Home Page      Peirce Papers      Intro to L75      L75 Version 2



  Final Version - MS L75.375  



      The categories furnish the definition of abduction, from which follows its mode of justification, and from this again its rules. The various maxims which are found in different books are passed in review and, for the most part, are found to sin only in vagueness. One question not very commonly studied is what is the character of a phenomenon which makes it call for explanation. The theory of Dr. Carus that it is irregularity, and that of Mr. Venn that it is isolation, though the latter is defended with some power, are positively refuted. This refutation does not apply to the theory that the character sought is that of being surprising. This, however, is open to another kind of objection. The true doctrine is nearly thus, however.

* * *

  From Draft E - MS L75.176-178  

      History of the doctrine. Several rules of more or less value which have been given examined. Comte's rule that a hypothesis must be "verifiable" is misunderstood, or quite untenable, if it be taken to mean that the truth of the hypothesis must be capable of being directly observed. If it is properly understood, it only amounts to this, that a hypothesis must be intelligible; since an unverifiable hypothesis, such as a thing-in-itself, or such as supposing that in complete darkness all blue things turn bright scarlet, is simply meaningless. I consider the neglected question of what character it is in a phenomenon which logically makes that phenomenon call for explanation. Dr. Carus says it is irregularity. Mr. Venn says it is isolation. Both these opinions can be decisively refuted. Another theory, that a phenomenon demands explanation just insofar as it is surprising, or contrary to what might have been probably predicted from previous knowledge, escapes the objections to other solutions. But surprise is an emotion that arises as a sort of succedaneum for an explanation. Many other emotions have this same character, perhaps all emotions. Shall we, then, give emotion a place in logic, and say that every emotion ought to be replaced by a scientific hypothesis? This is substantially what Socrates taught concerning fear; and whoever does not approve of an emotion will naturally say something analogous. But no such psychological doctrine can be admitted into critical logic. The true doctrine [is] deduced mathematically from the categories. The justification of abduction follows from it; and from this in turn follow the rules of abduction.

* * *

  From Draft D - MS L75.270-275  

      I open this intensely interesting question by showing that of the three types of induction one alone is of any real scientific value. I then show that all that an induction of this type really accomplishes is to ascertain the value of a ratio. It follows that the whole substance of science must come to us by abduction, in the same sense in which, according to the theory of natural selection in its extended form, the whole interval between the moner and man has been traversed by insensible variations in reproduction. Induction, like natural selection, merely weeds out the unfit. What, then, can be the justification for a hypothesis? In the first place, abduction only concludes interrogatively. But that is no sufficient answer to the question. Idle interrogations are as noxious as can be. The only justification is that which is often illustrated in playing the game of whist. Three rounds remain of a hand. How the cards lie, the leader does not know. But he does know that if they lie in certain way, a certain lead will save the odd card, while if they do not lie in that way, no lead will do so. This justifies his assuming, for the purposes of the lead, that so the cards do lie. For so alone his end may be gained. The principle is that we are always justified in presuming, for the purposes of conduct, that our sole end may be reached. But all belief is belief for the purposes of conduct. Nothing has any meaning aside from practical purposes. Aside from its practical aspects a proposition cannot be false, because a meaningless thing is not a proposition, and as such, has no room to be false. If, then, it comes to this, that a certain hypothesis must be true or there is no comprehensible truth, and if, as our ethical and esthetical discussions have shown is the case, the comprehension of the universe is the sole aim which a man can deliberately pronounce to be good, he is justified in unconditionally embracing the hypothesis which is alone consonant with the attainment of a comprehension of the truth. It need not be said that the hypotheses which perfectly fulfill that condition are extremely few. Perhaps the hypothesis that the universe is governed by a self-conscious mind, in the senses in which `self-conscious' and `mind' are logically defined, is the only one there is. Still, practically, the case often comes to that. Possible hypotheses consist of such hypotheses as we can make. `Can' is, no doubt, an elastic word. What "can" be done depends on the amount of effort. Still, the effects of efforts converge toward a limit. To fix our ideas, take a concrete example. The commander of an army is in battle. The battle is of such importance that the total sum of the commander's duty is to win the day. As well as he can make out, in the limited time he has for considering the question, if a certain position can be immediately taken, the battle may be won, but otherwise cannot. Then logic commands him to believe with his whole heart and soul that that position can be taken, although if he had time to make a reconnaissance it might be foolhardy and illogical in the extreme to come to such a conclusion merely from such data as are actually in his possession. This illustrates how much the time that is allowed to form an opinion has to do, logically, with that opinion. Now a scientific investigator is in a double situation. As a unit of the scientific world, with which he in some measure identifies himself, he can wait five centuries, if need by, before he decides upon the acceptability of a certain hypothesis. But as engaged in the investigation which it is his duty diligently to pursue, he must be ready the next morning to go on that hypothesis or to reject it. What logic requires of him is that he should accept that hypothesis which is the only way that he can, at that time, see in which there should be any comprehensible truth, and think of the most surprising observable necessary consequence of it he can, and the next morning put that consequence to the test of experiment. Being as he is in a double position, as an individual, and as a representative of the science of the race, he ought to be in a double state of mind about the hypothesis, at once ardent in his belief that so it must be, and yet not committing himself further than to do his best to try the experiment. If he is merely skeptical, he will not do half justice to the experiment; if he forgets his relation to general science, he will shrink from putting his darling theory to such a test. He must combine the two attitudes. Mendeleef, drawing up his very rough arrangement of the elements, and upon the basis of that risking his detailed descriptions of Gallium, Scandium, and Germanium, is the very exemplar of what the logic of abduction prescribes.

      All this is inexact enough. I am here only endeavoring to give a notion of the contents of this memoir. That I should lay myself open to any just accusation of loose reasoning is not among the doubts which trouble me most. I have for myself employed an algebraic notation to secure the accuracy of my work; but I am not decided to make use of it in my memoirs.

      Upon this theory of the validity of abduction I base certain rules for the practice of this kind of thought. In comparing these with those of other logicians I remark that I find in their doctrines far less that compels my dissent than in regard to induction, notwithstanding their hard, inelastic conception of this kind of reasoning. Yet it is here that they find themselves, most of them, utterly deserted by their general conception of logic, which it is here that I find mine most efficaciously helpful.



  Final Version - MS L75.376  



      This is a highly important memoir upon a subject of singular difficulty, although at first blush one would not anticipate any difficulty or interest in it.

* * *

  From Draft E - MS L75.178  

      Among the matters specially interesting in this memoir are the influence upon different kinds of induction of different types of uniformities and the argument from analogy. In both cases, views opposed to those which I deduce by my method will be carefully examined. This memoir is more important than might be supposed.

* * *

  From Draft B - MS L75.276  

      I here consider all kinds of mixed arguments. We have, first, arguments composed of independent arguments, either, as we may say, competing, that is, leading to the same result, or cooperating, that is, both required to produce the conclusion.

      Next, we have arguments one of which concludes something, not relating to the conclusion of the other, but relating to the argument itself.

      Finally, we have arguments which, from identically the same premisses, produce the same identical conclusion in two different ways. These are the most remarkable of the mixed arguments, and the argument from analogy is the chief example.



  Final Version - MS L75.377  



      There would be no advantage in devoting a special memoir to a strictly scientific treatment of fallacies in general. It would be like a chapter in a treatise on trigonometry which should treat of possible errors in trigonometry. But since my purpose is that these memoirs should not only be scientific but that they should also be useful, I propose to devote this to fallacies because I think, though it is not an attractive subject for a logician, that I can make the discussion very useful. I shall not attempt a strict theoretical development, but shall discuss fallacies under five heads, according to their causes, showing under each head how they come about, how we can avoid them in original reasoning and in controversy, how to detect them and reply to others who fall into them. The five heads are: 1st, slips; 2nd, misunderstandings; 3rd, fallacies due to bad logical notions; 4th, fallacies due to moral causes; and 5th, sophisms invented to test logical rules, etc. This will thus be of an entirely exceptional character among the memoirs, more so even than the first.

* * *

  From Draft E - MS L75.178-179  

      Few logicians of great theoretical force have manifested much interest in the general doctrine of fallacies. Ought it to be treated as a branch of pure logic? Five classes of fallacies: 1st, mere slips, like errors in adding up a column of figures; 2nd, misunderstandings; 3rd, fallacies having their origin in loose logica utens or faulty logica docens; 4th, fallacies having their origins in bad morals; 5th, sophisms which cannot deceive a sound mind but which try the efficacy of logical rules. I consider it a duty not to neglect this uninteresting subject; and I shall not confine myself to a purely logical consideration of it, but say what seems likely to be of service. 1st, certain rules may be given for checking our reasonings so as to correct slips. 2nd, the ignoratio elenchi and petitio principii are fallacies which presuppose that the logical process is sound. Accordingly, no plea that an argument is one of these fallacies should be entered in case there is any objection to the logical process, unless that objection is to be waived. 3rd, fallacies of the third class are extremely common, and the remarks under this head ought to be serviceable. 4th, the fallacies of the fourth class are common enough, too; but it is evident that no logical medicine can reach the seat of the disease. The rules of good logic suppose good faith. 5th, logic began with sophisms and some of them still merit attention.

* * *

  From Draft D - MS L75.276-279  

      This is a subject which has very little attracted the attention of the stronger logicians and is consequently in the most deplorable condition. I divide them into three classes, as follows: 1st, those fallacies which are mere slips, such as one may fall into in adding a column of figures, which is, indeed, a fallacy; 2nd, those which arise from misunderstandings, such as the ignoratio elenchi and petitio principii; 3rd, those which have their origin in loose logica utens, or more frequently, in the inexact logic docens. To these may be added, 4th, sophisms which really deceive nobody, but which present problems in logic often highly instructive. I make an attempt to enumerate all varieties. Those of the first class are hardly worth notice; yet still not utterly useless, any more than it would be to call attention to the ways in which there is danger of error in performing an algebraical computation. My remarks about the petitio principii I hope will be useful. In the third class, I call attention to a number of fallacies that are not mentioned in any of the books. Such, for example, is the extension of the doctrine of the burden of proof to cases where it has no meaning, but where formalistic reasoners appeal to it as a source of knowledge, as if it were a law of nature. Another class of examples of fallacies, to which logicians are especially liable (and logicians are the most fallacious reasoners in the world), are objections to arguments as being fallacious which are, in reality, sound, but are merely misunderstood by the objector to be arguments of a different kind from what they profess to be. The books are full of pretended refutations of fallacies where the reasoning criticized is really sound. Indeed, my observation leads me to conclude that persons of good sense whose minds are not vitiated by logical notions rarely fall into fallacies, unless they be mere slips. On the other hand, I know no class of books in which fallacies so abound as works on logic and philosophy. I have carefully read a large number of German treatises on logic of a somewhat original and superior kind, certainly at the least estimate over fifty of them. But I do not think I ever met with a single one--not even that of Schroeder--which does not somewhere fall into an unquestionable and utterly indefensible logical fallacy. This is not true of English books, but there are few English logics of any strength. The Germans, I think, are naturally stupid about logic, although some of the most magnificent reasoners have been Germans. Kepler is quite incomparable in inductive logic; Weierstrass and Georg Cantor superb in mathematical subtlety, for all the latter's being one of the "Baconians" in Shakespeare-ology. Among logicians, Leibniz, Lambert, Kant, Herbart are men of distinguished power. But there is a vicious tendency to subjectivism in Germans whenever they deal with any subject that tempts that disposition. I do not wish to be supposed not to admire the Germans; but when I see so many young Americans copying all their faults and generally worshipping them, I am moved to say that they are not gods.


  Final Version - MS L75.378-380  



      The first business of this memoir is to show the precise nature of methodeutic; how it differs from critic; how, although it considers, not what is admissible, but what is advantageous, it is nevertheless a purely theoretical study, and not an art; how it is, from the most strictly theoretical point of view, an absolutely essential and distinct department of logical inquiry; and how, upon the other hand, it is readily made useful to a researcher into any science, even mathematics itself. It strongly resembles the purely mathematical part of political economy, which is also a theoretical study of advantages. Of the different classes of arguments, abductions are the only ones in which, after they have been admitted to be just, it still remains to inquire whether they are advantageous. But since the whole business of heuretic, so far as its theory goes, falls under methodeutic, there is no kind of argumentation that methodeutic can pass over without notice. Nor is methodeutic confined to the consideration of arguments. On the contrary, its special subjects have always been understood to be the definition and division of terms. The formation of systems of propositions, although it has been neglected, should also evidently be included in methodeutic. In its method, methodeutic is less strict than critic.

* * *

  From Draft B - MS L75.279-280  

      The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But just as critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment. There is no such need of a subsequent choice after drawing deductive and inductive conclusions. Yet although methodeutic has not the same special concern with them, it has to develop the principles which are to guide us in the invention of proofs, those which are to govern the general course of an investigation, and those which determine what problems shall engage our energies. It is, therefore, throughout of an economic character. Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification.

* * *

  From Draft D - MS L75.329-330  

      I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in stechiologic or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone. Yet even as heuretic it indirectly has to consider other matters; and it extends to subjects that are not particularly heuretic. It is proper, therefore, in the study of methodeutic, to begin with the study of heuretic. Now it follows from the nature of truth, as analyzed in an earlier memoir, that it is not merely hopeless, but utterly nonsensical, to expect to discover anything except such things as we may hope that time will reveal. Consequently, to discover is simply to expedite an event that would occur sooner or later, if we had not troubled ourselves to make the discovery. Consequently, the art of discovery is purely a question of economics. The economics of research is, so far as logic is concerned, the leading doctrine with reference to the art of discovery. Consequently, the conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to be governed by economical considerations. I show how this leads to methodeutic inquiries of other kinds and at the same time furnishes a key for the conduct of those inquiries.



  Final Version - MS L75.380-388  



      In all economics the laws are ideal formulae from which there are large deviations, even statistically. In the economics of research the "laws" are mere general tendencies to which exceptions are frequent. The laws being so indefinite, at best, there is little advantage in very accurate definitions of such terms as `amount of knowledge'. It is, however, possible to attach a definite conception to one increment of knowledge being greater than another. To work this out will be the first business of the memoir. I also establish a definite meaning for the amount of an increment in diffusion of knowledge. I then consider the relation of each of these to the expenditure of energy and value required to produce them in varying conditions of the advancement of diffusion of knowledge already attained. Comparing knowledge with a material commodity, we know that in the latter case a given small increment in the supply is very expensive, in most cases, when the supply is very small, that as the supply increases it sinks to a minimum, from which it increases to a very large but finite value of the supply where no further increment would be possible at any finite cost. Putting instead of supply, the amount of knowledge attained, we find that there is a "law," or general tendency, subject to similar large irregularities as in the case of the supply of a material commodity, but here even greater. The final increase of cost of an increment with the increase of attainment already achieved is marked, on the whole, in almost all cases, while in many cases, at least, there is a point of attainment where the cost of an increment is at a minimum. The same general tendency appears in reference to the diffusion of knowledge; but there is this striking difference, that attainments in advance of sciences are very commonly actually on the upward slope where increments are costing more and more, while there are few branches of knowledge whose diffusion is already so great that a given increment of the diffusion will cost more and more, as the diffusion is increased.

      I shall next pass to a study of the variation of the utility (meaning, generally, the scientific utility) of given small increments of scientific knowledge and of the diffusion of knowledge in varying states of attainment. This is to be compared with the variation of the total amount that will be paid for a commodity for a fixed small increment of the demand, or amount thrown upon the market to fetch what it will, with varying amounts of that demand. Here, the additional total amount that will be paid for the small increment of amount sold will correspond to the utility of the small fixed increase of scientific knowledge or of the diffusion of knowledge; while the demand being equal to the supply, this demand, or total amount that is sold, will correspond as before to the amount of attainment in scientific knowledge or in the diffusion of knowledge. For a material commodity we know that if it is given away people will only carry home a finite amount. One would have to pay them to carry away more. On the other hand, there is probably some maximum price for most things, above which none at all would be sold. It necessarily follows that beyond a certain amount thrown upon the market, a small increment in that amount would actually diminish the total receipts from the sale of it, while for any smaller amount the increment of receipts for a given small increment of amount sent to market would be less and less. With regard to the scientific utility of a small fixed advance of knowledge, the "law" is certainly very different from that. In the first place, there is no degree of knowledge of which a small increase would be worse than useless, and while the general tendency is that the utility of such fixed increase becomes less and less, yet the curve is rather saw-shaped, since like Rayleigh's small addition to our knowledge of the density of nitrogen, now and then a small increment will be of great utility and will then immediately sink to its former level. The scientific advantage of the diffusion of knowledge is difficult to determine. It cannot be believed that any increment of diffusion is positively unfavorable to science. It is favorable in two ways; first, by preparing more men to be eminent researcher; and secondly, by increasing general wealth, and therefore the money bestowed on science. I am inclined to think that the general tendency is that a given increment of diffusion is less and less advantageous to science the greater the attained diffusion. But I am not confident that this is so, at any rate without very important deflexions. The general effect, however, is nearly the same for the advancement as for the diffusion of knowledge. Namely, beginning with dense ignorance, the first increments cost more than they come to. That is, knowledge is increased but scientific energy is spent and not at once recovered. But we very soon reach a state of knowledge which is profitable to science, that is, not only is knowledge increased, but the facility of increasing knowledge gives us a return of more available means for research than we had before the necessary scientific energy was spent. This increases to a maximum, diminishes, and finally, there is no further gain. Yet still, in the case of energy expended upon research, if it is persisted in, a fortunate discovery may result in a new means of research. I shall analyze as far as I can the relative advantages, for pure science exclusively, of expending energy (which is of such a kind as to be equally capable of being directed either way) to the direct advancement of knowledge and to the diffusion of knowledge. I find the latter so overwhelmingly more important (although all my personal sympathies are the other way) that it appears to me that, for the present, to give to research, in money, one or two per cent of what is spent upon education is enough. Research must contrive to do business at a profit, by which I mean that it must produce more effective scientific energy than it expends. No doubt it already does so. But it would do well to become conscious of its economical position and contrive ways of living upon it.

      Many years ago I published a little paper on the economy of research, in which I considered this problem. Somebody furnishes a fund to be expended upon research without restrictions. What sort of researches should it be expended upon? My answer, to which I still adhere, was this. Researches for which men have been trained, instruments procured, and a plant established, should be continued while those conditions subsist. But the new money should mainly go to opening up new fields, because new fields will probably be more profitable, and, at any rate, will be profitable longer.

      I shall remark in the course of the memoir that economical science is particularly profitable to science; and that of all the branches of economy, the economy of research is perhaps the most profitable; that logical methodeutic and logic in general are specially valuable for science, costing little beyond the energies of the researcher, and helping the economy of every other science. It was in the middle of the 13th century that a man distinguished enough to become pope opened his work on logic with the words, "Dialectica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens." This memorable sentence, whose gothic ornamentation proves upon scrutiny to involve no meaningless expression nor redundant clause, began a work wherein the idea of this sentence was executed satisfactorily enough for the dominant science of the middle ages. Jevons adopted the sentence as the motto of his most scientific contribution to logic; and it would express the purpose of my memoirs, which is, upon the ground well prepared by Jevons and his teacher, DeMorgan, and by the other great English researchers, especially Boole, Whewell, Berkeley, Glanvill, Ockham, and Duns Scotus, to lay a solid foundation upon which may be erected a new logic fit for the life of twentieth century science.

* * *

  From Draft D - MS L75.281-287  

      Political economy, in its general analysis by Ricardo and others, is a fine example of logical method. Its chief fault is that no coefficient of average stupidity is introduced and no coefficient of average sentimentality, which could have been introduced into the formulae. Of course, their values would have to be determined for each class of society. Political economy now goes by the name of economics, a change of title which obscures an important feature of the science, that it relates to very large collections of individuals whose average character must be much more fixed than those of the single individuals. The chief factors to be considered are the demand at different prices and the cost of different amounts supplied. In the case of research we have something analogous although measures cannot be made with any precision. The amount of the commodity is to be represented by the amount of knowledge of a given subject. The price is represented by the utility of an addition to knowledge, especially the scientific utility. The cost is the amount of energy, time, money, etc., required to produce a given increase of knowledge. The irregularities are excessive. The peculiarities of the individual case must always be considered. Nevertheless, there are certain general rules, subject to frequent exceptions, the consideration of which is far from being entirely useless. Two such rules are, that the more we already know of a subject, the less is likely to be the utility of a given increase of knowledge, and that the more we already know, the greater is likely to be the cost of a given increase of knowledge. But if for the amount of knowledge we substitute the number of persons informed, both rules will be reversed. Hence, by far the most valuable knowledge is that which is common experience. This does not, in itself, decide the question between the respective utility of diffusing and advancing knowledge; yet I think it is evident that until people generally know enough to conduct affairs with reasonable economy, it is bad economy to spend much on the advancement of science. Ten millions is a small sum when we are thinking of seventy millions of people. But if a hundred million were expended in teaching the people of the United States some things that are known respecting our protective tariff, it would produce a larger amount to be applied to the advancement of science. I do not begrudge the money spent upon churches, because what is taught in churches is, in itself considered, the most valuable of all truth. But I wish one tenth of that amount could be appropriated to diffusing economic knowledge, because that knowledge would produce the wealth requisite for the advancement and diffusion of all other knowledge. A great capitalist who is generous is a strange and wonderful phenomenon, while the people are naturally generous to the point of extravagance. In the light of these considerations, it becomes a maxim of the economy of research that great encouragement should be given to applications of science. For although steam and electricity are things of trifling value in themselves, since people were nearly as good and happy before the days of steam and electricity, yet they become of extreme utility in causing great expenditures to be made for the advancement of pure science.

      Now coming to pure science, the economy of research demands the opening up of new branches of knowledge as soon as the study of them can be conducted scientifically, rather than in carrying to extreme perfection sciences from which the richest juice has already been pressed. Carry forward the research that is promising: neglect the one whose outlook is dismal. If for one inquiry several hypotheses are equally attractive, and in another but one, prefer the latter. In any given inquiry, other things being fairly equal or even considerably against equality, prefer the hypothesis which if false can easily be proved to be so; if it can very easily be dispatched, adopt it at once, and have done with it. But while you hold it, hold it in good faith, so as to do it full justice. Among hypotheses choose one whose elements are well understood, so that unknown complications, and consequent expense of energy cannot arise. Prefer general hypotheses to special ones, provided the more general are so by being simpler; if they are so by being complex, it is necessary to consider the economics of testing them more particularly. For instance, instead of supposing y=a+bx+cx2+dx3+etc. and determining the coefficients, ask whether y has a constant term, next whether it tends to infinity with x, next whether its increments are approximately proportional to those of x, etc.

      There are many economic reasons for preferring hypotheses which seem simple. I do not here mean by simple, having only one indeterminate element, although that is a manifest ground of preference; but I mean simple to human apprehension. Especially, in using abduction you already commit yourself to the hypothesis that the truth is comprehensible to you, and therefore that what is akin to your mind is likely to be true. Being committed to this, you scarcely make an additional hypothesis in assuming that that which is more akin to your natural way of thinking is more likely to be true.

      Nothing unknown can ever become known except through its analogy with other things known. Therefore, do not attempt to explain phenomena isolated and disconnected with common experience. It is waste of energy, besides being extremely compromising. Turn a deaf ear to people who say, "scientific men ought to investigate this, because it is so strange." That is the very reason why the study should wait. It will not be ripe until it ceases to be so strange.

      Do not waste your time over questions concerning which facts are scanty and not to be gathered.

      All these maxims are so many theorems of logic which I shall endeavor in my memoir to present in systematic form.

* * *

  From Draft E - MS L75.180-181  

      The chief factors are [the] relation of the amount of increments of knowledge, first, to the scientific utility, and second, to the necessary expenditure of energy, etc. How far there are any regularities in these relations. There is much to be learned from the study of the economics of research, extending even into details of scientific procedure. I give what I have been able to deduce. I also consider, exclusively in the interest of the advancement of science, the economics of the diffusion of knowledge. I find that the advantage to research from such diffusion is, in the present condition of things, even greater than the same amount of energy expended in research itself, supposing that energy to be equally available in either direction. If one has a great researcher it is a terrible waste not to use him. I give an account of certain investigations into the mode of development of great men. I find the conditions not dissimilar to those of the production of giant trees in a forest. Consequently, there is an application of economics to the preparation of men for becoming great when great men are needed. I examine the question of the kinds of knowledge of which the diffusion is most desirable, always in the interest of the advancement of science. I find the normative sciences, including economics, of greatest importance. If our people could only learn enough political economy to see that it is a difficult science in which it is needful to trust experts, there would be far more money to spend on science than the genius of the country could use to the best advantage. The analytical part of political economy is directly dependent on logical methodeutic. It is a question whether it is not a branch of logic.


End of PART 8 of 10 of MS L75


Queries, comments, and suggestions to
Joseph Ransdell -- Dept of Philosophy
Texas Tech University, Lubbock Texas 79409

Scholarly quotation from or reference to
the content of this website will mention
the URL of the web-page where the content occurs.

The URL of the present page, which is part of the Arisbe website, is

Page last modified June 15, 1998

Top of the Page