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Professor Subir Chakrabarti

Education:
Ph.D. in Economics, University of Iowa, 1985
M.S. in Mathematics, University of Iowa, 1985
M.A. in Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1978
B.Sc in Economics (Honors), N.E.H.U., India, 1976



Office: CA 525
Phone: 317.278.7215
imxl100@iupui.edu

Professor Chakrabarti studies the role that strategic behavior plays in determining market outcomes. This means that he investigates the incentives for firms to behave in certain ways. For example, will airlines collude to set specific prices, will internet companies increase market share even at the expense of current profits, will competing companies adopt similar strategies. His research also helps explain why some companies pro-actively engage in socially conscious activities even though they are not required by law to do so.

Society may want to understand the nature of very large firms and how they come to dominate their market place. Examples of such firms are Microsoft in computer software, Procter and Gamble in household goods, and Citibank in banking and finance. Understanding firm behavior is essential for determining whether a firm is very large due to good management or to illegal business practices.

Professor Chakrabarti’s current research projects include investigating whether there is a strategic behavior element in the savings decisions of individuals and investigating how insurance companies design contracts that appeal to individuals of the appropriate risk type.

Selected Publications:
    • “Dynamics of the Nash Map in the Game of Matching Pennies” with Bob Becker, William Geller, Bruce Kitchens, and Michal Misiurewiczis. Forthcoming in Journal of Difference Equations and Applications.
    • "Game Theory in Decision Making" with C.D. Aliprantis. Decision Making in Engineering Design,chapter 21, edited by Wei Chen and Kemper Lewis, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 2006.
    • "Satisficing Behavior, Nash Equilibrium and Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem"Economic Theory 26, 2005, 63-85.
    • "Pure Strategy Markov Equilibrium in Discounted Stochastic Games with a Continuum of Players", The Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 39 , 693-724, 2003.
    • "Games and Decision Making", with C.D. Aliprantis, Oxford University Press, 2000.
    • “Finite and Infinite Action Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 32, 243-266, 1999.
    • “Markov Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 85, 294-327, 1999.
    • “Taxation and Trade in Ordered Market Chains,” with Edi Karni, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 64, 41-258, 1997.
    • “The Recursive Core,” with Robert Becker, Econometrica, Vol. 63, 401-423, 1995.
    • “Uncertain Altruism and Investment in Children,” with William Lord and Peter Rangazas, American Economic Review, Vol. 83, 994-1002, 1993.
    • “Equilibrium in Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Information,” Economic Theory, 482- 494, 1992.
    • “Finite Complexity and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games,” Economics Letters, Vol. 35, 355-358, 1991.
    • “Characterization of the Equilibrium Payoffs of Inertia Supergames,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 51, No. 1, 171-183, June 1990.
    • “Refinements of the Beta-Core and Strong Equilibrium and the Aumann Proposition,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 17, No. 3, 205-224, 1988.