

VITA
Subir Kumar Chakrabarti

PERSONAL

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Iowa, 1985
M.S. in Mathematics, University of Iowa, 1985
M.A. in Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1978
B.Sc. (Honours) in Economics, N.E.H.U., India, 1976

WORK EXPERIENCE

Faculty of the Graduate College, Purdue University, since 2009
Professor, Department of Economics, IUPUI, since August 1998
Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, August 2008 – May 2009.
Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, spring semester, 2002
Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Stanford University, February-June 2001
Visiting Professor of Economics, Cornell University, August 2000 – January 2001
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, IUPUI, August 1991 to August 1998
Visiting Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, August 1992 to August 1993
Faculty of the Graduate College, Indiana University, since 1994
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, IUPUI, January 1986 to July 1991
Visiting Assistant Professor at MEDS, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University 1986-1987
Graduate Assistant, Department of Economics, University of Iowa, 1981-1985
Junior Research Fellow, Presidency College, Calcutta, 1979-1981

HONORS, GRANTS AND AWARDS:

1. Guest Speaker at the 17th Annual Mathematics Contest, IUPUI, May 2009
1. Nominated to Marquis's Who's Who in the World 2000
2. Book Writing Grant from Oxford University Press, 1998
3. NSF course development grant 1996-1997
4. Faculty Spotlight Speaker, School of Liberal Arts and Science, September 1994
5. SLA summer grant 1986, 1988, 1989
6. Member of *Phi Beta Kappa*, 1985

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Publications

“A Proof of the Existence of the Minimax Point of a Strategic Game,” with C. D. Aliprantis and I. Topolya. Forthcoming in *Economics Letters*.

“Collusive Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopolies with Unknown Costs,” in *International Economic Review*, Forthcoming.

“Hyperbolic Dynamics in Nash Maps,” with Robert Becker, Will Geller, Bruce Kitchens, Michal Misiurewicz. Forthcoming in *Proceedings of the ICDEA (International Conference on Difference Equations and Applications)*.

“Dynamics of the Nash Map in the Game of Matching Pennies,” with Robert Becker, Will Geller, Bruce Kitchens, Michal Misiurewicz.: *Journal of Difference Equations and Applications*, Vol. 13, Nos. 2-3, February-March 2007, 223-235.

“Game Theory in Decision Making,” with C. D. Aliprantis, Chapter 21 in *Decision Making in Engineering Design*, edited by Wei Chen, Kemper Lewis and Linda Schmidt. ASME Press, New York, 2006.

“Satisficing Behavior, Nash Equilibrium and Brouwer’s Fixed-Point Theorem,” with Robert Becker in *Economic Theory*, 26, 2005, 63-85

“Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games with a Continuum of Players,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 39, 2003, 693-724

“Markov Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 85, 1999, 294-327

“Finite and Infinite Action Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 32, 1999, 243-266

“Taxation and Trade in Ordered Market Chains,” Co-authored with Edi Karni, *Journal of Public Economics*, volume 64, 1997, pages 241-258

“The Recursive Core,” with Robert Becker, *Econometrica*, 63, 1995, pages 401-423

“Uncertain Altruism and Investment in Children,” with William Lord and Peter Rangazas, *American Economic Review*, 83, 1993, pages 994-1002

“Equilibrium in Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Information,” *Economic Theory*, 1992, vol. 2, pages 481-494

“Equilibria of Large Games with Imperfect Observability,” with M. Ali Khan, *Positive Operators, Riesz Spaces and Economics*, edited by Aliprantis, C. D., Border, K. C., and W.A.J. Luxemburg, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1991

“Finite Complexity and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games,” *Economics Letters*, 35, 1991, pages 355-358

“Characterizations of the Equilibrium Payoffs of Inertia Supergames,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, vol. 51, No. 1, June 1990, pages 171-183

“Refinements of the β -core and Strong Equilibrium and the Aumann Proposition,” 1988 *International Journal of Game Theory*, vol. 17, Issue 3, pages 205-222.

Books

Games & Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2000, with C.D. Aliprantis

Book Reviews

Chakrabarti, S.K. & Ichiishi, T., Review of “Refinements of Nash Equilibrium,” by Eric Van Damme in *Zentralblatt Fur Mathematik*, vol. 50, 1985.

Chakrabarti, S. K., Review of “Transition and Economic Development in India” by Anjan Chakrabarti and Stephen Cullenberg and “India’s Emerging Economy: Performance and Prospects in the 1990s and Beyond,” Kaushik Basu (ed) in *Comparative Economic Studies*, 2006, 48, 706-710.

Chakrabarti, Subir, Review of “Economic Reform in China and India By Joseph Chai and Kartik Roy in *Comparative Economic Studies*, 2007, 49, 480-481.

Working Papers

“A Refinement of a Core Concept,” January, 1989

“Finite Complexity, Bounded Recall and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games,” August, 1991

“Measurable Selections and an Alternative Proof of the Blackwell-Maitra Theorem in Discounted Dynamic Programming,” August 1993

“Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Agents in an Intertemporal Model of Investment and Saving,” Current version-May 2002

“Information Revelation and Collusion in Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Current version-May 2005

Recent Working Papers and Works in Progress

1. “Robustness of the Competitive Equilibrium: Better Response Maps and Equilibrium Points.” April 2008.

2. “Dynamics of 2 by 2 Games,” work in progress. With Robert A. Becker, Michal Misiurewicz, Bruce Kitchens, William Geller.

3. “Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with Concave Transition Probabilities.”

4. “Non-expected Utilities and Equilibrium n Games,” with Robert Becker

5. Second Edition of Games and Decision Making. With C. D. Aliprantis.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Refereeing

Referee for *Games and Economic Behavior*, *International Economic Review*, *National Science Foundation*, *Economic Theory*, *International Journal of Game Theory*, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, *American Economic Review*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Mathematics of Operations Research*, *Rand Journal of Economics*

Organization of Conferences

Organized the “Spring 2004 Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Conference.” This was held at IUPUI in April 2004.

Seminar Presentations:

“Collusive Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopolies with Unknown Costs,” Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, January 2009

“Robustness of the Competitive Equilibrium: Better Response Maps and Equilibrium Points,” Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, November 2008

“Optimal Collusion in Cournot Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic and State University, Blacksburg, West Virginia, April 2007

“Optimal Collusion in Cournot Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, October 2006

“Collusive Equilibrium in Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Department of Economics, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, February 2004

“Collusive Equilibrium in Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, April 2001

“Collusive Equilibrium in Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Department of Economics, Arizona State University, March 2001

“Collusive Equilibrium in Oligopolies with unknown costs,” Department of Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, January 2001

“Equilibrium in Stochastic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Agents,” Department of Economics, Stanford University, Palo Alto, March 2001

“Equilibrium in Stochastic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Agents,” Department of Economics, Cornell University, November 2000

“Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Unknown Types,” Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, April 2000

“Equilibrium in Stochastic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Agents,” Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, April 2000

“Equilibrium in Stochastic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Agents,” Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, March 2000

“Markov Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games,” NSF funded workshop on the Nucleolus and Stochastic Games, University of Illinois-Chicago, Chicago, October 1997

“Markov Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games,” Theory and Industrial Organization workshop of Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, October, 1997

“Markov Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games,” Theory workshop of Department of Economics, University of Illinois, April 1997

“Equilibrium in Dynamic Games: Concepts and Solutions,” Theory workshop of Department of Economics, Indiana University, December, 1996

“Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with a Continuum of Players,” NSF-NBER Decentralization Conference, University of Alabama, April, 1996

“Taxation and Trade in Ordered Market Chains,” Theory Workshop, Department of Economics, Purdue University, October, 1995

“Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games with weak* Continuous Transition Probabilities,” Microeconomics Workshop of Johns Hopkins University, January 1993

“Finite Complexity, Bounded Recall and the Folk Theorem in Repeated games,” Department of Economics, Indiana University, October, 1990

“Dynamic Games: Related Equilibrium Concepts; Their Existence and Characterization,” Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, March 30, 1990

“The Recursive Core,” Department of Economics, University of Cincinnati, November, 1989

“On the Existence of Perfect Equilibrium points in Discrete-Time Dynamic Games,” Theory Workshop of the Department of Economics, Purdue University, September, 1987

“On the Existence of Perfect Equilibrium Points in Discrete-Time Dynamic Games,” Theory workshop of the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, November, 1987

Presentations at National and International Conferences:

“Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with Concave Transition Probabilities,” *Third World Congress of Game Theory*, Northwestern University, July 2008.

“Collusive Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopolies with Unknown Costs,” *North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society*, Duke University, June 2007.

“Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games with Incomplete Information about Payoffs,” *Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society*, London, UK, August, 2005.

“Stationary Equilibrium in Stochastic Games,” *North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, 2002*, University of California, Los Angeles, June 2002.

“Information Revelation and Collusion in Oligopolies with Unknown Costs,” *XVIII Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society*, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2001.

“Equilibrium in Stochastic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Agents,” *Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society*, Seattle, Washington, August 2000.

“Markov Equilibrium in a Stochastic Growth Model,” *Current Trends in Economic theory and Labor Market Effects*, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), Rhodes, Greece, July 1999

“Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with a Continuum of Players,” *New Directions in the Theory of Market and Games*, The Fields Institute, University of Toronto, October 1995

“Pure Strategy Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games with a Continuum of Players,” *Current Trends in Economic Theory and its Applications*, Cephalonia, Greece, May, 1995

“Pure Strategy Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Many Players,” *The Annual South-Eastern Economic Theory and International Trade Conference*, University of Virginia, October, 1994

“Pure Strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with Many Player,” *International Conference in Game Theory*, SUNY Stony Brook, July, 1994

“Stationary Strategies in Stochastic Games,” *The South-Eastern Economic Theory and International Trade Conference*, Duke University, October 1993

“Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games with weak* Continuous Transition Probabilities,” *The 20th Annual E.A.R.I.E. Conference*, Tel-Aviv, Israel, September 1993

“Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games with weak* Continuous Transition Probabilities,” *Mid-West Mathematical Economics Meetings*, Fall of 1992, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

“Finite Complexity, Bounded Recall and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games,” *International Conference on Game Theory and Economics*, SUNY at StonyBrook, July 1991

“Finite Complexity, Bounded recall and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games,” *The North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society*, June 1991, University of Pennsylvania

“Equilibria in Large Games with Imperfect Observability,” *International Conference on Game Theory and Economic Applications*, December 1990, ISI New Delhi, India

“Equilibria in Large Games with Imperfect Observability,” *The Columbus Summer 1990 Edwin Smart Symposium on Games and Economic Behavior*, July 1990

“Equilibria in Large Games with Imperfect Observability,” *International Conference on Game Theory and Economics*, SUNY at StonyBrook, July 1990

“The Recursive Core,” *The Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society*, August, 1990, Barcelona, Spain

“The Recursive Core,” *Edwin Smart Symposium on Games and Economic Behavior*, Columbus, Ohio, July 1989. The Paper is co-authored with Robert Becker of Indiana University, Bloomington

“On the Existence of Equilibria in a Class of Discrete-Time Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information,” *1989 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1989

“On the Existence of Equilibria in a Class of Discrete-Time Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information,” *Third International Conference in Mathematical Game Theory*, Oberwolfach, W. Germany, January 1989

“On the Existence of Equilibria in a Class of Discrete-Time Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information,” *International Conference in Game Theory in Honor of Lloyd Shapley*, Ohio State University, July 1988

“Strong, Perfect Equilibrium Points of Inertia Supergames,” *International Conference on Game Theory and Applications*, Ohio State University, June 1987

“Infinite Horizon Games with Perfect Equilibrium Points,” *International Conference on Game Theory and Applications*, Ohio State University, June 1987.

“The α -core: Definition and Existence” *Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society*, New-York, 1985

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