CHAPTER II

THE AESTHETICS OF MUSEMENT

We praise Joyce, on one hand, for revolutionizing the novel, but on the other hand, criticize him for his ideas on aesthetics. In describing Ulysses from a structuralist perspective, Robert Scholes remarks that perhaps we do not want to be Joyce's contemporaries. But following this remark is a veiled criticism of Joyce's aesthetic theories -- Piaget's "triad leads to a more satisfying esthetic than the one Joyce called 'applied Aquinas'."¹ It seems that we would like to be Joyce's contemporaries; but many of us are reluctant to accept the manner in which interpretations are derived from theories outside the text when the text itself seems to include such ideas and go beyond them. What is needed is a closer examination of Joyce's own aesthetic theories.

Without such a discussion of Joyce's own aesthetic theory, one could possibly assume that Joyce could never have created a cognitive system such as will be described in Ulysses. But this discussion has a second related purpose: to credit Joyce with the innovations in aesthetic theory that we have been considering apart from Joyce's own ideas on the subject. These innovations have been as
little understood as the process that governs the relationship of episodes in *Ulysses*. Yet we can see that the problem has been due to the new kind of thinking that is required to appreciate the advantages of the "intricate forms of inference" and to understand these "mazes intricate . . . yet regular/then most, when most irregular they seem."²

In the following sections we will discuss Joyce's theory of aesthetics, written during his second trip to Paris and his subsequent move to Pola. First, by way of introduction to an unfamiliar approach to reality and representation we will briefly discuss *Ulysses'* process of mediating representation, an idea clearly indicated by the aesthetic theories. The process of mediating representation, used in *Ulysses*, involves the notions of a cognitive system. In the second section, we will consider Joyce's entries of 6 March 1903 and 25 March 1903 as they adumbrate the characteristics of a well-constructed system. In the third section, we will consider the other entries in Joyce's Aesthetic Notebook, especially those written in Pola, as they suggest the characteristics of a theory of cognition synonymous with a theory of signification. In the last section we will relate Joyce's ideas to current thought on the subject.
Once I had recognized the taste of the crumb of madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-flowers . . . immediately the old grey house . . . rose up . . . And just as the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little crumbs of paper which until then are without character or form, but, the moment they become wet, stretch themselves and bend, take on colour and distinctive shape, become flowers or houses or people . . . so in that moment all the flowers in our garden . . . and the whole of Combray and of its surroundings, taking their proper shapes and growing solid, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of tea. --Proust, *Swann's Way*

--I seen a Chinese one time, related the doughty narrator, that had little pills like putty and he put them in the water and they opened, and every pill was something different. One was a ship, another was a house, another a flower. Cooks rats in your soup, he appetisingly added, the Chinese does.

--Joyce, *Ulysses*

Proust's vast structure of recollection in *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu* is based on the expansion of memories recalled by the taste of the crumb of Madeleine soaked in tea. Joyce parodies the mode of being of these representations and the manner of their coming into being. Joyce replaces what Genette, commenting on Proust, calls the "foolhardy" laws of narrative with a process of mediating representation. Rather than a structure of recollection, Joyce composes a cognitive system.

Within a cognitive system, sense-objects and facts, ideas, and relationships, receive their "meaning" not from the narrator but from the process of mediating
representation. This process, which has been called semiosis or the process of communication by signs, eliminates the traditional disjunction between mind and object that is found in traditional narration. The operation of semiosis in a system allows representation as we conventionally know it to take on a new dimension.

Traditionally representation is the relation of one thing standing for something else. Flowers that spring into existence from a cup of tea stand for the actual flowers. The mind of the narrator or narrative persona that relates the representation is clearly separated from the flowers and all other objects that are given in the text. Representation is, in this conventional sense, dyadic.

James Joyce adds a dimension to conventional representation making it a triadic relationship between a sign, object and interpretant. Representation becomes a relation of indicating, in addition to the standard relation of standing for something. The relation of indicating involves mediation -- an interpreting thought. Because triadic representation includes a mediating thought, the traditional concept of narrator can be eliminated. As Peirce explains in The Monist (1906), signs "require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and . . . these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself . . . in the Sign they are, so to say, welded" (4.551; his emphasis). The
possibility that Joyce may have read these articles is not as important as the fact that a separate concept of "utterer" or interpreter is not necessary from the perspective of one who understands the advantages of a logic of relatives.

Representation as we have described it in its triadic nature is quite different from traditional representation. Genette explains that in Proust's *Recherche*, representation conflicts with the presence of the narrator: "at the level of the narrative of actions, the paradoxical coexistence of the greatest mimetic intensive and the presence of a narrator, which is in principle contrary to novelistic mimesis . . . shakes the whole logic of narrative representation."[4] Joycean representation subsumes the traditional function of the narrator by including within representation the interpretant, or mediating thought. This is why Genette makes, it seems, an apology for Proust by stating that the laws of narrative are themselves "foolhardy," and why we never find such apology in Joyce studies.

Exactly how representation can be triadic rather than dyadic is explained by Peirce:

an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest limits, as anything which, being determined by an object, determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a
proof that every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol (4.531; emphasis added).

Three elements are interrelated ("three things are concerned in the functioning of a Sign; the Sign itself, its Object, and its Interpretant" [4.531]). Representation is thus a process of mediation. The interpretant can itself become a sign, in a series of successive interpretants.

Representation "necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves . . . mediating between an object and an interpreting thought" (1.480). However, much triadic representation differs from conventional dyadic representation, which places the interpreting thought in the separate category of a narrative persona, we can accept the fact that in triadic representation, "no doubt, intelligent consciousness must enter into the series [of successive interpretants]" (2.303).
The difference between dyadic and triadic representation can be illustrated with a typical Proustian and Joycean flower. We have seen that in *Swann's Way* the flower that springs into existence from the narrator's cup of tea stands for the actual flower that was once present. Such a flower does not include an interpreting thought; the narrator is there to provide it. In *Ulysses*, "flower" no longer stands for what a narrator is bringing to mind. It can be an object, a sign, and an interpretant:

He [Bloom, alias Henry Flower] tore the flower gravely from its pinhold smelt its almost no smell and placed it in his heart pocket.

Language of flowers . . . Angry tulips with you darling manflower punish you cactus if you don't please poor forgetmenot how I long violets to dear roses when we soon anemone meet all naughty nightstalk wife Martha's perfume. Having read it all . . . (U 78/77).

An actual flower is included in the letter received from Martha; the letter itself is addressed to Henry Flower. And the letter (printed on a previous page of the text) is re-read by Bloom in the "language of flowers." Flower becomes an interpretant, literally, and can be a sign of Bloom's behavior.

As we shall further see in our discussion of *Ulysses* in the next chapter, "thought is the chief, if not the
only, mode of representation" (2.274). According to Peirce, representation is "that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in the place of another thing" (1.654). Representation includes within it "the production of a certain mental effect." Representation which is triadic includes a cognitive element. As we shall see, the idea of relation leads directly to that of a system. And, likewise, the cognitive elements in a series of interpretants leads to the same system concept.

"The idea of relation is involved in the concept of a system" (3.637). In ordinary logic one talks of classes, in the logic of relatives one talks of systems (4.5). The very fact that elements have connected relations leads to the concept: "a system is a collection having a regular relation between its members" (4.621). In short, the relational logic of the novel requires the concept of a system.

We arrive at the same concept of a system if we focus on the role of the interpretant. The presence of the interpretant within the functioning of the sign places the mental process within the series of interpretants. And the concept of a system includes this same presence of a mental process. Paul Bouissac states, "the notion of system ... ultimately seems always to be an implicit attempt to model the brain processes in the form of a finite machine, as the terms or components are apprehended." And Peirce
explains, "every system may be said to be an ens rationis" (3.636). Thus we can see that the very nature of representation in its triadic aspect involves the notion of a system.

Before considering in detail Joyce's development of the idea of a cognitive system, we may ponder the potential value or use of a relational system. One advantage is that relational logic "corrects innumerable serious errors into which not merely logicians, but people who never opened a logic-book fall from confining their attention to non-relative logic." One such error is that "demonstrative reasoning is something altogether unlike observation." As Peirce explains, "the intricate forms of inference of relative logic call for such scrutiny of the representations of the facts, which representations are of an iconic kind, in that they represent relations in the fact by analogous relations in the representation, that we cannot fail to remark that it is by observation of diagrams that the reasoning proceeds in such cases" (3.641). Joyce's own close observations are altogether like demonstrative reasoning.

And Joyce meant for the common person who reads his works to be able to correct "serious errors." Scrutinizing Joyce's representations is much like demonstrative reasoning. We should not forget this general purpose; we can recall that Joyce himself believed that his works could be forces of change. Joyce wrote to Grant Richards that
the *Dubliners* was the "first step towards the spiritual liberation" of Ireland (*Letters*, I, 63). And later, "it is not my fault that the odour of ashpits and old weeds and offal hangs round my stories. I seriously believe that you will retard the course of civilisation in Ireland by preventing the Irish people from having one good look at themselves in my nicely polished looking glass" (*Letters*, I, 64). However much Joyce may have been exaggerating his claims in the face of censorship, we cannot deny the power of demonstrative reasoning so much like observation in his stories that they indeed serve as a looking glass -- one look through which may alter the course of civilisation, as Joyce puts it.

And Joyce's later works reflect, even more, the sophisticated ability to present "intricate forms of inference" characteristic of relative logic. Relational logic allows a person to think in a new and different way. For Joyce, it allows readers to observe reality, not as it has been conventionalized, but as it exists and reacts. The effects of conventional thinking can be demonstrated. One's ability to think and to know and to change can be emphasized without didacticism.

And relational logic is closely tied to esthetics. Peirce writes, "a man is not to be allowed to see what is reasonable unless he do do so by the rules of art" (2.195). "Logic needs the help of esthetics" (2.198). What is "reasonable" can be represented in art. The man on the
street who never opened a logic book can consider the ethics and logic of a society through a form of observation.

The well-constructed nature of Joyce's works seems, for some, to reflect a separation from life. But we too frequently forget that "an entire science of esthetic" could be offered with a comment, "'This is the first of my explosives'" (SH 36, 81). The revolutionary ideas presented as revolutionary ideas in Stephen Hero are, in fact, revolutionary. But the manifesto is "strangely unpopular" and called a "'flowery' composition"; Stephen is called mystical (SH 81). It is perhaps, convenient to separate Stephen's art from life, but as the essay "Art and Life" suggests, they are related. Stephen insists: "Art is not an escape from life. It's just the very opposite. Art, on the contrary, is the very central expression of life" (SH 86). The theory of the epiphany is not just a mystical way of describing insight. It is a means of making observation altogether like demonstrative reasoning. And this is the basis of relational logic, which is the basis of triadic representation and of the Play of Musement.

Ulysses' system did not appear de novo. Joyce elaborated a model for a system in his Aesthetic Notebook. On March 25, 1903, in Paris, he writes:
Rhythm seems to be the first or formal relation of part to part in any whole or of a whole to its part or parts, or of any part to the whole of which it is a part. . . . Parts constitute a whole as far as they have a common end (CW, 145; ellipses are Joyce's).

This entry is an important source of the relational system in Ulysses. Joyce's next entry in the Aesthetic Notebook, on March 27, 1903, applies the system to art:

e tékhne mímēitai tên phýsin -- this phrase is falsely rendered as 'Art is an imitation of Nature.' Aristotle does not here define art; he says only, 'Art imitates Nature' and means that the artistic process is like the natural process . . . It is false to say that sculpture is unassociated with movement. Sculpture is associated with movement in as much as it is rhythmic; for a work of sculptural art must be surveyed according to its rhythm and this surveying is an imaginary movement in space. It is not false to say that sculpture is an art of repose in that a work of sculptural art cannot be presented as itself moving in space and remain a work of sculptural art (CW, 145; ellipses Joyce's).
In the first entry Joyce elaborates the properties of a system. He stresses the \textit{relations} between part and part and between the whole and each of its parts. \textit{Rhythm} names this "first or formal relation." The final sentence of the first entry may, at first, seem a bit ambiguous: "Parts constitute a whole as far as they have a common end." What is \textbf{not} ambiguous about the statement is its opposition to the traditionally accepted notion that the whole is greater than its parts. This part-whole relation which Joyce writes about is the "intuitive primitive" of cognition in discourse, as we have earlier mentioned. And we have shown that neurological representation also depends upon the principle that each part contains the spread of information of the whole. Joyce's sources for this opposition to Euclid's axiom that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts could have included, as we have discussed earlier, Bruno and Peirce. George Cantor is another possible source.\textsuperscript{8} Let us bypass the consideration of sources to re-emphasize the uniqueness of this notion. No other aesthetic theory I am aware of includes such a notion.

Joyce establishes a series of parts which stand to one another in a group of connected relations. A "system is a collection having a regular relation between its members" (4.621). Thus the "common end" and the relations that obtain between parts and between parts and the whole define a system.
The system Joyce outlines has all the characteristics of a "well-constructed" or four-dimensional system, which James Bunn discusses in The Dimensionality of Signs, Tools, and Models. They are a self-regulating mechanism, a rhythmic impetus, a combination of the operations of analysis and synthesis, and an effort to duplicate the whole in miniature. By four-dimensional, Bunn means the addition of the characteristic of rhythmic impetus, or an aspect of motion measurable in time, to the three Euclidean dimensions. We will now consider each of these characteristics as they apply to the definition of system which Joyce provides in his Aesthetic Notebook.

The self-regulating mechanism found in well-constructed systems is inherent in Joyce's system. The part/part and part/whole relations determine a self-regulating mechanism. What we can call syntagmatic or analogic relations exist between part and part; and paradigmatic or digital relations exist between part and whole. But these two relations are interrelated and thus create a self-regulating mechanism. Because the part(s) "constitute a whole" even before being placed in relation to another part or parts, the part/part relations are BOTH analogic and digital (both syntagmatic and paradigmatic). This is the characteristic of a self-regulating mechanism. Because of the relations on both planes, the constraints between the parts and between the parts and the whole are in "dynamic equilibrium." According to Bunn, "dynamic
equilibrium" is "achieved by the self-regulating codes" of the whole system "where each subassembly receives and sends information to and from the other levels." The "self-regulating codes" are determined by the relation of part to whole; and the transfer of information between levels is thus ensured by the relation of each part to the other parts. The relations described here are both generative and hierarchical. The relation of one part (or subsystem) to another part (subsystem) is governed by two planes: the part/part and the part/whole relation.

The generative, hierarchical relationship is elaborated in Joyce's second entry. There Joyce rewrites Aristotle's e tekhne mimeitai ten physin as "The artistic process is like the natural process." The word/concept of "imitation" lacks the triadicity found in the word process, as we have discussed in the previous section on representation.

Joyce's extension of the traditional notion of imitation is allimportant. Joyce writes that Aristotle's "phrase is falsely rendered." "Process" corrects the error. Rather than imitation there is a relation between two processes. This is an aspect of Joyce's theory which situates him in the mainstream of semiotics. It allows for a revolutionary, new approach to art. What is given in the first entry above contains the reason for Joyce's rewriting of Aristotle in the second. A system requires a process. As Hjelmslev states, "A priori it would seem to be a
generally valid thesis that for every process there is a corresponding system.\textsuperscript{12}

Now that we have made the necessary connection between system and process, we can elaborate a bit upon the process. The generative/hierarchical relationship which we have shown in the first entry about a system of relationships can be understood as \textit{entelechy}; and this will, as we shall see, lead us to an appreciation of what Joyce says about \textit{process}.

\textit{Entelechy} brings us to Aristotle again, and to the most basic ideas concerning the representation process. Aristotle, Peirce explains, unlike modern philosophers, does not believe in only one mode of being (1.21-2):

Aristotle . . . whose system, like all the greatest systems, was evolutionary, recognized . . . besides an embryonic kind of being, like the being of a tree in its seed, or like the being of a future contingent event, depending on how a man shall decide to act. In a few passages, Aristotle seems to have a dim aper\textsuperscript{c}ue of a third mode of being in the \textit{entelechy}. The embryonic being for Aristotle was the being he called matter, which is alike in all things, and which in the course of its development took on form. Form is an element having a different mode of being. The whole philosophy of the scholastic doctors is an
attempt to mould this doctrine of Aristotle into harmony with Christian truth. This harmony the different doctors attempted to bring about in different ways. But all the realists agree in reversing the order of Aristotle's evolution by making the form come first, and the individuation of the form came later. Thus, they too recognized two modes of being of Aristotle. My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind in any way" (1.22-3).

Aristotle's *entelechy* suggests a third mode of being. Peirce's whole semiotic is based on this third mode of being, called Thirdness. And this implicit process involved in 'entelechy'—a process which we could call semiosis—is found in nature and could be used as the basis of art, as Joyce mentions in his Notebook.

**Entelechy** is defined by Peirce in the *Century Dictionary* as "realization: opposed to power or potentiality, and nearly the same as energy or act (actuality). The only difference is that entelechy implies a more perfect realization. The idea of entelechy is connected with that of form, the idea of power with that of matter... The development from being *in posse* or in germ to entelechy takes place, according to Aristotle, by means
of a change, the imperfect action or energy, of which the perfected result is the entelechy. Entelechy is, however, either first or second. First entelechy is being in working order; second entelechy is being in action. The soul is said to be the first entelechy of the body, which seems to imply that it grows out of the body as its germ; but the idea more insisted upon is that man without the soul would be but a body, while the soul, once developed, is not lost when the man sleeps. Cudworth terms his plastic nature . . . a first entelechy, and Leibnitz calls a monad an entelechy. To express this aspect of the mental function, Aristotle makes use of the word entelechy. 14

Joyce's two entries in the Aesthetic Notebook emphasize this aspect of Aristotle's philosophy which is a third mode of being. Process becomes the key statement of the second entry, just as the formal relations of a system in the first entry are primary. Joyce emphasizes the manner in which process connects matter and form. Joyce emphasizes such a use by referring to imitation and then elevating imitation to include this mediating element of process, which, when combined with the notion of a system, is similar to entelechy. The formal relations of a system remove traditional psychologyism from consideration. The natural process and the artistic process become equivalent; Peirce's ideas are also based upon a likening of the natural system and cognitive system. 15
The concept of process in Joyce's works can be traced to this entry. [The concept provides a specific means of analyzing the relation between matter (substance), form (expression), and process (thought or purport), as we shall see in Chapter Three.] The concept in the notebook is part of subsequent works and is important as a concept in its own right. In Stephen Hero, the concept of process is stressed: "This quality of the mind which so reveals itself is called (when incorrigible) a decadence but if we are to take a general view of //life// the world we cannot but see a process to life" (SH 37; cf. 33, 41-2, 43). "The process of the mind," Joyce writes in an early essay "A Portrait of the Artist," "liberate[s] from the personalized lumps of matter that which is their individuating rhythm, the first formal relation of their parts."\(^{16}\)

In Ulysses entelechy is related to the movement of a process, a generative/hierarchical mode of being "like the being of a future contingent event made determinate." Stephen in Nestor thinks: "It must be a movement then, an actuality of the possible as possible. Aristotle's phrase formed itself... Thought is the thought of thought. The soul is in a manner all that is: the soul is the form of forms" (U 25-6/26-7). In a sense, the ideas of the Aesthetic Notebook receive their entelechy in Ulysses. Not only does Stephen equate himself with the process (U 189/187) and then consider the process apart from himself: "the first entelechy, the structural rhythm"
(U 432/425), but the book as a whole demonstrates the process. By *Finnegans Wake* it is the "genre of portraiture of changes of mind" (FW 165).

In summary, the "self-regulating" mechanism of well-constructed, or four-dimensional systems is developed in Joyce's first entry about *rhythm*. The generative and hierarchical relationships possible from the part/part and part/whole relations are elaborated in the second entry. Like the natural process, the artistic process is "self-regulating." ¹⁷ These ideas in the Aesthetic Notebook are the basis of Joyce's later works.

The second characteristic of a well-constructed system is called "rhythmic impetus," or some aspect of motion measurable in time. This characteristic is most evident in Joyce's entry. With little difficulty, we can understand the "rhythm" Joyce defines as an aspect of motion measurable in time, an aspect of motion due to an implicit end-means accommodation.

For the part(s) to constitute the whole, there must be an end-means accommodation. Such an end-means accommodation includes a movement of sorts, an aspect of motion. But such an aspect of motion exists in a hypothetical dimension. And Joyce elaborates upon just this point in his second entry: "Art must be surveyed according to its rhythm and this surveying is an imaginary movement in space."
An end-means accommodation allows a person who "surveys" art to be aware of the whole as each of its parts is examined; thus each part/part relation contains rhythm. Such a survey is an "imaginary movement in space," it allows one to have a "glimpse of the end of a problem even as he [or she] becomes aware that a problem exists."\(^{18}\) If the end precedes the means, one can look back upon the end as one proceeds toward the end. One thus simultaneously explores the relations within the system to be learned and from without the system which has been revealed.

When one is in such a system (or surveys such a system) wherein one simultaneously explores relations within the system to be learned and from without the system which has been revealed, one reaches a state which can be called "rhythmic." John Dewey describes the complementarity of these opposite methods:

Esthetic recurrence in short is a vital, physiological, function. Relationships rather than elements recur, and they recur in differing contexts and with different consequences so that each recurrence is novel as well as a reminder. In satisfying an aroused expectancy, it also institutes a new longing, incites a fresh curiosity, establishes a changed suspense. The completeness of the integration of these two offices, opposed as they are in abstract conception, by the same
means instead of by using one device to arouse energy and another to bring it to rest, measures artistry of production and perception. A well-conducted scientific inquiry discovers as it tests, and proves as it explores; it does so in virtue of a method which combines both functions. And conversation, drama, novel, and architectural construction, if there is an ordered experience, reach a stage that once records and sums up the value of what precedes, and evokes and prophesies what is to come. Every closure is an awakening, and every awakening settles something. This state of affairs defines organization of energy.  

Joyce tersely describes this state of affairs. A part which constitutes the whole is found in relation to another part which constitutes the whole: "relationships rather than elements recur." Joyce formally defines "rhythm." What Joyce defines is a characteristic of a "well-constructed" system.

Joyce has preceeded others in defining a key concept. Jakobson has called such a phenomenon "introversive semiosis," and links it with the aesthetic function itself. Shapiro names Jakobson's "introversive semiosis" rhythm; and it seems as if Joyce has been ahead of us all along. Hofstadter bases much of his discussion of Godel, Escher and Bach upon the same concept, which he
Figure 1. Diagram of interlaced spiral paths which suggest the complementarity of knowing.

Source: James Bunn, The Dimensionality of Signs, p. 158.
calls a "strange loop." And language follows the same process. Sebeok states that "it is impossible that at all stages language be linear. If you take for example the simple principle of grammatical government, you have to know what comes at the end before you can have agreement at the beginning. So there must be a period in the brain processing during which the sentence is simultaneous . . . phonemes are defined standardly as a simultaneous bundle of distinctive features. So you have a simultaneity, which in turn is arranged into a sort of nacheinander." Thus even the processing of a simple sentence is implicitly related to the concept of this end-means accommodation.

Joyce uses rhythm to explain how one 'surveys' the artistic process; he makes clear that even a static object such as sculpture is "associated" with "movement." It "must be surveyed according to its rhythm and this surveying is an imaginary movement in space." It is clear that the most important element in a well-constructed system, that of "rhythmic impetus," is given prominence in Joyce's entry.

The combination of the operations of analysis and synthesis is the next characteristic of a well-constructed system. The following illustration exhibits their combination. If we imagine being at the midpoint of the interpenetrating cones while solving a problem (or while combining the two planes), two perspectives are being drawn
upon. One is "retrieving and sending, excluding and including choices." The spirals depict the kinematic circuitry involved in four-dimensional systems. Ingoing and outgoing messages are interrelated and "each cone is represented as being strapped by two spiral bands going in opposite directions" because "one is predicting and recapitulating, drawing back in order to leap higher."25

Actually the combination of analysis and synthesis is another way of naming the manner of one who "surveys" an artistic system: one can look back upon the end even as one proceeds toward it -- can be within the system to be discovered and without the system which seems to have been revealed.

And, of course, this is another way of applying the three modes of inference -- abduction, deduction, and induction -- in the Play of Musement, as we have seen. W. B. Yeats describes interpenetrating cones with spiral paths in his Vision.26 Piaget imagined such a spiral to depict the complementary methods involved in Kurt Godel's theory. Rather than a single cone or pyramid of knowledge whose theories are layered upon the ground level which rests secure as a self-sufficient base, Piaget explains: "the pyramid of knowledge no longer rests on foundations but hangs by its vertex, in ideal point reached, and, more curious, constantly rising! In short, rather than envisaging human knowledge as a pyramid or building of some
sort, we should thinking of it as a spiral the radius of whose turns increases as the spiral rises."^27

Combining the operations of analysis and synthesis is discussed in Joyce's works. According to the autobiographical Stephen Hero, the artist is "in the position of mediator between the world of his experience and the world of his dreams -- //a mediator, consequently gifted with twin faculties, a **selective** faculty and a **reproductive** faculty.// To equate these faculties was the secret of artistic success" (SH, 77-8; emphasis added). The connection between the entry of March 27 and these "twin faculties, a selective faculty and a reproductive faculty" has already been established by Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann. They write, in the footnote to Joyce's statement that "'Art imitates Nature' means that the artistic process is like the natural process": "Perhaps an anticipation of Stephen's theory that the making of a work of art includes the three stages of artistic conception, artistic gestation, and artistic reproduction (**Portrait**, p. 475[238]), an idea that he continues when he says that 'the mystery of aesthetic like that of material creation is accomplished' (**Portrait**, p. 481 [244-5])" (CW, 145).

The final aspect of a well-constructed system -- the effort to duplicate whole systems in miniature -- has been described all along. The "Parts constitute the whole" and can be seen to be containing relevant aspects of the whole.
The duplication of the whole system in miniature is an inherent potential of the system which Joyce describes. The potential is realized in *Ulysses*, especially in the Wandering Rocks episode. But even in Telemachus, Stephen himself creates a microcosm of the whole as the line his ashplant makes upon the path calls to him, an event we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter.

These two entries from Joyce's Aesthetic Notebook explicitly, contain the basic elements of a well-constructed system. Though Joyce does not use the word *system*, it is exactly the concept of a system which Joyce develops in his Notebook, as we have shown. The word *process* is used, and as Hjelmslev has been quoted above as saying, "for every process there is a corresponding system."

The characteristics which we have shown to be part of Joyce's "well-constructed" system are implicit in the description we have already provided of the Play of Musement. Abduction or "reasoning from consequent to antecedent" establishes an hypothesis to account for a "surprising phenomenon," or a break in expectation. This, of course, involves an end-means accommodation which as Peirce shows is based on a relationship between the natural process and cognitive process. And in as much as abduction leads to deduction and induction, the operations of analysis and synthesis are not just "combined" but also evaluated and modified as they accord with experience.
This is the self-regulating mechanism implicit in the activity of Musement itself, as the Muser speculates about the causes of a fact, idea, or relation that is observed and then evaluates it as a possible explanation for the event. Duplication of the whole in miniature is, in Musement, the testing of one's original hypothesis by "examining the experiential consequences which would follow from its posited truth." The purpose behind the "well-constructed" system is the clarification, or determination, or expression of meaning.28

iii

We have thus far established the basis of the concept of system in Joyce's Aesthetic Notebook. In our discussion we have touched on the most important aspects of cognition in systems; these ideas on cognition will now be considered separately.

Joyce's ideas on cognition are innovative. Joyce, like Peirce, transforms traditional notions about representation because of these very ideas. Peirce has been credited with transforming Kantian philosophy; a concept that things can be infinitely cognizable replaces the Kantian belief that thing-in-themselves are incognizable; the three modes of inference replace the concept of a priori principles of knowledge; and the concept of a community of interpreters replaces the belief in the concept of a transcendental subject of cognition.
But we criticize Joyce's theory for the ideas that have been praised in Peirce's writings. This is difficult to understand, unless we remember that Peirce spent his entire life propounding the validity of these ideas. Joyce spent his entire life building upon them and producing some of the most innovative novels of the century. It is time to consider the cognitive theory implicit in the Notebook as a valid theory in itself. The concept of the system is a start. The next step is to understand the cognitive aspects of such a system.

"Little progress has been made in defining the precise role of the epiphanies (moments of heightened awareness, secular illuminations) as an expressive and formal device in either Portrait or Ulysses," David Hayman concludes in his revised Ulysses: The Mechanics of Meaning.29 One reason for the lack of progress is the overall lack of emphasis upon the cognitive sciences in text theories.30

Joyce emphasizes the role of clear thinking about abstract matters such as life and art. "Men and women seldom think gravely on their own impulses towards art. The fetters of convention bind them too strongly," writes Joyce in "Drama and Life" in 1900 (CW, 44). In "James Clarence Mangan" Joyce explains that the "realities" that "alone give and sustain life" are "when the imagination contemplates intensely the truth of its own being or the visible world" (CW, 83). This emphasis on the thought
process as it revolts against artifice seems to be "a revolt, in a sense, against actuality. It speaks of what seems fantastic and unreal to those who have lost the simple intuitions which are the tests of reality; and, as it is often found a war with its age, so it makes no account of history, which is fabled by the daughters of memory, but sets store by every time less than the pulsation of an artery, the time in which its intuition starts forth" (CW, 81). Peirce calls these "simple intuitions which are the test of reality" by the name of abduction. Only abduction can start a new idea as it "sees connections" between a present experience and a universal proposition (2.96; 2.755). And they do "test" reality in as much as they proceed from rule and result to the case (2.706-14). In Peirce we find how abduction, or these intuitions Joyce emphasizes, "makes no account of history." They are a method of forming a general prediction, or regulating future conduct (2.266; 2.86).

Joyce's theory of aesthetics, as we have it in his Notebooks, is firmly rooted in a process which privileges cognition as a means of representing reality. The first entry of the Paris Notebook (13 February 1903) defines the proper conditions of art as they relate to "states of mind" (CW, 145). This entry, is important in its privileging of a person's cognitive state of mind in defining art:

Desire is the feeling which urges us to go to something and loathing is the feeling which
urges us to go from something: and that art is improper which aims at exciting these feelings in us whether by comedy or by tragedy. Of comedy later. But tragedy aims at exciting in us feelings of pity and terror. Now terror is the feeling which arrests us before whatever is grave inhuman fortunes and unites us with the human sufferer. Now loathing, which in an improper art aims at exciting in the way of tragedy, differs, it will be seen, from the feelings which are proper to tragic art, namely terror and pity. For loathing urges us from rest because it urges us to go from something, but terror and pity hold us in rest, as it were, by fascination. When tragic art makes my body shrink terror is not my feeling because I am urged from rest, and moreover this art does not show me what is grave, I mean what is constant and irremediable in human fortunes nor does it unite me with any secret cause for it shows me only what is unusual and remediable and it unites me with a cause only too manifest. Nor is an art properly tragic which would move me in anger against some manifest cause of human suffering. Terror and pity, finally, are aspects of sorrow comprehended in
sorrow -- the feeling which the privation of some good excites in us (CW 143-44).

Joyce then turns to comedy and defines the proper feeling as joy rather than desire, for similar reasons. Joy "holds us in rest so long as we possess something" but desire "urges us from rest that we may possess something."

Comedy not tragedy, is "the perfect manner in art": "All art which excites in us the feeling of joy is so far comic and according as this feeling of joy is excited by whatever is substantial or accidental in human fortunes the art is to be judged more or less excellent: and even tragic art may be said to participate in the nature of comic art so far as the possession of a work of tragic art (a tragedy) excites in us the feelings of joy. . . . All art, again, is static for the feelings of terror and pity on the one hand and of joy on the other hand are feelings which arrest us. It will be seen afterwards how this rest is necessary for the apprehension of the beautiful -- the end of all art, tragic or comic -- for this rest is the only condition under which the images, which are to excite in us terror or pity or joy, can be properly presented to us and properly seen by us. For beauty is a quality of something seen but terror and pity and joy are states of mind" (CW 144-5).

Stasis, as Joyce writes, is "necessary for the apprehension of the beautiful -- the end of all art." Joyce mentions that "it will be seen afterwards how this
rest is necessary," and his subsequent entries do develop the operation. But before we discuss the connection between entries within the Notebook, it becomes important to clarify the term "stasis." Stasis, we should first mention, is also used in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* when Stephen Dedalus explains his theory of aesthetics to Lynch (pp. 239-41). As we shall see, Joyce's own theory of aesthetics is frequently combined with Stephen's use of it in *Portrait* (and *Stephen Hero*).

One of the best discussions of Joyce's aesthetic theory, found in William Noon's *Joyce and Aquinas*, is critical of the theory of stasis -- both in Joyce's and Stephen Dedalus's explanations of it. We can determine the innovation of Joyce's concept of stasis once we are aware of exactly how it goes beyond what Noon establishes as traditional Thomistic philosophy. And Noon's qualified criticism is an excellent starting point.

Noon points out that "stasis" does not fit Hegel's notion of tragedy as a "special kind of action." A. C. Bradley is shown to defend Hegel's theory of tragedy as "kinetic," and, in addition, the Aquinian "contemplatio" is emphasized as being "as much kinetic as it is static."³¹ Noon writes: "Stephen might have made a better formulation of pity and terror as the essentially tragic emotions had he realized that when the mind is arrested by the artistic vision of conflict and collision it is very much in action and not static at all" (p. 37). According to Noon, it is
quite proper for the "Aquinan student of Joyce [to] agree with More's criticism that Joyce 'would have formulated his [Aquinas'] principles more correctly if, instead of a contrast between kinetic and static, he had distinguished between art that aims to arouse physical lust or loathing and art that seeks to move desire and joy of hyperphyscial realities.'"32 But Joyce makes this distinction between art which "urges us from rest" and art which "holds us in rest," in his above entry. Noon suggests that the theory of "stasis," despite its insufficiency, allows us to see "what Stephen is leading up to: a theory of art which situates the artistic (and the tragic-as-artistic) as a department of the beautiful" (p. 37). And it is this latter concept which is then used as a criticism for Joyce's philosophical position.

"The cautious reader of Joyce may begin to wonder if Stephen has the Scholastic or the Kantian aesthetic in mind," Noon writes (p. 37). But if we consider the possibility that Joyce (and Stephen) is not modeling ideas upon such an aesthetic we can learn much about the difference between the Scholastic or Kantian aesthetic and Joyce's.

Noon characterizes the Scholastic aesthetic as "metaphysical" and the Kantian aesthetic as "epistemological in nature." But both aesthetics are shown to lead to the supposed weakness in the definition of art as static (Stephen is ignoring "the psychological
involvement of aesthetic distance"). The Scholastic and Kantian aesthetics are aligned by Noon as follows: "Almost all neo-Thomist aestheticians have adverted to the (Kantian) doctrine of aesthetic disinterest and detachment in the explication of the quae visa placent, a special form of contemplation which rests content with the vision of the object as it is artistically symbolized and which is not led on by the vision to a desire for physical possession of the object itself, nor by any which to alter the physical (that is, non-ideational) universe, be it material or moral, which the artifact -- the poem or the picture, for example -- may either symbolize or 'represent'" (p. 38). This is the point upon which Aquinas and Kant are seen to agree and upon which Joyce (and Stephen) disagree.

The disagreement is important; one leads to a separation between art and life and the other to a relation between art and life. We shall accept Noon's characterization of the Scholastic (Aquinian) and Kantian "doctrine of disinterest" to show exactly what Joyce may have found unacceptable about it:

The 'disinterest' of which Kantian and Scholastic aestheticians speak is not a lack of interest in the artifact nor an indifference in regard to possession it. But possession of the artifact is not the same as possession of the object which the artifact somehow symbolizes or reveals. Aesthetic interest in the artifact
makes one less interested in the object to which it refers. The possession which the mind enjoys in contemplating the artifact as a work of art is an "intentional" possession; so long as the mind can hold the artifact before its spiritual vision, the question of physical possession or contact with the object referred to does not arise, and the question of physical possession of the artifact itself, if it arises at all, is quite separate from and subordinate to the mind's intentional possession by knowledge of what the artifact symbolizes (p. 38).

We can see more clearly what Joyce opposes in the Kantian "doctrine of disinterest." Joyce's entry is filled with references to possession and non-possession, and Joyce opts for a definition of art which "holds us in rest so long we possess something." Joyce clearly opposes the separation of possession of the artifact and possession of what the artifact reveals. Joy is "excited by whatever is substantial or accidental in human fortunes"--Joyce does not accept that "aesthetic interest in the artifact makes one less interested in the object to which it refers."

Instead, Joyce defines art to include both the artifact and the object to which it refers.

In addition, Joyce does not see the question of physical possession of the object referred to as
"subordinate to the mind's 'intentional' possession by knowledge of what the artifact symbolizes." The mind's 'intentional' possession is, instead, based on "knowledge of what the artifact symbolizes." How the mind comes to know such knowledge in the real world is a model of how the mind comes to know the artifact itself, and in Kantian philosophy we cannot know the thing-in-itself -- knowledge of the object of our thought is based on transcendental, a priori principles of knowledge. We can ask what enables the mind to "hold the artifact before its spiritual vision." If there is nothing that founds the relation between the artifact and the object to which it refers, the artifact is quite separated from referential reality. If there is nothing that founds the relation between the object in the real world and the object as it appears on a person's mind, then the thing-in-itself is incognizable. This is Kantian philosophy and this is what Joyce could not accept. Kant denies an objective knowable reality.

Kant would keep the "IMAGE"-in-itself incognizable. Joyce stresses the image in the artifact as it is cognizable. Joyce writes: "It will be seen afterwards how this rest is necessary for the apprehension of the beautiful -- the end of all art, tragic or comic -- for this rest is the only condition under which the images, which are to excite in us terror or pity or joy, can be properly presented to us and properly seen by us." The image, in a Kantian perspective, can be interpreted and
presented only if one's mind "can hold the artifact before its spiritual vision." It is incognizable until understood with some a priori principles which allow us to possess the artifact. But Joyce states that there is a proper means of presenting images that allows one to apprehend the beautiful. This proper means of presenting images is suggested in the operation involved in what he bases his definitions upon. He defines pity as "aspects of sorrow comprehended in sorrow." These "aspects" exist only analytically "as the basis that must be posited for the difference between one and the same thing [sorrow] now existing only in fact, now existing also in apprehension."33

The images of pity include a cognitive element. The form of the definition is "aspects of x comprehended in x." An image of joy, to extend Joyce's above definition, would be a presentation of 'satisfaction comprehended in satisfaction." Just as pity is excited by "the privation of some good," joy "is excited by whatever is substantial or accidental in human fortunes." Pity and joy, when they are seen by the viewer or reader of the artifact, require (1) understanding that they are aspects of sorrow or of satisfaction, and (2) comprehension in sorrow or in satisfaction. The latter involves a relation between the viewer of the artifact and the real world, and a relation between the real world and the created world. Joyce writes that tragic art unites one with "what is constant and
irremediable in human fortunes . . . [and] with any secret cause for it." Knowing what is constant and knowing the secret cause require a non-"subordinate" possession of "what the artifact symbolizes."

But is such knowledge of a general sort real? This question is the fundamental question which the Scholastics debated. As we know, it is a question which Stephen asks and answers in Nestor and Proteus. The question of whether universals which are found in things and universals which are found in the mind are real or logical or 'metaphysical' involves us not just with issues found within Joyce's works, but also with the issues upon which Joyce's aesthetic theory is "evaluated." We will now provide a summary of the issue.

The Scholastics separated universals found in things from universals found in the mind. The first is called ens reale or real being, the latter is called ens rationis, or being of reason. Both are real. A concept is thus real in two ways: real in itself and in its reference to real thing. In other words, a concept is real in virtue of the fact that someone has the concept and in virtue of the fact that "there is something real of which the concept is true." A first "intention" is a thought about the real world; a second 'intention' is thought about the first thought, or thought about the first intention. First intentional concepts have real things for their objects; second intentions have only entia rationis for their
objects. Joyce's definition of pity as "sorrow comprehended in sorrow" thus is an example of a second intention for it involves thought about a concept.

But what if the concept is about the nature of an individual thing or person? In Scholastic thought that which differentiates one man or thing from another within its class (such as Socrates from Plato who share one common nature in their humanity) leads to a formal distinction. There is a need to distinguish between that which makes Socrates unique and that which Socrates shares with other men. This distinction is between what Duns Scotus called haecceity and Common Nature. Scotus, we may recall, is both mentioned in Joyce's works and was part of the atmosphere of University College where Joyce's predecessor, Gerard Manley Hopkins, a member of the faculty, was filled with what has been called an "obstinate love" of Scotist doctrine. The distinction between haecceity and Common Nature is a formal distinction. If we consider whether the formal distinction is itself real, we have that which distinguished Aquinas from Scotus. Aquinas believes that the formal distinction between individuality (or haecceity) and common nature is a matter of logic; and he recognizes only two modes of being: the real and the logical. Scotus recognized a third mode of being which maintains the formal distinction as both real and logical.

Joyce includes the artifact itself and the objects to which it refers as real. Stasis is a principle which
allows the artifact to be considered "real" in both its individual and general (or common) characteristics for it includes analytical reflection. In other words, since terror, pity and joy "are states of mind," as Joyce puts it, the images which call these feelings forth are both universal and particular, both something which is presented and something which can be seen -- a concept and a thing. Beauty is this "quality of something seen" but only as it partakes of the universal in the particular which allows any image to be connected to the "end of all art" or the apprehension of the whole artifact as beautiful. Joyce, in a later entry, will specify the stages involved in the relation of an individual, real object to "states of mind."

Stasis is not to be confused with a Kantian or Neo-Thomist aesthetic of disinterest and detachment, which is kinetic as Noon shows. Stasis is not to be confused with that which causes the feelings of terror and pity and joy, which is kinetic; stasis is the effect of these "states of mind." During the time one is "arrested" by the feelings of terror and pity and joy one does not subordinate the objects to which the artifact refers but coordinates the objects to each other and to the end toward which they all are a part. The images are thus connected to each other as objects in the real world are seen to be in relation to each other; and the images are part of the "end of all art," or beauty, which is a "quality of something seen." They are in the latter respect understood
in their universal aspect. The images are both particular and universal, and in both respects they are real. One's relation to an image which arrests a feeling of joy or terror or pity is similar to one's relation to a second intentional concept.

Does Joyce's theory of stasis form a doctrine which is an alternative to what has been called the Scholastic and Kantian doctrine of aesthetic distance? Yes. The differences are found in the following areas: (1) the object to which the artifact refers is included and not made "separate from and subordinate to the mind's intenntinal possession by knowledge of what the artifact symbolizes"; instead the object to which the artifact refers is included as would a term in a second intention be included as a real object of thought. Such an inclusion of the object to which the artifact refers allows any work constructed according to the theory to make use of distinctions between dreams, future, representations, sensations, and so such as were debated in Scholasticism. In short the whole ability to show the relation between the object and the thought of the object is thus made an inherent possibility within the artifact. Such an ability (to make such distinctions and to show such relations) is denied in the non-aesthetic, real world by the Kantian system of philosophy. It is further denied in an aesthetic one. (2) The universal is found to be included in the particular; in an aesthetic object the beauty of an image
can be seen. This opposes the architectonic of Kantian nominalism which denies such a possibility.

Now that we have suggested an interpretation of Joyce's concept of stasis which shows its difference from Kantian aesthetic distance we need only comment that such an interpretation includes ideas that are themselves viable. What Joyce writes is acceptable aesthetic theory, not a confused version of Kantian aesthetic distance. John Boler has shown that Peirce solves the same problems in Kantian philosophy by the logic of relatives, by an acceptance of the reality of ideas, and with the three modes of inquiry. According to Boler, Peirce makes "the whole question of universals easier to express and to solve. Abstractions like humanity turn out to be simple forms -- the limiting cases -- in a general process whereby relations are treated as things (hypostatized) in order to serve as the terms for higher order relations. Pragmatism shows that scientific formulas take the form of such relations. When successful prediction indicates that these formulas are not fictions, they are called laws. Laws are manifested in things as real powers, or, in pragmatic terms, as real 'would-be's'." And he shows that the "would-be is independent of the individual actualities, and therefore that the law is not contracted in the individual [as Scotus would have it]. The laws are not simply other individual things: they are of a different mode of being. Relative to the mind -- indeed, idea-like in character --
they are nevertheless real; and the Peirce follows Scotus in calling them realities."

The idea of stasis as rest is thus precisely "the form of aesthetic contemplation" (6.458) which Peirce includes as an example of Musement. The idea of stasis as rest is confirmed in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (Popular Science Monthly, 1878): "But the soul and meaning of thought, abstracted from the other elements which accompany it, though it may be voluntarily thwarted, can never be made to direct itself toward anything but the production of belief. Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to belief is not part of the thought itself . . . . thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. The final upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief is only a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence future thinking" (5.397-8; emphasis added).

Thus far we can see that this single entry in Joyce's Notebook which defines art as static can be
accepted as a legitimate idea if we allow the possibility for a non-Kantian/Thomistic interpretation. More importantly, we can see the basis for the later entries which develop, as Joyce promised, the manner in which this "rest is necessary" for the apprehension of the beautiful.

We can see that the relation between the image and the artist in the following entry of his Notebook is based on the presence of thought which serves as the "stadium of mental action."

... There are three conditions of art: the lyrical, the epical, and the dramatic. That art is lyrical whereby the artist sets forth the image in immediate relation to himself; that art is epical whereby the artist sets forth the image in mediate relation to himself and to others; that art is dramatic whereby the artist sets forth the image in immediate relation to others. ... (CW 145; ellipses Joyce's).

Joyce defines three "conditions of art" based on the immediate and mediate relation of an image to someone—whether that person be the artist or another (or a combination of the two). That relation of the image to the artist and/or others is based on "mediation," and it involves a cognitive element. In addition, there is an implicit progression involved in the lyrical, epical and
dramatic conditions of art. The progression is explicitly discussed in *Portrait* and demonstrated in *Ulysses*. The mediation in three conditions can be understood in Peircean terms as the immediate interpretant, dynamical interpretant, and final interpretant, which themselves involve the notion of process and the two aspects of semiosis (sign-action and sign-interpreting).\(^{38}\) Peirce writes: "These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations. We may add that just as a piece of music may be written in parts, each part having its own air, so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together between the same sensations. These different systems are distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions. Thought is only one such system" (5.395).

Stephen's development of these three conditions of art in *Portrait* suggests the above notion of thought having
a beginning, middle and end in relation to a succession of images which are immediately and mediately present:

art necessarily divides itself into three forms progressing from one to the next. These forms are: the lyrical form, the form wherein the artist presents his image in immediate relation to himself; the epical form, the form wherein he presents his image in mediate relation to himself and to others; the dramatic form, the form wherein he presents his image in immediate relation to others . . . Lessing . . . should not have taken a group of statues to write of. The art, being inferior, does not present the forms I spoke of distinguished clearly one from another. Even in literature the highest and most spiritual art, the forms are often confused (P 214).

Sculpture does not suggest the movement of thought from the beginning to the middle and final forms of belief, but a single work of literature most definitely can. What Peirce above calls the congruence of succession is compatible with the idea of these forms "progressing from one to the next." What may seem ambiguous in the passage -- "his image" -- which can refer to the author's image of an external sense object, or which can also refer to the author's image of himself, is made clear once we consider that the external
world and "everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves." Of course, "This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign" (5.395). The progression is based on a process of abstraction which is real and which lends consistency to the related sequence of of images.

It is possible that Joyce read the important presentation of Peirce's ideas in "Some Consequence of Four Incapacities" (Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1868), where Cartesian principles are replaced with the ideas that "all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts . . . [that] every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions, [that] we have no power of thinking without signs, and [that] we have no conception of the absolutely incognizable" (5.266). Peirce's discussion of the relation of states of mind according to immediate and mediate images, his discussion of the three elements of thought in terms of the sensation of beauty, and especially his emphasis upon the verbal aspects of signs are very similar to what is presented in Joyce's Notebook. Since no other influence has as yet been presented as one which clarifies the ideas in Joyce's Notebook, an excellent case
can be made for a thorough reinterpretation of Joyce's aesthetic theory based on a Peircean approach.

Since the interpretation of Joyce's novels frequently depends upon understanding the aesthetic theory included within the text, it becomes important to first discuss the theory apart from the work to determine how consistent and viable it is. To assume the theory is weak or inconsistent with the Aquinan or Kantian aesthetics leads to making the same assumptions in the interpretation of the work: a risky undertaking.

Goldberg in The Classical Temper states: "There are three major, interrelated problems that Stephen fails to solve in his theory in the Portrait, problems that arise from and reflect his wider attitudes: the relation between aesthetic value and moral value; the difference between aesthetic beauty and natural beauty; and the relation between aesthetic form and aesthetic meaning. In each case to follow out his ideas is to find ourselves reach the impasse of his immaturity." Goldberg believes that "by ignoring the contexts of human experience in which art is created and apprehended, and the function of the language in which that experience is embodied, Stephen ignores the whole symbolic aspect of art. The result is, in a very pure sense, what has been called the 'ontological fallacy' -- the belief that 'a work of art fulfills its purpose and achieves its value simply by being, so that the critic becomes concerned only to demonstrate the mode of
its being by descriptive analysis'. To ignore the meanings created in a work of art -- and particularly to ignore the manner of their presence -- is to come perilously close to pure Aestheticism, and this Stephen in effect does. Subtly but inevitably, he suggests that as the artist is isolated from his society so art is isolated from life. . . . Stephen extends the exile of the artist to the exile of art."^{40}

But Stephen does not exile art. Although he is not yet the artist, his theories suggest the tremendous limitations of Dublin which force him into exile. Dublin creates the need for Stephen's exile and justifies the need for theories such as Stephen presents.

Stephen does not "underestimate" the relations between art and life. The first reference to exile ("I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use -- silence, exile and cunning" [P 247]) appears immediately before the diary entries begin. It is as if the decision to leave the city of paralysis creates room for self-expression.

Stephen does not come "perilously close to pure Aestheticism." Rather, the opposite is true. The first comments on the theory of the beautiful are a response to the dean of studies, who asks Stephen to "solve" the question of "what the beautiful is" (P 185). Their discussion clearly reveals the aspects of paralysis that
lead to Stephen's exile. "Beauty" is defined in an esthetic and theological "play" upon "good." The contrast is lost upon the dean, as is Stephen's comment that "there is not such thing as free thinking inasmuch all thinking must be bound by its own laws." Stephen's figurative use of "lamp" for "light" is taken literally (P 187-8). Stephen's point about the different uses of the word "detained" is missed completely, and the example Stephen uses to distinguish its use in the tradition of literature and its use in the tradition of the marketplace is mistaken: "The use of the word in the marketplace is quite different. I hope I am not detaining you [italics in text]," Stephen says. And the dean responds: "'Not in the least!'" (P 188). The first and second intensional senses are conflated by the dean. The dean's error is similar to Goldberg's.

The context for Stephen's later bolder statement of aesthetic theory actually establishes the complex theme of the novel: the relationship between the artist and his society. Goldberg asserts that Stephen does not distinguish between "moral value" and "values of morality," but Stephen not only recognizes both but plays upon their difference:

--This fire before us, said the dean, will be pleasing to the eye. Will it therefore be beautiful?
-- In so far as it is apprehended by the sight, which I suppose means here esthetic intellection, it will be beautiful. But Aquinas also says *Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*. In so far as it satisfies the animal craving for warmth fire is a good. In hell however it is an evil.

... It seemed as if he used the shifts and lore and cunning of the world, as bidden to do, for the greater glory of God, without joy in their handling or hatred of that in them which was evil but turning them, with a firm gesture of obedience, back upon themselves (p. 186).

Stephen accuses the priest of the lack of distinction between moral values and the value of morality.

Goldberg tries to establish Stephen's immaturity by discrediting the theories as "ontological fallacies." We have shown that no such fallacy exists when the theory is understood apart from the current nominalistic strains in modern thought. Goldberg further believes that *Ulysses*, which he sees as a continuation of the theories in *Portrait* to some extent, "does not in itself form a completely satisfactory aesthetic either" (p. 47). Once again, the aesthetic is not an easy capitulation to well-accepted nominalistic notions about reality, cognition, and so on. The aesthetic is an operation of Musement which produces a self-reflective, self-correcting habit of approaching the
real world. The "problem" of the aesthetic of the novels forces us to reconsider the Aesthetic Notebook.

The Pola Notebook contains three famous entries on cognition. In the first, headed with "Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus" from Aquinas, Joyce defines the good, true, and beautiful:

The good is that towards the possession of which an appetite tends: the good is the desirable. The true and the beautiful are the most persistent orders of the desirable. Truth is desired by the intellectual appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible; beauty is desired by the aesthetic appetite which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible. The true and the beautiful are spiritually possessed; the true by intellection, the beautiful by apprehension, and the appetites which desire to possess them, the intellectual and aesthetic appetites, are therefore spiritual appetites . . . (CW 146-7; ellipses Joyce's, emphasis mine).

The relations of the sensible and the relations of the intelligible can appease the aesthetic and intellectual appetites; the beautiful and the true are, because of the end toward which they "tend," "spiritually possessed." The
definition of the good is based on the movement toward what is spiritually possessed -- "the good is that towards the possession of which an appetite tends." Possession of the true or the beautiful requires the completion of that toward which an appetite tends. Notice the relation Joyce presents between "tendency" towards and "possession" of. Here again is the "end-means" accommodation, a semiotic concept, discussed above. And notice the inherent belief that concepts as well as things can be cognizable. Aquinas, in id quod visum placet, refers, with visum, to a "type of supernatural knowledge promised to the souls of the blessed -- the beatific vision in which God is beheld intuitively, not known discursively, and in which knowledge united with love is the principle of the soul's union with God." 41 Joyce refers to such a signification of visum in his previous entry: "for beauty is a quality of something seen" and above in his statement about "the beautiful -- the end of all art (CW 145, 144). This entry makes even more explicit the "type of supernatural knowledge" involved -- "the true and the beautiful are spiritually possessed." But Aquinas "regarded the idea [of a completed infinite] as a direct challenge to the unique and absolutely infinite nature of God." 42

Joyce regarded a completed infinite as a necessary part of his theory of art. To say "the true and the beautiful are spiritually possessed" is to bring into a person's aesthetic potential the ability to contemplate the
idea of a completed infinite. This is possible through intellection (of the true) and apprehension (of the beautiful). The ability to sense and think leads to the ability to know the "highest order of reality" which is spiritual.

Joyce's next entry in the Pola notebook (15 November 1904) defines beauty in terms of its cognitive levels. The quality of a sensible object, when apprehended, satisfies the aesthetic appetite "which desires to apprehend the most satisfying relations of the sensible." Two levels of cognition are involved: "the activity of cognition or simple perception and the activity of recognition" (CW 147).

By virtue of the first activity of perception, which is "like every other activity, itself pleasant," even "the most hideous object can be said to have been and to be beautiful in so far as it has been apprehended . . . there is no sensible object which cannot be said to be in a measure beautiful" (CW 147). Joyce is defining what Peirce calls the "question of esthetics": "What is the one quality that is in its immediate presence ἀλός? Upon this question ethics must depend, just as logic must depend upon ethics" (2.199) The Greek ἀλός depends upon the quality of being unbeautiful; much like Joyce's meaning above which includes even 'hideous' objects.

Joyce defines this one quality upon which esthetics itself is defined as the object of what has been
apprehended by some interpreter. The **quality** is a medium for the communication of a feature or a form. It exists independently of the interpreter and independently of the act of apprehension. The act of apprehension of the feature or form creates another subject of this embodied form as it exists in consequence of its being communicated. The first form is the immediate object and the form which is the product of the act of apprehension is the dynamical object, to use Peircean terminology. Once again, in reference to the above idea of completed infinity, we can see that there is no challenge to the absolutely infinite nature of God who is credited with making the form of the immediate object visible. The challenge is removed by making the form of the quality of beauty (in the dynamical object) that which is embodied in consequence of the communication and which exists in the sign or image within the mind of the interpreter or apprehender.

Joyce next discusses the "second part of the act of apprehension which is called the activity of recognition." He writes "there is no activity of simple perception to which there does not succeed in whatsoever measure the activity of recognition. For by the activity of recognition is meant an activity of decision; and in accordance with this activity in all conceivable cases a sensible object is said to be satisfying or dissatisfying. But the activity of recognition is, like every other activity, itself pleasant and therefore every object that
has been apprehended is secondly in whatsoever measure beautiful" (CW 147). The decision here will later be discussed as the mapping of perceptions onto a semantic model, and as the proportioning of what is present and absent in a person's volitional act of thinking. In Peirce's writings such a decision is more than the simple perception; the medium for the communication or extension of a form determines the interpreter (or perceiver) to represent or "take the form of" the object. In the second part of apprehension, the interpreter goes beyond this and determines the representation of the sign; instead of representing the object one is representing how this very sign itself represents that object. One determines the connection between the internal structure or quality of the sign in the immediate object and that which is external to the sign and is represented within the mind of the person. One can determine the connection to be a relation of likeness which is iconic, indexical, or symbolic. The context of the dynamic object is thus considered as it related to the immediate object. As the dynamic object is related to the immediate object, all the collateral information which exists prior to the perception of the immediate object and which exists in the context as tacitly understood in the situation comes into play.

An activity of decision does occur; such activity is in itself pleasant. What was originally forced upon the mind of the interpreter in perception as the form of the
beautiful (which can include the unbeautiful) now includes more than what perception itself reveals. Thus the sensible object "is secondly in whatsoever measure beautiful." It now includes an object of actual experience. Joyce concludes this entry by stating that this results in measure of "aesthetic satisfaction" and "in so far as its apprehension results in any measure of satisfaction whatsoever, [it is] said to be for the third time beautiful" (CW 148).

Joyce's final entry (16 November 1904) elaborates upon the second and third stage:

It has been said that the act of apprehension involves at least two activities -- the activity of cognition or simple perception and the activity of recognition. The act of apprehension, however, in its most complete form involves three activities -- the third being the activity of satisfaction. By reason of the fact that these three activities are all pleasant themselves every sensible object that has been apprehended must be doubly and may be trebly beautiful. In practical aesthetic philosophy the epithets 'beautiful' and 'ugly' are applied with regard, that is, to the nature, degree and duration of the satisfaction resultant from the apprehension of any sensible object and therefore any sensible object to
which in practical and aesthetic philosophy the epithet 'beautiful' is applied must be trebly beautiful, must have encountered, that is, the three activities which are involved in the act of apprehension in its most complete form. Practically then the quality of beauty in itself must involve three constituents to encounter each of these three activities . . . (CW 148; ellipses Joyce's; emphasis mine).

In the second stage of apprehension, the stage wherein "by the activity of recognition is meant an activity of decision," the quality of beauty external to the interpreter is mediated with the quality of beauty internal to the interpreter. In other words, the immediate object, or form of beauty external to the interpreter is mediated with the dynamical object, or form of beauty internal to the interpreter. This mediation can be compared to the middle term in a syllogism, or to the mental interpretant in representation which mediates between the object and what it stands for, or to a transformation rule which translates one form into another form and is thus a generality governing change. 44

The second stage of apprehension allows the thing in itself to be cognized. The quality of beauty that was perceived in the first stage called simple perception is not denied. The second stage of apprehension is based on the first stage: it is in a hierarchical relationship to
it. Peirce provides detailed explanation of the various relationships that the sign has in relation to its dynamic objects (icons, indices, symbols); the variety of material natures of the sign itself (qualisign, sinsign, and legisign); the relations of the sign to its immediate object (quality, existent, or law); the relations to its signified interpretant (rheme, dicent, or argument); the relations to its dynamic interpretant; and the relations to its immediate interpretant. Joyce wisely refrains from defining any of the "relations" of the sensible. But he points out items of vital importance.

The third stage of apprehension receives the most emphasis in this final entry. The third stage can be labeled \textit{Kalos}, the best or highest or most admirable quality which is produced by the final interpretant of an aesthetic sign.\footnote{The beauty which is trebly beautiful first focuses on the quality in the cognition-independent sign as it is simply perceived by the senses; it then is perceived as beautiful in the second stage due to the relationship between that in the first stage which is immediately present as an object of the sign and that which has been made dynamically present as an object in the mind of the interpreter; it is finally perceived as beautiful in the third stage of apprehension as it has been submitted to its interpretant as something satisfying, "the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged," something "urged upon the interpretant by an act of insistence,"}
something "presented to the interpretant for contemplation,"
and as it is interpretable "in thoughts or other signs of
the same kind of infinite series," "in actual
experiences . . . [and] in qualities of feelings or
appearances."46

In these entries Joyce strikes a fatal blow to
nominalism. The object in itself is cognizable, infinitely
cognizable rather than incognizable. Knowledge of the
external world is not based on subjective self-consciousness
but on a process of cognition. Three stages used to
apprehend the object include three forms of one type of
inference, which is inductive. Singular images and general
terms pose no problems as they do to the nominalists; "the
general features exist in the details; the details are, in
fact, the whole picture" (5.304). As Peirce explains,
"Sensation and the power of abstraction may be regarded as
the sole constituents of all thought" (5.295). That
Joyce's ideas are in themselves acceptable can be
established with reference to numerous articles Peirce,
over thirty years, had published before continued
publishing during Joyce's formative period. "Some
Consequences of Four Incapacities" is suggested as a
possible source, but other articles may have also, or
instead, have suggested such theories to Joyce; they
include "The Fixation of Belief" (1877); "The Doctrine of
Chances" (1878); "The Order of Nature" (1878); "The
Architecture of Theories" (1891); "The Law of Mind" (1892);
and various important reviews of George Berkeley and William James, among many others.

iv

Joyce writes that "the quality of beauty in itself must involve three constituents to encounter each of these three [cognitive] activities" (CW 148). This statement is one which equates the process of signification with the process of cognition. In this section we will further consider this equivalence between cognition and signification which Joyce writes about in his Aesthetic Notebook. The purpose is to consider and relate the idea (of the three cognitive activities as they encounter an object) to current thought on the subject. The question is whether Joyce's idea on this subject is basically in agreement with current thinking about the process of cognition.

According to Peirce's philosophy the process of signification is equivalent with the process of cognition. And Joyce's equation between the process of signification and the process of cognition is confirmed in Umberto Eco's *A Theory of Semiotics*.

Eco explains the process involved in the creation of expressions, emphasizing the role of topo-sensitive details. Topo-sensitive details are physical phenomenon whose nature is different from verbal phenomenon; they are non-verbal equivalents of deictic or anaphoric verbal signs
such as /this-that/ or /here-there/, the latter of which have been called shifters. Eco states that "in non-verbal signs the format of the sememe is determined by the format of the sign-vehicle -- or vice-versa. This particular link of 'motivation' ... cannot be explained without having recourse to a theory of the modes of physical production of sign-function." 47 His theory of the modes of physical production of sign-functions includes the stages of recognition, ostension, replica, and invention; the stages are considered in terms of their relation to the physical labor involved. A feature from a perceptual model is mapped onto a semantic model and then onto an expression model governed by either ratio difficilis or ratio facilis. "There is a case of ratio difficilis when an expression-token is directly accorded to its content, whether because the corresponding expression-type does not exist as yet or because the expression type is identical with the content-type. In other words, there is a ratio difficilis when the expression-type coincides with the sememe conveyed by the expression-token. ... One could say that in cases of ratio difficilis the nature of the expression is motivated by the nature of the content" (Theory, 183). The similarity between the expression type and the content-type "does not concern the relationship between the image and its object but that between the image and a previously culturalized content." In other words, "signs ruled by a ratio difficilis are motivated, but
mainly by a content-form" (*Theory*, 204-5). Examples of *ratio facilis*, on the other hand, are "foreseen by a given code" because an expression-token is accorded to an expression-type, duly recoded by an expression-system" (*Theory*, 185).

Eco's approach to sign-production confirms the existence of a relation between the process of signification and the process of cognition. The process of sign-production involves a cognitive process. Signification depends upon a relation between features in the perceptual model and the type-token relation, the latter of which involves previous culturized codes or a new means of creating an expression. Joyce's equation of the artistic process and the natural process emphasizes the above features of the perceptual modes as they are made into an expression model governed either by *ratio difficilis* (or the nature of the content) or *ratio facilis* (or the nature of previously used codes). Joyce's three stages of apprehension or cognition can be considered in light of Eco's discussion of the mapping from a perceptual model to a semantic model, and the mapping from the semantic model to an expression model. Recognition, ostension and replica refer to the cognitive activities required in the mapping processes and are implicit in Joyce's three cognitive stages.

Joyce's equation between the process of signification and the process of cognition is also
confirmed by reference to John Deely's analysis of the three stages of cognition, which he labels sensation, perception, and understanding. Deely explains that "cognition is equivalent to a process of communication by signs, or semiosis." The functioning of a sign and the functioning of ideas within the mind are exactly similar in that both bring something other than themselves into awareness. Because of this, he shows that "the function of signification is realized at the various levels of cognitive life."\(^4\)

At the "lowest" level of cognition is sensation. Sensation is the grade of cognition in which an organism achieves awareness of aspects of its surrounding environment under the direct stimulus of those features (of the surrounding environment) upon its sensory receptors. In this level, what is important is that the features of the interaction environment made known through a specific sensory channel also bring along into awareness other features which are not uniquely attained by any one channel but which overlap with and are attained in common by several channels. This is clearly seen with aspects of the environment such as colors, sounds, textures, and so on, which immediately bring along with themselves an awareness of plurality, positions, shapes, movements, and so on (Deely, pp. 94-98).

Sensation, at the beginning of the process of cognition, thus brings into an organism's awareness "an
outline of objective structure that is relative and changing, surely enough, but naturally determined nevertheless. As Deely emphasizes, "sense data already comprise an objective structure" (p. 98). The following figure labels the two kinds of related features received from the environment the "sensory core":

![Diagram](image)

Figure 2: The Relation Between the Whole of Perception and its Immediate "Sensory Core."

Adapted from John Deely, *Introducing Semiotic*, p. 114.

This feature of sensation which brings into awareness aspects of the environment which themselves comprise elements of an objective structure has been described by Umberto Eco, and mentioned by others. Eco
names this feature "topo-sensitivity" in his *A Theory of Semiotics*. And when he explains that topo-sensitive details are ruled according to *ratio difficilis* and are required in the production of expressions, he is stressing the same characteristics of what Deely calls the "sensory core" -- that they have a naturally determined, objective structure.

Deely's second level of cognition is *perception*. At this level of cognition an organism responds to features of sensation. It is therefore at a "higher" level of activity than that of sensation in as much as it "depends" upon it. Instead of sensory receptors (such as the eyes, nose, ears, skin, and mouth's taste buds in humans) an organism uses the higher levels of the cognitive process: evaluation, synthesis, memory, imagination, estimation, and so on. At this level of perception an organism responds to a "web" of relations that have been brought to awareness through sensation. The figure above shows the relationship between sensation and perception. What is most important about perception is that it serves as "the basis for the organism's apprehending and responding to its surroundings at a higher level of things to be sought and things to be avoided, offspring and enemy insider and outsider, and the like" (P. 98). There is an "active construction" which takes place. Overlaid upon the naturally determined relations of sensory awareness there "supervenes an active formation . . . from the side of the organism whereby the
elements of the physical environment become organized and presented to the organism in ways other than the ways they exist physically as here and now" (p. 99). "Active construction: requires the introduction of icons or representative forms into cognition, as Deely explains. The same icons were previously mentioned in the second stage of Peircean inquiry, or deduction. These representaive forms do not "terminate cognition but found relations whereby the superstructure of objectivity is erected on the foundations of sensations rooted in the physical world" (pp. 99-100). The result of perception is, ultimately, an individual's own objective world which he or she creates -- this has been called an Umwelt by von Uexkull.49

According to Deely, the basic function of representation in cognition is to establish a proportion between what is given in sense versus what is perceived in experience. And what is perceived in experience includes both things that are known as objects and things that are "emphatically unknown" (p. 100). The icons or representative forms which are introduced into cognition are not known as objects themselves. The icons or representaive forms only "proportion the cognized into the cognition of it." Deely explains that these icons are the element of "thirdness" on the side of the cognizing organism (p. 100).
Icons or representative forms proportion what is given in sense and what is perceived in experience. Though the icons are themselves unknown, these "images or ideas" allow a person to respond to the surroundings in terms of "things to be sought and things to be avoided, offspring and enemy," and so on. Present and absent objects are thus proportioned. The difference between sensation and perception can be shown in the following figure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity:</th>
<th>Production:</th>
<th>Cognized:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensation</td>
<td>Physical Aspects of Environment</td>
<td>Semiotically Structured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>Icons (&quot;Ideas or Images&quot;)</td>
<td>Present and Absent Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportioned Semiotically to Subjectivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Sensation and Perception


In sensation the present and absent objects have been brought to one's awareness. Proportioning these to a person's subjectivity requires memory, synthesis, imagination, and so on; and these latter activities require that a person "recall" or "call up" an image.

Two orders of relation are functionally equivalent in perception. The relation of two physical things A and B (such as smoke and fire, clouds and rain) acquires a new relation when cognition is introduced. A can represent B to or for a cognitive organism, in memory or imagination.
even after A and/or B disappear. The relation that first existed independently of cognition can thus exist dependently upon cognition even after the physical ground disappears. Thus relations that exist first in cognition can be introduced into the physical order by "bringing about the proper conditions within that order." And in addition "relations can be established in cognition that have no counterpart in the physical world." What is "real" and "unreal" are equivalent in perception; both physical relations and cognition-dependent relations (some of which may be with no physical counterpart) exist at the same level in perception (p. 102).

The third level of cognition is, according to Deely's terminology, understanding. Understanding is the awareness that objects of experience are not equal to our experience of them. Understanding is thus an awareness that objects exist independently despite their having been part of our sensations and perceptions. In other words, understanding separates our relation with an object from the object itself. The object is recognized as something in addition to our experience of it. The object is understood as a surplus or excess: there is more to an object than our experience of it (pp. 103-106).

Understanding arises within perception, but is distinct from perception. Perception reveals objects as they relate to one's needs, desires, disposition; understanding is the realization that these objects of our
experience do not reduce to our experience of them. Understanding allows an independent consideration of experiences to occur. With the ability to determine what is cognition-dependent and what is cognition-independent (or "unreal" and "real," respectively) one can investigate these elements in structures of experience. This ability to discriminate cognition-dependent and cognition-independent elements gives rise to the possibility of having "language," which is a "system of signs containing irreducibly stipulated components demonstrably understood as such by the controlled flexibility human beings display in discourse" (p. 105).

According to Deely, language makes it possible to thematize and assess in different situations, "the labile line between reality and unreality." Second, language has a "shaping effect" upon experience: as it is being used it is a "form of experience (mediative of the totality especially in its primary 'modeling' function) among those organisms able to deploy and perceive it formally (i.e., to recognize it as a sign) and not just materially as an expressive structure mediative in the sense of facilitative of social interaction" (pp. 107-8). In other words, language allows a user to separate relations from objects. In pre-linguistic experience (discussed in the paragraphs on perception of non-linguistic things) relations and objects are indistinguishable. In post-linguistic experience, we are aware of post-linguistic institutions or
systems and can differentiate between relations (roles as such belonging to the system or institution) and objects or the things actually being related (the individuals playing the roles). Post-linguistic systems or structures come into existence on the basis of language and depend on language for their existence, but are not themselves linguistic. Examples of post-linguistic systems include religious tradition, the military establishment, civil government, the medical establishment, and so on (pp. 110-112).

Deely shows how these post-linguistic influence exchanges that can occur in language in much the same way as sensation influences what will be perceived and understood. It is possible for a language user to be aware of these non-linguistic factors in any person's linguistic behavior. The two main factors that can be distinguished are: the shaping of the post-linguistic systems themselves in a person's linguistic behavior (we can in other words determine whether or not the words and the user have been thus "shaped") and, second, the pre-linguistic order of perception as it has influenced what a person will want to put into linguistic behavior. The following diagram illustrates the role of language in its relation to pre- and post-linguistic experience.
Figure 4: The relation of language to pre- and post-linguistic experience.


The relations below the dotted line show the relation of pre-linguistic behavior to language. Sensation, perception, and understanding give rise to language. Above
the dotted line are three examples of post-linguistic structures, or structures which depend upon language but are not themselves language. The double arrows extending from each post-linguistic structure show the two basic relations that obtain. The post-linguistic structure is experienced by language users in the structure itself (arrows here are directed to the right). In addition to the "in-group experience of post-linguistic structures" there is an "out-group experience of post-linguistic structures. If you follow the arrow below the dotted line, a movement which represents the impact this post-linguistic structure has upon pre-linguistic experience (upon humans not in the structure itself, and upon non-humans including animals and the environment), you will see that humans outside the post-linguistic systems experience the systems perceptually.

Deely's analysis can be summarized as follows: the three levels of cognition (sensation, perception, and understanding) are generative and hierarchical: the activity involved in the first level causes or brings into being the next, while the activity at the next level is dependent upon the first. Understanding gives rise to language. And language thus can help the understanding assess the line between cognition independent (real, or physical) and cognition-dependent (unreal, or non-physical) relations. Language itself, though, is cognition-dependent, and is thus the "unreal" part of semiosis. Systems built
upon the existence of language can be experienced by people within the system (who can, with language, distinguish between roles and individuals playing the roles) and perceptually by people not within the system (out-group experience of the system). In either case language can show the difference between the physical and the non-physical relations that obtain.

Joyce's equation of the process of signification with the process of cognition, written in his Aesthetic Notebook, is confirmed by Deely's study. Deely's ideas clearly show what such a perspective brings into the realm of what is cognizable. These potential areas of discussion are important in a look ahead toward our discussion of Ulysses. But they also are important in emphasizing what is potential in the system Joyce develops in his Aesthetic Notebook.

Joyce states that "the quality of beauty in itself must involve three constituents to encounter each of these three activities" and we can see that these constituents are as "an outline of objective structure that is relative and changing . . . but naturally determined" in the first stage of cognition, an icon (idea or image) in the second stage, and as a surplus to experience in the final stage. In fact we can thus accept Joyce's statement that "in practical aesthetic philosophy, the epithets 'beautiful' and 'ugly' are applied with regard chiefly to the third activity, with regard, that is, to the nature, degree and
duration of the satisfaction resultant from the apprehension of any sensible object and therefore any sensible object to which in practical aesthetic philosophy the epithet 'beautiful' is applied must be trebly beautiful, must have encountered, that is, the three activities which are involved in the act of apprehension in its most complete form" (CW 148). Here Joyce clearly insists upon the difference between the three activities involved in the act of apprehension, or cognition. He carefully insists upon the generative, hierarchical relation that exists between the three stages of apprehension, in that the second stage is based upon the first, and the third upon the second. But, the point is that Joyce's ideas do form a new means of representing reality. A "sensible object" in Joyce's aesthetic philosophy is the third of thirdness, a symbolic sign, a sign which includes the three stages of apprehension within it.

The innovation is, in part, suggested with Joyce's use of the word Practically in the final sentence of each of his entries on cogniton (November 15 and 16, 1904). The theory of cognition as it is found equivalent to the process of signification is a "practical" theory, one which allows distinctions such as those mentioned by Deely to be shown as meaningful. The theory of cognition as Joyce presents it is practical in that it can be used to clarify our own use of language and our apprehensions of the
meanings of words (see 3.457 and "How to make our ideas clear"). This is the basis of Pragmaticism. Joyce was aware of the philosophy of Pragmatism: in fact Joyce refers to it in a review which was published the same week that he wrote these entries on the stages of cognition in his Aesthetic Notebook. And as Peirce explains the purpose of Pragmatism:

   It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that in those cases, the disputants must be at cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or else one side or the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. Its object is the thing or occasion, however indefinite, to which it is to be applied. Its meaning is the idea which it attaches to that object, whether by way of mere supposition, or as a command, or as an assertion (5.6).

Joyce uses a similar idea in his Aesthetic Notebooks where he defines the movement toward which appetite "tends."
Joyce may have meant with his word "Practically" something similar to what Peirce defines Pragmatism: "Pragmatism does not undertake to say in what the meanings of all signs consist, but merely to lay down a method of determining the meanings of intellectual concepts, that is, of those upon which reasonings may turn" (5.8).

Joyce clearly develops a system of signification in his Aesthetic Notebook. The concept of a system is developed, and the relation between the natural and the artistic process is used to replace what Joyce finds to be an incorrect rendering of Aristotle's concept of "imitation." The three stages of apprehension which Joyce briefly elaborates become clear once we understand the semiotic framework within which they operate. It has been generally thought and accepted in Joyce studies that the ideas in the Aesthetic Notebook are interesting and perceptive in some respects. But as of yet the ideas in the Aesthetic Notebook have not been shown to be the outline of an Aesthetic Theory which has its foundation in what has been come to be known as a semiotic approach.

We have seen that the Aesthetic Notebook from a semiotic perspective is neither a confused interpretation of Aquinas and Aristotle nor a set of weak, inconsistent ideas. Joyce's ideas form an aesthetic theory in their own right. Joyce wisely abstains from a technical elaboration of his ideas. The complexity involved in naming and
defining the terms would have been tremendous, as we can understand with a look at Peirce's writings.

It has not been possible to explore the Aesthetic Notebook as a complete theory of aesthetics, but only to suggest that the ideas are themselves valid and worth further consideration. Such a complete demonstration is beyond my abilities and is best left to those Joyceans who are well-versed in semiotics. Nevertheless, in this semiotic approach to *Ulysses*, it needs to be pointed out that Joyce himself developed an aesthetic which is filled with as many innovations as are ascribed to Peirce. Fully understanding Joyce's explicit ideas on aesthetics and his implicit use of them in his works is necessary and will take years. Now, though, we can at least convincingly show that current thinking in semiotics confirms Joyce's statements about aesthetics which have been "problematic."

The evolution of Joyce's works suggest there may have been changes made in his way of thinking about art as a cognitive system. But those changes would be like the difference between a seed and the fruit than between what is hastily considered and what is then quickly dismissed as inappropriate.

The ideas in the Aesthetic Notebook, when applied to Joyce's works, offers clarity and an approach. This is the practical advantage. The Musement of *Ulysses* can be seen as a demonstration of Joyce's approach to art as a cognitive system. The Aesthetics of Musement develop into *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*.
Notes to Chapter II

1Scholes, "Ulysses: A Structuralist Perspective," JJQ 10 (Fall 1972): 166. The previous reference is to the opening statement of Ellmann's biography: "We are still learning to be Joyce's contemporaries." Scholes writes, "As part of my thesis, I will maintain that the reluctance of many critics to accept the later Joyce . . . is an aspect of this larger reluctance to accept the structuralist revolution. In a very real sense, some of us do not want to become Joyce's contemporaries," p. 161. Of course, Scholes is correct, not only about this but also about the possibility that Piaget's "triad leads to a more satisfying esthetic." But the issue becomes why we think Joyce's triad is less satisfying.

2John Milton's description of the Mystical Angelic Dance, quoted as epigram to Peirce's "Some Amazing Mazes," The Monist 18 (April 1980): 227-241. (See 4.585-4.642; Peirce in this article explains cyclic systems in terms of his existential graphs.)

3Narrative Discourse, p. 268.

4Narrative Discourse, pp. 210-11. The material omitted in the ellipses reads: "the dominance of direct discourse, intensified by the stylistic autonomy of the characters (the
height of dialogic mimesis) but finally absorbing the characters in an immense verbal game (the height of literary gratuitousness, the antithesis of realism); and, finally, the concurrence of theoretically incompatible focalizations . . ." (pp. 210-11).


6 Peirce writes that "in reality, every fact is a relation," and "a relation is a fact about a number of things" (3.416). And "of course the idea of relation is involved in the idea of a system . . . . It is very important for the understanding of relations that the conception of a system should be perfectly clear."

Peirce further explains: "To take a most elementary example--from the idea of a particle moving, we pass to the idea of a particle describing a line. This line is then thought of as moving, and so as generating a surface; and so the relations of surfaces become the subject of thought. An abstraction is an ens rationis whose being consists in the truth of an ordinary predication. A collection, or system, is an abstraction or abstract ens; and thus the whole doctrine of number is founded on the operation of abstraction. If we conceive an object to be a collective whole, but to be so in such a way that it has no part which is not
itself a collective whole in the same way, then, if the
collection is of the nature of a sorite, it is a general,
whose parts are distinguished merely as having additional
characters; but if the collection is a set, whose members
have other relations to one another, it is a continuum,"
(3.642). And, more briefly he defines the terms as follows:
"A system is either a sorite, heap, or mere collection, or
it is a set. A sorite is a system of which, if anything is
true, its truth consists of the truth of one predicate for
any one of the members. A set is a system of which the
truth of anything consists in the truth of different
predicates" (3.637).

The catalogues in Ulysses section II (or deduction) are
sorites, and they demonstrate a principle of relational
logic—that "from any proposition whatever, without a
second, an endless series of necessary consequences can be
deduced; and it very frequently happens that a number of
distinct lines of inference may be taken, none leading into
another . . . . Ordinary logic has nothing but barren
sorites to explain how this can be . . . . But the logic of
relatives shows that this is not the case in any other sense
than one which reduces it to an empty form of words. Matter
entirely foreign to the premises may appear in the
conclusion." (3.641). The episodes of the novel are a
continuum, in other words, have other relations to one
another than what is true for a sorite. For how this upsets
traditional notions of non-relational logic, see Peirce (3.640-42).

7 It is a means of integrating sensible and intellectual knowledge; for a discussion of sensible and intellectual knowledge from a thomist perspective, see Maratain, Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 142-55. He concludes with a discussion of how the "form which the intelligence, primarily put in act by the species impressa, engenders in itself through the discontinuous light of the active intellect ... the pure similitude or spiritual ignition of the object, ... [a form which is] intentionally present, not as "object, but as sign," p. 155.

8 Cantor's ideas were first published in 1872 and elaborated in articles until 1897. Peirce makes rather frequent mention of Cantor in his own articles. See the previous chapter for further discussion. Also, see Floyd Merrell, Semiotic Foundations (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press), pp. 66-79.


10 Bunn, Dimensionality of Signs, p. 144.

11 Joyce writes to Harriet Shaw Weaver, "I shall suggest to [T. S. Eliot] when I write to thank him [for his article "Ulysses, Order, and Myth"] that in alluding to it elsewhere he use or coin some short phrase ... such as the one he
used in speaking to me 'two plane'" (Selected Letters, p. 297; emphasis added).

12 Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, p. 9.

13 Peirce explains in his letter to Lady Welby, "The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are simple enough. Giving to being the broadest sense, to include ideas as well as things, and ideas that we fancy we have just as much as ideas as we do have, I should define Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness thus:

"Firstness is the mode of being of that which as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.

"Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.

"Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other." Later, in the same letter he adds: "Thirdness cannot be understood without Secondness but as to its applications, it is so inferior to Thirdness as to be in that aspect quite in a different world .... If you take any triadic relation, you will always find a mental element in it. Brute action is secondness, any mentality involves thirdness. Analyze for instance the relation involved in 'A gives B to C'. Now what is giving? It does not consist in A's putting B away from him and C's subsequently taking B up. It is not necessary that any material transfer should
take place. It consists in A's making C the possessor according to Law. There must be some kind of law before there can be any kind of giving,—be it but the law of the strongest . . . . In its genuine form, Thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting the mode of being a sign," *Semiotic and Significs*, ed. Charles S. Hardwick (Bloomington; Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 24-31.

Joe Weinsheimer shows how Homer and Nature are the same in Peirce's realism: "In a markedly un-Kantian way, Peirce called into question the antithesis of the true and beautiful, as well as that of truth and fiction. By definition, no fiction represents the actual, but that does not preclude fictions from being true, for the true represents the real and the real is a category more comprehensive than the actual since it includes real possibilities and real generals. Such possibilities and generalities are precisely the object of science as well as art insofar as science is not the intuition of the thing in itself but rather the search for general laws by means of hypothesis, the (potentially true) fictions of science (CP 5.543). What Peirce suggested is that the beautiful can have this same kind of cognitive import, that literature can be true, that Homer and Nature can be the same" ("The Realism of C. S. Peirce," *American Journal of Semiotics* 2-1/2 [1983], 256).
14 Peirce, "Entelechy," *Century Dictionary*, including the excerpt from E. Wallace, Aristotle's *Psychology*, p. xlili. The excerpt concludes: "Entelechy in short is the realization which contains the end of a process: the complete expression of some function--the perfection of some phenomenon, the last stage in that process from potentiality to reality which we have already noticed. Soul then is not only the realization of the body; it is the perfect realization or full development." We see here another connection to Joyce's entry: "Parts constitute a whole as far as they have a common end."

15 Most important in understanding Peirce's general theory of signs is his denial of the Cartesian idea of mind which assumed it to be non-material substance located "within this person or that, belonging to him and correlative to the real world" (5.128). He also denounced the idea that the mind is a tabula rasa. According to Peirce the mind is not the sum of one's experiences, for the ability of people "to originate ideas that are true" (5.50) requires a new way of thinking about mind. Mind should be thought of as an ongoing process of experience not limited to the solipsistic or private internal states of an individual. He writes: "Thus all knowledge comes to us by observation, part of it forced upon us from without from Nature's mind and part coming from the depths of that invoked aspect of mind, which we egotistically call ours; though in truth it is we who float upon its surface and belong to it more than
it belongs to us. Nor can we affirm that the inwardly seen mind which is its Creator" (7.558). Our ability to "originate" ideas is due to this affinity between the human mind and nature. Nature's "mind" and the human mind both embody general ideas which can be understood. And "man's proper function [is] to embody general ideas in are creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical cognition" (6.476). In discussing abduction, Peirce writes that the laws of the future are analogous to the laws of nature (2.86). Peirce elsewhere writes, "the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art" (5.119).


18 Bunn, Dimensionality, p. 158.


21"Peirce's Interpretant," in Structure and Content, p. 16; mentioned in previous chapter.

22See Godel, Escher and Bach where the principle is used throughout.


24Bunn, p. 156.


28This is the general purpose of Peirce's pragmatism; see (1.383;56-33).

29"Ten Years After Thoughts," p. 128.


32Noon is referring to Paul Elmer More's "James Joyce," The American Review, 5 (May 1935), p. 149. The subsequent
discussion reveals the extent to which a Kantian aesthetic is fundamentally different from Joyce's. This is important to point out in as much as Noon's "neo-Thomist" aestheticism is clearly aligned with Kant's doctrine of aesthetic disinterest.

Future studies of Joyce's aesthetic may attempt to explicate the relation between Joyce's and Aquinas' ideas with reference to Jacques Maratain's excellent account of Thomist realism as 'the philosophy of becoming.' Maratain's account of Aquinas, especially "Critical Realism," chapter 2, is especially pertinent. In this chapter Maratain provides "a very succinct resume in seven points of the thomist doctrine of the nature of knowledge." The "act of knowledge is not any of the actions which we customarily observe about us, it does not come under either the heading of 'action--not that of 'passion'--in Aristotle's table; taken purely in itself it does not consist in the production of anything not even in the depth of the knowing subject. To know is to advance oneself to an act of existence of super-eminent perfection, which, it itself, does not imply production" (p. 137). This seems to be more in keeping with Joyce and Aquinas than Kant's notion of aesthetic disinterest. Maratain states, "St. John of the Cross describes contemplation as an absence of all action, whereas St. Thomas defines it as the highest activity. For all that they are in entire accord: the one is speaking from an ontological point of view, and from this standpoint there is
no higher activity than a vital adherence to God . . . . The other is speaking from the point of view of the mystical experience itself, and from this standpoint the suspension of all activity of a human kind must appear to the soul like an absence of all activity," p. 402. This provides an excellent perspective on Joyce's definition of art as "statis."

33Deely, *Introducing Semiotic*, p. 136. Deely's discussion in Appendix II, "On the Distinction between Words and Ideas," provides a means of understanding the Joycean definitions of art. He mentions the three different cognitive acts involved in linguistically being aware of a thing. Rather than the word *cognitive*, Deely uses the term "intraorganismic factor."


36Boler, *Peirce and Scholastic Realism*, pp. 60-64.


40*The Classical Temper*, p. 45. This is an extension of the ideas found in *Joyce and Aquinas* which presume a separation between the thing of art in itself and the object which
it symbolizes or reveals. Noon writes, "even if Joyce should fall short of constructing a perfectly consistent aesthetic theory of his own, he would be better qualified to equip Stephen Dedalus with an aesthetic philosophy which would make Stephen intelligible," p. 69; and here we have the basis for Goldberg's extension of the idea that a flawed aesthetic theory is used in the characterization of Stephen. Though Noon does not suggest that Stephen's use of the aesthetic theory thus reveals Stephen's supposed isolation from life, Noon clearly does not deny the possibility. The alternative presented here is that the aesthetic theory is not flawed in Joyce's notebook, and that the presence of the theory as it is in Portrait serves to make a comment about Dublin society, to confirm the need for Stephen's exile, and to underline or emphasize what Stephen needs to imaginatively create, an idea Stephen himself mentions and an idea which is presented in Ulysses. Stephen states, "Perhaps Aquinas would understand me better than you" (P. 246). This too I accept as a truth which has not been shown in Joycean criticism. Once again, much hinges on what interpretation of Aquinas is used with reference to Joyce. Maratain, as stated before, provides such a focus on Thomistic doctrines of knowledge.

41 Noon, Joyce and Aquinas, p. 38.
43 See Peirce's draft of a letter to Lady Welby, Semiotics and Significs, pp. 195-97. Also see Savan, An
Introduction to C. S. Peirce's Semiotics, p. 16. This is also in accord with Maratain's account of the Thomist doctrine of knowledge, pp. 134-64. "To know is ... to be in a certain way another thing than what one is ... which presupposes, on one hand, the emergences of the subject capable of knowledge from matter (which restrains or imprisons things in the exclusiveness of their own being); and on the other, a form of union between the knower and known transcending any material one: for when matter receives a form it is in order to constitute with it a third term, a tertium quid, which is informed matter," pp. 135-6. In Thomist philosophy, the act of knowledge involves "the production of an image in sensitive knowledge, of a mental word of an image in sensitive knowledge, of a mental word or concept in intellectual knowledge; but this interior production is not formally the act of knowledge itself, it is at once a condition and a means, and an expression of that act," p. 137. Such a knowing being, other than God, "who is in himself super-eminent over all things," is differentiated as a being with a kind of existence called esse intentionale, or intentional being, and which is opposed to esse naturae, "to the being which a thing possess when it exists in its own nature." The esse intentionale, even when not concerned with the world of knowledge, is already for forms a means of escape from the slavery of matter; the scholastics frequently call esse spirituale this
existence not for itself, this *tendenz*-existence by which forms are not their own supervene in things," pp. 138-9.

44See Savan, *An Introduction to C. S. Peirce's Semiotics*, p. 7. Maratain discusses "the means of union of the knower and the known" and the "medium thanks to which the known is intentionally in the knower, and by which the knower becomes intentionally the known" in thomist philosophy as follows: "it is the whole world of intra-psychic immaterial forms which in the soul are like the deputies of the object and which the ancients called similitudes or *species*. This word, *species*, has no equivalent in modern language, and I have decided that the aptest rendering of it is the expression, *presentative* or *objectifying* form. No more than that of the *esse intentionale*, the notion of *species* is not for the philosopher an element of explication which is already known and fully elucidated by others. They are rather supports which result from the analysis of the data and of which it constrains the mind to recognize the reality--with certainty if the analysis has itself progressed correctly and under the constant pressure of intelligible necessities. It is absolutely necessary to that some determination should supervene in the knower, thanks to which what is not it *s* should be in *secundum esse intentionale* and not like an accident in a substance, and which will be able to to exist with the same active super-existence as that of the knower
become the known. The species is nothing other than this internal determination.

"In the case of sensitive knowledge, the external sense, itself in a state of vital tension, and which has only to 'open itself' to know (all is ready in advance for it, and in this it is comparable to an already acquired intellectual habitude), receives the thing by its qualities acting on the organ, which so offers itself to be felt (we call it 'the sensible in act') a species impressa, a presentative form imprinted on it--let us call it a 'received presentative form'--thanks to which it is specified as by a germ which has entered into its depths; and having so become intentionally the sensible in the initial or 'prime' act (the sense and the sensible then make only one principle of operation), in the terminal or 'second' act it becomes it, in its own action, and then makes only one act with the felt--not without producing at the same time an image of the latter, a species expressa of the sensible order in the imagination and the memory," pp. 140-1. At this point we can see that such a separate stage does exist, as Joyce writes in his entry. Whether we use Aquinas or Peirce, we can see that such a separate stage does exist.

Maratain relates the process to Aristotle's concept of entelechy: "The Thomists, following Aristotle, recognize in it an active light (the agens or activating intellect) which, making use of sensible representations and
disengaging the intelligibility which they contain in potentia (which is not possible without leaving on one side the individualizing notes enclosing the sensible as such), specifies the intelligence by means of species impressa, of a 'presentative form' abstracted from the sensible and 'received' by means of it. This is then the prime or initial act of the intellect; it has become, as indeed a principle of action, intentionally the object, which in its species is hidden in its depths like fecundating seed, a co-principle of knowledge (according to intellect, the sufficing principle of its own proper action, is already itself). And it is thus, actuated by this species impressa, and producing thus in it, like a living fruit, a mental word or concept, a species expressa of an intelligible order, an 'elaborated presentative form' in which it brings the object to the sovereign degree of actuality and intelligible formation, that it becomes itself in ultimate act this object. If the distinction between the prime and the second act re-appears again thus in the act of knowing, it is because this last as I have already said, constitutes in itself alone a whole metaphysical order, where are united, transposed into the same line which is that of knowledge, at once the distinction of the essential form and the existence in the line of being and that of operative form and the operation of the line of action," pp. 141-2. Thus we can also see that the three stages which Joyce outlines involve the principles of a cognitive system (the process described
in a prior entry with reference to entelechy and a third
mode of being, and the system described as it accommodates
the difference between a part seen as a sensible and
individual property and a part seen as general property, an
accommodation . allows for the "beauty" of the product
to be "seen" and to be presented within the operation of the
whole). It is possible that the immediate and dynamic
objects in Peircean terminology are quite related to what
Maratain calls the species impressa and species expressa.
But it should be clear by now that Joyce's entry which poses
a relation between the knower and the known (1) has been
misrepresented all too often in Joyce criticism as a
misinterpretation of Aquinas, and (2) involves the kinds of
operations described here, whether what Joyce calls the
"constituents" are named dynamical objects or species
impressa or expressa.

45Savan, An Introduction to C. S. Peirce's Semiotics,
pp. 49-50.

46Savan, An Introduction, p. 50.

47Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, pp. 120-21. See also pp.
114-121. Subsequent references will be included parentheti-
cally within the text. Peirce also makes use of the type-
token ratio.

48Deely, Introducing Semiotic, p. 94. Subsequent
references will be included parenthetically within the text.
Deely, p. 99. These ideas will be elaborated in the following chapters as they bear upon our discussion of *Ulysses*. 