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  Final Version - MS L75.389-390  



      Comparing the two wings of the special sciences, i.e., psychognosy and physiognosy, and taking the history of their development as a basis, but correcting the history, as well as we can, in order to make it conform to what good logic and good economy would have made it, we get the idea of rational courses of development which these branches might have followed. Between these two there is a striking parallel; so that we can formulate a general rational course of inquiry. Now passing to the study of the history of special sciences, also modified by the same process, we find some traces of the same law; or to express it more clearly, it is as if the special science showed us one part of the general scheme under a microscope. By successively examining all the sciences in this way (or all I am sufficiently able to comprehend), we can fill in details and make the general formula more definite. We find here a succession of conceptions which we can generalize in some measure, but which we find it difficult to generalize very much without losing their peculiar "flavors." These I call the categories of the course of research. They have not the fundamental character of the categories of appearance, but appear, nevertheless, to be of importance.

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  From Draft E - MS L75.183  

      Endeavors to formulate a general method, as well as special methods as much generalized as possible. Studies the connection between, 1st, natural classification; 2nd, a general formula of evolution; 3rd, a general formula in the history of intellectual development; 4th, the general formula of the course of research. Inquires into the proper method of attacking the present question. There are results; but there remains much to be discovered.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.298-302  

      One must suspect that a close relation exists between this problem and that of classification; and since this one ought, one would think, to be connected with some law exhibiting itself in the history of science, we should expect a deep, sympathetic study of the history of science to throw a light on the secret of the categories of the classificatory hierarchy. It was owing to a hope that this might turn out to be the case, and that those hierarchical categories might have other useful applications, that I have bestowed great study on the history of science.

      The general course of the history of science has been something like this. The first scientific problems to be taken up were medicine, pneumatology, cosmogony, etc., which mostly seem hopeless today. The result was that some successes began to be attained in arithmetic and in the simplest parts of astronomy, and shortly there was some development of geometry. We find in Pythagoras the beginnings of a true science of the categories. His numbers were categories; that is, elements of the phenomenon; and they bear a certain general resemblance to my categories. The duality on which he so much insisted was my second category, that of reaction. His examples show this. He looked too much on the formal side of it, but this was a good fault. We next find the Greeks developing a most extraordinary understanding of esthetic truths. A little later, in Socrates, we meet with a lofty ethical science. Logic follows in Plato, thoroughly worked out in Aristotle. Metaphysics also takes important steps; and that of Aristotle (a mere reworking of Plato) is in some respects better than what is current today. We also find in Aristotle decided success in psychology, the doctrine of association being well stated. His mechanics was excessively bad. His biology very rudimentary. Then came further successes in the simpler parts of astronomy. Statics was established. Grammar became worked out. Thus the order of development was substantially, and quite minutely, that of my table of the classification of the sciences, which I drew up exclusively to express the present state of the sciences as living today. The only exception is that the beginnings of several descriptive sciences were made although I place them at the bottom. Omitting them, and also geometry, in which additions were continually [text obscure: ed.], the order was: arithmetic, the categories, esthetics, logic, metaphysics, psychology, statics, grammar.

      Modern science is to complex to permit any such arrangement. The general law is that of progress from the more abstract to the more concrete. The history of any well-developed science exhibits the same law. In optics, the doctrine of rays and perspective came first. The law of reflexion was early discovered. The law of refraction was the first modern discovery early in the 17th century. The velocity of light was ascertained in 1676. Polarization, diffraction, and dispersion were discovered about the same time, as well as phenomena which were really those of interference. Thus, the main phenomena were already known. The general theory of undulations was suggested by Huygens, and Hooke showed that it would explain the colors of thin plates. It was approved by Euler. But it was not until 1817 that Young saw the vibrations were transverse. The electrical theory of light dates from 1873.

      Here, therefore, a purely geometrical account of the phenomena of ordinary experience was worked out. Then the main phenomena were discovered and mathematically formulated. Then the formal theory of the constitution of light was lit upon and worked out mathematically, and finally the material theory of its constitution arose from a mathematical analysis of another branch of physics.

      I have accumulated a considerable store of truth concerning the course of scientific discovery of almost all branches; but I have not yet brought it into the form of a system, as I propose to do in this memoir.



  Final Version - MS L75.390-391  



      Singularly enough, it seems to have been left to me to make a first attempt to formulate in detail what a system of doctrine ought to be. I follow the same general heuretic method as in the memoir, No. 29, taking some of the most perfect systems extant, and imagining how they might be more rational. In this way I work out a series of conceptions which I term the categories of systems.



  Final Version - MS L75.391  



      I study classification, after some general considerations, by actually drawing up a number of classifications of the only sort of objects which we can sufficiently comprehend; that is to say, different classes of objects of human creation; such as, contrivances for keeping the skin warm, languages, words, alphabets, sciences, etc. From these I endeavor to elicit a general series of categories of classification.

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  From Draft E - MS L75.181-183  

      All classification is based on a purpose. If this purpose is the idea governing the production of the objects classified, the classification is "natural." Every class which embodies information, in the sense that something is true of all its members beyond what is involved in the definition of the class, is a natural class. All classes are more or less natural; and all classification is more or less natural. The study of classification has been largely pursued by me in the light of actual classifications of objects wholly or partially artificial, so that their real nature is less occult than that of the forms of nature. By objects partially artificial, I mean languages, sciences, customs of various kinds, etc. From these classifications I ought to be able to deduce an answer to the question whether there are any universal hierarchical categories of classification, like those of Agassiz. I have done an enormous amount of hard work that ought to bear on this question, without obtaining any clear response. I do not know whether to say anything about it in this memoir or not. It is an elusive question.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.288-298  

      In 1867 I worked out a theory of natural classification which I never published, because the naturalists did not seem to take to it. I had been a special student under Louis Agassiz for about six months, with a view to studying his method of classification, that subject being a branch of logic. Since then, I have endeavored to penetrate further into the matter, and I think with some success. I continue to think that the definition I then gave of an important character is just. Namely, if one asks a naturalist why he considers a character "important," he surely must give some reason: he cannot be content with saying that it impresses him as such. Now his reason will either be that this character involves certain others, as for example a particular likelihood to taking certain forms, or it will be that this character is of an order of characters, such, for example, as its relating to the skeleton of the animal, which are generally important. This importance must ultimately resolve itself into an importance of the first kind; so the importance consists in a character's universally carrying with it certain others, be those others no more than tendencies. The objection made by the naturalists was that above families, or some said above species, taxonomic characters do not generally carry others with them. But in saying this they were evidently limiting too much their conception of a character. For there must be some reason for regarding a character as important, and it is obvious that, in the last analysis, that means that the character imports some other. In fact, the true objection to the definition is not, as the naturalists said to me at that time, that so few characters are important, but, on the contrary, that all characters, even quite trivial ones, appear as important under that definition. This consideration leads, at once, to the needed correction of the conception of importance; and a very fundamental correction it is. Namely, it is that an important character must not only entrain others, but it must entrain another which has relation to the purpose in view. That brings us back to Agassiz's conception of natural classification, which all my study confirms me in holding to be correct. Namely, every classification whatsoever, be it merely arranging words in alphabetical order, has reference to some purpose, or some tendency to an end. By a tendency to an end, I mean that a certain result will be brought about, or approached, and in such a way that if, within limits, its being brought about by one line of mechanical causation be prevented, it will be brought about, or approached, by an independent line of mechanical causation. This definition is the one always virtually used by physiologists in determining whether there is a tendency to an end. Every classification has reference to a tendency toward an end. If this tendency is the tendency which has determined the class characters of the objects, it is something of which there is a unitary conception. Persons whose conceptions are in need of logical training may misunderstand the statement that the end is not brought about by mechanical force. This is because crude and incomplete notions of "energy" and mechanical force have so taken possession of empty heads that they do not perceive that according to the general equation of motion no state of things is due exclusively to the action of forces, because the equation of motion is merely a differential equation of the second order; so that there are six circumstances for each particle that are not due to force. Now in case these trillions of circumstances present any general character, as they always must, or the problem would not attract any attention, a general character of the result is due to other factors than force; and it very generally happens that the most important characters are due to other factors. Take, for example, the phenomenon of the diffusion of gases. Force has very little to do with it, the molecules not being appreciably under the influence of forces. The result is due to the statistics of the equal masses, the positions, and the motions of the molecules, and to a slight degree only upon force, and that only insofar as there is a force, almost regardless of its character, except that it becomes sensible only at small distances. These features of a gas, that it is composed of equal molecules distributed according to a statistical law, and with velocities also distributed according to a statistical law, is an intellectual character. Accordingly, the phenomenon of diffusion is a tendency toward an end; it works one way, and not the opposite way, and if hindered, within certain limits, it will, when freed, recommence in such way as it can. Not only is an end an intellectual idea, but every intellectual idea governing a phenomenon produces a tendency toward an end. It is very easy to see by a general survey of nature, that force is a subsidiary agency in nature. There ought, therefore, to be discoverable natural classifications in nature; and Agassiz was right in saying that such a classification must have reference to an intellectual idea. I need not say that the idea itself, like almost every profound and important idea of philosophy, was very old. It was Aristotle's, if not older. The theory of natural development is in nowise opposed to this, whatever flavor it may take, least of all in the Darwinian flavor. For natural development takes place in one way, not in the opposite way; and the Darwinian machinery for it is reproduction, which is manifestly a tendency to an end. The neo-Darwinians seem to wish to make reproduction and variation as mechanical as they can. This is a praiseworthy effort, because it must inevitably eventuate in making the truth more plain that they are not mechanical, in the sense of being governed mainly by force. I do not know enough about biology to entertain a definite opinion that the work of classification is now conducted by a wrong method. I only note that naturalists certainly entertain a number of opinions about classification which are not true of classification generally. But how far these errors affect their work, I do not know. I fancy that the study of nature must largely force the right ideas upon them largely.

      As a specimen of what I refer to as erroneous notions entertained by naturalists about classification, I may mention the idea that if two classes merge into one another they cannot be natural classes. If we turn to classifications of human works, where the true principles of natural classification are beyond question, we soon find this idea refuted. In order to illustrate this, I shall, in the memoir, discuss the weights found by Prof. Petrie at Naucratis, and admirably worked over by him. I show, by an application of the principles of probability, beyond all reasonable doubt and so clearly that every naturalist must see the force of this argument, that in certain cases, where weights were intended to conform to two different standards, a weight intended to conform to the lighter standard was heavier than another weight intended to conform to the heavier standard. We can even say, roughly, how often this occurs. As a consequence of this, it is impossible to say which standard certain individual weights were intended to conform to. The two classes of weights merge, and as far as individual weights are concerned, merge inextricably, although they can be separated statistically. Therefore, a naturalist does not prove that two species are not natural classes by merely showing that they blend. I will give another example to show that the general principle which seems to underlie the naturalists' notion, namely, that an object has not distinct parts unless those parts have definite limits, is false. Namely, a lake with two islands in it certainly consists of two simple parts, if by a simple part we are to understand a part not enclosing an island. But the boundaries may be drawn as [below], or almost any way.

[illustrative graphical figures omitted]

      I do not pretend to have had any signal success in my studies of classification. Yet what I have found out seems worth giving. I have made classifications of artificial contrivances whose genesis we can indubitably understand. In these cases, we find a course of experience in which my three categories are repeated in order over and over again. First, there is a form with its peculiar characteristic of flavor. The reaction of experience develops manifest inconvenience, whence comes thought, resulting in one or more new forms (all novelty involves the first category) which in process of time has to contend with new difficulties, a new analysis is made, resulting in new improvements.

      I have not, at yet, discovered any particular law of the succession of problems--at least none that I should care to put forward.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.335-343  

      I do not pretend to have reached any signal result in my studies of classification, which have been, however, extended. But I have found out some things. I think there must be some general categories of classification, and that it may be that those of Agassiz approaches them. Indeed, wherever I have tried them they seem to answer the purpose, without, however, convincing me of more than this, that there is some truth in them. I should also expect my general categories to be of aid in determining the categories of classification. Classification, is, I believe, best studied in classifying different branches of human inventions and other human creations. Let us consider, for example, means of protection of human beings from cold. It will evidently be necessary to take account of the purpose of the classification; whether, for example, the object be to gain a conception of what has been done, or to decide what will best be done in a given case. But, at all events, the first step must certainly be to analyze the conditions of the problem. The human body generates heat; and all that is requisite is to keep the skin and the air that is breathed at certain temperatures. Practically, the latter point needs no attention. It is merely the skin which must not lose heat too rapidly. The first obvious suggestion is to surround it with a non-conductor; and if no inconveniences attached to this method, no other would ever be used. But several other conditions have to be fulfilled. The skin must be under atmospheric pressure, it must be supplied with oxygen, sufficient evaporation must go on from its surface, and yet not too rapidly; the person must not be encumbered with heavy clothing, and the man must not be imprisoned. On account of the last condition, the reliance must be upon something in the nature of clothing, and yet on account of the last but one, when the man is quiescent this clothing must not be too heavy. On account of the vast difference in the evolution of heat of a man in exercise and at rest, unless we can find some light clothing which conducts heat better when the man is in motion than when he is still, he must be differently protected in the two states. Thus, if we are making our classification for the purpose of finding a good solution of the problem of keeping the skin in good condition, the first class of conceivable contrivances will be a clothing weighing as little as possible, as devoid of elasticity and resistance as possible, somewhat porous, and conducting heat much better when the man is in motion than when he is at rest. Then the question arises, shall this be carried out by means of some peculiar material or by means of some mechanical contrivance. Either of these methods would require some clothing not cumbrous and yet warm enough to make it safe and comfortably for a man to sleep without other protection. This might be devised; although it would be somewhat expensive. But clothes must be changed, and the man must bathe. These conditions are not impossible of fulfillment. But a chemical change of conductivity is for the present out of the question. Then the clothing must be so made that motion causes it to open and admit air. This suggests very loose clothes capable of being tightened, if one could find a fashion of loose clothes which were not in the wearer's way in moving about. A man needs a house, it is true; and we have adopted the unhealthy practices of living in the house and of eating hot food. If we lived out of doors, it would be unsafe to eat hot food. A house ought to be a storage place only. However, granting that a man wants to live in the house, his plan has been to put on extra clothing when he goes out. If he is going to live in the house, the question is what clothing he should wear in the house. If the mean annual temperature is high enough, he need only have a large enough space to store sufficient air, and ventilate it only when the sun shines sufficiently to heat the house by means of a glass-house arrangement. He will then wear just clothing enough in the house to make up the difference, and no artificial heat will be needed. It is obvious that if we are to live in the house, the walls should be made so thick and impervious to heat that artificial heat is unnecessary, except perhaps during the winter storms. It is singular that we do not pursue this mode of life either. We live in houses so ill ventilated as to cause frightful loss of life and render old age rare, and yet we build them so wretchedly as to involve great expense in heating them. We wear clothing which is heavy, tiresome, and unhealthy, without being warm enough. Since we insist in living in such places, and refuse to make use of the heat of the sun, which would easily heat a house throughout the winter with a proper contrivance, except in unusual weather, we have to consider artificial heat. In order to generate heat, we must have a source of energy. We ask, first, whether there is energy at our doors to be used, and, second, where we can find it. Every man has the sun, the wind and earth currents; many men have water-power and tides. All these might be utilized to heat a house, for nothing is so easily done as to convert energy into heat, but so far it has not been done economically, except by direct solar heat, which I have already considered. The only sources of procured energy of any consequence at present or hitherto are muscular energy and combustion. The former is too expensive. We are reduced to combustibles. Then the question is, shall the combustion be performed in the house, or out of the house. In the former case, shall our fuel be solid, liquid, or gaseous. In the latter case, are we to bring a heated substance, say steam, into the house, or are we to bring in an electric current? Going back to the former case, we have a cross-classification, according as the combustion is to be performed in the very room that is to be heated, or hot air, steam, hot water, or electricity is to be carried through the house.

      We thus have the beginning of a classification of means of keeping warm, and our business now is to look this over and see what we can learn about classification. The course of our discussion has been this. Beginning with the purpose, which was somewhat complex, we analyzed it; and owing to the complexity of the purpose but one solution of the problem of attaining it seemed to present itself. But it was found that that solution involved certain inconveniences, which seemed to be due to the interference of another purpose. A new problem thus arose which was analyzed and solved. But this solution was found to involved inconvenience. The result was a new problem whose conditions were simpler, for the reason that the inconveniences had caused us to overrule some of the original requisitae. Being simpler, half a dozen methods of solving it arose. It is evident that any such discussion will present a problem, where the third category is prominent; then a solution, where the first category comes into prominence; then an inconvenience, where the second category rises into prominence; then another problem, and so on. At each solution we have generally a subdivision. That is, there will generally be several solutions.

      If anything of this sort is to be found, say in zoological classification, each branch would be a solution of the problem of producing an animal. But an inconvenience arises in connection with each, and each class is a solution of the problem of dealing with that inconvenience, and so on. This, however, does not seem to accord with the facts. It seems more reasonable, if we are to adhere to the formula of alternate solutions and inconveniences, to suppose that there was first a moner, which, owing to reactions with its environment produced rhizopods, gregarina, etc. That finally, owing to changed conditions, a sponge, a worm, and a hydra were severally produced as solutions of the problem. That the hydra after minor difficulties had resulted in various new forms until a greater crisis gave rise to a crinoid, etc.

      But I attach no particular value to all this, in its present state.



  Final Version - MS L75.391-392  



      In January, 1878, I published a brief sketch of this subject wherein I enunciated a certain maxim of "pragmatism," which has of late attracted some attention, as indeed, it had when it appeared in the Journal Philosophique. I still adhere to that doctrine; but it needs more accurate definition in order to meet certain objections and to avoid certain misapplication. Moreover, my paper of 1878 was imperfect in tacitly leaving it to appear that the maxim of pragmatism led to the last stage of clearness. I wish now to show that this is not the case and to find a series of categories of clearness.

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  From Draft E - MS L75.182  

      In January, 1878, I published a very brief sketch of my doctrine of this subject, including a maxim of "pragmatism," which has of late years attracted some attention. I there developed three grades of clearness of ideas. I now propose to treat all these more completely. Especially, my former account of pragmatism omitted most important questions and limitations. Furthermore, I am now prepared to show that there is a fourth, still higher grade of clearness, which I think I ought to set forth clearly.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.287-288  

      In 1877 I published a paper on this subject in which I set forth a doctrine called "pragmatism" which has since been talked of. But I know more about the clearness of ideas than I did a quarter of a century ago. I there described three grades of clearness: 1st, that which results from familiar use of the conception; 2nd, that which results from logical analysis, and is expressed by a formal definition; and 3rd, that which results from understanding the practical implication of the conception. I propose in this memoir to develop these three grades with fullness and not in the sketchy manner of a magazine article. I shall give the whole theory of definition and discuss its principal forms. I shall show, I hope quite convincingly, the great harm done by that definition by abstraction of which the Germans are so fond. For instance, to define coryza, you direct a person to think of a man with a bad cold. Now take away his pocket-handkerchief. Then take away his watch, knife, pocket-book, loose change, keys, shirt-buttons, boots, gloves, and hat. Then successively take away his clothes, body, and soul; and what you have left is a beautifully clear notion of coryza. I shall explain the doctrine of pragmatism more fully, and guard against extravagant applications. Finally, I shall develop a fourth, and higher, grade of clearness, resulting from an appreciation of the intellectual relations of the definitum.



  Final Version - MS L75.392-395  



      The term `objective logic' is Hegel's; but since I reject Absolute Idealism as false, `objective logic' necessarily means more for me than it did for him. Let me explain. In saying that to be and to be represented were the same, Hegel ignored the category of reaction (that is, he imagined he reduced it to a mode of being represented), thus failing to do justice to being, and at the same time he was obliged to strain the nature of thought, and fail in justice to that side also. Having thus distorted both sides of the truth, it was a small thing for him to say that Begriffe were concrete and had their part in the activity of the world; since that activity, for him, was merely represented activity. But when I, with my scientific appreciation of objectivity and of the brute nature of reaction, maintain, nevertheless, that ideas really influence the physical world, and in doing so carry their logic with them, I give to objective logic a waking like which was absent from Hegel's dreamland. I undertake in this memoir to show that so far from its being a metaphorical expression to say that Truth and Right are the greatest powers in this world, its meaning is just as literal as it is to say that when I open the window in my study, I am really exercising an agency. For the mode of causation in the one case and in the other is precisely the same. In fact, there are two modes of causation corresponding to Aristotle's efficient and final causation, which I analyze and make clear, showing that both must concur to produce any effect whatever. The mind is nothing but an organism of ideas; and to say that I can open my window is to say than an idea can be an agent in the production of a physical effect. This naturally looks toward a special metaphysics of the soul; but I pass this by, as not germane to my present subject, and go on to examine the logic of ideas in their physical agency. Herein I find the key to the different series of categories which the studies of memoirs Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32 developed.

      The remaining three memoirs are of the nature of elucidations of sound methodeutic by applying it in practice to the solution of certain questions, which, although they do not belong to logic, are of special interest in the discussion of logic.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.382-387  

      In this memoir, I pass beyond pure logic, to the consideration of the outward influence of ideas. It is a remarkable fact that, notwithstanding the miserable motives that seem to be the strongest in almost all men, yet, upon the whole, Justice and Truth are the greatest powers in the world. One may say, if one will, that they are not powers at all: that the fact simply is that men are somewhat disposed to tell the truth and to act justly when they can detect no disadvantage in doing so, and that, since their injustice and lies balance one another, this gives a slight but steady pressure toward what is true and just, but that the only agencies are men. Now it is, no doubt, true that Justice and Truth are not physical forces; and no more are men's minds. In order that a physical effect should be produced, a physical force is requisite. But that no more proves that Justice and Truth are not causes, than it proves that human minds, which act in precisely the same way, are not causes. One may say, if one is determined to look upon the matter from one side alone, that human energy and physical force give Justice and Truth the only efficacy they have. But it is quite as true to say that Justice and Truth animate their defenders and communicate power to them. This is not only just as true, although it would not be a truth germane to a physical investigation, but it has the advantage over the other statement of being the pertinent truth when we are considering the phenomena of the advance of Truth and Justice.

      If I, sitting in my study, begin to feel warm, I may go through a process of thought ending in a desire to have my window open. I say to myself, if I want my window open, I must open it; and if I am to open it, I must rise from the table; and thereupon my thought becomes sunk in the depths of consciousness. The next thing I can clearly discern is that I am across the room opening my window. Now the fashionable theory is that my physical actions are entirely explicable from beginning to end by mechanics, that my consciousness is merely an inward aspect of certain physical phenomena, and that if this aspect did not exist at all, as it happens to do, the laws of mechanics would still make all my conduct from the cradle to the grave just what it is. For my part, I think this flagrant nonsense. I do not admit that it is an admissible hypothesis that consciousness and a chemical action in the brain are two aspects of something, because that involves the hypothesis that there is a something for them to be aspects of, and that I cannot admit because it is an utterly unverifiable hypothesis, a meaningless piece of metaphysics. An aspect is an idea. It has no being other than its being represented. It is a fundamental position of logic, without which there can be no distinction of truth and falsity, certainly no falsity, that being and being represented are entirely different. If there be no falsity, it is not false to say that the mind is a substantial entity entirely independent of matter. If there is any falsity, being and being represented are different. Since, then, an aspect is merely a mode of being represented, if a chemical change is a mere aspect, it is not a real fact. In short, the whole physical universe must go by the board (for a chemical change is as real as any physical fact), consequently again no falsity. You may say, if you please, that the only substance is matter, and that mind is a mere aspect. That will not involve the same absurdity. That is pure materialism. But it is difficult for me to imagine that all the strong minds who pretend to believe in "psycho-physical parallelism" really fail to see that it is utter nonsense.

      Let us start then with the theory of pure materialism. The mind is nothing but the complex of a brain's ideas, and these ideas are mere aspects. That is an intelligible position. There is no way of overthrowing it except by hard fact. I believe that such facts abound. I propose to defend this proposition in this memoir. I say, then, that if there were nothing but matter, there could not be a law of nature. Well, there are no laws of nature, will be the answer, but only uniformities. I join issue there. Next, I say, if there were nothing but matter there could be no such thing as reasoning. There are logical machines, I shall be told. Yes, machines constructed by mind to fulfill a special process which they are made to fulfill by the action of mind on matter. But not performing any of the processes which logic criticizes, nor even any higher kind of mathematical reasoning. Next I say, if there were no mind, other than a mere aspect, a symbol could not determine a physical effect. My opponents will say that habit explains it. To this I rejoin that it cannot probably shown that habit would explain it, and even if it does, if there were nothing but matter there could be no habit. Finally, I say that if there were nothing but matter, there could be no such power as we observe in abstract ideas [such as] Beauty, Truth, Right. I will develop these arguments in the memoir, and I hope to make them convincing. As for the common objection to materialism, that matter could not feel, I grant that it is worthless.

      If my arguments are sound, an idea is not a mere aspect. Then I am bound to say what sort of being it has. This I postpone to the next memoir. At present I wish to consider objective logic, by which I mean the logical processes of ideas acting upon the external world. I propose to give a sketch of this sort of logic, if it can be called logic.

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  From Draft E - MS L75.183-184  

      Have ideas any power in the physical world? Absolute idealism is contrary to fundamental principles of logic. Psycho-physical parallelism is meaningless. The two tenable positions are materialism and spiritualism, between which positive facts must decide. These facts will be discussed. Small weight of psychical research. It appears to be true that matter can act directly only upon matter, and ideas directly only upon ideas. A tertium quid inadmissable. Still it does not follow that matter cannot act on ideas and ideas on matter. Recent physical research tends to favor the possibility. Laws of nature are ideas. Proof that they really influence matter. How? Von Hartmann's unconscious mind. The logical process of active ideas.



  Final Version - MS L75.395-396  



      The vagueness of the language with which men commonly talk of the uniformity of nature at once masks the diversity of a number of distinct questions which are wrapped up together in that phrase, and at the same time masks the great diversity of opinions that are very commonly held upon these questions. I have discussed these different questions in half a dozen different papers; but there is none of them [of which the] statement of my argumentation cannot be much amplified and improved, and to which new historical matter cannot bring considerable light. Moreover, I wish to bring all the different questions to one focus, and consider them together. This, I am sure, will cause thinkers to be more favorable to the views which I have at different times defended. Among the questions is that of nominalism and realism, in connection with which I shall show that all modern philosophy, by an accident of history, has been blind to consider- ations of the greatest evidence and moment.



  Final Version - MS L75.396-397  



      The great distinction between Aristotelian philosophy and a modern philosophy is that the former recognized a germinal mode of being inferior to existence, which hardly [even] Schelling does; certainly no other modern philosopher. This question is considered in the light of the methodeutic developed in previous memoirs. The result is applied to all the questions of high metaphysics.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.308  

      {From Draft D (308)} In this memoir I defend essentially Aristotelian opinions which give room for the real being and agency of ideas, distinguishing an esse in futuro from an esse in praeterito and an esse in praesento, and also a mode of action substantially Aristotle's final causation, as well as physical action which is substantially his efficient causation.



  Final Version - MS L75.397  



      This applies my methodeutic to the discussion of a question which will have repeatedly emerged during the course of the memoirs. I may say briefly that I defend the well-known opinion of Newton. But other questions are considered. I do not think any theory satisfactory which does not offer some explanation (a mathematically exact and evident one) of why space should have three dimensions.

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  From Draft D - MS L75.308  

      I hold, with Newton, that time and space are real entities. I discuss the question of whether they are so or not, and then consider their real properties.