This is the first paper in a series of six, published in the Popular Science Monthly in 1877-1878. Though apparently thought of by Peirce as chapters towards a larger work, the six papers are tightly related and could equally be conceived as having the unity of a single book and should perhaps be thought of that way. Max Fisch suggested that ...
This is a digitized version of the paper as it originally appeared, which is in the public domain. However, we insert in the text both the page numbers of the version of the paper which appears in the recent chronological edition of Peirce's work, Writings of Charles S. Peirce (Indiana University Press), and the paragraph numbers of the version of it in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Harvard University Press). These numbers are shown within parentheses in the text and on the corresponding "buttons" in the jump-tables, e.g. "W2.49" means page 49 of Volume 2 in the Writings of Charles S. Peirce and "CP1.545" means paragraph 545 in Volume 1 of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.|
The rationale is to keep referential practices in on-line publication and discussion consistent with the practices that have developed prior to this in referring to passages in Peirce's work, and the papers in this set are almost always referenced by scholars as they appear in one of those two versions. (Since the pagination of the journal in which it originally appeared is never used in scholarly reference, it is not included here.) This eliminates the need for including special pagination for the on-line digital version of this set of papers.
Conventions and practices of scholarly reference in on-line publication of Peirce's work in particular will have to be developed ad hoc because of the unusually various kinds of circumstances to be accounted for and the continuing development of the new medium. There should be a continuing attempt, though, toward the development of a small number of special paradigms that will eventuate in a reasonably simple and stable universal practice as regards Peirce in particular.