Lectures on Loyalty

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Lecture I – The Conflict of Loyalties
Lecture II – The Art of Loyalty
Lecture III – Loyalty and Individuality

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Lecture I - The Conflict of Loyalties

In the course of my own work as a teacher of philosophy, I have been gradually led, as the years have gone on, to the formulation of a doctrine about the principles which should govern the conduct of a wise life. It is the duty of the teacher of philosophy to reflect, to formulate, to inquire where other people perhaps simply accept on faith, to reason about what other people regard as a matter of plain sense or of instinct; [2] and so, as you know, philosophers are always talking about commonplaces, and are nevertheless disposed so to discuss these commonplaces as to make them appear often hopelessly mysterious. I believe that, in all this, the philosophers, if they keep to their own proper place, that is if they address only those who have asked to listen to them, and are ready to think carefully, are after all right. For nothing is so deep and so mysterious as are the most commonplace matters in our lives, – matters such as love, and sorrow and duty.

Now you have asked me, through your secretary, to tell this club something about my own [2a] views concerning the wise life, concerning duty, and concerning the problems of duty. You well know that the subject is a familiar one. You know that it is one which all the clergymen, and many of the editors, and even some of the politicians and statesmen of our time, daily discuss. You will ask, at the outset, what a teacher of philosophy can possibly have to say about this topic which can be either new or enlightening. And at the outset I can only answer that, whether the philosopher repeats to you commonplaces about right and wrong, or discourses to you of the problems and mysteries of life, he has this one [2b] purpose, – a purpose which not all of those other [sic: others] who daily discuss duty with you quite equally share. His purpose is namely to help you to think for yourselves and to think clearly about these things. He does not want simply to utter authoritative sayings, nor does he seek merely to persuade you to adopt his mode of opinion or of living. He is not asking either for your votes or for your enthusiastic approval. He is not intending simply to earn converts. He wants to appeal to your reason, and to help you to see for yourself something of your own moral situation. If he succeeds in helping you to a clearer personal insight of your own, he is content.

And it is worth while today to try to reason for yourself about at least some moral matters. It is worth while today to try to see for yourself something of your own moral [2c] situation. It is worth while to be not only a convert but a thinker. It is well to add a little moral philosophy, a little effort at independent reflection, to what the politicians, and the statesmen, and the editors and the preachers have to tell you about duty. Yes, all this is worth while, because our modern world is so complex, and to many of us is so confusing. Our moral traditions have become in many ways so fluctuating. Our social problems are often so new. Our consciences are so frequently led astray by popular passions and by strange new social movements. I do not for a moment exaggerate the office of mere reason as a guide [2d] in life. And I have a profound reverence both for the happy practical instincts of our best moral leaders, and for the work of many of our devoted public servants, philanthropists and preachers. I do not come to you to do any of their work over again, nor yet to undermine their influence. But I think
that there is today a new place, and an important place, not only for moral enthusiasm, but for the careful study of a rational philosophy of life. It is a fragment of such a rational study that I want to present to you in these lectures.

The philosophy of conduct of duty and of life which I lay at the basis of these lectures, is one which I have elsewhere expounded at greater length. I have ventured to give to it a name. I have called it The Philosophy of Loyalty. I need not say that my philosophy of loyalty is no attempt to set forth any wholly new view of the moral ideal. Nobody has a right to originate a wholly new morality. But I attempt in this philosophy (1) A certain simplification of our concepts of duty; (2) a rational unification of the doctrine and of the ideals of life, and (3) a plan for helping people, whether they agree with me or not, to think for themselves about what their ideals and their duty are. In working out this philosophy, I have started from the just mentioned fact that the combinations of the modern world have tended to confuse the minds of many of us regarding our estimates of the various values upon which the good of life depends. I have wanted to show, not in any entirely novel way, but by a sort of rearrangement of our current notions, where the central value of our personal human life is to be found. I have wanted as a teacher of philosophy to help my students, and my hearers and readers generally, to group the various special values of life about this central value, and so to see how best to unify their undertakings, and how thus best to live their own personal sort of wise and good life.

I.

My plan for stating the proposed unification of our moral notions is, briefly summarized, this: – There is a problem of life which in our days gets constantly emphasized. It is the problem as to the conflict between the individual on the one hand, and the various forms of social authority and social tradition on the other hand. It was especially this great problem that my philosophy of loyalty undertook to solve. And so, in order to sketch my philosophy of loyalty, I must first tell you a little more about the problems with which it thus principally deals.

Individualism in ethics is one of the notable tendencies of our times. And, by the term Individualism, people usually mean to designate a kind of moral teaching which predominately insists upon either one, or both of two principles. These are: (1) The principle that, about essentially important moral matters, the individual must in the end be guided, not by tradition, not by authority, but by his own independent judgment, – by his private intuitions, by his own inner voice, by his personal reason, – or perhaps simply by his mere determination to be free, to assert himself, and to win power; and (2) The principle that every individual has inalienable personal rights of his own, and that whatever duties he has must be in some sense made consistent with, and perhaps subordinated to these rights. These two, I say, are the essential principles of Individualism in morals. Briefly stated they are, (1) The principle of the freedom of private judgment; (2) The principle of the sanctity of private rights.

You are all acquainted with moral teachings founded upon emphasizing one or both of these two principles. They are both of them old. One of them, the principle of the sanctity of private and personal rights, that is the doctrine of the so called “inalienable rights” of the individual man, was prominent in the Eighteenth Century, and has played a great part in political
history both during the Revolutionary period, and ever since. It was embodied in a classic sentence of our Declaration of Independence. [7] It was emphasized by the political liberalism of the first half of the Nineteenth Century. It is still in question today whenever movements for any sort of emancipation of individuals from traditional forms of social, especially of political, authority are in question. The other principle, that of the freedom of private judgment in all matters relating to right and wrong, is a more subtle and in a way a less popularly comprehensible principle; and this principle has played a larger part in the history of literature, of religion, and of the inner life of individuals than it has played in politics. But of these two [8] doctrines, the doctrine that you have inalienable individual rights, and, the doctrine that you are at liberty to judge for yourself regarding all the central ideals of your personal life, ethical Individualism consists. And while, as I have said, these two principles are old, the recent tendencies of civilization have given to both of them a very greatly increased practical importance, and have consequently brought us into the presence of many new practical problems.

These problems are due to the conflicts which nowadays arise between the various forms of moral Individualism, one the one side and the equally numerous ways [9] in which social authority and social tradition array themselves against individualism on the other side. Against the asserted inalienable rights of the individual, stand the unyielding traditional demands of the social order. The resulting conflicts you have all felt in one way or another. The individual asserts his inalienable right to life, to liberty, to the pursuit of happiness; the social order requires him to submit to many restrictions of his choice and of his deed, and demands that he shall be ready, on occasion, to surrender even his life, at the call of authority. And the social order asserts that much of this restriction is not only a fact, but is something that ought to be, whether the individual [10] wills it or not and whether he consents or rebels. The individual meanwhile asserts his freedom of private judgment in moral matters. The voice of tradition declares that such and such duties are actually incumbent upon each man, and are his duties whether he acknowledges them or no. And so, I say, conflicts arise whose manifold expressions in moral discussions, in stories, in plays, and in the words of reformers, of critics, of sages, of deliberate mischief-makers and of equally deliberate workers of righteousness, – are familiar to most of you. Ibsen, Tolstoi, Bernard Shaw, Nietzsche, Browning, Walt Whitman, Emerson, – these familiar names remind you how varied, and how variously endowed is the company of those who in one way or another, have been led, within the last two generations to emphasize [11] various modern aspects of the conflict between ethical individualism on the one side and tradition and social authority on the other.

Now most of you know how these problems and these conflicts often confuse our minds, obscure our moral issues, and cloud our modern world with doubts, with ethical controversies, with questionable reforms, with chaotic teachings. My Philosophy of Loyalty is an attempt to clear up this our so confused moral situation of today. It is an endeavor to harmonize individual right with social duty, private judgment with a willingness to accept [12] a certain sort of external authority, the personal conscience with the voice of our wiser moral traditions. It tries
to be fair to ethical individualism, [sic: “,” should be “;”] it has sought to learn the lesson of individualism. It attempts to reconcile what is indeed worthy about individualism with what is demanded by the true welfare of society.

Whether my philosophy of Loyalty has succeeded in this its serious and difficult undertaking, others than I must decide. But now that I have indicated to you my main problem, I can sketch to you my solution.

III.

My doctrine starts from the obvious fact that a moral individual, a person with rights and duties, is not born, but is made. He is the product of a long process of social adjustment and of inner consciousness, through which we all pass in childhood and in youth. His moral freedom, his private judgment, his rights, – all these are not original but are acquired characters of his personality. His conscience is not the root nor yet the source, [sic: “,” should be “;”] it is rather the result, the flower, of his moral life. He is not born self-conscious, nor yet at birth, is he free, or dutiful, or conscientious. He wins these qualities, if at all, then only through the aid of a long social training. On the other hand, no social training can make a moral personality unless, at each step of the process, the embryonic moral individual within, [sic: unnecessary “,”] himself coöperates in the process, – becomes, as they say, self-active, takes over the moral motives and makes them his own, – wins individuality through somehow coming into a voluntarily chosen unity with his social world. My Philosophy of Loyalty has especially to do with the motives that enable any growing moral agent so to assimilate what society teaches him that he makes it his own, and thus becomes morally creative and not merely plastic to social influences, – becomes free instead of [15] remaining the puppet of his social order, and so gradually reaches the dignity of being worthy to have individual rights.

Every normal child lives out his early social life in a well known but baffling conflict between love and greed, between sociability and contentiousness, between kindliness and hostility, between helpless moral dependence and vigourously wilful rebellion. In this conflict of motives lies the basis for the moral life. What is it that most helps a child, or a youth to find himself, and also to discover the true meaning of what we call duty? To this question I answer: That which most helps the child, still more the youth, to become conscious both of moral values in general, and of the worth and dignity of his own personality in particular, is the appearance in his life of some socially suggested cause which arouses his Loyalty. By a cause I mean something of the nature of a club, a family, a friendship, a love affair, – any social tie that fascinates one and so binds one. Loyalty, whenever it begins in our life, tends at once to solve the natural conflicts between the rights of the individual and the demands of the social order. Meanwhile [missing “,”] Loyalty always makes our own individuality more intense and more significant. It not only binds us. It glorifies us. And therefore, I insist, it is loyalty which always tends, upon any level of the moral life to which we have attained, to help us further in our efforts both to become moral individuals, and also to harmonize our individual rights, and our private [17] judgment, with the requirements of our social order. Loyalty helps us at once to know our rights, to win them, and to define them so as to harmonize them with our duties.
Let me at once illustrate: A careless, a selfish, if you will a bad boy, becomes interested in games that involve what is called team play. The vigor and skill demanded for these games at first attract him. At the outset this attraction is simply the elemental fondness of the human animal for strength, and control, and glory. With a selfish love for victory and for praise, the boy tries to win a place in teams that play his favorite games. What is the result? Very soon this careless rebel changes into an earnest little hero. He learns to prize a laborious and self-sacrificing [sic: missing “-”] activity just for the sake of his team. What he began with a greedy love of triumph [18] and of prominence, he continues under conditions that may be wearisome, discouraging, physically painful, morally strenuous. I know men – highly trained and effectively righteous – who attribute their own first real moral awakening, in later childhood or in youth, to the influence of such team play. The results of such early loyalty to the team may be life long, and may prove to be the making of a thoroughly heroic moral personality. It is indeed no part of my present teaching to exaggerate the value of physical sports, or to deny the evils that, in modern times, are so often associated with [19] them. But from the ethical point of view, what is especially good about them is the team-loyalty that they foster. And what now interests me about this team-loyalty is that the boy or the youth who is once given over to its influence, develops [sic] a whole collection of virtues which, without such a motive, he might never think of developing. He was wilful and rebellious. But to his team and its leader he now becomes strictly obedient. He was a pleasure seeker; he now becomes ready to endure weariness and wounds. He was hasty tempered. He becomes cool and patient in the conduct of the game. He was impulsive. He becomes persistent, steady, devoted. [20] He once hated rules; now he turns into a very pedant in his insistence on and submission to the rules of the game. He once looked out for himself. He is now given over to the welfare of the little social order which constitutes his team. In brief he learns to solve a large number of personal problems which have to do with the natural conflicts between the individual and the social order. In particular, he no longer is over concerned about his private rights, as against his duties to the team, for the right that he most prizes is just the right to play on his team; and that right he wins and keeps by strenuous self-sacrifice, by service, by obedience, by patience, by what seems to him dutifulness. And [21] as for his private judgment, he learns to judge as the team judges; and this he longs to be able to do.

Here is merely one of countless instances of what you might call embryonic loyalty. It may be crude loyalty. It may be opposed to many actual obligations that we, who are older, view as incumbent upon the boy in question. For the sake of his team the boy may neglect his studies, or may trouble his home through his forgetfulness of home ties. But these are evils due to the mere narrowness of the team-loyalty. In itself this [22] loyalty, so far as it goes, is moralizing. And it is moralizing because it furnishes a positive solution for the natural conflict between the individual and society.

The solution in question is this: – Loyalty, when it appears in life, is a sort of obsession, which taking possession of an individual says: “When you serve this cause – this team, or other object of loyalty, – your whole personal advantage lies in the heartiness and effectiveness of your
service. Hence, when you are required to act so or so in the service of your cause, obedience to this requirement is not a giving up of your private will to a restraining outside force, but is rather a winning of what you yourself most want. Self-sacrifice for the cause is for you identical with your personal success. You want to toil, to be weary, to have hard work, – perhaps even to suffer and die for your cause. For your cause is just your own self writ large. It is your life, your soul, your opportunity, your fulfillment. Hence you need no longer talk of freedom or of rights as if they were opposed to service and to duty. Your dearest right is the right to serve. And for you the service of your cause is perfect freedom.

IV.

I have begun by mentioning such embryonic forms of loyalty. What I further maintain is that, through the higher development of just such loyalty, we all of us win whatever morality we possess that is not merely blind instinct, or mere habit, or slavish conventionality. Tell me to what you are loyal, and why, – and you tell me at once just what constitutes the really moral aspect of your personality. All the rest is chance, or fortune, or prejudice or barren routine. Tell me, again, wherein and whereto you are loyal, and you at once explain to me how far you have personally solved the problem about the conflict between private judgments and social conventions, between personal rights, and social duties. For if and in so far as you are loyal, your cause it is which defines for you your rights. And your personal rights are sacred in your eyes just because your cause assigns them to you as the treasure that you must protect for the sake of the cause. The parable of the talents defines, for the loyal, the whole significance that they can attach to the word rights. A personal right of yours is something which your accepted master, – namely, the cause to which you are devoted, – has left with you for safekeeping and for use. Your right belongs to you, – yes, but only as the talent to the servant in the parable. When the Lord, – your cause, – comes again, that Lord will require the talent of you with usury. That is why you defend your rights, because they are entrusted to you by and for the sake of the cause. Thus your principal right is just the right to serve the cause. And therefore, as a loyal person, you know of no conflicts between rights and duties. The problem as to personal rights is solved, – solved by the spirit of loyalty. You defend your rights merely as the mother would defend her infant from the enemy. Such defense is at once absolute self-assertion, and absolute self-sacrifice. Your rights are your duties to the cause; and your duties are, in the end, your only rights.

It is precisely so with the other problem of individualism, – viz., with the problem as to the freedom of private judgement. The loyal person wants to judge only as the cause needs to have him judge. Of course he uses therefore his own judgment; but he uses it with a perfectly objective principle to guide him. The cause is such and such. It requires this or this for its service. This is the truth. Therefore I must act thus and thus. I follow my conscience; but for me my cause is my conscience.

So it is that my philosophy of loyalty tries to explain that in the spirit of loyalty, and in that spirit alone, is to be found the solution of all our pressing modern problems about individualism in its war with convention and with authority. The first great rule of life is: Find a
cause, choose it as your cause, give yourself over to its willing service. Let your cause be one that can in your eyes be idealized, glorified, and let it be one in whose service your loyalty can constantly [30] grow and enlarge, and be enriched. If hereupon you steadily serve your cause and thus grow into the full spirit of loyalty, the essential moral problems of life will be solved for you as they arise. You will become a personality, with a choice and a will of your own; and you will become this the more, the more you serve the cause and devote yourself in complete self surrender [sic: missing “-”], to its furtherance.

Of course whoever hears my doctrine so far stated, asks at once: – To what cause shall I be loyal? [31] The answer to this question is critical for my whole Philosophy of Loyalty. But I can here only sketch my answer in its most general outlines.

First then, I answer: – Nobody can possibly determine for you precisely to what personal cause you yourself shall be loyal. That cause you must always choose for yourself. This is precisely the permanent truth about individualism. The choice of a special cause to which to be loyal is as much a matter of individual decision as is, let us say, such a special aspect of the choice [32] of your cause as is involved in choosing to marry or not to marry, or in choosing to whom to be wedded, or in choosing a profession or a dwelling place. You must choose. Nobody can choose for you. But this can be said: – It is indeed your duty to choose a cause to which you can be loyal, and to choose your cause so as to involve a lifetime’s devotion. Neither indecision nor fickleness nor unfaithfulness can ever be a part of duty. This does not mean that at the outset of life you can always fully know the whole meaning of the cause which you have chosen. But you can choose so that the choice involves a lifelong developement [sic] of loyalty.

Secondly, however, if the personal choice of a cause is a duty, such a duty can never be a matter of mere caprice. For the choice of a cause is subject to what I call the principle of “Loyalty to [33] Loyalty.” That is I hold, that you should so choose your cause, and so serve it, that thereby your neighbors, and mankind generally, may be helped to be loyal, in their own way, and loyal to their own personal causes, rather than hindered in their own developement [sic] of the spirit of loyalty. There are forms of personal loyalty which would, to a wise insight, prove to be destructive of the general progress of the spirit of loyalty amongst your friends or neighbors, or amongst mankind generally. Such forms of loyalty are to be discouraged, and, if necessary, destroyed. For to whatever else you are [34] loyal, you are human, and you cannot be sincerely and thoroughly and reasonably loyal if your loyalty preys upon that of humanity in general. Thus both your right and your duty to choose your personal cause are subject to strict general principles.

Thirdly, you have to remember that, while loyalty includes personal affections of very various grades of intimacy and intensity, the spirit of loyalty is never identical with any one personal affection. For you can be loyal only to a cause. And a cause is something which binds many individuals in the unity of one spirit, as the family or as the church does. Hence in choosing your cause, you may never identify it with your personal devotion to any one individual. Love goes along [35] with loyalty. But love for any one human being is never the whole of loyalty. True love is simply the warm light which loyalty throws over your relations to
your fellow servants in a common cause. Thus mother love when it is a true and loyal love, is
simply the will that the child should in time become, through the services that mother love offers,
a faithful fellow servant of the common cause, – of the home, of the family, of the social order,
of humanity. No love that is not inspired by a loyalty that is larger than any merely individual
affection, is an offering worthy [36] of the person to whom it devotes itself. In turn, you yourself
want nobody’s love who does not view you as such a fellow servant of a common loyalty. And
that is the principle which gives meaning to the well known knightly phrase: –

I could not love thee dear so much,
Loved I not honor more.

The three principles now stated: – Choose your own personal cause, choose it and serve it
so as to further the general loyalty of all mankind, and choose it so that it includes all your
personal affections, but transcends each and every one [37] of them, so that your loyalty is at
once personal and superpersonal in its whole spirit, – these principles, as I hold, furnish practical
guides for the conduct of daily life. If we follow them, we tend to a constant enlargement and
enrichment both of our inner loyal disposition and of our knowledge of the cause that we serve.
And thus we gradually come to know that all the loyal are bretheren [sic] of one whole order, the
invisible church of those who try to live in the spirit, and to prepare the way for the visible
triumph of the universal [38] cause, – the harmony of mankind, the unity of all life in the

“One undivided Soul of many a soul,
Whose Nature is its own supreme control,
Where all things flow to all, as rivers to the sea.”

In opposing these principles to the principles of simple Individualism, that is to the
principle of the freedom of individual judgment in moral matters, and to the principle of the
inalienable rights of each individual, I feel that I do not destroy those principles of individualism,
but that I rather show how they may be fulfilled precisely in so far as they are rational. I have
the [39] one inalienable right to be loyal, in my own way, to the cause of the furthering of
universal loyalty amongst mankind. This is my one right. But it is also my duty. I am free to
judge as best I can by what special form of loyalty I can best serve the universal cause. But my
freedom means no [“not”?] caprice, and is not the freedom to follow merely wayward intuitions.
It is the freedom to see with my own eyes the truth about my station and its duties. This truth
itself does not depend upon my private choice. I must steadfastly try to see the moral truth as it
is.

[40] V.

You will excuse the foregoing too lengthy outline of my general moral philosophy, I
hope, by the fact that it is the best introduction which I find myself able to make to the solution
of certain well known practical problems of life, – problem [sic: “problems” – note that Royce
clearly started with the singular in his thought and emended to the plural, evidenced by
additions and omissions] which I have indicated in my title, and problems which will concern
us both in this lecture and in the next. The problems in question are peculiar to the life and to the
spirit of loyal people. They are problems that do not exist for disloyal folk, nor yet for ethical
individualists. They are the problems which arise when two or more distinct causes, to the service of which a loyal man or woman is already more or less completely committed, appear to come into conflict with one another, or appear to make conflicting commands upon their loyal servant. In such cases the question arises, To what one of these causes shall I be loyal in the particular act now in question? I cannot deal with such problems without presupposing a whole philosophy of loyalty. Hence I have had to restate such a philosophy in order to deal with my later problems intelligently. Loyalty, from its very nature, is an active virtue. And action, however serene may be the spirit which gives to it life and unity, must often, in this imperfect world, include and face conflict. The loyal life is a warfare with evil. But often the evil that it meets belongs not only to the outer, but also to the inner world. Our ignorance, our blindness, may be foes to our effective loyalty. With the most loyal intentions, we may find ourselves perplexed, or drawn this way and that, in our efforts to be just to all the various, and conflicting demands which loyalty itself seems to set before us. The reasons why this sort of conflict can arise, lie very deep in the very nature of the undertakings of any loyal human being.

For, as is easy to see, the cause to which I am loyal, the task of my life, can never be anything simple. On the one side, since I am by nature and by virtue of my social situation, at once member of a family, and of a community, a friend of various and often of mutually hostile people, a citizen of a state, a person with a calling, and so on, – any plan for living my own loyal life will involve carrying on these various functions in some sort of harmony and inner unity. But often, as we all know, public and private duties, home life, and membership in a community, my calling as a breadwinner and my interest in the general welfare, and still other interests that equally appeal to the loyal spirit, seem to make conflicting calls upon me. On the other side, however, even if I am sure as to how my home duties and my calling, and the rest, are to be practically harmonized from my own point of view, my loyal life constantly brings me into dealings with a great variety of people, some of whom are my fellow servants in causes already recognized by all concerned, while others are strangers. Of these latter, some are themselves loyal in their own way, while others are foes to loyalty. These people will often view duty and life as I do not. But, as one loyal to the general loyalty, I am called upon to choose and to serve my cause so as to be just to all these people. The result will often be that my loyalty to the common cause will involve me in conflicts which may seem, in many ways, opposed to the very spirit of loyalty itself. Yet I must live through such conflicts, and must loyally work out my service to my cause despite doubt and ignorance. In all such cases I am likely to find myself in the presence of what seem to be conflicting loyalties. How shall I decide?

In my recent efforts to teach and to apply the Philosophy of Loyalty, I have endeavored to get from my students and hearers as many examples as I could of such conflicts between various forms of loyalty. Last year, when as visiting professor, I taught a class in Ethics at Yale University, I asked my students, a group of about forty young men, – some of them undergraduates, others divinity students and graduate students of philosophy, – to write me essays upon cases of apparently conflicting loyalties, the cases to be drawn from their own
experience or reading. I have made similar calls upon my Summer School and other classes, for some years. And various friends of mine have added from time to time their own statements of Cases of Conscience involving the conflict of loyalties. Let me present to you some illustrations from the material thus collected. The problems involved have their own charm, even apart from their ethical interest, [47] just because they illustrate so well the vicissitudes of life.

The type of cases most easily illustrated, and most frequently presented to me for discussion, is the well known type of the more or less loyally intended lie. The prisoner of war is questioned by the enemy about the state of the besieged fortress. Some of the questions, perhaps, he cannot merely evade. If he refuses to answer, his refusal may be taken as a confession of something that it is his duty to conceal if he can. If he answers truly, he is disloyal to his country. Shall he then lie? But lying always appears to involve a deliberate disloyalty to an universal human cause, the cause of reasonable human intercourse generally. [48] Hence the loyal spirit necessarily involves a certain deep aversion to lying. Even in war the lying use of a flag of truce is universally condemned, and the spy, who serves his own cause by a systematic deceit, is not taken to be an honorable foe nor viewed as worthy of a soldier’s death. Where then is the limit of lying addressed to the public enemy? Is it right for the prisoner of war, when questioned, to lie? If so, does the spy’s loyalty to his country excuse his treacherous disloyalty to the cause that, when he visits the enemy’s country as a seeming friend, he appears to espouse. [sic: “?”] And if the spy is in the right, why is the false use of the flag of truce an intolerable treachery? Was our own Funston a loyal man when, treacherously coming in the guise of surrender as a prisoner of war, he offered his hand to Aguinaldo, as to his conqueror and then unmasked [49] as the leader of an armed band?

But lying, as we know, and lying that at least professes to be loyal, is not confined to war. A young woman is questioned regarding her reported engagement, when the fact is not yet common property. Loyalty to various causes may require her to keep a secret which, in this case, is not wholly her own property. Yet, if she refuses to answer the questioner, the refusal is a confession. Is it loyal for her to lie, and impressively deny the fact of the engagement? Still more critical, at such a moment, may be the position of her lover. She, perhaps for very good reasons, has required him to keep the engagement, for the present, a secret. Does not loyalty forbid his breaking her command even if he can only keep her command by becoming [50] for the time a liar. [sic: “?”]

Or again (herewith I touch upon a case presented to me by an undergraduate), an elder brother learns that his younger brother, now at a preparatory school, has become a little wild, has fallen into bad company, gambles a little, drinks more than is good for him, and is in general in danger. The elder brother is ready to use his influence to get the younger out of mischief. The elder brother has himself now securely outgrown his own former vices. He has risen on stepping stones of his dead self to higher things. He hopes, he in fact foresees, with his own securely mature vision, that the younger brother will do the like. Only, – their father is an austere man, intolerant of wild oats, – easily provoked, – persistent in discipline, – with no tenderness for youthful follies. If father finds out [51] the facts, he will at once withdraw the younger brother
from school, will set him to some plain sort of hard work, will trust him no more, will give him no further chance for a higher education. All this the elder brother, who of course has as mature an insight into the ways of his father as he has into the ways of the world, – all this the elder brother clearly perceives. But things can be concealed from father, who of course asks questions, only in case one deceives father. Is it not loyal to do so? Someday father will of course learn the truth, but the younger brother too will have become by that time serenely mature and worldly wise, like the elder, and father will be glad to have been kept out mischief at a critical moment by so loyally fraternal and filial a device.

[52] I need not remind you that both a father and a mother not infrequently face similar problems when one of them knows about the wayward son what the other does not yet know or is supposed not yet to know. In such cases the sense of conflicting loyalties may become extremely pathetic. It may be complicated by a mutual distrust that the father and mother feel, each regarding the other’s judgment or tenderness, or toleration, or power to bear painful news. And like all tragedies, this familiar complication of home life may assume grotesquely comic forms. The pathetic and the sacred come to stand in such cases [53] so near to the ridiculous.

I remember a family, dwelling in a distant community, with whose more or less wayward but still not unaffectionate nor wholly undutiful son I once had, for a little time, to deal. When I talked with the boy, he very often said: – “Oh, this I dare not tell father and mother; they do not know; they could not understand; but” –. And when I saw the father, he expounded, with comparative accuracy, his boy’s case, which was transparent enough, and added: “Now I never tell my wife; it would kill her; but you see” –. And when it fell to my lot to interview the mother, she was indeed mother-wise enough about her son; but she also was disposed to say: “Now my husband does not know; he cannot compre- [54] hend the boy; you must not tell him; but” –. And so these very human and on the whole admirable people not only lived in their own conflicts of loyalty, but constantly put upon me also, during my brief dealings with them, a certain conflict of loyalties of my own. They were really all of them wanting to do something for the common cause; but they conspired, so to speak, to make it, if possible, my duty to lie to all three of them simply for the sake of keeping secret, from each, what they all substantially knew. In such grotesque ways do our loyalties not infrequently appear to play hide and seek with one another.

If one adds the well known problem as to whether loyalty requires one to lie to the hostess, whose entertainment has actually bored one, by uttering the conventional expressions of delight, – one [55] descends from the heights of the heroic lying of the captive in war, to the seeming trivialities of daily life; but one does not escape from the apparent conflict of loyalties.

Another and related type of cases, frequently insisted upon by my students, concerns the moral consequences which ensue when a change of religious faith, or that loss of religious faith which is nowadays so frequent an incident of early personal development [sic], has taken place. Loyalty to the truth at large seems to require that one should avow one’s opinions, and live them out openly. But perhaps one is a beloved son, whose Roman Catholic or whose Evangelical Protestant parents, or whose family devoted to the old world Judaism of the Ghetto, would view
the change of faith, or the liberalism in question, with horror. Or perhaps one is already a clergyman, in office, whose repetition of the creed can be privately interpreted by himself, and whose sermons can use traditional formulas, which he can employ in one sense, while his hearers understand them in another. Loyalty to the church as a social institution, as a means of doing good, seems to the clergyman in question to counsel silence as to points of difference, concealment of untraditional opinions, and a more or less conscious and persistent double dealing. But loyalty to mankind in general seems to demand that we should be perfectly trustworthy in what we say, if indeed we say anything, about our belief in sacred or in supernatural matters. The resulting conflict is nowadays common enough.

Very frequent, amongst the cases of conscience proposed to me, are the conflicting loyalties of lovers. A familiar basis for romances furnishes an example. A young woman of wealth and social station, fully old enough to choose for herself, has found at length the lover who, in her opinion, is able to help her to make life worth living. In an older civilization the conflict of loyalty hereupon resulting might take the form of the Romeo & Juliet tragedy, or that of the comedy of the eloping princess or heiress. But in our social order the family of our heroine, at her age, have comparatively little power, no authority, to prevent her by any restraint from marrying a man whose worldly position is not on a par with her own, but who is a perfectly respectable, and, for all that I know, a really worthy lover. So with us, the family simply move heaven and earth to prove to the young woman that family loyalty viewed just as an ideal requires her not to leave her own circle, where, as they insist, worthy lovers in plenty are to be found. As a fact, the motives of the family, in such cases, are not mainly sordid. They love her. They mean her best good. But their own social view is a limited one. And they cannot conceive how a lover so far removed from their own favorite standards of life can be the fit husband for her. They plead the claims of loyalty to themselves. This, of course is an old story. Doch wird es immer neu, as Heine says. Our interest in it is the moral problem of loyalty involved. It suggests countless types of family problems such as you all in one way or another know. Loyalty to the aged or invalid parents, whose welfare is opposed to the marriage of their son or of their daughter furnishes a still more familiar problem to the lovers who want to be true to one another, but not to be selfish, and not to be undutiful to their parents.

Yet lovers do not always remain true to one another. And thereupon the way opens wide to the endless problems of conflicting loyalty which arise when hearts have once mingled and when love leaves the well-built nest, and when, as a result, somebody discovers, or imagines that he, or she discovers, a duty of loyalty to the new love before the lover in question has quite gotten rid of the old love. My students and friends have proposed to me a variety of such problems illustrated by special cases. You may consult endless poems, and romances, and records of family tragedies, for other cases.

If one finally turns from these cases to the official and professional and business conflicts of loyalty, one observes still another endless variety of problems, whose ethical character, for our philosophy of loyalty, is after all much the same. A variety of causes may claim me as their own. I may already be committed in some sense to each. In such cases I may stand where many
of the young West Pointers stood at the outset of the Civil War. Is the Federal Government, or is the State, my true cause? Who is my true beloved. [sic: “?”] To whom is my troth pledged?

[62] I have thus illustrated the problem of the conflict of loyalties. What principles shall we use in solving such problems? I have promised you in my general introduction a simplification of the ideals of life and of our conceptions of duty. You may reproach me now, at the conclusion of my lecture, with having led you in all appearance deeper into the wilderness of mystery and of complication. Well, I told [63] you at the outset, that whatever else, as teacher of philosophy, I attempted to do, I should try to make you think for yourselves. As a fact, the principles that guide loyal people in meeting such problems are not so mysterious, nor so complex, nor so doubtful [missing “as”] my discourse may at the moment have made them seem. Those principles are near to you all. Think of them, I pray you. There is little need, after all for me to announce them. You already possess them. – The solution of such problems constitutes the Art of Loyalty. And of that Art, in my next discourse, I am summarily to treat. [64] I beg you to anticipate my poor abstract reasoning processes by the wisdom of your own consciences, and then to try to formulate in your own words this wisdom. Then, as I am assured, I shall have little to teach you. It will be reward enough if, by this mere statement of problems I have led you to teach yourselves.