THE PREMISE AND PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS ARCHAEOLOGY

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Researchers have increasingly promoted an emerging paradigm of Indigenous archaeology, which includes an array of practices conducted by, for, and with Indigenous communities to challenge the discipline’s intellectual breadth and political economy. McGhee (2008) argues that Indigenous archaeology is not viable because it depends upon the essentialist concept of “Aboriginalism.” In this reply, we correct McGhee’s description of Indigenous Archaeology and demonstrate why Indigenous rights are not founded on essentialist imaginings. Rather, the legacies of colonialism, sociopolitical context of scientific inquiry, and insights of traditional knowledge provide a strong foundation for collaborative and community-based archaeology projects that include Indigenous peoples.

En respuesta tanto a la herencia intelectual de la disciplina arqueológica como a la economía política de su praxis, diversos investigadores han promovido de manera creciente la implementación de un paradigma de Arqueología Indígena que se caracteriza por un despliegue de prácticas conducidas por, para, y con las comunidades indígenas. En contraste, McGhee (2008) sostiene que la Arqueología Indígena no resulta ser una propuesta viable pues depende del concepto esencialista de “Aboralidad.” En la presente replic, los autores se abocan a corregir la descripción presentada por McGhee sobre aquello que constituye una Arqueología Indígena, demostrando a la par el porque los derechos indígenas que la caracterizan no están fundamentados en imaginarios esencialistas. Por el contrario, sostienen, los legados del colonialismo, el contexto socio-político de la investigación científica, así como el valor reflejo del conocimiento tradicional, constituyen bases sólidas para el desarrollo de una arqueología colaborativa, arraigada en proyectos comunitarios que incluyan a las poblaciones indígenas.

As Indigenous archaeology is still an inchoate project, Robert McGhee’s (2008) article is a welcome opportunity to engage in an open dialogue about the potential and pitfalls of this emerging paradigm. Despite our serious disagreement with McGhee’s logic and our strong rejection of his conclusions, there is plainly common ground for discussion. McGhee (2008:580) is right to be concerned whether an Indigenous form of Orientalism is developing (Said 1978), and with the potential negative impacts of unfettered essentialism in archaeology. Also, McGhee’s (2008:580, 590-591, 595) acknowledgment that archaeologists should work in partnership with Indigenous peoples and his willingness to consider multivocal methodologies that include traditional knowledge reflect our shared concern for marginalized communities.

Although there is much to argue with, and about, in McGhee’s article, three central questions deserve a considered response: What is Indigenous archaeology? What does inclusion and essentialism mean for archaeology? And why do Indigenous communities have special rights to heritage? In contradiction of McGhee’s (2008:579) claim that “very little effort has been expended … in examining the intellectual viability or the social and cultural desirability” of Indigenous archaeology, our answers to

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these questions are a clear rejoinder that show many scholars are thoughtfully working to define this new approach.

**Conceiving Indigenous Archaeology**

McGhee’s article is replete with strawman arguments, as he never deeply engages with Indigenous archaeology’s multifaceted development or its varied definitions and practices. McGhee misconstrues Indigenous archaeology, misrepresenting it as one cohesive program—a single agenda and set of values. While Vine Deloria, Jr.’s writings have inspired thinking about archaeology’s relationship with Indian country (Bials and Zimmerman 1997; see McGhee 2008:581, 591), in fact, what we are now calling Indigenous archaeology has traveled a long and uneasy path that goes far beyond Deloria’s critiques (Watkins 2003). As early as 1900, with Arthur C. Parker, Native Americans have attempted to pursue archaeology professionally (Thomas 2000a), but it was not until a handful of Native American tribes, First Nations, and Inuit communities began launching their own heritage programs in the 1970s that Indigenous peoples were able to begin at last pursuing scientific research on their own terms (Anyon et al. 2000; Klesert 1992; Rowlley 2002). In the United States, legislation—such as the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and the 1992 amendments to the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPCA), which established Tribal Historic Preservation Offices—further empowered tribes to control archaeological processes and objects and have a voice in historic preservation (Ferguson 2000; Killion 2008; Stapp and Burney 2002). The florescence of the broader public archaeology movement provided additional intellectual and methodological insights into community-based participation (Marshall 2002; Shackel and Chambers 2004). In the post-NAGPRA era, archaeologists and Indigenous peoples began to work together regularly and more Indigenous peoples have become professional archaeologists even though they remain a fraction of the field’s professionals (Dongoske et al. 2000; Nicholas and Andrews 1997a; Nicholas 2010; Swidler et al. 1997).

From this pastiche of movements and programs, a conversation began about the possibility of an "indigenous archaeology," an "archaeology done with, for, and by Indigenous people" (Nicholas and Andrews 1997b:3). Joe Watkins (2000) published *Indigenous Archaeology*, but significantly, this book was less a manifesto and more a dissertation on the history of science, with the aim of contextualizing the legal, political, and social milieu in which archaeology unfolds. As such, Watkins’ initial formulations are not seamlessly reflected in later work, which has begun to explicitly frame Indigenous archaeology as an effort to challenge the discipline’s colonialist underpinnings (e.g., Atalay 2006a; Smith and Wobst 2005). A variety of models have developed that point to what these kinds of archaeology mean in practice, including tribal, collaborative, and covenantal archaeologies (Preucel and Cipolla 2008). Since Indigenous archaeology is not one idea, process, or product, but rather a broad approach that can be applied in a range of ways—from tribal programs to CRM projects to academic field schools—it is perhaps better conceived of in the plural, *Indigenous Archaeologies* (Atalay 2008:29; Silliman 2008a:2).

Indigenous archaeology, in name, is thus a little more than a decade old, although it is rooted in many years of thinking and work; it is fundamentally about an array of archaeological practices undertaken by, for, and with Indigenous communities in ways that challenge the discipline’s historical political economy and expand its intellectual breadth. This paradigm includes numerous practices and approaches (Table 1), even as a relatively comprehensive definition is now available:

Indigenous archaeology is an expression of archaeological theory and practice in which the discipline intersects with Indigenous values, knowledge, practices, ethics, and sensibilities, and through collaborative and community-originated or -directed projects, and related critical perspectives. Indigenous archaeology seeks to make archaeology more representative of, relevant for, and responsible to Indigenous communities. It is also about redressing real and perceived inequalities in the practice of archaeology and improving our understanding and interpretation of the archaeological record through the incorporation of new and different perspectives [Nicholas 2008:1660].
When Indigenous peoples express dissatisfaction with archaeology, their list of complaints often relates to the role of archaeologists as gatekeepers. Historically, through academic training and government sanction, archaeologists have exclusively controlled the flow of academic resources concerning Native American history and identity. In extracting Indigenous heritage as scientific data, archaeologists have long taken collections of artifacts and human remains to distant institutions as research findings, for processing into social capital (publications, expertise, reputation) and economic capital (careers, livelihoods, jobs). This process has involved archaeologists claiming the right of access to these collections and data as their own, and intellectual property rights over the knowledge produced (Nicholas and Bannister 2004). While Indigenous peoples have long served as laborers at archaeological sites, for more than a century they have been excluded from participating in the full choice of research activities. By maintaining a geographic and social distance between the source community and the data produced from scientific investigations, archaeologists impede the flow of information that could be of use to Indigenous communities—the very people whose ancestors are the source of scientific data.

Counter to McGhee’s arguments, Indigenous archaeology does not depend on a timeless, authentic “Indian.” Indigenous archaeology is not simply archaeology done by Indigenous peoples, Native Americans, or Aboriginals, but instead entails “finding ways to create counter-discourse that speaks back to the power of colonialist and imperialist interpretations of the past” (Atalay 2006b:294). As Chris Gosden (2005:149) has written, the term “Indigenous” no doubt can be fraught with definitional complications (see also Haber 2007), but the nascent field of Indigenous archaeology itself seeks to engage with rather than dismiss these issues and conversations, to establish viable points of contact between archaeologists and local communities. Gosden (2005:150) writes further that “such connections are not always harmonious and easy, but should be seen to represent a set of possibilities, rather than problems, for archaeologists and all those interested in the past.” When looking at the actual research conducted by Indigenous people, for the benefit of Indigenous communities, or in collaboration with Indigenous partners, we see researchers grappling with complex questions of identity, community, and engagement (Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2008; Kerber 2006; Silliman 2008b). The concept of Indigeneity here is not anchored in an Orientalism-like Aboriginalism—eternal, pure, and noble—but rather has emerged from the real lived experiences of people who see themselves, and are seen by the world, as Native peoples (Clarke 2002). The broad brush strokes of essentialism with which McGhee paints this new paradigm in fact obscures the rich diversity of practices, discussions, and viewpoints that are developing under the banner of Indigenous archaeology.

**Inclusion and Essentialism**

On a theoretical level we can say that some groups of people have similar experiences of the past and present. This will lead them to have similar identities and social relationships. The concept of “Indigenous” is a crude shorthand to try to capture shared experiences. Essentialism is not always problematic and completely avoidable because it is a generalized classification based on what appear to be key characteristics that are identifiable to a range of people. As scientists, we essentialize as hypothesis-building, “strategic” essentializing until the strategy no longer functions well. Indeed, all people essentialize, and so long as that is critically and reflexively recognized for its limits and use-
fulness, it is acceptable, even necessary. When it is assumed to be truth, however, not tested in reality, essentialism can be dangerous, no matter who is doing it. Essentialist behaviors can be powerful, no question. Do some Indigenous archaeology proponents sometimes essentialize? Certainly. Do most of them think of their categories as absolute truth? Unlikely. Indigenous archaeology is not the naive epistemological structure McGhee describes. In name, Indigenous archaeology does carry racialist overtones that can be problematic (Echo-Hawk and Zimmerman 2006), but in practice scholars have diligently avoided an identity politics that only Indigenous people can do Indigenous archaeology (Lippert 1997, 2005, 2006, 2008a). As Sonya Atalay (2008:30) has said, unequivocally, “Indigenous archaeology approaches are not simply critique and practice carried out by Indigenous people—one need not be a Native person to follow an Indigenous archaeology paradigm. It is also not necessarily archaeology located on an Indigenous land base—it may or may not take place on Native lands. Indigenous archaeologies do not include such essentialist qualities” (see also Atalay 2007).

In exploring these questions, Matthew Liebmann (2008:73) looks at the refutation of essentialist thinking “wherein social groups or categories are presumed to possess universal features exclusive to all members.” Liebmann considers how Native Americans today are often caught in-between essentialist ideals and postcolonial theory. The former insists that traditional “Indians” are fixed in time, while the latter’s emphasis on cultural fluidity often undermines tribal rights by reducing traditions to inventions and identities to cultural myths. This no-win situation, however, depends on a false choice. A radical constructivist position misreads postcolonial theory and disregards an anthropological understanding of the complex process of identity construction. Liebmann (2008:82) writes, “Modern identities are neither simple continuations of past identities nor created out of thin air; rather, identities draw on history for their legitimacy, restaging the past in the creation of the present ... In other words, modern identities may not represent a straightforward, one-to-one correlation with the past, but there is a relationship between the past and modern groups.” Lynn Meskell (2002:293) has similarly argued that “Meaning and identity must be construed as projects, sometimes grounded, other times contingent, but always ongoing.” Between unbending essentialism and radical constructivism, then, lies a “third-way” that focuses on cultural routes rather than immutable historical roots, and the importance of hybridity in the formation of cultures (Liebmann 2008:83–88). Indeed, Indigenous archaeology is perhaps uniquely positioned to creatively challenge hegemonic categories and dismantle binary frameworks such as “Indian” and “archaeologist,” to recognize “the existence of different voices, different perspectives, different interests within these oppositional entities” (Bray 2003:111).

Why McGhee singles out Indigenous archaeology for the charge of unfettered essentialism is unclear. Close examination of the language and theories across contemporary archaeological practice, reveals essentialist ideas woven into the very fabric of the field, from the characterization of culture groups to the development of regional histories (see Altschul and Rankin 2008:9; Speth 1988). McGhee (2008:591) similarly ignores broader practices when he criticizes George Nicholas for arguing that “archaeology [should] be willing to accept restrictions placed by Indigenous communities on the dissemination of data, and to accept publication moratoriums that may allow the subject community time to explore ways of benefiting from the data before others do.” Nicholas was referring specifically to the results of DNA studies—something that Indigenous communities have legitimate concerns about (e.g., Hernandez 2004; Holowell and Nicholas 2009)—but even if McGhee objects to this broader practice, we are uncertain why he does not also elect to critique the scores of archaeologists who work for government agencies or private companies (see Bergman and Doershuk 2003). These archaeologists often work under contracts that may also restrict access to data. McGhee, then, strangely holds advocates of Indigenous archaeology to a higher standard than thousands of other practicing archaeologists.

More to the point, McGhee’s argument is unsatisfactory because these are defensible practices: it is justifiable at times for CRM practitioners to control the flow of information for managing heritage sites on the behalf of their clients, just as Indigenous archaeology practitioners control the flow of information for managing heritage sites for the benefit of Indigenous communities. But McGhee is
offering us a feast of red herrings when he presents Indigenous archaeology as if this practice means that *including* Indigenous views and values necessitates *excluding* all others. Rather, Indigenous archaeology seeks to move beyond the nationalist and internationalist rationalizations of controlling heritage (Merryman 1986), to acknowledge intranationalist rights and participation (Watkins 2005a). It is unnecessary to decide, *prima facie*, that heritage must either belong to one group or to no one at all. Heritage often has nested and complexly layered values; its meanings must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis (see Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2009a).

In presenting his argument, McGhee ironically sanctifies the very dichotomies he professes to abhor. McGhee pits science against religion, scientists against Indians—a simplistic dualism with science as a pure objective positivist pursuit and Native peoples as ecology-spiritual subjectivists. McGhee’s arguments depend on this false essentialized dichotomy, and when framed as unrestrained Aboriginalism versus impartial science, naturally the scientific community is going to be swayed to the latter. The dichotomy of scientists versus Indians is starkly belied by the increasing number of archaeologists of Indigenous ancestry who are members of the Society for American Archaeology (Lippert 2008b), as it is contradicted when we can recognize that science is a social process and social processes such as oral traditions can provide avenues for understanding history (Whiteley 2002). The divisiveness of these dichotomies is both observably untenable and practically unproductive.

Because of these problems with his analysis of inclusion and essentialism, we therefore reject McGhee’s (2008:595) conclusion that Indigenous archaeology should be a branch of “Aboriginal Studies,” rather than a component of the academic discipline of archaeology. Even in its incipient form, Indigenous archaeology has already made substantial contributions to the intellectual growth of our discipline (e.g., Conkey 2005; Gonzalez et al. 2006; Green et al. 2003; Martinez 2006; Nicholas 2006; Norder 2007; Smith and Jackson 2006; Two Bears 2006; Watkins 2005b; Welch and Ferguson 2007; Wilcox 2009; Zedeño and Laluk 2008), and when fully developed it holds the promise of significantly advancing an archaeological understanding of the past. As Robert W. Preucel and Craig N. Cipolla (2008:130) concluded in their critical examination of Indigenous Archaeologies, “The inclusion of Native voices offers not only the potential to transform the discipline into a more democratic practice but also the opportunity to reconceptualize notions of time, space, and material culture.”

### Indigenous Communities and Special Rights

At the core of McGhee’s concerns about Indigenous archaeology seems to be the notion that it is not a government agency or an academic researcher but Native peoples who are at last given a say in the archaeological endeavor. After all: Why do Indigenous peoples get distinctive treatment? Where do they get their special rights to archaeology, heritage, and history?

McGhee is unambiguous in his belief that Indigenous peoples should not have any special rights to archaeology, despite the fact it is *their* heritage they are concerned about. Responding fully to this view is not easily done in a few sentences. There are important legal considerations, such as treaty rights and the long-established political rights of dependent sovereign nations (Castile 2008; Wilkins and Lomawaima 2002), but there are also more shapeless concerns, such as the colonial histories of war, forced acculturation, and exploitation (McGuire 1992; Thomas 2000b). Regarding the United States, McGhee’s treatment of Native American concerns about archaeology confuses issues of tribal sovereignty with his vision of essentialized Aboriginalism. Federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States have political rights based in law that include unique property interests, distinctive jurisdictional principles, and a special trust relationship between Indians and the United States (Newton 2005). The same holds true in Canada, as the Crown also holds a fiduciary relationship with First Nations and Inuit peoples of broad constitutional and legal scope (Hurley 2002). The consultation with Indian tribes called for in the NHPA and NAGPRA, and the right of tribes to make certain decisions about cultural property and heritage sites discovered on Federal or tribal land, are not “ethnically based special rights” (McGhee 2008:595), but long-established legal rights derived from the unique political status Indian tribes have in the
United States formed over the centuries. In the United States and Canada, federally recognized tribes and First Nations are political bodies, not simply ethnic groups. Archaeologists need to understand and respect these legal rights.

As a starting point we can say (as an empirical observation) that there are sectors of society that are marginalized, and we can argue (as a moral contention) that in the interests of fairness marginalized communities need particular opportunities to ensure their voices are heard, their freedoms are uncompromised, and their concerns are met. A fear of the tyranny of the majority leads us to acknowledge that minorities at times need special protections (Ackerly 2008; Song 2007). A commitment to democracy is a commitment to ensuring that all citizens are given the chance to flourish. While we can philosophize that all are born equal, we can observe that powerful interests and history often conspire to conceive inequality.

This view forms the architecture of Indigenous archaeology. Contrary to McGhee’s claims, the rights of Indigenous peoples are not grounded in an ageless Other, but in the time-specific historical legacies of colonialism, present-day social injustices, and the inherent politics of scientific inquiry (Little 2007; McGuire 2008; Schmidt and Patterson 1995). For more than a century, the political majority, a select group of self-appointed stewards empowered by affluence and endorsed by laws, have dominated archaeological inquiry. Indigenous archaeology is the attempt to introduce and incorporate different perspectives of the past into the study and management of heritage—to accommodate the diverse values for archaeology that exist in our pluralist democracy.

As democracy is enriched by diversity, so too is archaeology. This does not mean the simple opening up of the field to all, but rather should encourage us to pursue common ground by investigating how diverse standpoints work to enlarge the discipline’s philosophical commitments and methodological practices. McGhee (2008:580) claims to adhere to a kind of “modest realism,” as proposed by Alison Wylie (2005), but Wylie herself has recently argued that diversity of the kind provided by Indigenous communities is critical for an epistemically vigorous scientific discourse (see also Longino 2002; Wylie 2003). “The principle I propose,” Wylie (2008) contends, “is that, if well functioning epistemic communities are to counteract the risks of insularity—of epistemic blindness and social entrenchment—they must seek out critical, collaborative engagement with those communities that are most likely to have the resources necessary, not only to complement and correct specific lacunae, but to generate a critical standpoint on their own knowledge making practices.” Wylie concludes that, “the rationale for collaboration arises not only from moral obligations to descendant and affected communities, but also from an epistemic obligation that is rooted in norms of critical engagement that are constitutive of scientific inquiry.” Intellectual inclusiveness is thus not a repudiation of scientific principles, but an acknowledged feature of them. Incorporating Indigenous perspectives into our work provides broad intellectual benefits for the discipline.

An admirable goal for archaeology—which McGhee (2008:591) seems to acknowledge too—is thus forming a practice of critical multivocality in which multiple perspectives and values are brought together to expand shared historical understandings (see also Habu et al. 2008). Yet McGhee (2008:591) is concerned that “sharing theoretical authority” strips archaeology of “the scientific attributes that make it a particularly powerful narrator of the past” and therefore relegates it to “at most equal weight relative to Indigenous oral tradition and religious discourse.” This simplistically assumes that Indigenous views somehow change science’s attributes and that everyone wants to have an omnipotent historical narrator. Sharing authority does not call for any changes to “scientific attributes” but merely to the underlying assumptions of scientific ownership of the past free and clear of the social and political contexts that surround archaeology. Sharing authority merely asks people to recognize the impact that the practice of archaeology has had on descendant groups and the implications of perceiving Western science as the only “real” way to explain things. Giving equal consideration is categorically different from giving equal weight to Indigenous views, concerns, and needs.

Where traditional knowledge is provided and used to explicate our understandings of the material world, it is because Indigenous traditional leaders, elders, and community members have resonant connections to specific places and histories. Participation is not based on biology, an inborn Aboriginal mindset, but because we know that a
boundless amount of cultural and historical information is infused in Indigenous people’s oral histories, songs, poetry, dances, rituals, pilgrimages, and prayers (e.g., Anyon et al. 1997; Bahr et al. 1994; Bernardini 2005; Echo-Hawk 2000; Ferguson et al. 2000; Kuykendall 2002; Naranjo 2008; Scott 2003; Swentzell 2004; Thompson 2002; Whitley 2007; Wiget 1982, 1995; but see Mason 2006). McGhee (2008:592) is critical of Larry J. Zimmerman for suggesting that the loss of scientific credibility might be worth the cost due to increased access to Indigenous knowledge. But Zimmerman’s statement was intended as an optimistic vision of what Indigenous participation can offer, and it is striking that McGhee ignores Zimmerman’s (1997, 2008a, 2008b) work on an “ethnocritical archaeology,” which spells out how interpretive disagreements between communities can be mediated.

Any viable archaeology—Indigenous, feminist, Marxist, processual, post-processual, processual-plus, or otherwise—must commit itself to an honest and lucid exploration of the past. Through close scrutiny of data, unguarded conversation, and a commitment to look below the surface of difference, historical explanations and new hypotheses are possible, which do not either wholly dismiss traditional histories or flatly discount physical evidence. It is not always feasible to come to tidy conclusions, but the underlying process of inclusion—a commitment to honest discussion, working together, and mutual respect—can lead us to a more productive, insightful, and accurate pursuit of the past.

McGhee argues that Indigenous communities should not be afforded special rights to archaeology, but we question in turn whether archaeologists should be afforded carte blanche. McGhee (2008:594) notes that “many archaeologists are also concerned regarding access to the Indigenous archaeological resource,” and that “continued access to archaeological materials is the subtext of many publications proposing the development of Indigenous archaeology.” Perhaps this statement more than any other reflects McGhee’s true concerns with Indigenous archaeology: access to artifacts and resources. In many ways, this appears to present the crux of McGhee’s unjustified concerns: that archaeologists should have the unreserved right to practice archaeology free from outside influence and free to research the histories they “discover.”

**Indigenous Peoples and Perspectives**

The first Native American to become a professional archaeologist was Arthur C. Parker. Beginning his career in early 1900s, under the tutelage of Frederick W. Putnam, Parker overcame the racism of the age to become a leading museologist and archaeologist in a career that spanned a half-century (see Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2009b). Parker expressly became an archaeologist to honor his Seneca heritage, and yet he adopted the very practices of archaeology that disempowered Indigenous communities. He furtively purchased sacred objects; most of his excavations focused on burials in spite of Iroquois protests; and when Iroquois leaders and government agents would not allow him to dig on New York’s Indian reservations he readily turned to sites on private land where he could spurn Native concerns.

Parker’s conflicted legacy illustrates why Indigenous archaeology is not merely about inducting more Indigenous peoples into the discipline. Despite his personal sympathies and Seneca heritage, Parker was unable to conduct archaeology in concert with Indigenous values and viewpoints because at that time there simply was no alternative paradigm that allowed him to develop a robust and full collaboration with his own community. Building on the theories and practices of feminist, Marxist, and post-processual research, Indigenous archaeology is fundamentally about altering the field’s political economy and intellectual breadth so that Indigenous values, ideas, expressions, and experiences can be productively incorporated into the discipline. The next generation of scholars should not have to choose, as Parker was forced to, between pursuing archaeological science and respecting Indigenous communities.

In the end, what does Indigenous archaeology really look like? In practice, it looks much like any other archaeology. People conduct rigorous scientific studies, utilize sophisticated theories to explain the evidence, draft publications for the discipline’s benefit, and seek outreach opportunities. The main difference is that this is all done in a spirit of respect for the differing rights and perspectives of archaeology’s many stakeholders. There is an acknowledgement that Indigenous people are bound by responsibilities to their ancestors and that a responsible archaeologist does not ignore or belittle these.
Indigenous archaeology looks like Australian archaeologists conducting research into ancient human remains at the request of the traditional owners and under their supervision of each step of the process (Claire Smith, pers. comm. 2009). It looks like a Choptaw archaeologist working with Choctaw artisans to replicate and scientifically analyze archaeological materials from a Choptaw site (Thompson 2008). It looks like California Department of Transportation archaeologists collaborating with the Kashaya Pomo to develop local methods and results that are inclusive, reciprocal, and mutually respectful (Dowdall and Parrish 2003). Indigenous archaeology looks like non-Indigenous archaeologists partnering with Cayuga people in the anthropological exploration of a Haudenosaunee site in New York (Rossen and Hansen 2007). It looks like Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, Indigenous and non-Indigenous archaeologists according each other equal respect in our interests, rights, and responsibilities.

Much more could be said about McGhee’s provocative article. As a reply to McGhee, unfortunately, we have room neither to fully address all of his arguments nor to provide a positive accounting of Indigenous archaeology. Instead we have chosen to respond to McGhee’s arguments about Indigenous archaeology’s goals and definition, as well as the importance of including Indigenous viewpoints and acknowledging Indigenous rights. These concepts and ideas, after all, lay the foundation for future archaeology projects that can equitably and productively include Indigenous peoples and their perspectives.

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