Irreversibility and Evolution in Peirce's Cosmology
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Dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1997

This dissertation explores Peirce's attempts to explain irreversible processes and the evolutionary development of complexity and order within the universe as a whole. It uncovers two distinct models of irreversible behavior in Peirce's thinking. One is based upon the law of large numbers of probability theory and statistics; the other, which is better known in Peirce scholarship, is called by Peirce the law of mind or, equivalently, the law of habit. Both of these models describe a type of teleological process. That which is described by the law of large numbers is a comparatively weak stochastic telos. The law of habit involves a much stronger notion of final cause characteristic of conscious and deliberate goal-seeking behavior. Peirce's attempts to explain how the stronger version arises from the weaker version is investigated, with special attention being paid to his attempt to give a molecular theory of protoplasm based upon the principles of the statistical mechanical theory of matter.

The claim is made that the two distinct models of evolutionary phenomena found in Peirce's cosmological theory are in tension with one another. This tension is formulated here as two separate problems: a problem of redundancy and a problem of incompatibility. Moreover it becomes apparent that there is related ambiguity in Peirce's thinking about the evolution of natural laws. While the law of large numbers seems suitable as an explanation of law in the sense of a mere statistical uniformity, it has definite shortcomings as an account of the growth of dynamical (i.e. causal) law. For this topic the law of habit naturally suggests itself as a superior hypothesis. Yet Peirce never makes the distinction between the two models explicit and even appears to offer both as accounts of the very same phenomena. In summary, Peirce apparently failed to realize that he was relying upon two distinct models and so was unaware of the difficulties which their combination entails.

Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking. The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, by Charles Sanders Peirce
Patricia Ann Turrisi, ed.
ISBN 0-7914-3265-3 (Cloth)

The philosophical significance of the 1903 Harvard Lectures can hardly be overstated. Peirce was unable to publish them when he was alive, and, until Turrisi's edition, the fifth volume of the Collected Papers was for about sixty years the only textual source scholars could conveniently access. The lectures represent a considerable editing challenge, for many of them exist in several drafts, and Peirce kept revising them until the last second before presentation. What to publish and how to edit it constitute two very difficult practical questions, and they allow for different strategies. It had long been known that the CP text did not do sufficient justice to the lectures, and so Turrisi's answer to the challenge deserves a warm welcome, and indeed much scholarly gratitude. She decided to publish as much as was feasible, as a result of which we have the pleasure of being able to read three of the drafts of lecture 2, for instance. Unlike their more recent publication in Essential Peirce 2, Turrisi tried to reproduce the lectures as Peirce actually delivered them, and she thus relegated most of the passages Peirce skipped for lack of time into the notes instead of restoring them into the running text. Her edition begins with an introduction that ably explains the historical circumstances of the organization of the lectures. An 80-page long commentary follows, in which Turrisi moves from one lecture to the next exploring various Peircean philosophical themes. The lectures themselves take up about half the book and are textually quite reliable. Most of the endnotes consist of additional Peirce text. The work ends with a good conceptual index.

Logik, Mathesis universalis und allgemeine Wissenschaft; Leibniz und die Wiederentdeckung der formalen Logik im 19. Jahrhundert
Volker Peckhaus
ISBN 3-05-003111-5 (Cloth)

This masterful treatise concentrates exactly on the topic expressed in its subtitle: Leibniz and the re-discovery of formal logic in the nineteenth century. It addresses the