first placed upon a scientific footing by J. H. Kirchheis in his great work *Die tierische Sterbenbestimmungen physiologisch-ästhetisch entwickelt.* Peirce continued with a detailed but bizarre description of this work (retaining his German spelling):

This book is in two volumes, of which the first (Leipzig: 1867, pp. 516) consisting of *Theil I, Theil I bis,* and a portion of *Theil II,* treats of nerve-physiology; *Theil I* being devoted to histology, *Theil I bis* to the history of the doctrine of immortality in its nerve-physiological relations, and *Theil II* to the physiology of esthetics. The second volume has two *Abtheilungen.* It may be mentioned, as a slight indication of the thoroughness with which the work is carried out that in the Register to the first and smaller of the *Abtheilungen* of Vol. II, the name of Christ occupies more than a column, although this index only refers to places where the different names occur incidentally. Most of the references to Christ are to dates. *Abtheilung I* of Band II (Tübingen: 1878, pp. 107) treats of the psychology of ethics from a physiological point of view. *Abtheilung II* of Band II (Leipzig: 1901) begins by completing *Theil II* of the entire work. This, however, only occupies the first 772 pages, treating of the physiological esthetics of ethics. *Theil III,* which would have been more speculative, is omitted for the sake of brevity; so that the work is brought to a close with p. 1584 of this *Abtheilung,* except for an *Anhang* of 2210 pages. *Theil IV* and the *Anhang* are simply devoted to summing up the proof. The price of the whole in paper is 42 Marks. These details are given because the book is strictly indispensable to everybody who has any species of interest in the subject of the argument.

A truly remarkable description of what must be an exceptional work. Our first inclination was that this must be a spoof on German scholarly works, especially since no trace of the book has been found, and the appendix is three pages longer than the work it is supposed to summarize. The publication dates are also suspicious, as they roughly correspond with important moments in Peirce’s own intellectual life. So, perhaps it is all a spoof and there was no Kirchheis.

What counts against such an interpretation is that the *Minute Logic,* where the footnote appeared, was clearly intended as a serious work, and Plato’s immortality argument is followed by a serious discussion of how to evaluate such an argument (albeit without any further reference to Kirchheis). Moreover, Peirce’s mention of Kirchheis in the Abbot-Royce affair can hardly be called a spoof. If Kirchheis was indeed an invention of Peirce, he would have been seriously distorting the facts.

Another breakthrough in the Kirchheis saga came from *Die Deutsche Bibliothek* in Leipzig. No Kirchheis was found, but a likely candidate surfaced whom Peirce might have had in mind instead, namely, Julius Hermann Kirchmann (1802–84). We know that Peirce knew of Kirchmann, since at one point he asked his brother to bring back from Germany a copy of Kirchmann’s *Philosophie des Wissens.* Kirchmann was an extremely prolific writer and founding editor of the *Philosophische Bibliothek* who, amongst other things, wrote extensive commentaries on Plato. One possible scenario is that when writing the Abbot letter, Peirce incorrectly remembered “Kirchmann” as “Kirchheis” and that the name “Kirchheis” continued to exist as an inside joke. Peirce’s use of it in the lecture on burlesque might be the first occasion for this. So far, however, the evidence is still thin. We have not managed to obtain Kirchmann’s books to determine whether he said anything about Abbot.

We want to thank the following scholars who have sent us suggestions regarding the Kirchheis mystery: Fred Davidson (University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign), Michael Hoffmann (Universität Bielefeld), Ivor Grattan–Guinness (Middlesex University), and Klaus Hentschel (University of Göttingen), who suggested it might be a misspelling for Gustav Robert Kirchhoff.

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**INDIANAPOLIS PEIRCE SEMINAR**

The Indianapolis Peirce Seminar, a new initiative at the Peirce Edition Project, has been instituted to give visiting scholars an opportunity to present their work or talk about their research. The seminars have been well attended and have generated lively discussions. Topics have ranged from graphical ways of representing Peirce’s different classifications of signs, to the alleged circularity of Peirce’s proof of pragmatism, to a long discussion on how to conceptualize the very first stages in Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology.

The first seminar was given by Helmut Pape (University of Hannover) on 14 October 1999 in the back room of the Peirce Edition Project, surrounded by hanging manuscripts. The title of Pape’s presentation was “The Ontology of Emergent Time: Peirce in 1898.”

Since then, eight more seminars have been held. Floyd Merrell (Purdue University) gave a presentation on fractal space, the pragmatic maxim, and abduction. Paul Forster (University of Ottawa) took a stand against the accusation that Peirce’s defense of the pragmatic maxim is circular because it makes use of results of the special sciences. Instead, Forster argued that Peirce aimed to ground the maxim in logic, and he presented a (re)construction of what he believed Peirce’s argument to be. Priscila Farias (University of São Paulo) presented the research that she and João Queiroz have done on ways to diagram Peirce’s 10, 28, and 66 classes of signs, which revealed interesting common patterns shared by the three classifications. Christopher Hookway (University of Sheffield) discussed and criticized Putnam’s reading of the pragmatist conception of truth. Carl Hausman (emeritus Penn

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