NOTE FROM PEP'S DEVELOPMENT OFFICE

As the individual directing the fundraising activities of the Peirce Edition Project, I often recall an old Frank and Ernest cartoon. In it, Frank stands clad as Moses holding the Ten Commandments and gazing heavenward. The caption reads, “What about funding?”

In the past I have used that cartoon to inform students that even the most divine and spiritual realities only exist in specific physical locations. (Indeed, one should recall that the giving of the commandments is followed by the world’s first documented capital campaign as the Israelites give jewels and gold for the construction of the tabernacle and the Ark of the Covenant.) Leaving aside the question of the relative value of the Peirce Edition Project to that event, the need to pay for the intellectual, moral, and spiritual goods one values remains. It is a fact, perhaps an intractable one.

If the Chronological Edition of the Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce is to be completed, if the work of the PEP is to continue, then salaries have to be paid, manuscripts studied, equipment and supplies purchased, photocopies and trips made. The mere fact that we may value moral and intellectual goods more than material ones does not mean that the former exist outside of the realm of materiality. Those of us who lament the fact that Peirce labored under financial distress and wonder about how much more he could have accomplished and how much more significant his work would have been on the wider world, absent that distress, rarely conclude that he was better off without financial stability. We imagine how much better everything would have been if his situation had been different. We applaud those who gave money to ease his financial plight and deplore the behavior of those who, while outwardly lamenting his fate, did nothing, as though some university would hire him, the government pension him, or his family support him.

Too often, however, many of us manifest this attitude. We act as though because it would be more appropriate for some good to be provided from a common fund, then we need not do it. This view, even if correct, rarely accomplishes anything of value, regardless of how self-satisfied it makes us feel. It will not get the papers of Charles Sanders Peirce published, nor will it help to disseminate his ideas widely.

Those of us who care about Peirce, his work, and his legacy must be the ones to sustain them. We must demonstrate that concern through our support, both intellectual and material. Only by showing that it has value to us, can we then ask others to value it. This essentially is the meaning of the challenge grant from NEH. Such grants say, “Okay, here is some money to do your work, but you have to prove that the work is sufficiently important to others that they also will support it. Our resources are limited and numerous worthy projects clamor for them. Show us that people are so committed to what you do that we should fund you rather than another project, perhaps equally worthy.”

In a world of finite resources, those of us who know Peirce’s importance and the importance of the Peirce Edition Project must be those who help finance it. We must support the work, if we are to expect others to do so. Recently you should have received the annual appeal letter from the Peirce Edition Project asking you for a contribution. If you already have made your donation, thank you. If you have not yet done so, please take the time to do it now. Although we are nearing our goal for the NEH Challenge Grant, the deadline looms. Send you donation today and send the message that the legacy of Charles Sanders Peirce must be made available to the world. (Donations received too late for the NEH Challenge will be used to help build a Peirce Endowment.)

Edward L. Queen II

do to with instruction, there would never be a university in this country. The editors yielded, and Peirce’s definition was printed as he desired. But this was an exception, for the editors often made heavy revisions. The lack of surviving archives prevents us from examining exactly the extent to which Peirce’s definitions were changed. At the end of his Monist article “Reply to the Necessitarians” Peirce warned his readers that strict philosophical definitions were in many cases not allowed by the C.D. editors; his definitions consequently “were necessarily rather vaguely expressed, in order to describe the popular usage of terms, and in some cases were modified by proofreaders or editors; ... they are hardly such as I should give in a Philosophical Dictionary proper.”

How seriously we need to take this caveat is just one of the many problems PEP editors will face when tackling W7. There are six categories of materials that need consideration: (1) the surviving draft manuscripts and typescripts, which contain much writing that did not end up in the C.D.—such documents are the closest to Peirce’s hand; (2) the first edition of the C.D.: we have a complete photocopy of Peirce’s own prepublication set of the dictionary (called the interleaved copy)—Peirce used a green pencil to mark in the margin all the definitions he contributed in full or in part; (3) the interleaves of the interleaved copy, which are inserted blank sheets on which Peirce handwrote hundreds of additions, refinements, criticisms, etc., regarding definitions found on facing pages; (4) Peirce’s contributions to the 1909 two-volume Supplement; (5) the correspondence and other exchanges with various C.D. participants (B.E. Smith and Alan Risteen, for instance) and critics (Simon Newcomb); and (6) the various judgments Peirce passed at different times on the dictionary, scattered here and there throughout the papers. Each of these categories comes with its own set of selection and editing problems.

Will volume 7 constitute Peirce’s Philosophical Dictionary? No, that cannot be claimed. For one thing, the selected definitions will not be limited to those philosophical and logical. But even if it were, the readers would have to keep in mind that just about every definition Peirce provided was doctored by the Century editors, and that they rejected a great many of his contributions. We may of course assume that most editorial interventions did not alter the essence of Peirce’s definitions, but we can never be completely sure. At the same time, it is also true that Peirce used the C.D. to propagate certain tenets of his own philosophy. Thus will we find, in the 1909 Supplement, definitions for such purely Peircean conceptions as firstness, secondness, and thirddness, phaneron, universal phenomenon, and cenopythagorean phenomenology. To what extent he had a hand in the definition of pragmatism is unclear. We know that John Dewey assisted in defining the word (and related terms) and Max Fisch speculated that Dewey used Peirce’s interleaved definition when he constructed the entry. References to Peirce’s work, especially his 1905 Monist article, are given a prominent place, and “pragmatism” has a separate entry. Peirce even planned to extract entries from the C.D. as the basis for his own philosophical dictionary. But he never brought the project to fruition, and so W7 will have to serve as an imperfect completion of his unfulfilled dream.

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