions in any notable way. In brief, he asks me to lead, or at least to take part in, a "forlorn hope." I can only say, at the outset, that, since the matter concerns a contest for a moral ideal, the task is as attractive as it is forlorn.

I

Football is, in many respects, the king among those athletic sports which arouse the keenest general interest, which are reported at the greatest length by the newspapers, and which draw together the notable and enthusiastic assemblages. Consequently, football is at present a great social force in our country. It has long been so. Apparently it is destined long to remain so. In consequence, any plain man, however little he knows about the game itself, is bound to form his impressions about its place among the great social forces of his time and his nation. The plain man has a right to these impressions—yes, even a duty to form them. He may be able to give many reasons for them without being even disposed to form or to express any opinion whatever regarding the more intimate and technical problems of the game itself. Any great social force properly attracts the attention and awakens the scrutiny of the man who is not directly involved in the activities which represent this force. It does so, not because of what those who are under the direct sway of this force regard as its most interesting features, but because of its interference or coöperation with the other social forces which mould our common life.

Thus, for instance, the great labor strikes, nowadays so common, are phenomena that represent great social forces. Each great strike grows out of controversies whose merits are, in general, quite problematic to all who stand at a distance from the disputants, and who
know nothing of the practical workings of the business in which the strike has arisen. To judge who is right in the particular controversy that has led to the strike is therefore usually impossible to anybody but the expert. And nevertheless, if the strike is a serious one, our ignorance of the merits of the controversy, and of the technique of the industry in whose conduct the quarrel has arisen, does not absolve us from forming an opinion as to the way in which the interests of our common social order are affected by the strike. Some of these common interests we do understand; and it is our social duty to understand them. If they are endangered by the strike, we form an opinion regarding the mischief done. We must form such an opinion. If hereupon a powerful employer of labor suggests that he has a "God-given" right to run his business in his own way, and that we, being quite ignorant (as in fact most of us are ignorant) of how his business must be run in order to make a fair profit, must not presume to comment upon his decisions in the matter under dispute,—we find just this particular appeal to the rights of experts simply grotesque. For the strike may be endangering our whole social order. And equally, if a labor leader assures us that, unless we have toiled in the dust and darkness side by side with the striking laborers, we can form no fair judgment regarding what their grievances justify them in doing for the sake of redress, we repudiate this way of viewing the merits of the case. For the rest of us have our own work to do, and with this whole work the strike may be interfering. Each man's business, calling, sport, pleasure, grievance, love, or hate is his own; but the social order is for all of us. Whoever affects by his action its general forces can take no refuge behind his skill as an expert, or behind his rights as a free judge of what is good for himself, when we form and express our opinion about the effect that his institutions and practices have upon the common weal.

Well, it is with great sports, and, in particular, with football, as it is with strikes. If such things affect the social order at large, they have to be judged by every loyal lover of the social order, whether he knows anything about the details of the industry in which the strikers are engaged or not, and whether he is acquainted with the technique of the game of football or not. Football must be estimated as to its general relations to the welfare of society, just as Standard Oil, or just as the railway management which results in killing a larger proportion of railway passengers in our country than in other countries, must be estimated; it must be judged by non-experts, precisely in so far as it influences their great common social concerns.

II

The great social concerns with which, in this little paper, I have to do are the concerns called Moral Ideals. Does this great modern social interest in football, does this gathering of crowds, does this fascination, does this long-continued prominence in the newspapers, help on our moral education? Do such social influences make our national ideals higher, sounder, more lasting, more effective? That is a fair question. For the reasonable answer to that question the opinions of a football coach, however expert he may be, and however honorable a man he may be, are not finally decisive. The question is one for moralists. Now a football coach may indeed be, and no doubt often is, a moralist. But as a moralist he has no special authority conferred upon him by his expertness in the game. Or again, the value of football may have been publicly estimated by a lover of sports and of ideals who is himself not only a most distinguished moralist, but a President of the United States. In this case, the distinction of the moralist, and his own lofty ideals and lengthy public services, will indeed give great weight to his judgment. But his expertness in sport will no more make his opinion upon the moral question final than his high political office will make it decisively authoritative. Problems about ideals must be thought out by each moralist for himself. And any man, according to his powers and his insight, can become a moralist who will take the trouble to think out his ideals for himself, with the hearty intent to put them into practice, and to make them indeed moral ideals.

I have stated the question. Does football, as played under these absorbing and engrossing social conditions, under the sway of all this
newspaper publicity, in the presence of these notable, these fascinated,—yes, if you will, these fascinating—multitudes,—does football (viewed not as a game, but as an American institution, as a great social force in our nation) help on the moral education of our people? Now there are some—I fancy that there are even many—who will turn rather lightly away from this question. “Football is a sport,” they will say. “It is not for moral education, but for the joy of power in those who play; and in those who look on, football exists to satisfy love of watching the mighty display their might.”

So far as any chance reader of mine tends to respond in this way, he tends to answer my question at once; and, so far as he himself is concerned, he tends to answer it in a decisive way. A bard who sang in a recent number of the Harvard Illustrated Magazine gave voice to precisely the confused emotion which a great and excited crowd usually awakens in an unguarded mind, when, after a brief expression of the spectator's joy in the game where “a man is a man and a team is a team,” he reminded us that the true football enthusiasm naturally culminates in a “glorious night in town.” Now, whoever states the case thus, points out that, to him at least, football stands for no moral ideals, but simply for “letting off steam,” or for what may be called, in a phrase that I borrow from Professor James, “a moral holiday.” I have here absolutely no comment to make upon the place of “moral holidays” in a man's existence. I am discussing ideals. Whoever states the case for football as the author of the verses in question stated it, answers my question by saying frankly that football is, in his own mind, the teacher of no moral ideals whatever. And that, as far as it goes, is an instructive answer to my question. I regret the answer, but thank the bard in question for his frankness. I have no doubt that there are thousands of spectators who feel in the same way—

“Where the world looks on from crowded stands;
Where we hear the rip of quick commands,
And the crash of cheers, and the boom of bands.”

A great social force that had only this message for those under its influence would possibly act as an anesthetic for over-sensitive consciences and might in consequence be recommended as an occasional relief to certain saintly invalids. But if this were the whole story, such a force would help no man to an ideal, but might serve to scatter and muddle whatever ideals he might happen already to possess, especially if he were young enough to believe that whatever the world on the “crowded stands” happens to feel or to think is important.

I hasten to point out, however, that the true lovers of football, and especially that those true lovers who as players have been trained by it, or who, as experts in observing the moral influence of sports, defend it as an indispensable means for the training of a large portion of our youth to manhood,—that these, I say, find in the game another, and a very genuinely ideal value. These, the only true and enlightened lovers of the great sport, emphasize the thesis that it trains men to a very high and practical form of Loyalty. Now Loyalty is, to my mind, indeed the central moral ideal, an ideal of which our nation at present stands in very great need. If football, in its general social influence, is training our youth, as a socially organized group, to genuinely high forms of loyalty, then my question is answered effectively, and is answered in a sense favorable to the sport.

I fully agree that if such high training in loyalty is as a fact the normal, the prevailing result of this intense social interest in the “game of games,”—then very much can be endured in the way of incidental mishaps and extravagances, and still the sport can be viewed as a vastly important and perhaps indispensable factor in the moral education of our youth. I can and should regard with indifference a good many serious physical accidents; I ought to make light of much “roughness”; I should cheerfully leave to the coaches and to the other experts the entire supervision of all the controversies about this or that rule or method of play,—if only the lovers of the game can make good their thesis that the game teaches to the majority of those concerned, both players and spectators, the art of honoring, of prizing, and of practising a hearty devotion to serious social ideals.
Loyalty means a willing and practical sacrifice of a man for some significant cause. In its higher form loyalty means a hearty cooperation with the growth of the loyal spirit in all other men. Now “team work” and “fair play” are surely examples of the loyal spirit. The high physical and mental training involved in the preparation of the players, the coolness and self-control that they must learn to exercise under trying conditions, the obedience to discipline that is essential to their work, the self-sacrifice, the indifference to pain, the courage, which belong to their task, the fair play to which the rules, and the constant public criticism to which the players are subject, are supposed to hold the players—well, all these are means of training,—not merely “manhood,”—but loyal manhood. And whoever defends football upon such grounds has indeed insisted upon ideals that are of genuine, in fact, of eternal worth. And such a lover of football, if only he can make out the thesis that this sort of training is the net result of football, has indeed hereupon every right to insist also upon the cheerfully emotional aspect of the case, and to say that a sport which teaches ideals at all, teaches them far better than sermons, or even than set tasks of study or of enforced discipline, can teach them, and that it does so just because a sport is fascinating, and because it thrills a man through and through, even while it makes him work his hardest. Such lovers of the sport have a right then to dwell upon the joy of it, and to emphasize all its fascinations.

And now, as a fact, I know some great public servants, men now devoted to the noblest and hardest social tasks, who assert that they personally first learned unselfish devotion, and the spirit of “team work” (that is, of social service) on the football field; and who say that the “roughness” and perhaps their own broken bones, first gave them the needed moral lessons in what have since proved to be the most delicately tender and the most earnestly devoted forms of loyalty. If such could be shown to be the prevailing social influences, due to modern football, the objections arising from “roughness,” from accidental injuries, from the occasional neglect of classroom studies, and from all the other mere incidents of the sport, would be swept away at a stroke. I should myself unhesitatingly say,—better broken bones and extravagant enthusiasms and much “roughness” with true loyalty as the net result, than physical safety and sedate demeanor without a youth trained to the spirit of loyalty.

III

But, as a fact, can the thesis be maintained that the prevailing result of this great social force which we are discussing, is, in view of the present condition of the sport, the training—not of this or of that individual,—but of the youth of our nation at large towards effective loyalty?

I insist that this question is one, not for football experts, but for any fair-minded observer of general social conditions, and for any lover of loyal ideals. I also insist that, in answering this question, one must consider most of all not the effect of the game on the players, but its effect upon the spectators.

The game, as it is now played, is played for “the world that looks on from crowded stands.” Were that world not there, or were it not expected to be there, the game, as we are often told, would “dwindle.” That is why any restriction of intercollegiate football is vigorously resisted by all who love the game. In other words, were not the crowds what they are, as to size and enthusiasm, nobody concerned would see any such reason, as he now sees, for the degree and the form of enthusiasm for the sport which is at present in him. The spectators come largely because each expects the crowd. The players regard their cause as deriving its importance from its publicity. For the sake of the crowds they have learned to be loyal to that cause.

If this be so, since the players, and the candidates for the teams, are relatively few, and the crowds are vast, the prevalent, the widely and socially important moral influence, whatever it is, is the influence upon the spectators, and upon especially the watching academic youth. The moral effect upon the players is an effect of vanishing quantity when compared with the moral effect upon the masses who do not play. Now, does it train me in loyalty to see another man’s bones broken? Or, better (since the broken bone, or other notable
physical mishap, is indeed only the occasional chance of the sport,—
does it train me in loyalty to see another man showing his physical
prowess in a loyalty devoted way? He, the player, indeed, is loyal.
Does that make me, the spectator, a loyal man?

Certainly there are conditions under which the example of loyalty
proves contagious, and deeply effective. But if you will look through
your life, you will see that the example of another man’s loyalty has
been of the most ideal value to you, either (1) when you were yourself
already working side by side with him, in the same sport, task, or
other cause; or else (2) when you were aroused by his example ear-
nestly to plan some way in which you could practically imitate him,
or could at least somehow translate his spirit into your own deeds.
Cheering a loyal man is good; but for you personally it is the cheapest
and tamest form in which you can possibly honor loyalty. “Go thou
and do likewise” is the only word that can convey the true spirit in
which any loyal act of another man, whoever he is, should influence
you. Cheer, if you will. But if a man has only taught you to cheer him,
he has so far merely amused you, and perhaps has roughened your
throat.

Yet there are those who grow enthusiastic over the “vast influence”
which the indeed genuine devotion of the players has upon the gen-
eral spirit of college loyalty, and who seem to suppose that staring at
the loyal players is itself loyalty, that cheering is loyalty, that a cloud
of enthusiastic emotion is loyalty, that waving flags constitutes loy-
alty, that singing songs is loyalty, that talking over the chances of
the game for weeks means loyalty, that neglecting other things in order
thus to stare and to talk and to be stirred is loyalty, that, in brief,
anything is loyalty which is not a hearty and sustained and clear-
headed devotion of a man to his own hard individual work for his
own chosen ideal and cause. The loyal players,—well, everybody
knows that their business is not to stare, nor to cheer, nor to be over-
come with emotion. Yet one persists in saying: “How loyal their devo-
tion makes me, by reason of the contagion of their noble example!
See the results. I cheer, I wave my flag. In the tumult and passion of
my loyalty I lose my wits. How noble all this makes me! See how I
rage and exult.”

The fair retort to any such view of the matter is plain. What does
this enthusiasm make you do? These players are setting you the exam-
ple of loyalty. They risk their bodies, they devote their toil, they suffer
and endure,—for their cause. And you,—you should regard it as a
deep disgrace to have sat there staring and glowing, to have enjoyed
the spectacle of their devotion, to have made your holiday out of their
pain, to have gloried in their care and in their service,—unless in your
life there is some service, some effective loyalty, which is at least as
hard, as long, as painful, as cheerful in danger, as resolute in the face
of apparent defeat, as patient when defeat has come,—as their loyalty
has taught them to be.

If this is the lesson that football teaches you, and if you go away
from every game a man more practically devoted to your own tasks,
whatever they are, just because these players are so devoted to
their,—well, then football has helped you and is helping you to an
ideal. If not, football, may have helped you to “let off steam.” But on
the whole its prevailing influence will have been to enervate you, the
spectator,—to make you less, not more loyal,—for all your cheering.
For you have gloated over the sacrifice of others, and yourself have
sacrificed, and intend to sacrifice—nothing.

IV

One may reply, and probably will reply, that to introduce such con-
siderations as these to the ordinary member of the crowd of specta-
tors is to attempt to remind him of something wholly incongruous
with the occasion. “Of course,” one will say, “the enthusiasm of the
crowd at the game is not itself any form of practically loyal devotion.
But it is a sort of preliminary to a possible loyalty. It at any rate is a
tribute to loyalty, and therefore need not be other than a perfectly
innocent joy, with a tendency resulting to prize good work for its own
sake.”

I answer: As true as is the word: “On ne badine pas avec l’amour,”
so true is the thought that one does not well to trifle with the spirit
of loyalty, by cultivating a slavery to the enthusiasms of vast crowds and of an excited newspaper public in the place of a serious devotion of the great body of our youth to those possible activities which, whether under the name of sport or under the name of work, should actually absorb them in personal and practical and ideal tasks of their own. "Teamwork" is the great ideal of civilization; it is another name for loyalty. But is the crowd on the benches a team? And what is the prevailing social influence of the vast modern sports? Is it not far more this: To make and keep the crowd a crowd, rather than to train and keep the team a team?

Now to my mind, all the special evils which are justly chargeable to any modern athletic sport as it exists in our schools, colleges, universities, are merely incidents, often mere transient accidents of the one great evil which results from the extravagant publicity of our sports, from the prominence which the newspapers give to them, from the size and the miscellaneous constitution of the crowds which attend them, and from the inevitable distracting, confusing, and unreasonable social influences which belong to sportive activities thus carried on. These evils I believe to be both great and manifold.

The loyalty that is trained in the players is indeed precious. There is no praise too high for some of its best manifestations, even in case these are not always as wise as one could wish. For when a man devotes himself and all his powers, according to his lights, to his cause,—what more can you ask of him, so far as he has yet come in the pursuit of wise loyalty?

But sometimes,—in some place, in some seasons,—this or that evil spirit of unfair play may for a time be suggested to this or to that group of players. At such times the crowds concerned in watching these players are not themselves in any condition to give discriminating counsel, or to help the players into a better insight. On the other hand, the crowd may, for a time, condone, or even ignorantly applaud the new evil, until it grows somewhat obviously intolerable. Then comes one of those worse seasons of football, when evils that nobody has ever deliberately intended wax prominent. We have known of such seasons. They lead to efforts, which are often very serious, to introduce reforms. These efforts prove temporarily effective. Good seasons follow for a time,—seasons when the friends of the game are content, and when its critics,—all except a stray moralist or two whom nobody will heed,—are silent. But the social forces involved in this extravagant publicity, in these fascinations of the crowd, are irresistible. After a time the moral clouds gather again,—now in some Western community, now nearer to our own homes. The clouds themselves vary endlessly in their form and their shading. Now one hears of "professionalism," now of violence, now of some other form of unfairness; or perhaps one hears merely of triviality, of neglect of work, of an excess of accidental injuries, or of some other symptom of over-excitement. These are but examples of the evils which attend the social influences to which I have referred.

For my part I care little what special form these passing evils take during the bad seasons. And I am never disposed to blame individuals, nor yet particular bodies of students, for any of these ills. What I note is that the modern game is played under social conditions which render such incidental and recurrent mishaps inevitable. These conditions involve namely a play of social forces which renders an enlightened and prevailing public opinion, such as shall steadily favor, in the mass of spectators a loyal life and a practical love of loyalty, impossible, so far as the conduct and the spirit and the results of these public displays are concerned. And so various evils result. The prevalent result is not favorable to the best moral education of the great body of our youth.

V

One will ask, Could these social conditions he changed without destroying the "great game"? I answer that, if the colleges could more completely organize their own academic social order, and could shut out extraneous public sporting influences, and could meanwhile so develop their other sports, and their college activities generally, that the spectators at the great games were limited to those who had the
opportunity and, in the vast majority of cases the wish, when they applauded the display of the loyal spirit, to "go and do likewise," themselves, by doing their own work or play with equal loyalty,—well, then the great games might be simply culminating events in a generally loyal common social life. In that case I should have little fear that anybody would have occasion to complain of any excessive love of sport. I should be sure that football would retain all of its vigor and its true charm, without being helplessly obliged, every few years, to go wrong; and every year to mislead a good many people as to the estimate of true moral values.

But I see no very near prospect that such a social change is imminent. And under present social conditions, I do not believe that the forces at work before and about the great public games tend to the general moral education of our academic youth. The players win training, and may learn the highest ideals through their devotion. But the crowds do not thus learn ideals. Hence the frequent incidental evils.

Whoever believes that I am wrong, is meanwhile invited to refute me by using his opportunities as a spectator at the game as means of making himself a more loyal and devoted man, in whatever sport or calling he thinks wise, than ever he was before. If those who thus refuted me should prove to be the majority of those present at any game, I should ardently rejoice in being thus refuted. If the game, if the players,—if their devotion, if their patience in training, if their courage in facing difficulty or peril, if their self-control in adversity, if their moderation and dignity in triumph, if their sacrifices, if their coolness and clearness of head, awaken these virtues in the spectators, and make the latter a body of men as earnest and devoted as they are joyous and enthusiastic,—a body of men as much lovers of sound reason,—and of such sound reason put into loyal action,—as they are now lovers of football,—then let this body of spectators show the result in their whole social life. Hereupon I shall be indeed both refuted, and blessed in the consciousness that I am refuted by a wisdom which will be much better than all the cheers of many multitudes.

At a moment when the thoughts of serious people in this country are fixed, not only upon the exciting events of the day, but upon the future problems and the new responsibilities which, for you and for the whole British Empire, must grow out of the present situation, I know of no more appropriate topic upon which I can venture to address this Philosophical Society than one which has been suggested to me, as a transient visitor, by some aspects of what I have heard during my journey about this very crisis through which your Empire is passing. I say suggested to me. I speak, of course, then, not of your crisis itself, as if that were directly my topic, but of suggestions that have come to my mind as I have thought over this crisis. It is, indeed, very far from my thought to attempt any direct study of that crisis as

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