**WILL NEH DISOWN SCHOLARLY EDITIONS?**

Scholarly editions have been in trouble since 1996, when Congress slashed funding for the national endowments. Although small annual budget increases have restored some of that cut, NEH continues to be severely underfunded, and Chairman William Ferris is feeling the pinch.

Ferris, a folklorist from Mississippi, would like to leave his mark on the humanities programs his agency funds and wants to support more short-term, popular-culture projects. Without additional support from Congress, Ferris knows he will have to fund these projects with dollars taken from other NEH programs. The scholarly editions stand out as easy targets because they take time, and a commitment to a new edition is likely to be long-lasting. Although the scholarly editions program has been a major part of the NEH profile since the endowment was first established in 1965, Ferris believes it is time to cut the editions loose—or at least to begin doing so.

After considering this matter over a period of several months, the President’s Council reached a tentative conclusion that long-term projects (principally the scholarly editions) should have outright funding limited to six years. After the first six years, there might be another six years of dollar-for-dollar matching awards and a final six years of two-for-one matching awards (if two are raised, NEH gives one). But there would be no outright funding after six years.

For those who understand how much time and funding are required to complete scholarly editions, it is evident that this new policy would force many editions to shut down. Major editions of fifteen or more volumes would no longer be viable. Even minor editions cannot be completed in six years—and how NEH supposes an edition could continue to operate after six years on matching awards alone is hard to understand, because without some outright funding, staff cannot be kept in place while matching funds are raised.

As word of this proposed policy spread, opposition began to grow. On 6 October 2000 an article titled “Scholars Fear Humanities Endowment Is Being Dumbed Down” appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education. That article, by Ron Southwick, although not entirely critical of Ferris’s leadership, reported “to many scholars, the idea that the endowment supports barn photography with enthusiasm while it considers cutting...

Continued on page 2

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**CAROLYN EISELE**

*In Memoriam*

Carolyn Eisele, member of the Board of Advisors and friend of the Peirce Edition Project, died on 15 January 2000. Born in New York in 1902, Eisele was educated at Hunter College and did graduate work in mathematics at Columbia University and the University of Chicago. She taught mathematics at Hunter College for nearly fifty years and retired as professor in 1972. In 1980, she was awarded a Doctor of Humanities degree by Texas Tech University and two years later received an honorary Doctorate of Science from Lehigh University. In 1985, the New York Academy of Sciences recognized Eisele for her seminal contributions to the history and philosophy of science through her publication of Peirce’s mathematical and philosophical works.

Professor Eisele was known worldwide as a mathematician, a historian of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century mathematics and science, and as a leading expert on the thought of Charles Peirce. She served as president of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Her editions of Peirce’s mathematical writings, *The New Elements of Mathematics*, and his writings on the history of science, *Historical Perspectives on Peirce’s Logic of Science*, are monumental achievements. She almost single-handedly brought Peirce’s mathematical ideas to the serious attention of historians of mathematics and science. Eisele’s principal studies of Peirce’s thought are collected in her *Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce* (edited by Richard Martin). Eisele’s unwavering recognition of Peirce’s importance and her unstinting devotion to the advancement of Peirce scholarship were little short of prophetic. Eisele’s papers and library have been deposited at IUPUI in the care of the Peirce Edition Project.
Continued from page 1

well-argued letters ended up on the desks of Roberts and Ferris. The weight of concern increased on 21 October when the New York Times published a lead editorial titled “Scholarly Editions in Jeopardy.” The Times editorial concluded with this paragraph:

Nothing the N.E.H. can do is more central to its mission than fostering the kind of research and historical enlightenment these editions provide. They preserve and make public this country’s intellectual, political and cultural monuments. The irony is that by trying to kill off funding as an expression of conservative ire, Congress and the endowment’s critics have made the task of preserving, editing and disseminating “the best that is known and thought in the world” nearly impossible. It is time to put these editions on a solid footing, to give them the encouragement they so clearly deserve.

When the President’s Council met on 17 November, the council members took account of the criticisms of Ferris’s plan. The council seemed more reluctant to abandon or severely cut back the editions, and concluded its discussion by adopting a proposal to create a separate scholarly editions budget and to construct new guidelines for editions. The guidelines are still expected to strongly favor projects that can be completed within a limited time frame, but they will probably be less restrictive than the earlier six-year plan. The council plans to take up this matter again in March.

Now with a new Republican administration at the nation’s helm, it is unclear what is in store for Ferris and for his revisioning of NEH. Ferris will probably at least complete his tenure, which runs for one more year, but it seems likely he will not be looked on too favorably by the more conservative members of the Bush administration. Friends of the editions should be on their guard and should use whatever influence they have to advocate for the continuation and strengthening of the scholarly editions program. To find out who is on the council, access this Web site: http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/council.html. See if you know any of the council members and if you do, let them know what the Peirce Edition Project means to you and to United States and world culture.

**THE CAROLYN EISELE COLLECTION**

On 15 January 2000, Carolyn Eisele passed away in her Manhattan apartment at the age of 98. The real tragedy, however, occurred much earlier, in 1992, when a severe stroke greatly incapacitated her. She spent the last eight years of her life in bed in her small apartment surrounded by her books and papers, almost entirely unable to communicate, and under the constant care of a professional nurse.

The stiff Manhattan rents forced a quick evacuation of the apartment. So, at the request of the executor of her estate, Arthur Kaufman, Nathan Houser and I left for New York City to collect her library and papers, which had been given to the Peirce Edition Project.

Carolyn Eisele lived in a one-bedroom apartment on the 27th floor of an apartment building in midtown Manhattan. What the apartment lacked in size was amply compensated for by its location and its most magnificent view of the Manhattan skyline, especially at night. The apartment was literally filled with books and papers. She must never have thrown anything away. Books and journals were found everywhere, as were the remnants of her extensive travels, and the hall closets were filled more than knee-high with shopping bags stuffed with correspondence. Her complete financial records, including all check stubs, tax returns, phone bills, etc. had also been preserved. Even the kitchen did not escape, as there was an old shopping cart filled with mathematics books blocking one of its two entryways. With the help of Ralph Müller from Fordham University and five of his students, we carried away well over a hundred boxes, quite a few of which had already been packed eight years earlier to make room for a hospital bed.

In cooperation with IUPUI’s Public History Program and with support from the Max Fisch Library Fund, a student of Archival Studies is currently sorting her way through the material we brought back. Eisele’s library is now being catalogued, and her books broaden our existing research collection in an important way, as they are mostly on mathematics and on the history of science. They are
PROBING THE COMMUNAL MIND

The Peirce Project depends on specialists from many fields for help in preparing our critical texts and editorial annotations. Although the heaviest burden falls on our regular contributing editors and advisors, we hope that through the newsletter we can significantly extend the scope of communal involvement. If you can answer one of our questions, or offer some guidance, please reply in writing or by e-mail to Associate Editor André De Tienne at adetienn@iupui.edu.

Previous question:

We are still looking for an answer to Question 10: who is Kirchheis/Kirchheiss? In 1891 Peirce wrote a letter to the editor of the Nation (reprinted in Ketner & Cook I:115–17) in support of F. E. Abbot, whose Ways out of Agnosticism had been fiercely attacked by Royce. In his letter Peirce noted that “philosophers of the highest standing” had spoken highly of Abbot’s work, and he gave three examples of such philosophers: Renouvier in France, Seth in England, and Kirchheiss in Germany. We have been successful with respect to the first two (Seth wrote a review of Abbot’s Scientific Theism for Mind), but so far have been unable to find any reference to the German philosopher Kirchheiss.

New questions:

Question 16. In his 1892 review of Sidgwick’s Distinction and the Criticism of Belief for the Nation (reprinted in Ketner & Cook I:167–69), Peirce concluded with a discussion of one of Sidgwick’s examples that was derived from the British House of Commons. In the last paragraph Peirce added:

Until our “G. B.” has his way, it may be feared we shall not hear debating like that in the House of Representatives. In this country we have not time for such reasonings, nor for the other argumentations which Mr. Sidgwick is occupied with refuting, nor for the closely similar ones with which he would replace them.

One question that has puzzled us for some time, and for which we have not found an answer, is who is this G. B.? Presumably he was a public figure so familiar to the average Nation reader that mentioning his initials was enough (like L.B.J. or C.S.P.). One possibility could be George Bancroft, in which case our question becomes whether Bancroft was known for peculiar debating habits.

Question 17. An isolated sheet with the letterhead of the Century Club in New York (7 West Forty-Third Street) contains the following ciphered poem in sixteen lines. The poem is signed “C. S. Peirce” and is handwritten very carefully with only four corrections. It was probably composed around 1893 given the paper and handwriting. Could anyone help us decipher this poem or shed light on the seemingly syllabic principles underlying its ciphering? Peirce is likely to have ciphered some well-known poem.

Smyef oysachelpowsk erjorpaupho psil helhgy
Stelsmyef bien ohau ciesnau fohauhelbhe skirth
Aphar skoborsbu haubulflks a skolbghiecar gorbif
Ohaujor ghorfasm iwshelghelphau oshhiwchiebelp
Ohau snilstauberjaud osni garpsi dath ops arbuo
Diwsmey helsh ayshuboporsk olpsurshf ajoysiebue
Bild olsnalnleskeyfoj fulfoth iebild
Ohau stiwshirkw iwg apn anjehoth eybild
Oysiwph ask ahau fulfiljigh ayhadausk olshauspajie
Smyef ipsiwph obmausk ows ohau stiwpsharwisnwoy smanau
Bild iljehonuo smiw smeyef ijeosymauphelphe farshoh
Orfaypsowphosk ohau skopshor iwg eyfor aljormshes
Steyjief anie smey oymashoy1 smeybo shiwmsnl eyfor cowshil
Bild anie smey olahausmayjil smeyfels osnorph
Aypsilgelshi smeyf smdelphesh ask smeyth alsnorph
Aphar skolshanbar2 smeyf oshowsmsw giorspi surnau3 smiw sienau.

1. This word could also read “oymashoy.”
2. Or “skolshaubar.”
3. Or “siwnau.”

“Carolyn Eisele Collection” continued

expected to greatly facilitate finalizing the annotations for Peirce’s History of Science Lectures, which will be published in volume 9. As for the papers, our first intern, Cinda May, has organized Eisele’s personal correspondence, as well as the material associated with her late husband, Morris Halpern. Our second intern, Marcia Caudell, is currently working on Eisele’s professional papers.

The wealth and diversity of the material we have obtained is staggering. It includes, besides drafts of her own papers and recordings of her opera lessons, a few fragments of original Peirce manuscripts, a plate for Peirce’s quincuncial world map, old photographs of Arisbe, and copies from Peirce manuscripts at the Houghton Library that precede the microfilm edition. In addition to their use for the Peirce Edition Project and for the study of Peirce in general, Eisele’s papers contain material on her own life, her tenure at Hunter College, her voice lessons, and on the American opera scene in the 1930s (her husband worked as a voice coach). The material also gives detailed insight into her involvement with professional organizations like the New York branch of the American Mathematical Society, and of the day-to-day operations at the mathematics department at Hunter College, where she began teaching in 1924.

 provisionally, the collection is being divided into twelve series: (1) Correspondence; (2) Writings; (3) Research; (4) Speeches and Lectures; (5) Courses; (6) Department and University Affairs; (7) Professional Organizations; (8) Personal; (9) Printed Materials; (10) Music; (11) Art; and (12) Morris Halpern Papers. It should be added, though, that this is very much a work in progress and that there is still much to be done to make the collection accessible.

Cornelis de Waal
Assistant Editor
COMING ATTRACTIONS

THE HISTORY OF PEIRCE’S 1894 LOGIC BOOK

I had a great ambition to some day write a Popular Logic for the Million—But I must be upon my guard against things I have an inclination for. (CSP to Jem, 3 March 1895)

Volume 10 of the Writings will be a standalone volume containing Peirce’s 1894 unpublished logic book How to Reason: A Critic of Arguments, often referred to as the Grand Logic. Although the title Grand Logic contrasts nicely with Peirce’s later Minute Logic, it is doubtful that he himself used this title. Peirce makes no mention of it in his correspondence, and all instances of this title in the Harvard manuscripts were written on them after Peirce’s death.

Historical Background

How to Reason is in part the outcome of several earlier projects that failed. In 1892, the Open Court Publishing Company offered to publish in book form the series of articles called “The Critic of Arguments,” which Peirce had begun writing for the weekly The Open Court. However, due to complex interpersonal relations, fueled in part by Peirce’s misguided suspicions, this enterprise fell through. Peirce wrote several installments for this series, of which only the first two were published.

In 1893, Peirce refocused his attention on a volume containing revised versions of his published papers, entitled Search for a Method. R 1583:2 contains a table of contents for that work. Most items on that table of contents, called “essays” by Peirce, are checked off, which might indicate that he finished revising them. Some of these essays have survived, albeit sometimes in a chaotic or fragmentary state, but others were recycled for How to Reason. For instance, chapter 15 of How to Reason was formerly marked “Essay III,” and illustrations for “Essay I” have been cut out and glued on the manuscript of chapter 9. Due to Peirce’s extensive recycling, not enough material survives to allow us to fully reconstruct Search for a Method. Moreover, overlaps between the earlier papers that compose Search for a Method and the later How to Reason weigh against the inclusion of this 1893 project in the Writings.

Shortly thereafter, perhaps inspired by the great success of Herbert Spencer’s multivolume Synthetic Philosophy, Peirce embarked on an equally ambitious enterprise. In November 1893, he wrote to publisher Henry Holt that he planned to write a series of small books under the title Tractates of Synecism or Synecistic Philosophy, and he envisioned producing about four volumes a year. A few weeks later, this project developed into the better known The Principles of Philosophy: Or, Logic, Physics and Psychics, Considered as a Unity, in the Light of the Nineteenth Century, a series of twelve volumes for which Peirce had a circular and a syllabus printed. The plan was to sell the series by subscription. Although Peirce received some subscriptions for the series, the project never really got off the ground.

On 26 December 1893, Peirce wrote a letter to William James, asking him to endorse this project, adding, “the first two volumes are nearly ready; the first needs a month’s work.” In the syllabus, Peirce further indicated that the first volume was “nearly ready” and the second “substantially ready.” It is this second volume, entitled Theory of Demonstrative Reasoning, that concerns us most here, as it is probably his work on this volume that eventually became How to Reason. Peirce described the volume as “a plain, elementary account of formal logic, ordinary and relative … carefully adapted to the use of young persons of mediocre capacities.” It is hard to estimate exactly what Peirce meant by the volume being “substantially ready.” It is likely, however, that he continued to work extensively on it during the first half of 1894. In June of that year he sent the manuscript for How to Reason to the Boston office of Ginn & Co., a textbook publisher. They rejected the manuscript on the grounds that it was not suitable as a college textbook. The next mention of the manuscript occurs in a letter from Peirce to Francis Russell early in September. Peirce wrote Russell that he was holding back on the manuscript “to make some alterations which I have no time to make at present.” A few days later, on September 8, he wrote Russell again, reaffirming that the volume was now “completely ready for the press; though I am anxious to make some alterations in it.”

In the same month Peirce received a letter from George Plimpton from the New York office of Ginn & Co. in which he invited Peirce to submit a short logic book “after the plan of Jevons.” Of this work, which he called the “Short Logic,” Peirce
completed only the first chapter (see EP2:11–26). Later in the year, Peirce submitted How to Reason to another textbook publisher, the American Book Company. Although we have not found an actual rejection letter, it is clear the manuscript was not accepted.

In March of the following year, 1895, Peirce seems to have given up on the idea of publishing How to Reason. In a letter to his brother Jem he wrote, “I had a great ambition to some day write a Popular Logic for the Million—But I must be upon my guard against things I have an inclination for.” However, by August, Peirce was clearly back in the running, writing Russell that his logic “has been completed & largely rewritten.” It is unclear whether he submitted the manuscript at this point, but he may have tried to strike a deal by combining it with his geometry textbook, an extensively revised republication of his father’s Elementary Treatise on Geometry. Whatever happened, by November, part of the manuscript ended up in the hands of Russell in Chicago, who kept it until June 1896. At the end of September, Peirce asked Russell about the possibility of publishing How to Reason with the Open Court, adding that the chapter on quantitative logic, which he had sent to Russell earlier, needed serious revision, requiring a “few months more of terribly hard work.”

About two years later, in 1898, D.C. Heath & Co. invited Peirce, on the recommendation of Josiah Royce, to write a small logic manual. Peirce optimistically replied by sending a proposal for three small volumes, in which he probably sought to include the material from How to Reason. Peirce’s proposal was more than the editors of Heath & Co. had bargained for. On top of that, they thought Peirce’s logic was terribly outdated. They answered, “From your description of your work it is evidently scholastic and belongs to a period of thought which rather antedates the present marked interest in science.” This seems to mark the end of Peirce’s attempts to get the book published.

**The Manuscript Material**

The surviving manuscript material is remarkably complete with only a few pages missing here and there. The most significant gap is that the first chapter starts at page sixteen with §16. It might be that the missing fifteen pages were superseded by the current eighty-three-page introduction on the association of ideas, of which we have two versions. That this introduction was written at a later date is suggested by the fact that two isolated sheets are pulled from a draft of chapter 6.

It is not yet entirely clear how much rewriting Peirce did after first submitting the manuscript in 1894. The chapters were obviously reshuffled, as Peirce changed several of the chapter numbers. The correspondence suggests that after its initial submission, Peirce did not work much on the manuscript until the spring of 1896, and that he planned to revise the chapter on quantitative logic. No substantial alternative draft of this chapter (chapter 23) has so far been identified. However, there are substantial revisions found for chapter 8, one of the most technical chapters in the book. Moreover, there are two versions of chapter 6.

The surviving manuscript also appears to be set up as a three-volume work, in conformity with Peirce’s proposal to D.C. Heath & Co. Each of the three books into which the table of contents is divided starts at page 1. If this is correct, it might indicate that the long introduction on the association of ideas was actually dropped in favor of the now missing (or possibly later recycled) fifteen-page introduction, thereby reversing the above hypothesis concerning these missing pages.

This short account of Peirce’s How to Reason must conclude with a disclaimer. There are still many uncertainties regarding the precise compositional sequence of the documents, which we hope to clear up further as we work to publish this important book, for the first time, in 2004, well over a century after Peirce first submitted it.

*Cornelis de Waal*

*The first page of chapter 15 of How to Reason. For this chapter Peirce used a copy of the original published paper and annotated it freely. The current chapter, under the title “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension,” was formerly the third essay of Search for a Method, where it started on page 47.*
In this section we publish short descriptive notices of new books about Peirce or subjects likely to interest our readers. We cannot survey all new publications or prepare critical reviews, so we notice only those books sent by authors and publishers. When available, we reprint notices supplied with the books (often edited and supplemented with text from prefaces or introductions); otherwise we prepare our own brief announcements. Please note: we notice books only if they are sent as review copies to be deposited in the Project library. Prices and ISBNs are given when available.

**Book Notes**

In this section we publish short descriptive notices of new books about Peirce or subjects likely to interest our readers. We cannot survey all new publications or prepare critical reviews, so we notice only those books sent by authors and publishers. When available, we reprint notices supplied with the books (often edited and supplemented with text from prefaces or introductions); otherwise we prepare our own brief announcements. Please note: we notice books only if they are sent as review copies to be deposited in the Project library. Prices and ISBNs are given when available.

**Signs Grow: Semiosis and Life Processes**
Floyd Merrell
ISBN 0-8020-7142-2 (paper), $24.95

*Signs Grow* is the third volume of Merrell’s trilogy on signs, which began with *Signs Becoming Signs and Semiosis in the Postmodern Age*. Whereas the first two volumes concentrate on the firstness and the secondness of the sign respectively, *Signs Grow* explores the thirdness of the sign. Elaborating on Peirce’s doctrine of the man-sign, Merrell argues that after they are “born,” signs begin to grow “in a twisting, turning world of ordered complexity, of chaotic harmony,” in the course of which they go through puberty, mature, survive midlife crises, so as to finally become senile and fade away. Merrell’s book is a strangely fascinating blend of Peircean semiotics and post-modern insights that is intensely stimulating.

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**The Essential Peirce, Vol. 2**
The Peirce Edition Project
ISBN 0-253-33397-0 (cloth), $39.95

This book, which completes the two-volume *Essential Peirce*, provides the first comprehensive anthology of Peirce’s mature philosophy. During his later years, Peirce worked unremittingly to integrate new insights and discoveries into his general system of philosophy and to make his major doctrines fully coherent within that system. A central focus of this volume is Peirce’s evolving theory of signs and its application to his pragmatism. Included are thirty-one pivotal texts, beginning with “Immortality in the Light of Synecchism” (in which Peirce proposes synecchism—the tendency to regard everything as continuous—as a key advance over materialism, idealism, and dualism) and ending with Peirce’s late and unfinished investigations of the relative merits of different kinds of reasoning.

Peirce’s *Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism* and selections from *A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic* are among the texts included. There are a few previously unpublished texts and all have been newly edited. Even well-known writings appear fresh and in new light in their chronological placement. All selections are introduced by summary headnotes and there is a general introduction to provide historical background. EP 2 is extensively annotated, and an electronic companion mounted on the Peirce Edition Project’s Web site provides additional support for classroom use.

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**The Logical Status of Diagrams**
Sun-Joo Shin
ISBN 0-521-46157-X (cloth), $39.95

Shin challenges the all-too-common prejudice against visualization in the history of logic and mathematics and provides a formal foundation for work on natural reasoning in a visual mode. She presents Venn diagrams as a formal system of representation equipped with its own syntax and semantics, and specifies rules of transformation that make her system sound and complete. Shin’s extended system is based on Peirce’s graphical innovations which, according to Shin, “not only overcame some important defects of Venn diagrams but opened the way to a totally new horizon for logical diagrams.” Shin concludes with a discussion of the fundamental differences between graphical systems and linguistic systems.

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**Elements of Knowledge: Pragmaticism, Logic, and Inquiry**
Arthur Franklin Stewart
ISBN 0-826-51303-4 (cloth), $19.95

This is a revised and expanded version of Stewart’s *Elements of Knowledge: Pragmaticism and Philosophy of Knowledge*, noticed in a previous issue of the Newsletter. As noted then, *Elements of Knowledge* is remarkable for serving as an accessible introduction to pragmatism while also serving as an excellent text for courses in reasoning. Now, in the Vanderbilt edition, Stewart has smoothed out his prose and improved the presentation and has succeeded in giving us a superb text for the classroom, whether for logic or general education, yet in a form well adapted for the general reader.

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**Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community**
John J. Stuhr
ISBN 0-7914-3558-X (paper), $19.95

Stuhr begins his preface with the question “Can a book have a preface?” In other words, can a book begin before it begins? Moreover, can the start of anything really be a beginning? Isn’t any beginning a reconstruction? In this way, Stuhr introduces readers to his view that the work of pragmatism is reconstruction: it reconstructs philosophy, experience, and community. Pragmatism must be critical, addressing future possibilities, but it must also address the past—for the sake of the future. In looking backward, in presenting itself as “the history of the future of philosophy,” pragmatism is genealogical. Genealogical pragmatism avoids stagnation and irrelevance—“the chewing of historic cud long ago reduced to woody fiber”—by being constantly guided by the fully faced present. Guided more by Dewey than any other pragmatist, Stuhr investigates the practical ramifications of a genealogical pragmatism that takes seriously the notion that the future of philosophy is to help shape the future.

The three parts of Stuhr’s book explore and evaluate—and extend—the reconstructive import of the work of the classical pragmatists for philosophy, experience, and community. The fifteen essays that make up this book are persuasively written and exhibit fine craftsman-
ship. They not only feature the classical pragmatists, but also include discussions of the work of many contemporary pragmatists and philosophers. Chapter 6, “Rorty As Elvis,” is an especially engaging discussion of Rorty’s misreading of Dewey. Peirce scholars will be most interested in chapter 11, where Stuhr criticizes Peirce’s account of the normative sciences. He considers Peirce’s view that the ideal of conduct is to contribute to reasonableness and attempts to identify some practical consequences of this view “for individual and social action.” Stuhr paints Peirce as hopelessly entrenched in a fundamental dualism of theory and practice (and also of means and ends, facts and values, and logic and inquiry) but draws out some important practical lessons nonetheless. Peircans will want to challenge some of Stuhr’s interpretations, and well they should, but it would be a shame to lose track of the main thrust of Stuhr’s message. This is an important book.

“Charles Sanders Peirce and the Principle of Bivalence”
Robert Edwin Lane

In 1909, Peirce defined the first operators for three-valued logic, thus rejecting the principle of bivalence. Lane challenges the way commentators have interpreted Peirce’s reasons for this move. Lane rejects in particular the following interpretations of Peirce’s third value: object-indeterminate propositions, indeterminate predications, modal propositions, and lawful generalizations of future directed subjunctive conditionals. Instead, Lane argues, Peirce intended this third value to be taken by so-called “boundary propositions”; that is, propositions which predicate of a continuity breach one of the properties that is a boundary property relative to that breach. Lane concludes his argument by considering how Peirce’s rejection of the principle of bivalence affects his pragmatic account of truth.

Products as Representations: a semiotic and aesthetic study of design products.
Susann Vihma

Vihma uses Peirce’s semeiotic to analyze the different ways in which designed products can act as signs. In addition to a study of the literature, and a theoretical chapter on the application of semeiotic for design products, Vihma concentrates on four such products: the steam iron, the exercise bike, the telephone kiosk, and the bicycle helmet. Vihma makes good use of Peirce’s distinction between icon, index, and symbol. Early electric irons, for instance, had to resemble the old models that worked with coals; steam irons often have pilot lights to indicate they have reached the right temperature; and irons generally contain symbols such as the famous “Made in Germany.” According to Vihma, this triadic division becomes an exceptionally useful tool when comparing, for instance, the various steam irons that come on the market—a tool far richer than traditional approaches that seek to examine designed objects only within the context of cultural history, or in terms of social power structures, or according to their ergonomic aspects.

The Peirce Seminar Papers: Essays in Semiotic Analysis, Vol. 4
Michael Shapiro and Michael C. Haley (eds.)
ISBN 1-57181-732-8 (cloth), $69.95

This volume constitutes the proceedings of the International Colloquium on Language and Peircean Sign Theory held at Duke University in June 1997, and contains 22 papers by linguists and philosophers working together to understand the relevance of Peirce’s “semeiotic” to contemporary linguistics. From among the papers worthy of Peirce scholars’ attention, let us single out the following eight. Tony Japp demonstrates the superior analytical power of Peirce’s theory of iconicity over categorically degenerate versions such as some Jakobsonian models. Tom Short offers an important study of Peirce’s conception of teleology, contrasting it with that of purposefulness. Joëlle Réthoré shows how a semiotics steeped in pragmaticism overcomes traditional linguistic methodology when it comes to analyzing discourse, especially assertions. Jim Liszka clearly explains the three necessary conditions that allow a process to become meaningful: directedness, mediation, and interpretation. Dan Nesh shows the relevance of Peirce’s pragmatist semiotics for learning theory. Michael Haley teaches George Lakoff a good lesson in Peircean philosophy. Robert Innis
brings to light significant agreements between Peirce and Polanyi on perception and meaning. Finally, Helmut Pape offers an engaging discussion of context-dependence, indexicality, and vagueness. Overall, this is an excellent collection reflecting the ever-widening appeal and potential of Peirce’s logic of signs.

Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals
Vincent G. Potter, S. J., with a new introduction by Stanley M. Harrison
ISBN 0-8232-1710-8 (paper), $30.00
ISBN 0-8232-1710-8 (paper), $16.00

This is a reprint of a celebrated work that first appeared in 1967, in which the late Father Potter excavated systematically and thoroughly the foundations supporting several major pillars of Peirce’s mature philosophical system. A primary reference in Peirce scholarship, Potter’s book studies Peirce’s conception of the three normative sciences, his theoretical definitions of them, and in particular the puzzling but fundamental claim that esthetics precedes ethics, which in turn precedes logic. Potter shows how this claim is inseparable from the kernel of Peirce’s pragmaticism, and how a correct understanding of it provides a smooth philosophical introduction to all the premisses of Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics, including those of his synecism, his tychism, and his agapism. Harrison’s introduction is clear and inspirational, and is a useful guide to some of the milestones in the book.

Metaphysics: Royce’s 1915–16 Class Lectures
Richard Hocking and Frank Oppenheim (eds.)
ISBN 0-7914-3866-X (paper), $24.95

These lectures were initially edited by William Ernest Hocking from detailed class notes taken by Ralph W. Brown and complemented by notes from Bryon F. Underwood. This book is an outstanding achievement that virtually enables readers today to sit in on Royce’s last yearlong course in metaphysics. As was pointed out by John E. Smith, “Nowhere else did Royce have an opportunity to explain the relations between his two most ambitious works, The World and the Individual and The Problem of Christianity and to show how they complement each other, the former being the ‘logical’ approach to metaphysics and the latter the ‘social’ approach.” Peirceans will be especially interested in Royce’s many references to Peirce and to his assessment of some of Peirce’s contributions. When commenting on Peirce’s discovery that there is an intellectual “mode of action” that can’t be defined in terms of perception or conception, Royce remarked, “I don’t think James ever appreciated the views of Charles Peirce.” From Royce, who knew James so well, this comment must be taken seriously indeed. Royce also makes many penetrating criticisms of the proponents of “the new realism,” who were then beginning to build up steam. Of course the main value of this collection is to add to our understanding of Royce’s own philosophy in one of its most mature presentations. Hocking and Oppenheim have added an important work to the growing library of Classical American Philosophy.

Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Essential Readings & Interpretive Essays, Second Edition
John J. Stuhr (ed.)
ISBN 0-195-11829-4 (cloth), $59.95
ISBN 0-195-11830-8 (paper), $32.95

Most readers of this newsletter are already familiar with the first edition of John Stuhr’s anthology. First published in 1997, it quickly became one of the most widely used texts for university courses on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American philosophy. Now in its second edition, with “Pragmatism” added to the title and expanded in scope to include Emerson and some of the contemporary thought that helps put classical pragmatism into context, Stuhr’s anthology is sure to become a classic in its own right. Changes to this edition go beyond the inclusion of new sections. The sections on Peirce and Mead have been reorganized (the Peirce section entirely) and introduced by different scholars: Vincent Colapietro for Peirce, and James Campbell for Mead. In addition, some revisions were made in the James and Santayana selections. The result is the best collection of its kind.

The Writings of Charles S. Peirce, Vol. 6
Peirce Edition Project
ISBN 0-253-37206-2 (cloth), $49.95

This volume contains forty-seven writings—most from the unsettled period in Peirce’s life just after he moved from New York to Milford, Pennsylvania, followed shortly afterward by the death of his mother. It begins with interesting remnants of Peirce’s correspondence course in logic, by which he hoped in vain to make a living. Other notable selections include the much-heralded “A Guess at the Riddle,” Peirce’s never-finished yet substantial attempt to draw his wide-ranging philosophical theories into a unified system of thought; his dispute with Edmund Gurney over Gurney’s Phantasms of the Living; his attack, under the pseudonym “Outsider,” on Spencer’s mechanical philosophy; and lengthy excerpts from the report on gravity that led to his forced resignation from the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. These and other writings in this volume reveal Peirce’s powerful mind probing into diverse issues, looking for an underlying unity but, perhaps, also looking for direction.

PEIRCE BOOK FOUND
Charles Peirce’s writing invites biographical treatment. He tells us that “no man’s philosophy can be well-understood until one knows how he came by it.”¹ As if to answer the biographer’s need, Peirce occasionally mixes autobiography with his philosophical writing. My current investigations explore the role of Peirce’s early experience with laboratory chemistry in his philosophical development.

Peirce’s Uncle Charles and Aunt Lizzie helped “Charley,” as the youngster was called, set up a chemistry laboratory at home. The date is uncertain. Peirce gives various dates, ranging from when he was 6 years old (CP 5.411, 1897) to when he was 12 (MS 619: 06, 1909). Not surprisingly, the secondary literature on Peirce cites several dates.

It was no accident that young Charley was steered toward chemistry. Internationally, the work of Professor Justus Liebig (Giessen, Germany) was gaining recognition, and chemistry was emerging as an important new area of science. New interest in chemistry and new methods of education were brought to Harvard by Eben Norton Horsford, an American student of Liebig’s. Horsford was appointed Rumford Professor of Chemistry in the Lawrence Scientific School (Harvard) in 1847. Benjamin Peirce, Charley’s father, had helped organize the Lawrence School. As is evident from Benjamin’s correspondence to his wife, Sarah, (22 January 1857) Charley’s study of chemistry satisfied his father and seemed a way of assuring success in life.

Peirce venerated his father highly, especially intellectually. In later years, Peirce wrote, “He educated me and if I do anything it will be his work” (MS 1608: 02, c. 1894). In compliance with Benjamin’s wishes, he sought to “make himself a thorough scholar in chemistry” (BP to SMP, 22 January 1857). In 1863 he took the bachelor of science degree in chemistry from the Lawrence Scientific School, summa cum laude. Writing to Victoria Lady Welby in 1909, he claimed, “I was the first man in Harvard to take a degree in chemistry summa cum laude.”²

Unfortunately, the records of the Lawrence Scientific School and the Quinquennial Catalogue of Harvard University show Peirce’s boast to have been false. Instead, sixteen men preceded Peirce in this honor. Also unfortunately, the secondary literature on Peirce has repeated his boast uncritically. Max Fisch expressed doubt in a private note, but his published statement concurs with Peirce’s version of events. Several scholars simply repeat Peirce’s claim without examination. These include Carolyn Eisele, Paul Weiss, Douglas Anderson, Beverly Kent, Murray Murphey, Thomas Gouge, and James Feibleman. Joseph Brent repeats Peirce’s claim, but cautions that the records are spotty and perhaps unreliable.

What kind of chemistry did Charley do in the lab his aunt and uncle helped him set up? Peirce’s testimonials, considered with other evidence, indicate that it was qualitative analysis. On this point, the secondary literature is confused. According to Weiss, Murphey, and Knight he did quantitative analysis. But Brent, Fisch, and Gouge claim (correctly, I think) that it was qualitative analysis. The point is important because the procedures of qualitative analysis are a model education in the hypothetico-deductive method of science. What is the import of this for Peirce’s philosophical development?

Testing in qualitative analysis involves trying out hypotheses concerning the chemical identity of an unknown substance. Such investigation follows the familiar pattern of conjecture/hypothesis followed by confirmation or refutation, with each confirmation subject to further confirmation or refutation. And there is evidence that Peirce did in fact learn the hypothetico-deductive method this way. MS 634: 3–6 (1909) contains an autobiographical-sounding conjecture of what a youngster would learn in a chemistry lab. Peirce’s conjecture strongly suggests that his own manipulations of laboratory instruments, coordinated by his mind with the reports of his senses, made an impression of method that stayed with Peirce through some six decades.

Peirce’s early experience with the hypothetico-deductive method seems important for his philosophical development in several ways. First, I believe this exposure was at the root of his lifelong interest in the logic of the sciences. Admittedly, Peirce himself says in several places that it was reading Whately’s Elements of Logic at age 12 or 13 that initiated his interest in logic, an interest that grew to include the logic of science. But the methods and procedures he was exposed to in the chemistry laboratory, probably well before this, appear the more likely foundation of his interest. Even if young Charley did not reflect explicitly on laboratory method, the exposure would have set up a habit of inquiry (a point of importance in his later theory of inquiry). At any rate, experience with the method of qualitative analysis would have enriched the relevance and interest of Whately’s book.

Second, I believe Peirce’s exposure to laboratory chemistry was a preparation for his later formulations of pragmatism. This is indicated by a 1905 formulation of pragmaticism (CP 5.458):

to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry relate except to the “behavior” of different possible kinds of material substances? And in what does that behavior consist except that if a substance of a certain kind should be exposed to an agency of a certain kind, a certain kind of sensible result would ensue, according to our experiences hitherto. As for the pragmatist, it is precisely his position that

Continued on page 11
PEIRCE-RELATED RESEARCH

IVAN SARAİLIEV: AN EARLY BULGARIAN CONTRIBUTOR TO PRAGMATISM

Ivan V. Saraïliev (1887–1969) was a pioneer convert to pragmatism, incorporating the pragmatic viewpoint in his writings as early as 1909. Saraïliev studied in Paris under Bergson and graduated summa cum laude from the Sorbonne in 1909. Although he was fluent in French, English, and German, he wrote almost exclusively in Bulgarian. As a result, his achievements remained largely unknown. To make matters worse, his work was heavily suppressed by the Communists after they gained power in 1944.

After his graduation from the Sorbonne, Saraïliev spent a year in England, where he had frequent discussions with F. C. S. Schiller (some of Schiller’s letters to Saraïliev have survived). Upon his return to Bulgaria, Saraïliev taught at a Sofia high school for the next eleven years. In 1920, he was appointed assistant professor at the University of Sofia, where he became a tenured professor in 1927. Saraïliev’s On The Will appeared in 1924 (Sofia: Court Press). That same year Saraïliev returned to Britain, where he met again with Schiller and attended H. W. Carr’s course on Bergson. (In 1934, he published a collection of papers on Bergson under the title Essays. On some Unclear Moments in H. Bergson’s Philosophy [Sofia].)

In 1931, Saraïliev traveled to New York, where he spent a year as a Rockefeller fellow at Columbia University. At Columbia he discussed Peirce with William Pepperel Montague and with Dewey. In his diary, Saraïliev made a special note on the pronunciation of Peirce’s name, and in “Charles Sanders Peirce and his Principle,” which was published in the Bulgarian journal Outchiisten Pregled (vol. 32, June 1933, pp. 725–36) he made sure the readers knew how to pronounce Peirce’s name.

In March of the following year, Saraïliev went to Harvard, where he met Ralph Barton Perry, Alfred N. Whitehead, George Allen Morgan, and James Bissett Pratt. Later that year he visited several other American universities. Upon his return to Europe, Saraïliev traveled first to Italy and met with several Italian pragmatists, and then spent two years in Germany and Switzerland.

In the 1930s, Saraïliev gained recognition among Bulgarian intellectuals because of his debate with a well-known Bulgarian professor, Dimiter Mikhalschev, on the dilemma between religion and science. Saraïliev used a pragmatic approach with semiotic influences to defend his view that life is not solely a product of physical causality. He argued that we live in a world of “pre-thought” and that we live and act in accordance with its rules and laws rather than with physical ones. Those rules and laws do not contradict modern science but rather complete and prove its validity. Somewhat as Peirce had, Saraïliev sought to unify scientific and religious thought and to show how knowledge of God might be gained through hypothetical (or abductive) reasoning. Saraïliev set out his views on science and religion in two essays published as Contemporary Science and Religion: Response to a Critic (Sofia: Chippeff Publishing House, 1931).

In 1944, however, Saraïliev’s career came to a sudden halt after the Communists took power in Bulgaria. This brought an abrupt end to his extensive international travels, and immediately isolated him from the international scholarly community. In June 1946, Saraïliev was elected president of the University of Sofia, but because of his unwillingness to cooperate with the Communists, he was compelled to resign within the year. Then he was asked to give up his pragmatist ideas and to teach Marxism. Again Saraïliev refused and was saved from the labor camps only because of his reputation as a scholar. A few years later, in 1950, Saraïliev was forced to retire, and he spent the rest of his life in almost complete isolation. He was banned from publishing, and his previous publications were blacklisted. Even his name was classified. In 1969 Saraïliev died peacefully but in total obscurity in Sofia. There are few reliable documentary sources on his life, and it is still difficult to obtain any of his books, articles, or papers. Saraïliev was all but erased from history.

This story of Ivan Saraïliev’s life and work might not have been told were it not for a pure accident by which I stumbled upon one of his books. The book, entitled Pragmatism (in Bulgarian), was published in 1938. Pragmatism, with a photograph of the famous Ellen Emmet Rand portrait of William James for its frontispiece, is a remarkable book. It is an important record of Saraïliev’s involvement with the European spread of pragmatism and of his extensive travels in France, England, Germany, and the United States. It also provides a vivid snapshot of pragmatism at this critical period in Europe’s history.

Title page of Pragmatism by Ivan Saraïliev
In the introduction, Saraïliev identified Peirce as the founder of pragmatism with a reference to the latter’s “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). Saraïliev added, however, that this paper remained unnoticed until 1898, when William James published his “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” in which he credited Peirce with the discovery of pragmatism. The further spread and the European premiere of pragmatism Saraïliev credited to Ferdinand Schiller, in particular his 1891 Riddles of the Sphinx.

Saraïliev found the greatest number of pragmatists in Italy, and he discussed Papini, Calderoni, Giovanni Vailati, and Giovanni Amendola. Saraïliev also included a brief discussion of Mussolini. In the London newspaper Sunday Times (April 1926), the Italian dictator expressed his gratitude to pragmatism by saying that it was of great help to his political career, and that he had learned from James that any action must be tested by its results rather than on doctrinal grounds. Mussolini continued, “James has inspired in me a trust in action and a will for living and fighting on which fascism has built its great success.”

To balance this, Saraïliev quoted others who were enthusiastic about pragmatism, like the Russian revolutionist Vladimir Lenin. Saraïliev also made sure to include Giovanni Amendola, who died after being tortured by the fascists.

Saraïliev continued his overview of the European expansion of pragmatism with an outline of its influence in German-speaking countries. Although weaker than in Britain and Italy, it had some influence: Saraïliev mentioned George Wobbermin, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Julius Goldstein, Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Ostwald, Georg Simmel, among others who were influenced by pragmatic ideas. He then continued to show how pragmatic ideas influenced several of the logical positivists in Vienna.

Saraïliev finally followed pragmatism to France, where it was met with more appreciation and played a role in the development of a new religious philosophy founded by Alfred Loisy and George Tyrell. In the 1930s, with further contributions from thinkers such as Maurice Blondel, Laberthonière, Le Roy, and others, this developed into a French movement for a renewal of philosophy and religion known as “modernism.”

The introduction is followed by the essay “Charles Sanders Peirce and his Principle” as well as essays on the pragmatism of James, the humanism of Schiller, and the instrumentalism of Dewey. Also included are an essay on Italian pragmatism, a conclusion, and a supplemental essay on the meaning of the words “pragmatism,” the adjective “pragmatic,” and Peirce’s term “pragmaticism.” The book concludes with a lightly annotated and remarkably complete bibliography of pragmatic thought.

Saraïliev’s account of pragmatism’s invasion of Europe was scrupulously researched and very well written. He described pragmatism as a new theory of truth, marked its crucial points, and concluded that after the death of its chief representatives the debate about it began to fade away.

It is remarkable that long after pragmatism was abandoned by most philosophers, this diligent Bulgarian professor, Ivan Saraïliev, stood firm for pragmatism and in his own work followed a model of thinking that exemplified Peirce’s “logic of science.” In his Genetic Ideas (Sofia: Court Press, 1919), his Socrates (Sofia, 1947), and in his debate on science and religion, he closely followed the pragmatists’ doctrine for the clarification of meaning.

Under more fortunate circumstances, Saraïliev would have enjoyed an influence, perhaps a great influence. Instead, he suffered under harsh political persecution and was forced to be a social outcast. His thought was suppressed by a conspiracy of silence and his work was expected to vanish in the darkness of the following ignorant decades. As Peirce understood so well, thought must not be imprisoned in the monastery of a single consciousness, but it must be let out to fight in the street with other thoughts—for the sake of truth. The recent happy discovery of Saraïliev’s work most assuredly confirms, at least, that no authority can hope to forever “fix” the truth.

Ivan Mladenov
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia

Editor’s note: The copy of Saraïliev’s Pragmatism that prompted Ivan Mladenov to search for Saraïliev’s papers and to investigate his role in the spread of pragmatism in Europe has been deposited with the Peirce Edition Project’s rare book collection. We wish to express our gratitude to Professor Mladenov and the book’s owner, Mrs. Kina Arnaoudova, for this kind gesture. We have recently learned from Professor Mladenov that more of Saraïliev’s papers have been uncovered and that a small archival project has been formed.

“As a youngster, Charles Peirce was given a chemistry laboratory. I believe the experience gained in this lab initiated his interest in logic, and especially the logic of science. I also believe it helped prepare him for his articulation of pragmatism. And it could well have contributed indirectly to his logic of relatives. These findings, which I intend to publish in fuller form elsewhere, suggest that there may be more to learn about Peirce’s philosophical development by following his suggestion that we find out how he came by his ideas.”

Charles Seibert
University of Cincinnati
In my last Director’s Report I made the happy announcement that we had received a grant from NEH for 1997–99 and were waiting to hear if we would be awarded a new grant for 1999–2001. Fortunately, we were. In fact, we are now halfway through the new grant and have already submitted another proposal to NEH for a 2001–03 grant. We’re concerned about this new application because of the move afoot at NEH to abandon the scholarly editions altogether (see this issue’s front-page story), but we remain hopeful.

The Peirce Edition Project had another good year in 2000. I noted in my previous column that Cornelis de Waal had joined PEP as a Visiting Assistant Editor. He has now been made a permanent member of our editing staff—and of course he continues his association with IUPUI’s philosophy department. Volume 6 was published in early spring and reached sales of more than 600 copies by August. Work on volume 8 is going well, and we expect to finish it this year; it will be an exciting volume with some interesting writings appearing in print for the first time. And some of the important previously published writings—e.g., the 1891–93 Monist series—will be based on the recently discovered original printer’s copy. We are also making progress on volumes 9 and 10 (see de Waal’s piece on W10 on pp. 4–5).

In hopes of finding a way to move ahead more quickly within the confines of our present funding situation, we are exploring the possibility of working with teams of scholars in Hannover, Germany, and in Montreal to set up satellite operations devoted to special volumes of the critical edition. The group in Germany, led by Helmut Pape, has already developed a detailed plan and is presently seeking separate funding. Pape is hoping to establish a center for the study of pragmatism that would have a larger purpose than simply working on the edition. The Montreal group, led by François Latraverse, is not quite as advanced in its planning but is equally serious in purpose. I hope to have more to report on this in the next issue of the newsletter.

We may suffer some delays this summer because of renovations to the air circulation system in Cavanaugh Hall, where PEP is located. We will have to work in temporary quarters—perhaps for as long as four months—but with careful advance planning we hope to avoid serious setbacks. Scholars hoping to undertake research at PEP this summer should make arrangements well in advance.

Many readers will be glad to know that Indiana University Press has reached an agreement with the InteLex Corporation to produce an electronic edition of the critical edition. The initial CD-ROM will include the first six volumes and will be periodically updated after that. Some details remain to be worked out, but the first CD likely will be available later this year.

In March the Peirce Project received the library and papers of Carolyn Eisele (see article on p. 2), a significant addition to our resources. The expenses related to this acquisition were covered by the Max H. Fisch Library Fund, and we are very grateful to everyone who has contributed to that fund.

On the funding front, we were fortunate that so many of you provided support for our NEH matching funds challenges. We managed, to the surprise of many, to raise $80,000 to fully meet the first NEH match for 1997–99, and we have pledges that fully cover the $45,000 match for 1999–2001 (which must be completed by July). We are indeed thankful for your help. We are now facing the realization that to insure the completion of the critical edition, and also to insure that the many important resources we have managed to bring together in Indianapolis continue to serve the scholarly community after the edition’s completion, it is necessary to establish a Peirce Endowment. A steering committee is being formed to guide this effort, with much help from the School of Liberal Arts Development Office, and before long you can expect to hear more about this. Some of you have already been contacted. Please be thinking about how you could help—perhaps with a bequest or the transfer of an annuity. Truth crushed to earth may inevitably rise again, but only, I am learning, when advocates and friends of “that truth” come forward with funds to support it. This is the world we live in.

Many thanks to John Gallman for his unwavering support of the critical edition and for his years of service to PEP as a member of the Board of Advisors. John retired last year from the directorship of Indiana University Press. Thanks also to Tara Morrall for stepping up to edit this newsletter.

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FROM THE EDITOR
I am pleased to present you with another issue of the Peirce Project Newsletter. As a graduate intern at the Project, one of my responsibilities is editing the newsletter.

It has been a while since the last one appeared because our attention must be focused, as always, on the work of producing the Writings volumes. However, we consider it important that you receive news and information about the ongoing work of the Project and topics related to Peirce. Therefore, we hope to again publish two issues a year. If you have comments on this issue or suggestions for future issues, contact Nathan Houser (nhouser@iupui.edu) or Tara Morrall (tmorrall@iupui.edu) here at the Project. — T. Morrall