In the introduction, Saraïliev identified Peirce as the founder of pragmatism with a reference to the latter’s “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). Saraïliev added, however, that this paper remained unnoticed until 1898, when William James published his “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” in which he credited Peirce with the discovery of pragmatism. The further spread and the European premiere of pragmatism Saraïliev credited to Ferdinand Schiller, in particular his 1891 *Riddles of the Sphinx*.

Saraïliev found the greatest number of pragmatists in Italy, and he discussed Papini, Calderoni, Giovanni Vailati, and Giovanni Amendola. Saraïliev also included a brief discussion of Mussolini. In the London newspaper *Sunday Times* (April 1926), the Italian dictator expressed his gratitude to pragmatism by saying that it was of great help to his political career, and that he had learned from James that any action must be tested by its results rather than on doctrinal grounds. Mussolini continued, “James has inspired in me a trust in action and a will for living and fighting on which fascism has built its great success.”

To balance this, Saraïliev also quoted others who were enthusiastic about pragmatism, like the Russian revolutionist Vladimir Lenin. Saraïliev also made sure to include Giovanni Amendola, who died after being tortured by the fascists.

Saraïliev continued his overview of the European expansion of pragmatism with an outline of its influence in German-speaking countries. Although weaker than in Britain and Italy, it had some influence: Saraïliev mentioned George Wobbermin, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Julius Goldstein, Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Ostwald, Georg Simmel, among others who were influenced by pragmatic ideas. He then continued to show how pragmatic ideas influenced several of the logical positivists in Vienna.

Saraïliev finally followed pragmatism to France, where it was met with more appreciation and played a role in the development of a new religious philosophy founded by Alfred Loisy and George Tyrell. In the 1930s, with further contributions from thinkers such as Maurice Blondel, Labertonière, Le Roy, and others, this developed into a French movement for a renewal of philosophy and religion known as “modernism.”

The introduction is followed by the essay “Charles Sanders Peirce and his Principle” as well as essays on the pragmatism of James, the humanism of Schiller, and the instrumentalism of Dewey. Also included are an essay on Italian pragmatism, a conclusion, and a supplemental essay on the meaning of the words “pragmatism,” the adjective “pragmatic,” and Peirce’s term “pragmaticism.” The book concludes with a lightly annotated and remarkably complete bibliography of pragmatic thought.

Saraïliev’s account of pragmatism’s invasion of Europe was scrupulously researched and very well written. He described pragmatism as a new theory of truth, marked its crucial points, and concluded that after the death of its chief representatives the debate about it began to fade away.

It is remarkable that long after pragmatism was abandoned by most philosophers, this diligent Bulgarian professor, Ivan Saraïliev, stood firm for pragmatism and in his own work followed a model of thinking that exemplified Peirce’s “logic of science.” In his *Genetic Ideas* (Sofia: Court Press, 1919), his *Socrates* (Sofia, 1947), and in his debate on science and religion, he closely followed the pragmatists’ doctrine for the clarification of meaning.

Under more fortunate circumstances, Saraïliev would have enjoyed an influence, perhaps a great influence. Instead, he suffered under harsh political persecution and was forced to be a social outcast. His thought was suppressed by a conspiracy of silence and his work was expected to vanish in the darkness of the following ignorant decades. As Peirce understood so well, thought must not be imprisoned in the monastery of a single consciousness, but it must be let out to fight in the street with other thoughts—for the sake of truth. The recent happy discovery of Saraïliev’s work most assuredly confirms, at least, that no authority can hope to forever “fix” the truth.

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As a youngster, Charles Peirce was given a chemistry laboratory. I believe the experience gained in this lab initiated his interest in logic, and especially the logic of science. I also believe it helped prepare him for his articulation of pragmaticism. And it could well have contributed indirectly to his logic of relatives. These findings, which I intend to publish in fuller form elsewhere, suggest that there may be more to learn about Peirce’s philosophical development by following his suggestion that we find out how he came by his ideas.

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