PRAGMATISM

THE BASIS OF PRAGMATICISM
279. The Basis of Pragmaticism. Meditation the First (Med)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-16, with variants.
Types of readers who will not profit from this critical examination of pragmaticism. The Harvard Lectures of 1903 presented the argument which finally convinced CSP of the truth of pragmaticism. The argument of 1903 restated. Discussion of the ethics of terminology contains some amusing satire. The comparative merits of English and German; English better adapted to logic than German. A great mistake to attempt to reform English by way of German expressions out of harmony with it.

280. The Basis of Pragmaticism (Basis)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-48, plus fragments.
Of the different senses of "philosophy," preference is stated for that sense in which it is synonymous with cenoscopy, i.e., the study of common experience. The need for a technical nomenclature and terminology in the idioscopic sciences. The situation in philosophy is somewhat different. Philosophy needs to admit "into its language a body of words of vague significations with which to identify those vague ideas of ordinary life which it is its business to analyze." Logical analysis is not always adequate. Examples from the history of philosophy, especially Kant and Leibniz, of irresponsibility in logical analysis. Kant's use of "necessary" and "universal." Blunders in logical analysis inevitable until proper method (pragmaticism) is adopted. Specifically, blunders result from the failure of philosophers to understand and accept the logic of relations. Elementary discussion of existential graphs ("quite the luckiest find that has been gained in exact logic since Boole"). CSP reflects bitterly on treatment received from institutions and publishers.

281. The Basis of Pragmaticism (Basis)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-9, plus pp. 4-6.
On the senses of "philosophy" and on terminology in general. The danger of taking words from the vernacular, e.g., "light" in physics. Earlier draft of MS. 280.

282. The Basis of Pragmaticism (BP)
A. MS., G-c.1905-7, pp. 1-9.
Published as 5.497-501 with insignificant deletions.

283. The Basis of Pragmaticism (Basis)
A. MS., G-1905-1d, pp. 1-162, with pp. 3-6 missing and with pp. 112-119 discarded (p. 120 continues p. 111), plus 210 pp. of alternative sections and single page fragments.
The following parts of this manuscript were published: p. 31 (section 8), pp 37-45 as 1.573-574; pp. 45-59 as 5.549-554; pp. 135-148 as 5.448n (footnote to Monist article "Issues of Pragmaticism"). Unpublished is the argument for the truth of pragmatism based upon the argument of the Harvard Lectures of 1903 which, CSP notes, were not published in his lifetime because of the failure of a "friend" to recommend them for printing. The meaning of "science." Heuretic, practical, and retrospective science distinguished. The meaning of "philosophy." Cenoscopic and synthetic philosophy. Methods of cenoscopic research. The idea of growth, as found in Aristotle and as applied to knowledge generally. The divisions of cenoscopy, with metaphysics as the third and last division and normative science as the mid-division. The deplorable condition of metaphysics: the necessity of logic and the normative sciences generally as propaedeutic to it. The hard dualism of normative science, its distinctness from practical science, and its relationship to psychology. Action, effort, and surprise: effort and surprise only experiences from which we can derive concept of action. Doctrine of Signs. Modes of indeterminacy; indefiniteness and generality; the quantity and quality of indeterminacy. The relationship of law and existence.

284. The Basis of Pragmaticism
A. MS., two notebooks, G-c.1905-5, pp. 1-48 (one notebook); 49-91 (second notebook) .
Selections from first notebook published as 1.294-299, 1.313, and 1.313n; selections from second notebook (pp. 65-69) were published as 1.350-352. Omissions from publication (First Notebook) include the disassociation of pragmaticism from some doctrines which have become associated with it; for example, the denial of the Absolute, the affirmation of a Finite God, making action (brute force) the sammum bonum. ". . . I am one of those who say 'We believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible' where the invisible things, I take it, are Love, Beauty, Truth, the Principle of Contradiction, Time, etc. Clearly I can have but the vaguest analogical notion of the Maker of such things, and Pragmaticism, I am sure, does not require that all my beliefs should be definite." CSP thinks that Royce in The World and the Individual comes closer to exhibiting the meaning of pragmatism than any exposition of it given by a pragmatist other than himself. Another misrepresentation of pragmaticism is to assert that pragmatism depreciates science. The principal question for pragmaticism must be whether thought has any meaning or purport beyond the simple apprehension of the thought itself. Also omitted is a discussion of the four sects of logic: Leibnizian, Associationist, Aristotelian, and Kantian. The analogy between the indecomposable elements of thought and the atoms of the different elements. Logical terms and valencies. The indecomposable elements of the phaneron. Propositions and assertions. Omissions from publication (Second Notebook) include a discussion of the three modes of mental analysis (dissociation, precision, and discrimination). Application of these modes to primanity, secundanity, and tertianity, e.g., primanity can be prescinded though it cannot be dissociated from secundanity, but secundanity cannot be prescinded but only discriminated from primanity. Finally, the use of existential graphs to explain logical fallacy.

MONIST ARTICLES 1905-06

285. Analysis of "What Pragmatism is"
A. MS., n.p., [c.1910-11], 1 folded sheet.
An incomplete topical summary of the contents of the article entitled "What Pragmatism Is," the first of the three Monist articles of 1905-06. See G-1905-1a.

286. Analysis of the Issues of Pragmatism
A. MS., n.p., [c.1910-11], 2 folded sheets. An incomplete topical summary of the contents of the article entitled "Issues of Pragmatism," the second of the three Monist articles of 1905-06. See G-1905-1b.

287. Analysis of Prolegomena
A. MS., n.p., [c.1910-11], 2 folded sheets.
An incomplete topical summary of the contents of the article entitled "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," the third of the three Monist articles of 1905-06. See G-1905-1c.

288. Materials for Monist Article: The Consequences of Pragmaticism. Vols. I and II
A. MS., two notebooks ("Vol. I" and "Vol. II"), n.p., April 27, 1905 (the first date recorded).
The material collected in both volumes is for the second article of the 1905-06 Monist series. Volume I: Critical Common-sensism. Pragmatism is regarded as a more critical version of a philosophy of common sense. The indubitability of propositions with indubitability associated with vagueness. The nature of doubt: the relationship of doubt to feeling, habit, and belief. The relationship of Critical Common-sensism and the normative sciences, and the relationships among the normative sciences. Volume II: Generality and vagueness. Concept of God is vague; Being of God is indefinite. Criticism of Kant: "Kant is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist." Ethical and logical control compared. Pragmatism connected with real possibility, with pragmatism rendered intelligible by the assertion of real possibility. Pragmatism's relationship to the normative sciences. Existence and reality: Generals are real but nonexistent.

289. Consequences of Pragmaticism (CP)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1905], pp. 1-22, plus rejected pp. 1, 5.
This paper serves as a critical commentary on the Popular Science article of January 1878 (G-1877-5b). Applications of the pragmatic maxim to specific questions, e.g., are the so-called "Laws of the Universe" habits of the universe in some objective sense? Question of God's objectivity. God and Demiurge are distinguished. Brief consideration of what constitutes reality and characterizes propositions.

290. Issues of Pragmaticism (CP)
A. MS., G-1905-1b, pp. 1-26, 30-63 (with no break in text); 12-28, 20-21, 27-28, 45-59; plus 9 single page variants.
Published, in part, as 5.402n (pp. 33-37). Unpublished is the mention of an early anticipation of pragmaticism in a Journal of Speculative Philosophy article of 1868 (G-1868-2). In that article CSP accepts two positions which underlie pragmaticism: Critical Common-sensism and Scholastic realism. Critical Common-sensism differs from the Scottish notions of common sense. Two classes of indubitable propositions noted. Acritical inferences and reasoning. Logica docens and logica utens. CSP finds support of Critical Common-sensism in the writings of Avicenna. Several applications of pragmaticism to the meaning of matter and time and to the notion of action at a distance. Theory of signs, especially symbols.

291. Pragmatism, Prag [4] (P)
A . MS., G-c.1905-8, pp. 2-68.
Omitted from publication (5.502-537): the footnote on pp. 20-21, which is concerned with the meaning of "to precide" as "to render precise, that is, non-vague, non-indefinite." Discussion of the derivation of the verb.

292. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism ()
A. MS., [c.1906], pp. 1-54 and pp. 29-54 of a partial draft, with 28 pp. of variants and 2 pp. ("Index to Prolegomena").
Less misleading, perhaps, to say that there are two drafts of pp. 29-54 and that it is not certain which should be counted as completing pp. 1-28. Pages 45-53 of one of these drafts were published as 1.288-292. See G-1905-1c. Not published is the first part of the manuscript which follows the third of the Monist articles very closely. Theory of signs. Relation among thought, thinking, and Signs. Application of the type-token distinction. Diagram of thought, with some conventions for diagramming. The meaning of a conditional proposition and the revision of the tychistic hypothesis. The "second" draft is similar to the first in respect to the conventions for the diagramming of thought. Restatement of chief purpose for constructing algebras of logic and existential graphs. Sketch of a classification of signs.

293. (PAP)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1906], pp. 1-56 (only the transition from 45-46 seems unnatural) and a sequence 10-18 marked "Keep for reference" by CSP, with 48 pp. of variants.
Anthropomorphism. The "operation of the mind" as an ens rationis. Genuine reasoning distinguished from reasoning which is not genuine. All necessary reasoning is diagrammatic: Diagram is an icon of a set of rationally related objects, a schema which entrains its consequences. The three modes of non-necessary reasoning: probable deduction, induction, and abduction. System of existential graphs: application of existential graphs to the phaneron; classification of the elements of the phaneron; valency; the precedence of form over matter in all natural classifications, with the distinction between form and matter applied to existential graphs. Kant's Gesetz der Affinito/oot. What is meant by saying that identity is a continuous relation. Diagram variously characterized as token, as general sign, as definite form of relation, as a sign of an order in plurality, i.e., of an ordered plurality or multitude (pp. 10-18).

294. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism (Pr)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1906], pp. 1-3, incomplete.
Stylistic problems. Should a writer be allowed to use the first person singular? Strategy for convincing the reader of the soundness of the writer's position.

295. ()
A. MS., n.p., [c.1906], fragments running brokenly from p. 8 to p. 103, with 3 pp. unnumbered.
Rejected pages for the Monist article of 1906 (G-1905-1c). Both marking and topics treated indicate close affinity with MS. 292. Various topics discussed: kinds of signs; type-token distinction; collections and classes; the substitution of "seme," "pheme," and "delome" for "term," "proposition," and "argument," and the reason for making the substitution; several conventions of the system of existential graphs.

296. The First Part of an Apology for Pragmaticism (A1)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907-08 or 18 months after "Prolegomena"], pp. 1-14; 14-32, with p. 25 missing (but with no break in the text); pp. 7-16 of another draft; plus 24 pp. of variants.
This manuscript was intended as the fourth article of the Monist series of 1905-06, with two more articles following: The fourth article was to begin the apology, the fifth to have contained the main argument, and the sixth to have provided the subsidiary arguments and illustrations. More specifically, a rhetorical defence of the principle of pragmatism in the Popular Science Monthly issues of November 1877 and January 1878; system of existential graphs; the nominalism of Ockham and J. S. Mill; objective and subjective generality; Scholastic realism; the three ways in which an idea can be mentally isolated from another (dissociation, precision, and discrimination). Among the variant pages are some interesting biographical data, especially CSP's reflections on his father's "remarkable aesthetical discrimination" and his boyhood impressions of visitors, Emerson included, to the family home in Mason Street, Cambridge.

297. Apology for Pragmatism (Apol)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-7, incomplete.
Draft of G-1905-1g. CSP notes that there are three arguments favoring pragmatism of which the first "sets out from the observation that every new concept comes to the mind in a judgment." Judgment and assertion.

298. Phaneroscopy ()
A. MS., G-1905-1h, pp. 1-36, plus 20 pp. of variants.
This article, intended for the January 1907 Monist, was to have followed the Monist article of October 1906. Published as follows: 4.534n1 (pp. 2-3); 4.6-11 (from pp- 5-16); 4.553n1 (pp. 18-19); 1.306-311 (pp. 26-36). Unpublished are CSP's thoughts on the relevance of existential graphs to the truth of pragmaticism; his view that existential graphs afford a moving picture of thought, and his reflections on telepathy, spiritualism, and clairvoyance. Vividness and intensity of feeling: CSP's disagreement with Hume.

*299. Phaneroscopy: Or, The Natural History of Concepts (Phy or Phaneroscopy)
A. MS., G-c.1905-4, pp. 1-37 incomplete, plus 31 pp. of variants.
Published as follows: 1.332-334 (pp. 12-18); 1.335-336 (pp. 33-37). Unpublished: definition and presuppositions of science; idioscopy and cenoscopy; mathematics and cenoscopy; the nature of experience and cognition; kinds of reasoning from experience; experience and shock (having an experience requires more than a shock).

300. The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism (Bed)
A. MS., G-1905-1e, pp. 1-65; 33-40; 38-41; 37-38; 40-43.7; plus 64 pp. of fragments running brokenly from p. 1 to p. 60.
This was to have been the fourth and ante-penultimate article of the Monist series. The following pages were published as indicated: 4.561n (pp. 31-39 1/2); 4.553n2 (pp. 37-38 of a rejected section). Omitted from publication are comments on the circumstances which led to writing the various articles of the Monist series. In this connection CSP notes, with some horror, the view attributed by the New York Times to William James that practical preference was the basis of pragmatism and considers what James probably meant to say, noting James's definition of "pragmatism" in Baldwin's Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy. The truth of pragmatism and its scientific proof. CSP reveals that he "had passed through a doubt of pragmatism lasting very nearly twenty years." Discussion of the nature of doubt: the confounding of doubt with disbelief. System of existential graphs; comparison of existential graphs with chemical ones; existential and entitative graphs. Studies of modality: CSP's early views and subsequent modifications. Among the fragments one finds CSP's disagreement with Cantor on the matter of pseudo-continuity which for CSP raises a question of the ethics of terminology.

LECTURES ON PRAGMATISM

Eight Lectures delivered at Harvard from March 26 to May 17, 1903, the first seven under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy and the eighth under the auspices of the Department of Mathematics. Two of the notebooks included here are probably but not certainly part of the Harvard Lecture series.

301. Lecture I
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
Published in entirety: 5.14-40.

302. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
A liberal education in a hundred lessons: fifty lessons devoted to the teaching of some small branch of knowledge. Of the remaining fifty lessons, thirty-six were to be devoted to logic. Lectures begin with a discussion of the different kinds of mathematics. Dichotonic and trichotonic mathematics. Logic of relatives. Incident involving Sylvester, who claimed that mathematical work shown him by CSP, who, in turn, suspected that his work reduced to Cayley's Theory of Matrices, was really nothing more than Sylvester's umbral notation. Later CSP discovers, with some satisfaction, that what Sylvester called "my umbral notation" had originally been published in 1693 by Leibniz. CSP's bitterness revealed in his remark that he can find a more comfortable way of ending his days, if nobody is interested in his efforts to gather together the scattered outcroppings of his work in logic for the purpose of a more systematic presentation of it.

303. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
A note appended to notebook reads: "Rejected. No time for this and it would need two if not three lectures." The history and nature of mathematics. Role of diagrams in mathematics. Algebra of logic as an attempt to analyze mathematical reasoning into its logical steps. An aside on opium's "dormitive virtue": a sound doctrine but hardly an explanation. The nature of abstraction, especially mathematical abstraction. Role played by conception of collection in mathematics. Whether pure mathematics is a branch of logic. "I am satisfied that all necessary reasoning is of the nature of mathematical reasoning." Boolean algebra.

304. Lecture II. On Phenomenology
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
CSP notes "First draught" and "To be rewritten and compressed." Published: 1.322-323 (pp. 10-12). Omitted from publication is CSP's discussion of the goal of phenomenology, which is to describe what is before the mind and to show that the description is correct. Presentness (Hegel's view and CSP's contrasted). The "immediate" defined. Quality distinguished from feeling; quality as an element of feeling. Neither abstract nor complex quality is the First Category. Law of nature, with the being of law considered to be a sort of esse in futuro. An objection to this view of law noted and refuted. Reaction (or struggle) as the chief characteristic of experience. Content of the percept. No criticism of perceptual fact possible. Reaction is no more to be comprehended than blue or the perfume of a tea rose. Perception and imagination. Genuine and degenerate varieties of the Second Category. The Third Category (called "Mediation") and signs. First degenerate form of the Third Category.

305. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
CSP notes: "Second Draught" and "This won't do, it will have to be rewritten." Published: 5.41-56 (pp. 7-10, 13-32). Pages 1-6 and 10-13 not published.
Classification of the various sciences and the place of philosophy among them. The three principal divisions of philosophy metaphysics, normative science, and phenomenology and the relation of dependence among them.

306. Lecture II
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
Published: 5.59-65 (pp. 1-14). Only the first paragraph was omitted.

307. Lecture III
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
This lecture is subtitled: "The Categories Continued." Published: 5.71n (p. 9); 5.82-87 (pp. 16-34). Omitted: the three categories and their degenerate forms, if any. Genuine form of the representamen is the symbol. First and second degenerate forms are the index and icon respectively. Symbol, index, and icon analyzed with regard to degenerate forms. Given the three categories, all possible systems of metaphysics are divided into seven classes, e.g., into systems which admit only one of the three categories (three systems possible), systems which admit only two of the three categories (three systems possible), and that system which admits all three categories. The history of philosophy is examined for examples of each system. Schroeder's argument against admitting the Second Category into logic deemed naive, but not Kempe's argument against the Third Category. Kempe's system of graphs.

308. Lecture III
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1.
This lecture is subtitled: "The Categories Defended." Published: 5.66-81, except 5.71n1 and 5.77n1 (pp. 1-12); 5.88-92 (pp. 48-53). Omitted: whether the three categories must be admitted as irreducible constituents of thought. Objection raised against Schroeder's and Sigwart's denial of the Second Category. Discussion of Sigwart's reduction of the notion of logicality to a quality of feeling (Logical Gef,hl). Objection raised against Kempe's denial of the irreducibility of the Third Category. Brief comparison of existential graphs with Kempe's system of graphs. Whether the categories are real, i.e., "have their place among the realities of nature and constitute all there is in nature," is a question which remains to be answered.

309. Lecture IV. The Seven Systems of Metaphysics
A. MS., two notebooks, G-1903-1.
Notebook I (pp. 1-37, of which pp. 1-4 and 12-37, with exception of 25-34, were published as 5.77n and 5.93-111 respectively). Unpublished: a discussion of the possible systems of metaphysics based on CSP's categories and their combinations. In CSP's opinion, the following philosophers were on the right track: Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Reid, and Kant. Rejection of the idea attributed to the Hegelians that Aristotle belongs to their school of thought. Aristotle and the notion of esse in futuro. The Aristotelian distinction between existence and entelechy. Ockhamists and the rise of nominalism. Analysis of infinity (pp. 24-30). The reality of Firstness (pp. 31-35). Notebook II (pp- 38-62, of which pp. 38-45, 45-49, 49-51, 52-57, and 59-62, were published separately as 5.114-118, 1.314-316, 5.119, 5.111-113, 5.57-58 respectively). Omitted is a discussion of the reality of Secondness and a consideration of the position that feelings and laws (Firstness and Thirdness) are alone real (that to say that one thing acts upon another is merely to say that there is a certain law of succession of feelings). Experience is our great teacher; invariably it teaches by means of surprises.

310. Lecture V
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903, pp. 1-14.
A knowledge of logic is requisite for understanding metaphysics. The three categories are not original with CSP; they permeate human thought for all time. Statement of his own early intellectual behavior. The year 1856 is given as the year of his first serious study of philosophy. Beginning with esthetics (Schiller's Aesthetische Briefe) he proceeded to logic and the analytic part of the Critic of Pure Reason. Mentions his subsequent neglect of esthetics and his incompetence in this area. Reflections on esthetics. Is there such a quality as beauty? Is beauty the name we give to whatever we enjoy contemplating regardless of the reasons for liking it? Esthetic quality related to the three categories: It is Firstness that belongs to a Thirdness in its achievement of Secondness. Reflections on ethics.

311. Lecture V
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903, pp. 1-16.
The branches of philosophy. The normative sciences: the relationships among the normative sciences; the relationship between the normative sciences and the special sciences, especially psychology; the dependence of the normative sciences upon phenomenology and pure mathematics. Description of the laborious "method of discussing with myself a philosophical question."

312. Lecture V
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1 50.
Published: 5.120-150 (pp. 11-50). Not published is Part I., "How I go to work in studying philosophy" (pp. 1-10), and the contents of pp. 43-47, which constitute a first draft (the published second draft is the versos of these pages) and which concern the obscurity of the relation between the three kinds of inferences and the three categories as well as CSP's attempt to achieve clarity here.

313. Lecture VI
A. MS., n.p., 1903, pp 1-31.
Perceptual judgments as involving generality and as being beyond the power of logic to criticize, as referring to singular objects, and as relating to continuous change (time, continuity, infinity). The nature of logical goodness and the end of argumentation. Logic and metaphysics. Pragmatism: the genealogy of a born pragmatist; pragmatism and realism; the ultimate meaning of a symbol. CSP's acceptance of the term "meaning" as a technical term of logic (as referring to the total intended interpretant of a symbol). The meaning of an argument and of a proposition (rhema); the meanings of such difficult abstractions as Pure Being, Quality, Relation. Definitions, it is stated, should be "in terms of the conceptions of everyday life." CSP raises one possible objection to his formulation of the maxim of pragmatism, and ends this draft with some disparaging remarks about the state of logical studies at Harvard. The objection raised is this: If meaning consists in doing (or the intention to do), is there not a conflict with the view (to which CSP subscribes) that the meaning of an argument is its conclusion, since a conclusion is an intellectual phenomenon different from doing and presumably without relation to it?

314. Lecture VI
A. MS., notebook, G 1903-1, pp. 1-43.
This manuscript is presumably the second draft of Lecture VI. Published in entirety (5.151-179) as "Three types of Reasoning." Note on the cover reads; "first 35 pages as delivered." See MS. 316 for the continuation of Lecture VI.

315. Lecture VII
A. MS., notebook, G-1903-1, pp. 1-48.
Published: 5.180-212 (pp. 1-21). The omitted pages concern the three essentially different modes of reasoning (deduction, induction, and abduction), with the pragmatic maxim identified with the logic of abduction.

316. [Lectures on Pragmatism]
A. MS., notebook, n.p., [1903], pp. 44-60.
MS. 316 continues MS. 314, and was in fact delivered as part of Lecture VI. What is the end of a term? Distinction between term and rhema. The common noun, its late development and restriction to a peculiar family of languages. Term and index. Three truths necessary for the comprehension of the merits of pragmatism: that all our ideas are given to us in perceptual judgments; that perceptual judgments contain elements of generality (so that Thirdness is directly perceived); that the abductive faculty is a shading off of that which at its peak is called "perception." Pragmatism and the logic of abduction.

* 316a. Multitude and Continuity
A. MS., notebook, n.p., 1903.
CSP notes that this is a "lecture to be delivered . . . in Harvard University, 1903 May 15." This lecture was delivered. See G-1903-1 and sup(1) G-1902-1.

PROPOSED ARTICLE ON PRAGMATISM FOR THE NATION

* 317. Topics of the Nation Article on Pragmatism (Topics)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-6, plus a variant p. 5 and a photostatic copy the original of which has been catalogued separately (HUD 3570) and can be dated by means of a letter from Paul E. More to CSP on the reverse side. The original, without the letter, was published in Philip P. Wiener's Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism, p. 21. The letter is dated March 24, 190[9].
A list of sixty-three topics, with page references and the beginning of an "Index of Technical Terms."

318. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., G-c.1907-1a and G-c.1907-1c, with no single, consecutive, complete draft, but several partial drafts end and are signed (Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce) on pp. 34, 77, and 86.
An article in the form of a letter to the editor of The Nation was published as follows: 5.11-13 (pp. 1-7); 5.464-496 (pp. 7-45 of one draft and pp. 46-87 of another; the last two sentences of 5.481 were spliced by the editors of the Collected Papers). Also published as 1.560-562 were pp. 20-27 of still another draft. Omitted from publication: an analysis of James's definition of "pragmatism" (pp. 10-13 of one of the alternative sections). James's pragmatism again, followed by a discussion of his own position; the two distinct opponents of pragmatism (Absolutists and Positivistic Nominalists); pragmatism and religion; law distinguished from brute fast, not, as the nominalists would have it, by being a product of the human mind, but, as the realists assert, by being a real intellectual ingredient of the universe; triadic predicates as always having an intellectual basis, the evidence for which is inductive; thoughts regarded as signs, with signs functioning triadically; three kinds of interpretants emotional, energetic, and logical; the distinction between association and suggestion; the syllogism as an associative suggestion; "corollarial" and "theoric" reasoning, of which an example of theoric deduction is the "Ten Point Theorem" of Van Standt (pp. 10-56 of a long draft from which pp. 20-27 were published). The three kinds of interpretants of signs; ultimate intellectual interpretants; pragmatism and common sense, with the meaning of critical common sense explained (pp. 43-59 of an alternative section of the long draft numbered 10-56 and described above). Kernel of pragmatism; concepts equated with mental signs; the object and interpretant of a sign distinguished; the problem of ultimate, or "naked," meaning; existential meanings; the meaning of an intellectual concept; qualities of feeling as meanings of signs, where qualities are neither thoughts nor existential events; the distinction between real and immediate (as represented by a sign) object, with immediate objects resembling emotional meaning and real objects corresponding to existential meaning; mathematical concepts as examples of logical meaning; the relationship of logical meaning to desires and habits (pp. 11-34 of another alternative section). Object and interpretant (meaning); the different units of interpretants (meanings); pragmatic definition and a prediction that pragmatism will occupy the same position in philosophy as the doctrine of limits occupies in mathematics (pp. 14-25 of an alternative section of the one described immediately above). Kernel of pragmatism; theory of signs; by inference a sign first comes to be recognized as such; the elementary modes of inference (pp. 12-30 of an alternative section). The divisions of geometry; a problem in topics; the Census Theorem and Listing Numbers; the function of consciousness; concepts and habits; the vulnerability of James and Schiller arising from their (apparent) denial of infinity, including an infinite Being (pp. 62-77 of still another alternative section). An attempt to define "sign"; the sense in which utterer and interpreter are essential to signs; the immediate and real objects of signs; a brief note on the Census Theorem (pp. 12-90, with the exception of pp. 46-87 which were published).

319. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-17, with 5 pp. of variants.
An abandoned draft of a letter to the editor of The Nation. After stating the purpose of the letter, CSP discusses his philosophical ancestry and the Metaphysical Club, of which he was a member in his youth. James's position contrasted with his own. Application of the pragmatic maxim to the problem of probability. Chance and tychism.

320. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-30, incomplete, with 8 pp. of variants.
Another abandoned draft. The membership of the Metaphysical Club. Types of mind. Criticism of James's views on pragmatism. Application of the pragmatic maxim to philosophical questions involving chance and probability. Nominalism as a perversion of pragmatism. Criticism of J. S. Mill's attempt to eliminate necessity by regarding "law" and "uniformity" as synonymous. Affirmation of the reality of potentialities or capacities. Pragmatism as a part of methodeutic; its connection with the experimental method of the sciences. Critical Common-sensism.

321. Pragmatism (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-27, 24-30 but no continuous draft, with 13 pp. Of variants.
Another abandoned draft. Notes invitation from The Nation to clarify pragmatism. The ancestry of pragmatism. The Metaphysical Club. Kant's nominalism explored. The views of James, Schiller, and CSP compared. Thought and signs. Experiences as the objects of signs, never their meanings. Mathematical concepts as examples of logical interpretants. How CSP was led to his formulation of the pragmatic maxim. Application of the maxim to the problem of ascertaining the meaning of probability.

322. (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 2-21, plus 3 pp. of variants.
Presumably another attempt at the article for The Nation. Pragmatic tendencies discovered in Kant. Definitions in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding are pragmatistic. Tinge of pragmatic thought in Aristotle partly attributable to Socrates. Descartes is singled out as being pragmatistically blind. Characterization of some of the members of the Metaphysical Club, with special praise for Chauncey Wright. What pragmatism is and isn't. Pragmatism as a method of determining meaning, not a doctrine of the truth of things. A comparison of James's views on pragmatism with CSP's. Pragmatism as a rule of methodeutic. One influence of pragmatism upon metaphysics: bringing metaphysics more in line with common sense than is usually the case. The metaphysical position toward which pragmatism is favorably disposed is conditional idealism (Berkeleyanism with some modifications). Laplace and the notion of probability. Truth and error.

323. (Prag)
A. MS., G-c.1907-1b, pp. 2-12.
Apparently still another attempt at the article for The Nation. Published, in part: 5.5-10. In the unpublished part CSP writes of his "personal peculiarity, which prompts him to struggle against every philosophical opinion that has recommended itself to him before he definitely surrenders himself to it," and hence of his relative lack of bias in his discussions of pragmatism.

324. (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., [c.1907], pp. 1-3, incomplete, plus another draft of p. 1.
The Metaphysical Club, its members and its occasional visitors, e.g., Abbot and Fiske. Misunderstanding of the meaning of "pragmatism." Pragmatism is not a metaphysical doctrine. "It does not relate to what is true, but to what is meant." Alternative p. 1.: The Metaphysical Club. Of those who attended the meetings of the Club, CSP was the only one for whom Kant had an appeal. The others were inspired by the English philosophers.

MISCELLANEOUS

325. Pragmatism Made Easy (Prag)
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-8.
A draft of a letter to the editor of the Sun. Associating the personal names of the discoverers with the great advances made in science is defended. The study of scientific philosophy requires a religious spirit. CSP's intellectual development. The Metaphysical Club. Nicholas St. John Green, a member of the Club, brought the doctrines of Bain to the attention of the other members. The correlation of the traditional threefold division of consciousness (feeling, volition, and cognition) with the threefold division of logical predicates (predicates connected with single subjects, two subjects, and more than two subjects).

326. Some Applications of Pragmaticism (SAP)
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-21; 5-10, 11-17; 2 pp. of fragments.
Apparently a draft of a letter (see p. 13). Pages 1-21: Wundt's psychology, as exemplifying a certain kind of error in philosophy; Wundt's mistaken assumption that philosophy must be based on the results of one of the special sciences (which implies that there are no immediately indubitable facts other than those which the special sciences have uncovered); Wundt's contention that philosophy requires the results of the special sciences (or else its theories are generated from thin air) is dismissed; Wundt's confusion of cenoscopy and idioscopy. Pages 5-17: Wundt as scientist distinguished from Wundt as philosopher; Wundt's success in science contrasted with his failure in philosophy. The branches of cenoscopy, the study of those facts familiar to the whole world, and the pragmatistic variety of a philosophy of common sense.

327. Why I Am A Pragmatist (OM)
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-8.
The meaning of abstract ideas. It would seem that either the ultimate intellectual purport of ideas conforms to the pragmatist's program or these ideas are classified with our instincts. CSP believes both to be the case. The article itself begins with a sketch of the classification of the sciences.

328. Sketch of Some Proposed Chapters on the Sect of Philosophy Called Pragmatism
A. MS., notebook, G-c.1905-6.
Published, in part, as 1.126-129 (pp. 11-17). Unpublished are the reasons why pragmatism ought to be investigated. CSP came to the position of pragmatism through the study of the following philosophers and in the order noted here: Kant, Berkeley, the other English philosophers, Aristotle, and finally the Scholastics. Whether the principle of pragmatism is self-evident. The place of philosophy among the sciences. The branches of philosophy. Pragmatism and the question of the external world. Deduction, induction and probability, and their justification.

329. Nichol's Cosmology and Pragmaticism (Carus)
A. MS., G-c.1904-3, pp. 1-6, 7 1/2-23, with parts of several other drafts, but no continuous draft.
Nichol's book is used mainly as a point of departure for CSP's own views. An early expression of the first article of the Monist series of 1905-06 on pragmatism (G-1905-1a). Published, in part, as 8.194-195 (pp. 12-15). Unpublished is a description of the experimentalist's way of thinking. CSP's disagreement with Balfour on the question of a physical reality unraveled in experiments whether a belief in a non-experiential reality is the unalterable faith of the scientist. Pragmatism, pragmaticism, and common sense. Tin doubts, toy baby scepticism. Meaning of a proper name. The pragmaticist's use of the term "real." Generality as an indispensible condition of reality. Generality and its relationship both to evolution and to the summum bonum. The pragmaticistic analysis of past and future.

330. The Argument for Pragmatism anachazomenally or recessively stated
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 1 folded sheet; plus 5 other folded sheets which, although lacking a title or mark, seem to be connected with the first.
The argument stated. A generalized habit of conduct is the essence of a concept, i.e., its logical interpretant. The problem of evil and CSP's solution: The evil passions are evil only in the sense that they ought to be controlled, but they are good as the only possible way that man has to reach his full and normal development. The meaning of "true" and "satisfactory"; the relationship between the true and the satisfactory. Hedonism rejected.

331. [Pragmatism and Pragmaticism]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 5 pp.
This manuscript may possibly be a draft of a letter to The Nation. See note in the body of the manuscript which reads: "Say, Garrison, was not Schiller in Cornell at one time." Pragmatism, humanism, and instrumentalism.
Whether the pragmatist's God must be finite. In CSP's opinion, a finite God cannot satisfy human instincts. Recommendation that the word "pragmatism" be employed for the looser sense of the term's meaning but that the word "pragmaticism" be retained for the more precise meaning.

332. [Pragmatism, Experimentalism, and Mach]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 2 pp.
The true experimentalist is a pragmatist. Mach misses the bull's-eye by holding that general thought has no value other than its utility in economizing experience. But, although he misses the bull's-eye, Mach does hit the target.

333. [Fragments on the Fixation of Belief]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., 29 pp., plus 3 pp. (numbered 80, 81, 86) of notes and 2 pp. Of a draft of 5.362-363.
The following information was supplied by Professor Max H. Fisch: "Of the present contents of this folder, some sequences of pages on the rag paper with the watermark J. Whatman 1868 may be parts of the paper read to the Metaphysical Club in November 1872. Others are probably, indeed almost certainly, parts of The Logic of 1873. The two slightly longer sheets of rag paper contain two pages of a draft of 'The Fixation of Belief,' probably of 1876 or 1877. The sheets of wood pulp paper numbered 80, 81, 86, or at least pages 80 and 81, probably belong to some work of the 1890's in which Peirce went over the same ground again." In connection with the numbered pages, see MS. 1002. It is of some interest to note that the earlier name for the method of tenacity was "the method of obstinacy," and instead of "authority," CSP employed the word "despotism."

334. The Fixation of Belief
Offprint from the Popular Science Monthly (G-1877-5a) with inserts: "A" (5 pp.), "B" (2 pp.), "C" (1 p.), "D" (pp. 1-3; 1-7), "E" (2 pp.), "F" (pp. 1-3; 1-7), "G" (2 pp.), "H" (2 pp.), "N" (2 pp.), unmarked (3 pp.).
Changes are indicated both in the margins and in the notes which were to be inserted in future editions of his earlier work. There is a clear indication where to insert some of the notes. With others (N, B, D, F, G, H, and those pages which are unmarked), there is no indication. The notes concern the fallibility of thinking, especially in mathematics (A); the distinction between definite and indefinite doubt, and the possibility of a third attitude of calm ignorance, whether conscious or unconscious, besides belief and doubt (C); the dependence of the validity of pure mathematics and of logic upon the validity of rational instinct, and the consequences of this for evaluating the a priori method of fixing belief (E); on Malthus and Darwin (B); the distinction between assertion and proposition and between modal propositions and the psychological modals "can" and "would" (D); the improvement of the standards of reasoning and the inward power of growth as reflected in the development of the instinct of just reasoning, with some remarks on Malthus and Darwin (F); the ultimate appeal to instinctive feelings (G); Descartes' mythical Eldorado of absolute certainty, and the attempt to attain it by methodological scepticism (H); the development of the intellect (N), and a preface to an essay on logic and reasoning, with a digression on theology (unmarked).

335. [Fragment on the Justification of Belief]
A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-6; plus 4 pp. of another draft.
On absolute certainty: "We cannot attain absolute certainty about anything whatever, unless it be either that there are sundry seemings or something as vague as that." The proposition twice two is four fails as an example of perfect certainty.