279. The Basis of Pragmaticism. Meditation the First
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-16, with variants.
Types of readers who will not profit from this critical
examination of pragmaticism. The Harvard Lectures of
1903 presented the argument which finally convinced
CSP of the truth of pragmaticism. The argument of 1903
restated. Discussion of the ethics of terminology contains
some amusing satire. The comparative merits of English
and German; English better adapted to logic than German.
A great mistake to attempt to reform English by way
of German expressions out of harmony with it.
280. The Basis of Pragmaticism (Basis)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-48, plus fragments.
Of the different senses of "philosophy," preference
is stated for that sense in which it is synonymous
with cenoscopy, i.e., the study of common experience.
The need for a technical nomenclature and terminology
in the idioscopic sciences. The situation in philosophy
is somewhat different. Philosophy needs to admit "into
its language a body of words of vague significations
with which to identify those vague ideas of ordinary
life which it is its business to analyze." Logical
analysis is not always adequate. Examples from the
history of philosophy, especially Kant and Leibniz,
of irresponsibility in logical analysis. Kant's use
of "necessary" and "universal."
Blunders in logical analysis inevitable until proper
method (pragmaticism) is adopted. Specifically, blunders
result from the failure of philosophers to understand
and accept the logic of relations. Elementary discussion
of existential graphs ("quite the luckiest find
that has been gained in exact logic since Boole").
CSP reflects bitterly on treatment received from institutions
281. The Basis of Pragmaticism (Basis)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-9, plus pp. 4-6.
On the senses of "philosophy" and on terminology
in general. The danger of taking words from the vernacular,
e.g., "light" in physics. Earlier draft of
282. The Basis of Pragmaticism (BP)
A. MS., G-c.1905-7, pp. 1-9.
Published as 5.497-501 with insignificant deletions.
283. The Basis of Pragmaticism (Basis)
A. MS., G-1905-1d, pp. 1-162, with pp. 3-6 missing and
with pp. 112-119 discarded (p. 120 continues p. 111),
plus 210 pp. of alternative sections and single page
The following parts of this manuscript were published:
p. 31 (section 8), pp 37-45 as 1.573-574; pp. 45-59
as 5.549-554; pp. 135-148 as 5.448n (footnote to Monist
article "Issues of Pragmaticism"). Unpublished
is the argument for the truth of pragmatism based upon
the argument of the Harvard Lectures of 1903 which,
CSP notes, were not published in his lifetime because
of the failure of a "friend" to recommend
them for printing. The meaning of "science."
Heuretic, practical, and retrospective science distinguished.
The meaning of "philosophy." Cenoscopic and
synthetic philosophy. Methods of cenoscopic research.
The idea of growth, as found in Aristotle and as applied
to knowledge generally. The divisions of cenoscopy,
with metaphysics as the third and last division and
normative science as the mid-division. The deplorable
condition of metaphysics: the necessity of logic and
the normative sciences generally as propaedeutic to
it. The hard dualism of normative science, its distinctness
from practical science, and its relationship to psychology.
Action, effort, and surprise: effort and surprise only
experiences from which we can derive concept of action.
Doctrine of Signs. Modes of indeterminacy; indefiniteness
and generality; the quantity and quality of indeterminacy.
The relationship of law and existence.
284. The Basis of Pragmaticism
A. MS., two notebooks, G-c.1905-5, pp. 1-48 (one notebook);
49-91 (second notebook) .
Selections from first notebook published as 1.294-299,
1.313, and 1.313n; selections from second notebook
(pp. 65-69) were published as 1.350-352. Omissions
from publication (First Notebook) include the disassociation
of pragmaticism from some doctrines which have become
associated with it; for example, the denial of the
Absolute, the affirmation of a Finite God, making action
(brute force) the sammum bonum. ". . . I am one
of those who say 'We believe in God, the Father Almighty,
Maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible
and invisible' where the invisible things, I take it,
are Love, Beauty, Truth, the Principle of Contradiction,
Time, etc. Clearly I can have but the vaguest analogical
notion of the Maker of such things, and Pragmaticism,
I am sure, does not require that all my beliefs should
be definite." CSP thinks that Royce in The World
and the Individual comes closer to exhibiting the meaning
of pragmatism than any exposition of it given by a
pragmatist other than himself. Another misrepresentation
of pragmaticism is to assert that pragmatism depreciates
science. The principal question for pragmaticism must
be whether thought has any meaning or purport beyond
the simple apprehension of the thought itself. Also
omitted is a discussion of the four sects of logic:
Leibnizian, Associationist, Aristotelian, and Kantian.
The analogy between the indecomposable elements of
thought and the atoms of the different elements. Logical
terms and valencies. The indecomposable elements of
the phaneron. Propositions and assertions. Omissions
from publication (Second Notebook) include a discussion
of the three modes of mental analysis (dissociation,
precision, and discrimination). Application of these
modes to primanity, secundanity, and tertianity, e.g.,
primanity can be prescinded though it cannot be dissociated
from secundanity, but secundanity cannot be prescinded
but only discriminated from primanity. Finally, the
use of existential graphs to explain logical fallacy.
MONIST ARTICLES 1905-06
285. Analysis of "What Pragmatism is"
A. MS., n.p., [c.1910-11], 1 folded sheet.
An incomplete topical summary of the contents of the
article entitled "What Pragmatism Is," the
first of the three Monist articles of 1905-06. See
286. Analysis of the Issues of Pragmatism
A. MS., n.p., [c.1910-11], 2 folded sheets. An incomplete
topical summary of the contents of the article entitled
"Issues of Pragmatism," the second of the
three Monist articles of 1905-06. See G-1905-1b.
287. Analysis of Prolegomena
A. MS., n.p., [c.1910-11], 2 folded sheets.
An incomplete topical summary of the contents of the
article entitled "Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism," the third of the three Monist articles
of 1905-06. See G-1905-1c.
288. Materials for Monist Article: The Consequences
of Pragmaticism. Vols. I and II
A. MS., two notebooks ("Vol. I" and "Vol.
II"), n.p., April 27, 1905 (the first date recorded).
The material collected in both volumes is for the second
article of the 1905-06 Monist series. Volume I: Critical
Common-sensism. Pragmatism is regarded as a more critical
version of a philosophy of common sense. The indubitability
of propositions with indubitability associated with
vagueness. The nature of doubt: the relationship of
doubt to feeling, habit, and belief. The relationship
of Critical Common-sensism and the normative sciences,
and the relationships among the normative sciences.
Volume II: Generality and vagueness. Concept of God
is vague; Being of God is indefinite. Criticism of
Kant: "Kant is nothing but a somewhat confused
pragmatist." Ethical and logical control compared.
Pragmatism connected with real possibility, with pragmatism
rendered intelligible by the assertion of real possibility.
Pragmatism's relationship to the normative sciences.
Existence and reality: Generals are real but nonexistent.
289. Consequences of Pragmaticism (CP)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-22, plus rejected pp.
This paper serves as a critical commentary on the Popular
Science article of January 1878 (G-1877-5b). Applications
of the pragmatic maxim to specific questions, e.g.,
are the so-called "Laws of the Universe"
habits of the universe in some objective sense? Question
of God's objectivity. God and Demiurge are distinguished.
Brief consideration of what constitutes reality and
290. Issues of Pragmaticism (CP)
A. MS., G-1905-1b, pp. 1-26, 30-63 (with no break in
text); 12-28, 20-21, 27-28, 45-59; plus 9 single page
Published, in part, as 5.402n (pp. 33-37). Unpublished
is the mention of an early anticipation of pragmaticism
in a Journal of Speculative Philosophy article of 1868
(G-1868-2). In that article CSP accepts two positions
which underlie pragmaticism: Critical Common-sensism
and Scholastic realism. Critical Common-sensism differs
from the Scottish notions of common sense. Two classes
of indubitable propositions noted. Acritical inferences
and reasoning. Logica docens and logica utens. CSP
finds support of Critical Common-sensism in the writings
of Avicenna. Several applications of pragmaticism to
the meaning of matter and time and to the notion of
action at a distance. Theory of signs, especially symbols.
291. Pragmatism, Prag  (P)
A . MS., G-c.1905-8, pp. 2-68.
Omitted from publication (5.502-537): the footnote on
pp. 20-21, which is concerned with the meaning of "to
precide" as "to render precise, that is,
non-vague, non-indefinite." Discussion of the
derivation of the verb.
292. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism ()
A. MS., [c.1906], pp. 1-54 and pp. 29-54 of a partial
draft, with 28 pp. of variants and 2 pp. ("Index
Less misleading, perhaps, to say that there are two
drafts of pp. 29-54 and that it is not certain which
should be counted as completing pp. 1-28. Pages 45-53
of one of these drafts were published as 1.288-292.
See G-1905-1c. Not published is the first part of the
manuscript which follows the third of the Monist articles
very closely. Theory of signs. Relation among thought,
thinking, and Signs. Application of the type-token
distinction. Diagram of thought, with some conventions
for diagramming. The meaning of a conditional proposition
and the revision of the tychistic hypothesis. The "second"
draft is similar to the first in respect to the conventions
for the diagramming of thought. Restatement of chief
purpose for constructing algebras of logic and existential
graphs. Sketch of a classification of signs.
A. MS., n.p., [c.1906], pp. 1-56 (only the transition
from 45-46 seems unnatural) and a sequence 10-18 marked
"Keep for reference" by CSP, with 48 pp.
Anthropomorphism. The "operation of the mind"
as an ens rationis. Genuine reasoning distinguished
from reasoning which is not genuine. All necessary
reasoning is diagrammatic: Diagram is an icon of a
set of rationally related objects, a schema which entrains
its consequences. The three modes of non-necessary
reasoning: probable deduction, induction, and abduction.
System of existential graphs: application of existential
graphs to the phaneron; classification of the elements
of the phaneron; valency; the precedence of form over
matter in all natural classifications, with the distinction
between form and matter applied to existential graphs.
Kant's Gesetz der Affinito/oot. What is meant by saying
that identity is a continuous relation. Diagram variously
characterized as token, as general sign, as definite
form of relation, as a sign of an order in plurality,
i.e., of an ordered plurality or multitude (pp. 10-18).
294. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism (Pr)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1906], pp. 1-3, incomplete.
Stylistic problems. Should a writer be allowed to use
the first person singular? Strategy for convincing
the reader of the soundness of the writer's position.
A. MS., n.p., [c.1906], fragments running brokenly from
p. 8 to p. 103, with 3 pp. unnumbered.
Rejected pages for the Monist article of 1906 (G-1905-1c).
Both marking and topics treated indicate close affinity
with MS. 292. Various topics discussed: kinds of signs;
type-token distinction; collections and classes; the
substitution of "seme," "pheme,"
and "delome" for "term," "proposition,"
and "argument," and the reason for making
the substitution; several conventions of the system
of existential graphs.
296. The First Part of an Apology for Pragmaticism (A1)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907-08 or 18 months after "Prolegomena"],
pp. 1-14; 14-32, with p. 25 missing (but with no break
in the text); pp. 7-16 of another draft; plus 24 pp.
This manuscript was intended as the fourth article of
the Monist series of 1905-06, with two more articles
following: The fourth article was to begin the apology,
the fifth to have contained the main argument, and
the sixth to have provided the subsidiary arguments
and illustrations. More specifically, a rhetorical
defence of the principle of pragmatism in the Popular
Science Monthly issues of November 1877 and January
1878; system of existential graphs; the nominalism
of Ockham and J. S. Mill; objective and subjective
generality; Scholastic realism; the three ways in which
an idea can be mentally isolated from another (dissociation,
precision, and discrimination). Among the variant pages
are some interesting biographical data, especially
CSP's reflections on his father's "remarkable
aesthetical discrimination" and his boyhood impressions
of visitors, Emerson included, to the family home in
Mason Street, Cambridge.
297. Apology for Pragmatism (Apol)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-7, incomplete.
Draft of G-1905-1g. CSP notes that there are three arguments
favoring pragmatism of which the first "sets out
from the observation that every new concept comes to
the mind in a judgment." Judgment and assertion.
298. Phaneroscopy ()
A. MS., G-1905-1h, pp. 1-36, plus 20 pp. of variants.
This article, intended for the January 1907 Monist,
was to have followed the Monist article of October
1906. Published as follows: 4.534n1 (pp. 2-3); 4.6-11
(from pp- 5-16); 4.553n1 (pp. 18-19); 1.306-311 (pp.
26-36). Unpublished are CSP's thoughts on the relevance
of existential graphs to the truth of pragmaticism;
his view that existential graphs afford a moving picture
of thought, and his reflections on telepathy, spiritualism,
and clairvoyance. Vividness and intensity of feeling:
CSP's disagreement with Hume.
*299. Phaneroscopy: Or, The Natural History of Concepts
(Phy or Phaneroscopy)
A. MS., G-c.1905-4, pp. 1-37 incomplete, plus 31 pp.
Published as follows: 1.332-334 (pp. 12-18); 1.335-336
(pp. 33-37). Unpublished: definition and presuppositions
of science; idioscopy and cenoscopy; mathematics and
cenoscopy; the nature of experience and cognition;
kinds of reasoning from experience; experience and
shock (having an experience requires more than a shock).
300. The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism (Bed)
A. MS., G-1905-1e, pp. 1-65; 33-40; 38-41; 37-38; 40-43.7;
plus 64 pp. of fragments running brokenly from p. 1
to p. 60.
This was to have been the fourth and ante-penultimate
article of the Monist series. The following pages were
published as indicated: 4.561n (pp. 31-39 1/2); 4.553n2
(pp. 37-38 of a rejected section). Omitted from publication
are comments on the circumstances which led to writing
the various articles of the Monist series. In this
connection CSP notes, with some horror, the view attributed
by the New York Times to William James that practical
preference was the basis of pragmatism and considers
what James probably meant to say, noting James's definition
of "pragmatism" in Baldwin's Dictionary of
Psychology and Philosophy. The truth of pragmatism
and its scientific proof. CSP reveals that he "had
passed through a doubt of pragmatism lasting very nearly
twenty years." Discussion of the nature of doubt:
the confounding of doubt with disbelief. System of
existential graphs; comparison of existential graphs
with chemical ones; existential and entitative graphs.
Studies of modality: CSP's early views and subsequent
modifications. Among the fragments one finds CSP's
disagreement with Cantor on the matter of pseudo-continuity
which for CSP raises a question of the ethics of terminology.
LECTURES ON PRAGMATISM
Eight Lectures delivered at Harvard from March 26 to
May 17, 1903, the first seven under the auspices of
the Department of Philosophy and the eighth under the
auspices of the Department of Mathematics. Two of the
notebooks included here are probably but not certainly
part of the Harvard Lecture series.
301. Lecture I
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
Published in entirety: 5.14-40.
302. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
A liberal education in a hundred lessons: fifty lessons
devoted to the teaching of some small branch of knowledge.
Of the remaining fifty lessons, thirty-six were to
be devoted to logic. Lectures begin with a discussion
of the different kinds of mathematics. Dichotonic and
trichotonic mathematics. Logic of relatives. Incident
involving Sylvester, who claimed that mathematical
work shown him by CSP, who, in turn, suspected that
his work reduced to Cayley's Theory of Matrices, was
really nothing more than Sylvester's umbral notation.
Later CSP discovers, with some satisfaction, that what
Sylvester called "my umbral notation" had
originally been published in 1693 by Leibniz. CSP's
bitterness revealed in his remark that he can find
a more comfortable way of ending his days, if nobody
is interested in his efforts to gather together the
scattered outcroppings of his work in logic for the
purpose of a more systematic presentation of it.
303. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
A note appended to notebook reads: "Rejected. No
time for this and it would need two if not three lectures."
The history and nature of mathematics. Role of diagrams
in mathematics. Algebra of logic as an attempt to analyze
mathematical reasoning into its logical steps. An aside
on opium's "dormitive virtue": a sound doctrine
but hardly an explanation. The nature of abstraction,
especially mathematical abstraction. Role played by
conception of collection in mathematics. Whether pure
mathematics is a branch of logic. "I am satisfied
that all necessary reasoning is of the nature of mathematical
reasoning." Boolean algebra.
304. Lecture II. On Phenomenology
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
CSP notes "First draught" and "To be
rewritten and compressed." Published: 1.322-323
(pp. 10-12). Omitted from publication is CSP's discussion
of the goal of phenomenology, which is to describe
what is before the mind and to show that the description
is correct. Presentness (Hegel's view and CSP's contrasted).
The "immediate" defined. Quality distinguished
from feeling; quality as an element of feeling. Neither
abstract nor complex quality is the First Category.
Law of nature, with the being of law considered to
be a sort of esse in futuro. An objection to this view
of law noted and refuted. Reaction (or struggle) as
the chief characteristic of experience. Content of
the percept. No criticism of perceptual fact possible.
Reaction is no more to be comprehended than blue or
the perfume of a tea rose. Perception and imagination.
Genuine and degenerate varieties of the Second Category.
The Third Category (called "Mediation") and
signs. First degenerate form of the Third Category.
305. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
CSP notes: "Second Draught" and "This
won't do, it will have to be rewritten." Published:
5.41-56 (pp. 7-10, 13-32). Pages 1-6 and 10-13 not
Classification of the various sciences and the place
of philosophy among them. The three principal divisions
of philosophy metaphysics, normative science, and
phenomenology and the relation of dependence among
306. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
Published: 5.59-65 (pp. 1-14). Only the first paragraph
307. Lecture III
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
This lecture is subtitled: "The Categories Continued."
Published: 5.71n (p. 9); 5.82-87 (pp. 16-34). Omitted:
the three categories and their degenerate forms, if
any. Genuine form of the representamen is the symbol.
First and second degenerate forms are the index and
icon respectively. Symbol, index, and icon analyzed
with regard to degenerate forms. Given the three categories,
all possible systems of metaphysics are divided into
seven classes, e.g., into systems which admit only
one of the three categories (three systems possible),
systems which admit only two of the three categories
(three systems possible), and that system which admits
all three categories. The history of philosophy is
examined for examples of each system. Schroeder's argument
against admitting the Second Category into logic deemed
naive, but not Kempe's argument against the Third Category.
Kempe's system of graphs.
308. Lecture III
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
This lecture is subtitled: "The Categories Defended."
Published: 5.66-81, except 5.71n1 and 5.77n1 (pp. 1-12);
5.88-92 (pp. 48-53). Omitted: whether the three categories
must be admitted as irreducible constituents of thought.
Objection raised against Schroeder's and Sigwart's
denial of the Second Category. Discussion of Sigwart's
reduction of the notion of logicality to a quality
of feeling (Logical Gef,hl). Objection raised against
Kempe's denial of the irreducibility of the Third Category.
Brief comparison of existential graphs with Kempe's
system of graphs. Whether the categories are real,
i.e., "have their place among the realities of
nature and constitute all there is in nature,"
is a question which remains to be answered.
309. Lecture IV. The Seven Systems of Metaphysics
A. MS., two notebooks, G-1903-1.
Notebook I (pp. 1-37, of which pp. 1-4 and 12-37, with
exception of 25-34, were published as 5.77n and 5.93-111
respectively). Unpublished: a discussion of the possible
systems of metaphysics based on CSP's categories and
their combinations. In CSP's opinion, the following
philosophers were on the right track: Plato, Aristotle,
Aquinas, Scotus, Reid, and Kant. Rejection of the idea
attributed to the Hegelians that Aristotle belongs
to their school of thought. Aristotle and the notion
of esse in futuro. The Aristotelian distinction between
existence and entelechy. Ockhamists and the rise of
nominalism. Analysis of infinity (pp. 24-30). The reality
of Firstness (pp. 31-35). Notebook II (pp- 38-62, of
which pp. 38-45, 45-49, 49-51, 52-57, and 59-62, were
published separately as 5.114-118, 1.314-316, 5.119,
5.111-113, 5.57-58 respectively). Omitted is a discussion
of the reality of Secondness and a consideration of
the position that feelings and laws (Firstness and
Thirdness) are alone real (that to say that one thing
acts upon another is merely to say that there is a
certain law of succession of feelings). Experience
is our great teacher; invariably it teaches by means
310. Lecture V
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903, pp. 1-14.
A knowledge of logic is requisite for understanding
metaphysics. The three categories are not original
with CSP; they permeate human thought for all time.
Statement of his own early intellectual behavior. The
year 1856 is given as the year of his first serious
study of philosophy. Beginning with esthetics (Schiller's
Aesthetische Briefe) he proceeded to logic and the
analytic part of the Critic of Pure Reason. Mentions
his subsequent neglect of esthetics and his incompetence
in this area. Reflections on esthetics. Is there such
a quality as beauty? Is beauty the name we give to
whatever we enjoy contemplating regardless of the reasons
for liking it? Esthetic quality related to the three
categories: It is Firstness that belongs to a Thirdness
in its achievement of Secondness. Reflections on ethics.
311. Lecture V
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903, pp. 1-16.
The branches of philosophy. The normative sciences:
the relationships among the normative sciences; the
relationship between the normative sciences and the
special sciences, especially psychology; the dependence
of the normative sciences upon phenomenology and pure
mathematics. Description of the laborious "method
of discussing with myself a philosophical question."
312. Lecture V
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1 50.
Published: 5.120-150 (pp. 11-50). Not published is Part
I., "How I go to work in studying philosophy"
(pp. 1-10), and the contents of pp. 43-47, which constitute
a first draft (the published second draft is the versos
of these pages) and which concern the obscurity of
the relation between the three kinds of inferences
and the three categories as well as CSP's attempt to
achieve clarity here.
313. Lecture VI
A. MS., n.p., 1903, pp 1-31.
Perceptual judgments as involving generality and as
being beyond the power of logic to criticize, as referring
to singular objects, and as relating to continuous
change (time, continuity, infinity). The nature of
logical goodness and the end of argumentation. Logic
and metaphysics. Pragmatism: the genealogy of a born
pragmatist; pragmatism and realism; the ultimate meaning
of a symbol. CSP's acceptance of the term "meaning"
as a technical term of logic (as referring to the total
intended interpretant of a symbol). The meaning of
an argument and of a proposition (rhema); the meanings
of such difficult abstractions as Pure Being, Quality,
Relation. Definitions, it is stated, should be "in
terms of the conceptions of everyday life." CSP
raises one possible objection to his formulation of
the maxim of pragmatism, and ends this draft with some
disparaging remarks about the state of logical studies
at Harvard. The objection raised is this: If meaning
consists in doing (or the intention to do), is there
not a conflict with the view (to which CSP subscribes)
that the meaning of an argument is its conclusion,
since a conclusion is an intellectual phenomenon different
from doing and presumably without relation to it?
314. Lecture VI
A. MS., notebook, G 1903-1, pp. 1-43.
This manuscript is presumably the second draft of Lecture
VI. Published in entirety (5.151-179) as "Three
types of Reasoning." Note on the cover reads;
"first 35 pages as delivered." See MS. 316
for the continuation of Lecture VI.
315. Lecture VII
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1-48.
Published: 5.180-212 (pp. 1-21). The omitted pages concern
the three essentially different modes of reasoning
(deduction, induction, and abduction), with the pragmatic
maxim identified with the logic of abduction.
316. [Lectures on Pragmatism]
A. MS., notebook, n.p., , pp. 44-60.
MS. 316 continues MS. 314, and was in fact delivered
as part of Lecture VI. What is the end of a term? Distinction
between term and rhema. The common noun, its late development
and restriction to a peculiar family of languages.
Term and index. Three truths necessary for the comprehension
of the merits of pragmatism: that all our ideas are
given to us in perceptual judgments; that perceptual
judgments contain elements of generality (so that Thirdness
is directly perceived); that the abductive faculty
is a shading off of that which at its peak is called
"perception." Pragmatism and the logic of
* 316a. Multitude and Continuity
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
CSP notes that this is a "lecture to be delivered
. . . in Harvard University, 1903 May 15." This
lecture was delivered. See G-1903-1 and sup(1) G-1902-1.
PROPOSED ARTICLE ON PRAGMATISM FOR THE NATION
* 317. Topics of the Nation Article on Pragmatism (Topics)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-6, plus a variant p. 5
and a photostatic copy the original of which has been
catalogued separately (HUD 3570) and can be dated by
means of a letter from Paul E. More to CSP on the reverse
side. The original, without the letter, was published
in Philip P. Wiener's Evolution and the Founders of
Pragmatism, p. 21. The letter is dated March 24, 190.
A list of sixty-three topics, with page references and
the beginning of an "Index of Technical Terms."
318. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., G-c.1907-1a and G-c.1907-1c, with no single,
consecutive, complete draft, but several partial drafts
end and are signed (Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce)
on pp. 34, 77, and 86.
An article in the form of a letter to the editor of
The Nation was published as follows: 5.11-13 (pp. 1-7);
5.464-496 (pp. 7-45 of one draft and pp. 46-87 of another;
the last two sentences of 5.481 were spliced by the
editors of the Collected Papers). Also published as
1.560-562 were pp. 20-27 of still another draft. Omitted
from publication: an analysis of James's definition
of "pragmatism" (pp. 10-13 of one of the
alternative sections). James's pragmatism again, followed
by a discussion of his own position; the two distinct
opponents of pragmatism (Absolutists and Positivistic
Nominalists); pragmatism and religion; law distinguished
from brute fast, not, as the nominalists would have
it, by being a product of the human mind, but, as the
realists assert, by being a real intellectual ingredient
of the universe; triadic predicates as always having
an intellectual basis, the evidence for which is inductive;
thoughts regarded as signs, with signs functioning
triadically; three kinds of interpretants emotional,
energetic, and logical; the distinction between association
and suggestion; the syllogism as an associative suggestion;
"corollarial" and "theoric" reasoning,
of which an example of theoric deduction is the "Ten
Point Theorem" of Van Standt (pp. 10-56 of a long
draft from which pp. 20-27 were published). The three
kinds of interpretants of signs; ultimate intellectual
interpretants; pragmatism and common sense, with the
meaning of critical common sense explained (pp. 43-59
of an alternative section of the long draft numbered
10-56 and described above). Kernel of pragmatism; concepts
equated with mental signs; the object and interpretant
of a sign distinguished; the problem of ultimate, or
"naked," meaning; existential meanings; the
meaning of an intellectual concept; qualities of feeling
as meanings of signs, where qualities are neither thoughts
nor existential events; the distinction between real
and immediate (as represented by a sign) object, with
immediate objects resembling emotional meaning and
real objects corresponding to existential meaning;
mathematical concepts as examples of logical meaning;
the relationship of logical meaning to desires and
habits (pp. 11-34 of another alternative section).
Object and interpretant (meaning); the different units
of interpretants (meanings); pragmatic definition and
a prediction that pragmatism will occupy the same position
in philosophy as the doctrine of limits occupies in
mathematics (pp. 14-25 of an alternative section of
the one described immediately above). Kernel of pragmatism;
theory of signs; by inference a sign first comes to
be recognized as such; the elementary modes of inference
(pp. 12-30 of an alternative section). The divisions
of geometry; a problem in topics; the Census Theorem
and Listing Numbers; the function of consciousness;
concepts and habits; the vulnerability of James and
Schiller arising from their (apparent) denial of infinity,
including an infinite Being (pp. 62-77 of still another
alternative section). An attempt to define "sign";
the sense in which utterer and interpreter are essential
to signs; the immediate and real objects of signs;
a brief note on the Census Theorem (pp. 12-90, with
the exception of pp. 46-87 which were published).
319. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-17, with 5 pp. of variants.
An abandoned draft of a letter to the editor of The
Nation. After stating the purpose of the letter, CSP
discusses his philosophical ancestry and the Metaphysical
Club, of which he was a member in his youth. James's
position contrasted with his own. Application of the
pragmatic maxim to the problem of probability. Chance
320. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-30, incomplete, with 8
pp. of variants.
Another abandoned draft. The membership of the Metaphysical
Club. Types of mind. Criticism of James's views on
pragmatism. Application of the pragmatic maxim to philosophical
questions involving chance and probability. Nominalism
as a perversion of pragmatism. Criticism of J. S. Mill's
attempt to eliminate necessity by regarding "law"
and "uniformity" as synonymous. Affirmation
of the reality of potentialities or capacities. Pragmatism
as a part of methodeutic; its connection with the experimental
method of the sciences. Critical Common-sensism.
321. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-27, 24-30 but no continuous
draft, with 13 pp. Of variants.
Another abandoned draft. Notes invitation from The Nation
to clarify pragmatism. The ancestry of pragmatism.
The Metaphysical Club. Kant's nominalism explored.
The views of James, Schiller, and CSP compared. Thought
and signs. Experiences as the objects of signs, never
their meanings. Mathematical concepts as examples of
logical interpretants. How CSP was led to his formulation
of the pragmatic maxim. Application of the maxim to
the problem of ascertaining the meaning of probability.
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 2-21, plus 3 pp. of variants.
Presumably another attempt at the article for The Nation.
Pragmatic tendencies discovered in Kant. Definitions
in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding are
pragmatistic. Tinge of pragmatic thought in Aristotle
partly attributable to Socrates. Descartes is singled
out as being pragmatistically blind. Characterization
of some of the members of the Metaphysical Club, with
special praise for Chauncey Wright. What pragmatism
is and isn't. Pragmatism as a method of determining
meaning, not a doctrine of the truth of things. A comparison
of James's views on pragmatism with CSP's. Pragmatism
as a rule of methodeutic. One influence of pragmatism
upon metaphysics: bringing metaphysics more in line
with common sense than is usually the case. The metaphysical
position toward which pragmatism is favorably disposed
is conditional idealism (Berkeleyanism with some modifications).
Laplace and the notion of probability. Truth and error.
A. MS., G-c.1907-1b, pp. 2-12.
Apparently still another attempt at the article for
The Nation. Published, in part: 5.5-10. In the unpublished
part CSP writes of his "personal peculiarity,
which prompts him to struggle against every philosophical
opinion that has recommended itself to him before he
definitely surrenders himself to it," and hence
of his relative lack of bias in his discussions of
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-3, incomplete, plus another
draft of p. 1.
The Metaphysical Club, its members and its occasional
visitors, e.g., Abbot and Fiske. Misunderstanding of
the meaning of "pragmatism." Pragmatism is
not a metaphysical doctrine. "It does not relate
to what is true, but to what is meant." Alternative
p. 1.: The Metaphysical Club. Of those who attended
the meetings of the Club, CSP was the only one for
whom Kant had an appeal. The others were inspired by
the English philosophers.
325. Pragmatism Made Easy (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-8.
A draft of a letter to the editor of the Sun. Associating
the personal names of the discoverers with the great
advances made in science is defended. The study of
scientific philosophy requires a religious spirit.
CSP's intellectual development. The Metaphysical Club.
Nicholas St. John Green, a member of the Club, brought
the doctrines of Bain to the attention of the other
members. The correlation of the traditional threefold
division of consciousness (feeling, volition, and cognition)
with the threefold division of logical predicates (predicates
connected with single subjects, two subjects, and more
than two subjects).
326. Some Applications of Pragmaticism (SAP)
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-21; 5-10, 11-17; 2 pp. of
Apparently a draft of a letter (see p. 13). Pages 1-21:
Wundt's psychology, as exemplifying a certain kind
of error in philosophy; Wundt's mistaken assumption
that philosophy must be based on the results of one
of the special sciences (which implies that there are
no immediately indubitable facts other than those which
the special sciences have uncovered); Wundt's contention
that philosophy requires the results of the special
sciences (or else its theories are generated from thin
air) is dismissed; Wundt's confusion of cenoscopy and
idioscopy. Pages 5-17: Wundt as scientist distinguished
from Wundt as philosopher; Wundt's success in science
contrasted with his failure in philosophy. The branches
of cenoscopy, the study of those facts familiar to
the whole world, and the pragmatistic variety of a
philosophy of common sense.
327. Why I Am A Pragmatist (OM)
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-8.
The meaning of abstract ideas. It would seem that either
the ultimate intellectual purport of ideas conforms
to the pragmatist's program or these ideas are classified
with our instincts. CSP believes both to be the case.
The article itself begins with a sketch of the classification
of the sciences.
328. Sketch of Some Proposed Chapters on the Sect of
Philosophy Called Pragmatism
A. MS., notebook, G-c.1905-6.
Published, in part, as 1.126-129 (pp. 11-17). Unpublished
are the reasons why pragmatism ought to be investigated.
CSP came to the position of pragmatism through the
study of the following philosophers and in the order
noted here: Kant, Berkeley, the other English philosophers,
Aristotle, and finally the Scholastics. Whether the
principle of pragmatism is self-evident. The place
of philosophy among the sciences. The branches of philosophy.
Pragmatism and the question of the external world.
Deduction, induction and probability, and their justification.
329. Nichol's Cosmology and Pragmaticism (Carus)
A. MS., G-c.1904-3, pp. 1-6, 7 1/2-23, with parts of
several other drafts, but no continuous draft.
Nichol's book is used mainly as a point of departure
for CSP's own views. An early expression of the first
article of the Monist series of 1905-06 on pragmatism
(G-1905-1a). Published, in part, as 8.194-195 (pp.
12-15). Unpublished is a description of the experimentalist's
way of thinking. CSP's disagreement with Balfour on
the question of a physical reality unraveled in experiments
whether a belief in a non-experiential reality is
the unalterable faith of the scientist. Pragmatism,
pragmaticism, and common sense. Tin doubts, toy baby
scepticism. Meaning of a proper name. The pragmaticist's
use of the term "real." Generality as an
indispensible condition of reality. Generality and
its relationship both to evolution and to the summum
bonum. The pragmaticistic analysis of past and future.
330. The Argument for Pragmatism anachazomenally or
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 1 folded sheet; plus 5 other folded
sheets which, although lacking a title or mark, seem
to be connected with the first.
The argument stated. A generalized habit of conduct
is the essence of a concept, i.e., its logical interpretant.
The problem of evil and CSP's solution: The evil passions
are evil only in the sense that they ought to be controlled,
but they are good as the only possible way that man
has to reach his full and normal development. The meaning
of "true" and "satisfactory"; the
relationship between the true and the satisfactory.
331. [Pragmatism and Pragmaticism]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 5 pp.
This manuscript may possibly be a draft of a letter
to The Nation. See note in the body of the manuscript
which reads: "Say, Garrison, was not Schiller
in Cornell at one time." Pragmatism, humanism,
Whether the pragmatist's God must be finite. In CSP's
opinion, a finite God cannot satisfy human instincts.
Recommendation that the word "pragmatism"
be employed for the looser sense of the term's meaning
but that the word "pragmaticism" be retained
for the more precise meaning.
332. [Pragmatism, Experimentalism, and Mach]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 2 pp.
The true experimentalist is a pragmatist. Mach misses
the bull's-eye by holding that general thought has
no value other than its utility in economizing experience.
But, although he misses the bull's-eye, Mach does hit
333. [Fragments on the Fixation of Belief]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 29 pp., plus 3 pp. (numbered 80,
81, 86) of notes and 2 pp. Of a draft of 5.362-363.
The following information was supplied by Professor
Max H. Fisch: "Of the present contents of this
folder, some sequences of pages on the rag paper with
the watermark J. Whatman 1868 may be parts of the paper
read to the Metaphysical Club in November 1872. Others
are probably, indeed almost certainly, parts of The
Logic of 1873. The two slightly longer sheets of rag
paper contain two pages of a draft of 'The Fixation
of Belief,' probably of 1876 or 1877. The sheets of
wood pulp paper numbered 80, 81, 86, or at least pages
80 and 81, probably belong to some work of the 1890's
in which Peirce went over the same ground again."
In connection with the numbered pages, see MS. 1002.
It is of some interest to note that the earlier name
for the method of tenacity was "the method of
obstinacy," and instead of "authority,"
CSP employed the word "despotism."
334. The Fixation of Belief
Offprint from the Popular Science Monthly (G-1877-5a)
with inserts: "A" (5 pp.), "B"
(2 pp.), "C" (1 p.), "D" (pp. 1-3;
1-7), "E" (2 pp.), "F" (pp. 1-3;
1-7), "G" (2 pp.), "H" (2 pp.),
"N" (2 pp.), unmarked (3 pp.).
Changes are indicated both in the margins and in the
notes which were to be inserted in future editions
of his earlier work. There is a clear indication where
to insert some of the notes. With others (N, B, D,
F, G, H, and those pages which are unmarked), there
is no indication. The notes concern the fallibility
of thinking, especially in mathematics (A); the distinction
between definite and indefinite doubt, and the possibility
of a third attitude of calm ignorance, whether conscious
or unconscious, besides belief and doubt (C); the dependence
of the validity of pure mathematics and of logic upon
the validity of rational instinct, and the consequences
of this for evaluating the a priori method of fixing
belief (E); on Malthus and Darwin (B); the distinction
between assertion and proposition and between modal
propositions and the psychological modals "can"
and "would" (D); the improvement of the standards
of reasoning and the inward power of growth as reflected
in the development of the instinct of just reasoning,
with some remarks on Malthus and Darwin (F); the ultimate
appeal to instinctive feelings (G); Descartes' mythical
Eldorado of absolute certainty, and the attempt to
attain it by methodological scepticism (H); the development
of the intellect (N), and a preface to an essay on
logic and reasoning, with a digression on theology
335. [Fragment on the Justification of Belief]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-6; plus 4 pp. of another draft.
On absolute certainty: "We cannot attain absolute
certainty about anything whatever, unless it be either
that there are sundry seemings or something as vague
as that." The proposition twice two is four
fails as an example of perfect certainty.