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Timothy D.
Lyons |
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Timothy D.
Lyons |
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Office: Cavanaugh 333D. Telephone & Voice Mail: (317) 278–7768. Fax: (317) 278–4579. E-mail: tdlyons@iupui.edu ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Research interest: Philosophy of science. Graduate education: Ph.D., University of Melbourne, 2002. Representative publications & presentations: “Science and Epistemic Utopianism,” History and Philosophy of Science Postgraduate Conference, 20 March, 1999. “Science and the Pursuit of Unknowable Truths,” Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, 9 July, 1999. “Science and Epistemic Utopianism,” Australasian Association of the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science Conference, 11 July, 1999. “Scientific Realism and the Historical Threat,” History and Philosophy of Science Postgraduate Conference, 1 April, 2001. “Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Reductio,” Australasian Association of the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science Conference, 27 June, 2001. Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense, co-edited with Steve Clarke (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002). “Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens,” in Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 63-90. “Scientific Realism and Commonsense, ” co-authored with Steve Clarke, in Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science, pp. ix-xxiii. “Deployment Realism: Essentiality, Credit, and a Criterion for Belief,” Northwest Philosophy Conference, 3 October, 2003. “Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory,” Philosophy of Science, 70, No. 5, 2003, pp. 891-901. “McCosh, James,” Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2005 (3,600 word entry). “McMullin, Ernan,” Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2005. “Toward A Purely Axiological Scientific Realism,” Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 63, No. 2, 2005, pp. 167-204. “Inference to the Best Explanation by Peter Lipton” (invited review), The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2006, pp. 255-258. “Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide et Impera,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2006, pp. 537-560. “Non-Competitor Conditions, Criteria for Truth, and the Scientific Realism Debate,” Midsouth Philosophy Conference, 24 February 2007. “Non-Exceptioned Theories and the Pursuit of Truth,” International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, 14 August 2007, Beijing, China. Representative awards: Outstanding Senior Scholarship, conferred by the Golden Key National Honors Society, 1997. Postgraduate Overseas Research Scholarship, University of Melbourne, 2000. Melbourne Research Scholarship, 1998-2002. International Postgraduate Research Scholarship, University of Melbourne, 1998-2002. First Class Honors (H1 results), University of Melbourne. Indiana University, School of Liberal Arts Summer Research Grant, Summer 2004. Indiana University Overseas Conference Fund (OCF) Grant, for International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Conference, Beijing, China, August 2007. Frequently taught courses: Undergraduate: Introduction to Philosophy (P110); Philosophy of Science (P331); Scientific Inference, Scientific Realism (P383); Research in Philosophy (P488). Graduate: Philosophy of Science (P553); Scientific Inference, Scientific Realism (P600); MA Thesis Committee Member (P803). (**For course descriptions, see below.) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Course descriptions: P110: Introduction to Philosophy (3 cr.): Official description (from the course bulletin): An introduction to the methods and problems of philosophy and to important figures in the history of philosophy. Concerns such topics as the nature of reality, the meaning of life, and the existence of God. Readings from classical and contemporary sources, e.g., Plato, Descartes, Nietzsche, and Sartre. A second description (from a recent syllabus): The aim of this course is to introduce you to the field of philosophy. We will engage in a set of important philosophical issues and will encounter a number of history’s great thinkers as they wrestle with those issues. A very brief sample of questions we will address: How can we ‘bring our beliefs to life’? How do we attain knowledge? Does God exist? Are humans capable of acting with an unselfish regard for the well-being of others? This course will be divided into four general topics. We will spend a few weeks on each one. The topics are as follows: 1) The Spirit of Philosophy 2) Epistemology/Ontology 3) Philosophy of Religion 4) Meta-Ethics P331: Philosophy of Science (3 cr.): Official description (from the course bulletin): An introductory study of theories with regard to the nature, purpose, and limitations of science. A second description (from a recent syllabus): The aim of this course is to introduce you to the philosophy of science. We will explore a set of important philosophical issues pertaining to science and will encounter a number of key thinkers as they wrestle with those issues. Our path will be roughly historical, tracing key ideas and the problems they’ve encountered. A brief sample of questions to be addressed along the way: Is there a scientific method? If so, what is it? What is the difference between science and non-science? What is the relationship between observation and theory in science? What are the criteria for theory choice? Have theory choices been rational historically? This course will be divided into a few general topics, with a few weeks dedicated to each. The topics are as follows: 1) Inductivism 2) Hypothetico-Deductivism / Confirmationism 3) Falsificationism 4) Historical Accounts of Science and the Rationality of Theory Choice. (No substantial scientific background is required for this course.)
P383: Topics: Scientific Inference, Scientific Realism (3 cr.): Course description (from a recent syllabus): The aim of this seminar is to explore, in depth, two closely related issues that are receiving significant attention in contemporary philosophy of science. The first issue pertains to how our non-deductive inferences in both scientific and everyday contexts are to be described. Many contemporary philosophers have come to hold that many or most such inferences are inferences to the best explanation (which some will equate with abductive inferences). However, just how such inferences are to be articulated remains an open question and will constitute our primary concern for the first half of the course. The second issue pertains to whether we are justified in inferring (and thereby believing) that the best explanation for a set of phenomena is true. Scientific realists claim that we can justifiably believe that our successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, truth here pertaining to both the observable and unobservable realms. And it is generally argued that the justification for this belief comes from an overarching inference to the best explanation. We will concern ourselves, in the second part of the course, with whether our inferences to the best explanation are justified and whether, as some conclude, scientific realism holds.
P553: Philosophy of Science (3 cr.). (Graduate course, see description under P331 above.) P600: Scientific Inference, Scientific Realism (3 cr.). (Graduate course, see description under P383 above) |