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PEIRCE-L Digest 1286 -- February 6, 1998
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Topics covered in this issue include:

  1) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
  2) Re: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection (from Anderson)
	by Joseph Ransdell 
  3) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
  4) Signs and sign-action
	by Howard Callaway 
  5) cp 7.182 and cp 7.206
	by "" 
  6) Re: Hypostatic Symbols
	by Everdell[…]aol.com
  7) Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (3)
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
  8) RE: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by Larry Jorgensen 
  9) Re: Signs and sign-action
	by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
 10) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by Tom Anderson 
 11) The New List (Paragraphs 2 and 3)
	by Tom Burke 
 12) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by Tom Anderson 
 13) Re: Signs and sign-action
	by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
 14) Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
 15) Re: Heroin  & history                                                                                                 
	by Ken Ketner 
 16) RE: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
	by Larry Jorgensen 

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Feb 1998 00:02:17 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34e04e99.19786251[…]pop3.cris.com>

On Thu, 5 Feb 1998 15:59:20 -0600 (CST), Tom Burke 
wrote:

>On Wed, 4 Feb 1998, BugDaddy wrote:

>> The New List is about categories.  Categories of what?  I think
>> Peirce' answer would be categories of signs.  This unfortunately
>> confuses things since signs may be words or propositions or
>> extensive arguments in the form of a book.

>How does this relate to Kant's categories of "[the] understanding"?  What
>even *is* a category of "understanding"?

I literally know nothing about Kant.

>> But even so, he goes beyond signs to consider forms of argument.
>> Thus we have seen that he discusses *abduction.*  So the New
>> List's subject seems to range over the entire spectrum of logic,
>> or at least material logic.

>.. versus Kant's "transcendental logic" somehow supporting or underwriting
>material logic? (or vice versa?)  In any case, the move to "arguments" more
>or less corrsponds to the move from the transcendental analytic (and the
>faculty of understanding, the categories, judgments, etc.) to the
>transcedendental dialectic (and the faculty of reason, arguments, etc.).

I used the term *material logic* in what I believe is its classical
sense.  I know nothing of "transcendental logic."  Material logic
is properly opposed to formal logic.  Formal logic studies the form
of valid syllogisms.  Material logic attempts to show the
relationship between formal logic and the real world.

>The categories (of understanding) for Kant are more or less derived from
>and depend on a fixed view of logic (as fixed) -- specifically keyig off of
>a fixed taxonomy of possible kinds of judgments.  Would we say that
>Peirce's categories (of what?) are more or less derived from or depend on a
>different view of logic (a logic of relatives, etc.).  As such, are they
>categories of "understanding"?  of "phenomena"?  of "signs"?  of "being"?

These are questions that we need to consider, certainly.
Unfortunately, I lack the knowledge to address Kant's program.

    1. This paper is based upon the theory already
       established, that the function of conceptions is to
       reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity,
       and that the validity of a conception consists in the
       impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness
       to unity without the introduction of it. 

When do we move on to paragraph 2?  Is there a plan or are we just
winging it?


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         William  Overcamp
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Christ is among us...
He is and Will be!

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 05 Feb 1998 21:33:47
From: Joseph Ransdell 
To: peirce-l[…]TTACS.TTU.EDU
Subject: Re: Hookway -- chapter 1 -- Introspection (from Anderson)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980205213347.52a74b96[…]pop.ttu.edu>

posted for Tom Anderson

===========message from and posted for Tom Anderson========

Jim L Piat wrote:

> Back to internal-external (private-public).  What meaning do you attach
> to internal-external if not private-public?  I thought the private-public
> was a good translation.  What problem do you have with it?

I was thinking about Peirce's comments about 'the hand of the sherrif' and
so on -- the impingement of the external on the mind, where something's
presence is something that insists it's there and forces itself on you --
that's external.   Peirce's comments about introspection I take in a logical
sense -- that we don't know that we're seeing something red, a red ball in
front of us now, because we look inside our minds and see a representation
of a red ball.  We just see the red ball -- and we infer that we have a
mental representation of it rather than the other way around.

Public private seems first of all very 20th century to me.  You might want
to argue that internal external translates -- but that's an argument and I'd
rather not see it assumed without argument.

I think it's pretty much true, but not necessarily so  and I also think that
the two things are independent and meaningfully so.  I guess I also think
that sometines -- or maybe very often -- internal and external is pretty
impersonal.  I think that's why I object to eliding it to public private,
because they seem to involve some reference to seperate personalities
implicitly.

Looking at what I wrote -- it seems pretty tentative to me.

Why do you think public private means about the same as internal external,
Jim?

Incidentally, although my plate is full, I did start skimming around Rotman,
and I'm very pleased -- I think it's a very rich book and there's more there
than I had imagined -- both to agree and disagree  with!  Thanks!  And more
later.

Tom Anderson



------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 00:08:35 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <19980206.000836.11238.0.piat[…]juno.com>



Tom Burke asks:

>>.  Would we say that Peirce's categories (of what?) are more or less
derived >>from or depend on a different view of logic (a logic of
relatives, etc.).  As such, >>are they categories of "understanding"?  of
"phenomena"?  of "signs"?  of 
>"being"?

How about categories of understanding of experience of being through
signs.
Being, like Gaul, being divided into three parts. 

William Overcamp wrote:

>    1. This paper is based upon the theory already
>       established, that the function of conceptions is to
>       reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity,
>       and that the validity of a conception consists in the
>       impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness
>       to unity without the introduction of it. 
>
>When do we move on to paragraph 2?  Is there a plan or are we just
>winging it?
>
BugDaddy - why am I amused by this?  I think the plan is to wing it like
bumble bees.  Are we ready for #2?  Here's my off the cuff summary of
what I can recall we have tentatively concluded or at least considered
regarding #1:

1. The theory referred to is Kant's  derived in part from Aristotle
amended by Hegal?  But basically he's revising Kant is he not?

2. Peirce's approach in developing his argument is in part a kind of
iterative bootstrapping.

3. The approach or argument (I'm not sure I'm using argument correctly in
any technical sense) is based upon abduction - for better or worse

4.  The excuse for categories is that they are needed to get the job
done.  Perhaps a lame one, to be reconsidered when all the evidence is
in.  

5.  What is to become of both conceptions and sensuous impressions

6.  These categories are categories of what ?

7.  To conceive is to bring into being - or to take hold of as in
understanding 

8. All the other good stuff I'm already forgetting.

9.  Maybe we too can cycle through this essay a few times and see how
things look the second or third time around.

My reaction to paragraph #2 following #1and with my own bias and
misperceptions thrown in,  is: So your saying that perhaps there is a
series of categories we must consider.  Well, OK, perhaps.  Let's see
where you are going.  You've got this psychological notion called a
conception on one side and this psychological notion called sensuous
impressions on the other and you plan to logically  - not psychologically
- connect and explain them both I suppose or hope. Good. This is a tall
and worthy order.  On one side the material world on the other knowledge
and awareness.  Mind-body resolved, no?

I just looked down at Howard Callaway's essay _ Emerson and Romantic
Individualism_ available at Arsibe and realized (by checking) that I'd
previously mispelled his name.  I greatly admire Howard.  I can not spell
well at all. My spell checker is more problem than help with names.   I
apologize to all.  I do not mispell other's names on purpose.    

Jim Piat 

_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]


------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 13:28:16 +0100 (MET)
From: Howard Callaway 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Signs and sign-action
Message-ID: 


I wonder if those more familiar with Peirce on signs might
help out by way of comments on the following. What I say is 
partly based on Dewey's distinction between "signs" and sym-
bols in the 1938 _Logic_. 

I think that James's (implicit) criticism of Peircean
"synechism" in _A Pluralistic Universe_ (1909) are important
in understanding Dewey's view. What is perhaps also im-
portant in understanding Dewey's relationship to Peirce are
comments in Dewey's 1938 _Logic_, p. 60, where Dewey dis-
tinguished "signs" as where we say that smoke is a sign of
fire, and symbols. One natural thing or event may be counted
as a sign of another in that we come to make an inference
from one to the other, but Dewey insists that it is impera-
tive to distinguish this kind of relationship from the
"implicational" relations which obtain among meaningful
symbols. Implicitly at least, this makes the point that the
continuities and discontinuities of (culturally evolved)
meanings must be distinguished from the continuities and
discontinuities of things. But does this conflict with
Peirce's talk of "the logic of things?" 

I mention this point partly because I suspect that there is
some tendency in Peirce to assimilate signs and symbols. For
Peirce, "Logic is applicable to all signs, whether they are
directly mental or not..." ("Minute Logic," MS 425A). He
thus seems to arrive at a doctrine of "sign-action" in
nature, suggestion a non-human teleology. Criticisms of
Peircean metaphysics seem to chiefly cluster around such
points. So, while I suppose that regularities arise in
nature, I do not suppose that prior changes (generally) take
place "in order that" new regularities may arise in nature. 
Nor do I suppose that we should think of all regularities as
purposeful habits. That kind of view is open to Deweyan
criticisms, I believe, which still would not touch the more 
general commonalities between Peirce and Dewey as regards 
continuity and discontinuity.

Basically, I'm wondering about the basis of contemporary
resistance to Peirce's metaphysics.

Howard

H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz
 



------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Feb 1998 13:33:10 +0100 (CET)
From: "" 
To: Multiple recipients of list 
Subject: cp 7.182 and cp 7.206
Message-ID: 

Hello all!

While reading Popper's well known "Conjectures and Refutations" I came
across an interesting reference of his to Peirce. ON pp 240 - Popper links
Peirce's economics of investigation with his own methodology... Not long
ago, similar connections were already discussed on the list (I found the
argument of H.Callaway very stimulating) - but there was no reference to
this particular passage, if I recall correctly.

Here it goes:
"A serious empirical test always consists in the attempt to find a
refutation, a counterexample. In the search for a counterexample, we have
to use our background knowledge; for we always try to refute first the
most risky  predictions, the 'most unlikely ... consequences' (as Peirce
already saw*); which means that we always look in the most probable kinds
of places for the most probable kinds of counterexamples - most probable
in the sense that we should expect to find them in the light of our
background knowledge." (Popper C&R: 240)


The reference in the footnote (*) is to Peirce's: CP 7.128 and 7.206...
I suspect Popper misunderstood Peirce on this occasion but as I don't have
access to CP I cannot say much more. So, could someone be so kind to
introduce the two paragraphs mentioned for the purposes of further study?!
Many thanks in advance,

best regards to all,
andrej pinter



************************
Andrej Pinter,

student of communication sciences,
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Editor of TEMA, students journal;
Assistant editor of Javnost/The Public;

snail-mail address:
Tesarska 4, Ljubljana 1000, 
Slovenija
************************



------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 07:35:14 -0500 (EST)
From: Everdell[…]aol.com
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Hypostatic Symbols
Message-ID: <980206073514_1617653420[…]mrin53>

Thanks to Joe Ransdell for further instructions on retrieving dates of Peirce
MSs (I found them), and to Thomas Riese for the history of medicine website.

And to Steven Skaggs, who writes:  <>

To which I cannot resist appending the poem by Hughes Mearns which
illustrates so many of my classes and sums up so much of ontology for me:

As I was sitting in my chair
I knew the bottom wasn't there
Nor legs nor back; but I just sat
Ignoring little things like that

-Bill Everdell, Brooklyn

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Feb 1998 13:01:10 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (3)
Message-ID: <34dd05c8.4595073[…]pop3.cris.com>

Porphyry pointed out that Aristotle had two lists of categories:
a short list of four categories and a longer list of ten.
*Perhaps* there is something worth considering in the short list,
which is based on two distinctions.  (1) Substance and accident
and (2) the particular and universal.  That gives four
categories: Particular substance, universal substance, particular
accidents and universal accidents.


----------------------------------------------------------
Friend and lover you have taken away.  My only friend is darkness.
Psalm 88:18
-----------------------------------
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
         Bill  Overcamp
-----------------------------------

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 10:40:50 -0500
From: Larry Jorgensen 
To: "'peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu'" 
Subject: RE: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: 

> From: Tom Burke [mailto:burke[…]sc.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, February 05, 1998 4:59 PM
> 
> The categories (of understanding) for Kant are more or less derived
from
> and depend on a fixed view of logic (as fixed) -- specifically keyig
off of
> a fixed taxonomy of possible kinds of judgments.  Would we say that
> Peirce's categories (of what?) are more or less derived from or depend
on a
> different view of logic (a logic of relatives, etc.).  As such, are
they
> categories of "understanding"?  of "phenomena"?  of "signs"?  of
"being"?
> 

Paul Thom, in the Introduction to _The Logic of Essentialism_, suggests
that Aristotle's theory of syllogism is best interpreted as an analysis
of the statements that are necessary for his essentialist metaphysics.
It would seem, then, that Aristotle is categorizing being as such.

My understanding of Kant (which doesn't go far, so correct me if I'm
wrong) is that he is seeking unity in experience which establishes a
means of understanding (what exactly?).  This also seems to be Peirce's
suggestion ("reduce manifold sensuous impressions to unity").  So far,
all we know is that Peirce is picking this up and going *somewhere* with
it.  And that the end result will be a *new list*.

Larry Jorgensen

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 12:35:35 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Signs and sign-action
Message-ID: <19980206.123536.9302.0.piat[…]juno.com>


On Fri, 6 Feb 1998 06:28:50 -0600 (CST) Howard Callaway
 writes:
>
>I wonder if those more familiar with Peirce on signs might
>help out by way of comments on the following. What I say is 
>partly based on Dewey's distinction between "signs" and sym-
>bols in the 1938 _Logic_. 

Howard,  I'm not more familiar but I'm interested in the question and
think I can speak to the issue of resisting Peirce from the standpoint of
those who don't fully understand Peirce.  So I'd like piggy back my own
questions on to yours by way of attempting to respond to your comments. 

>I think that James's (implicit) criticism of Peircean
>"synechism" in _A Pluralistic Universe_ (1909) are important
>in understanding Dewey's view. What is perhaps also im-
>portant in understanding Dewey's relationship to Peirce are
>comments in Dewey's 1938 _Logic_, p. 60, where Dewey dis-
>tinguished "signs" as where we say that smoke is a sign of
>fire, and symbols. One natural thing or event may be counted
>as a sign of another in that we come to make an inference
>from one to the other, but Dewey insists that it is impera-
>tive to distinguish this kind of relationship from the
>"implicational" relations which obtain among meaningful
>symbols. Implicitly at least, this makes the point that the
>continuities and discontinuities of (culturally evolved)
>meanings must be distinguished from the continuities and
>discontinuities of things. But does this conflict with
>Peirce's talk of "the logic of things?" 
>
I understood Peirce to use the term sign to include symbols, icons and
indicies.  Thus Dewey's example of "smoke" as a sign of fire would in
Peirce's nomenclature be called an indexical sign. Likewise, smoke
signals would be symbolic signs.

>I mention this point partly because I suspect that there is
>some tendency in Peirce to assimilate signs and symbols. For
>Peirce, "Logic is applicable to all signs, whether they are
>directly mental or not..." ("Minute Logic," MS 425A). He
>thus seems to arrive at a doctrine of "sign-action" in
>nature, suggestion a non-human teleology. Criticisms of
>Peircean metaphysics seem to chiefly cluster around such
>points. So, while I suppose that regularities arise in
>nature, I do not suppose that prior changes (generally) take
>place "in order that" new regularities may arise in nature. 
>Nor do I suppose that we should think of all regularities as
>purposeful habits. That kind of view is open to Deweyan
>criticisms, I believe, which still would not touch the more 
>general commonalities between Peirce and Dewey as regards 
>continuity and discontinuity.

>Basically, I'm wondering about the basis of contemporary resistence to
>Peirce's metaphysics. 

Again, speaking as one of the acquainted but largely uninformed observers
of Peirce from which I suspect many current Peirce resisters spring:  I
thought Peirce intended that logic applied to all signs (icons, indicies
and symbols) and as such, loosely speaking, to both mind and matter. 
Also,  that Peirce 'additionally' does intend a non-human teleology to be
lovingly directing the contingent evolution of the universe (including
humans).  I believe (agree?) that this is the sticking point for many
critics of Pierce.  It's not appealing or fashionable to many would be
logicians and universe tamers (wannabees like myself) to succumb to the
notion that the universe yields to a purpose greater than our own. 
Paradoxically,  at the same time what is so attractive about Peirce is
that he has just the sort of impeccable credentials as a logician and
scientists that so impress many among us that resist Judeo-Christian
loving-authoritarianism. In short, Peirce is a mixed breed, a hearty
hybrid - hard to pigeon hole, dismiss or reduce to  a mere other or
second.  So, current bottom line for me,  I continue to study and try to
better understand, but so far remain unconvinced that Peirce's account of
chance and 'directed' evolution is correct.  I think Darwin's account of
evolution provides an explanation of interrelationship between organism
and environment.  I'm not persuaded evolution has a discernable direction
in the cosmic long haul.  

So, Howard, clearly mostly just further questions here, but I was drawn
in by your comments.  Maybe I should exercise a little more restraint.  

Jim Piat

_____________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com
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------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Feb 1998 12:03:09 -0800
From: Tom Anderson 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34DB6C7C.6B93967F[…]ix.netcom.com>



Larry Jorgensen wrote:

> Paul Thom, in the Introduction to _The Logic of Essentialism_, suggests
> that Aristotle's theory of syllogism is best interpreted as an analysis
> of the statements that are necessary for his essentialist metaphysics.
> It would seem, then, that Aristotle is categorizing being as such.
>
> My understanding of Kant (which doesn't go far, so correct me if I'm
> wrong) is that he is seeking unity in experience which establishes a
> means of understanding (what exactly?).  This also seems to be Peirce's
> suggestion ("reduce manifold sensuous impressions to unity").  So far,
> all we know is that Peirce is picking this up and going *somewhere* with
> it.  And that the end result will be a *new list*.

I took a look at Aristotle and some commentary after the dialogue with Bill
Overcamp.  I think he was more right than I was in suggesting that Aristotle
used his notion systematically.  Julius Moravcsik published a book of essays
on Aristotle in a Doubleday paperback many years ago -- in that book are
Ackrill's excellent translation and commentary by John Cook Wilson, Ackrill
and Moravcsik.  Moravcsik interprets Aristotle's categories as metaphysical
categories of the objects of sense.  He contrasts this to Kant's categories
which are categories of judgement not objects of sense, and to Ryle's
categories, as in 'category mistakes'.

Peirce's categories at first blush appear to be categories of 'conceptions'
that would include, I think, both Kant's judgements and Aristotle's
objects.  What he's up to has some relations with Aristotle's and Kant's
problems (each different from the other) but I don't think with Ryle's.

Tom Anderson


------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 12:31:40 -0500
From: Tom Burke 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: The New List (Paragraphs 2 and 3)
Message-ID: 

At 10:39 AM -0500 2/6/98, Larry Jorgensen wrote:
>My understanding of Kant (which doesn't go far, so correct me if I'm
>wrong) is that he is seeking unity in experience which establishes a
>means of understanding (what exactly?).  This also seems to be Peirce's
>suggestion ("reduce manifold sensuous impressions to unity").  So far,
>all we know is that Peirce is picking this up and going *somewhere* with
>it.  And that the end result will be a *new list*.

I think this is exactly right.  Peirce's keying off of Kant is not entirely
disingenuous, but he intends to bracket most of what Kant had to say and to
move off in new directions.  The point here is that the "old list" is
Kant's, and to a lesser extent Aristotle's even "older list."

So what is this "gradation among those conceptions which are universal"
which Peirce introduces in paragraph 2?  Is he saying here that this
gradation is absent in Kant ... i.e., Kant doesn't acknowledge a kind of
regress ("and so on") in this business of "unification"??

I guess paragraph 2 does hardly more than pose this question, in the form
of a claim or thesis that there is some such regress.  Paragraph 3 then is
where Peirce starts to re-do Kant's take on these matters, but ever so
slowly.

 ______________________________________________________________________
  Tom Burke                  http://www.cla.sc.edu/phil/faculty/burket
  Department of Philosophy                         Phone: 803-777-3733
  University of South Carolina                       Fax: 803-777-9178

           For a list of common LISTSERV User Commands see
	http://www.cla.sc.edu/phil/faculty/burket/listserv.html





------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Feb 1998 13:01:20 -0800
From: Tom Anderson 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <34DB7A20.32D852EF[…]ix.netcom.com>



Larry Jorgensen wrote:

> Paul Thom, in the Introduction to _The Logic of Essentialism_, suggests
> that Aristotle's theory of syllogism is best interpreted as an analysis
> of the statements that are necessary for his essentialist metaphysics.
> It would seem, then, that Aristotle is categorizing being as such.

One of the points Aristotle makes in the Categories is simply that 'being as
such' is analyzable -- that only when you look at what is in various
categories does it make any sense -- or more bluntly, 'being as such' is an
illegitimate category.  We can only look at the things that are in smaller
categories.  I don't have the Aristotle with me right now, but I believe he
makes remarks that are very close in spirit to Peirce's "The conception of
being, therefore, plainly has no content."  What do you think?

Tom Anderson


------------------------------

Date: Fri, 06 Feb 1998 13:28:40 -0800
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Signs and sign-action
Message-ID: <34DB8088.71DA8ECC[…]door.net>

Howard:Callaway says:

> . So, while I suppose that regularities arise in
> nature, I do not suppose that prior changes (generally) take
> place "in order that" new regularities may arise in nature.
> Nor do I suppose that we should think of all regularities as
> purposeful habits. That kind of view is open to Deweyan
> criticisms, I believe, which still would not touch the more
> general commonalities between Peirce and Dewey as regards
> continuity and discontinuity.

I don't think there is any difference between Peirce and Dewey on the
points you mention, other than terminological.  Peirce does not use the
word "sign" as coordinate with "symbol" so that they can be contrasted
in that way.  "sign" applies anything playing the role of the first term
in the triadic representation relation.  The distinction you have in
mind is handled by Peirce in terms of the distiction between the
symbolical and the indexical.  "Icon", "index" and "symbol" ARE
coordinate terms.  insofar the difference is just verbal, but the
"insofar" could perhaps be important.

Dewey's usage of "sign" seems at first at least to be more closely
attuned to what we ordinarily associate with the term "sign".  But I
think some significance attaches to the fact that Peirce himself
originally used "sign" where he came subsequently to say "index"
instead, the generic term being "representation".  Now "representation"
is ambiguous in that usage since it is also the name for the triadic
relationship, and he had good reason to want to abandon that usage.  But
why opt for "sign"?  Perhaps it is to be explained only in terms of
wanting to mainain verbal continuity with Locke's usage yet I don't feel
that to be sufficient, though I don't have any evidence that I could
point to on that.

My hunch is this, though, that Peirce decided to use sign as the generic
term because he wanted to emphasize terminologically that semiotic as he
conceived it was primarily adapted to the analysis of semiosis --
sign-action -- and thus to processes, rather than formal structures or
sign-systems.  Thus a symbol, considered as actively generating an
interpretant, is ipso facto functioning as an individual entity which is
not as such a symbol.  (An actually occurring instance of a symbol -- a
replica -- is not a symbol proper and has, as something actual,
indexical value instead.)   This fits in well with his contextualism,
which is a ubiquitous feature of a Peircean type of analysis.

As regards his teleology it is tendential rather than intentional in
type, exemplified most purely in probability: the laws of chance.  It is
indeed non-human, in at least one sense.

Joe


>




------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 15:20:59 -0500
From: piat[…]juno.com (Jim L Piat)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: <19980206.152100.20606.0.piat[…]juno.com>


On Fri, 6 Feb 1998 11:56:40 -0600 (CST) Tom Anderson
 writes:
>
>One of the points Aristotle makes in the Categories is simply that 
>'being as
>such' is analyzable -- that only when you look at what is in various
>categories does it make any sense -- or more bluntly, 'being as such' 
>is an
>illegitimate category.  We can only look at the things that are in 
>smaller
>categories.  I don't have the Aristotle with me right now, but I 
>believe he
>makes remarks that are very close in spirit to Peirce's "The 
>conception of
>being, therefore, plainly has no content."  What do you think?
>
>Tom Anderson
>
Tom, thanks for this and the earlier one about what Peirce is up to vis a
vis Kant, Aristotle and Ryle. I take it you meant "un-analyzable" above. 
I understand Peirce to connect the experience of being with the act of
attention (denotation) or that of responding to the mere presence (rather
than essence or connotation) of an object.   I think this is a very
important point that Peirce makes.  It points to the common element of
consciousness - attention to presence.  In my view this is the key to
establishing a system within a system which in turn allows or perhaps
constitutes the act of symbolization, awareness and modeling or standing
for in general.

Glad you like the Rotman book -  offered in the spirit of deflation or
value returning to its rightful owners.  Share your thoughts whenever. 
I'll get back on the internal/external, private/public later - Peirce the
early behaviorist.  Right now off with the wife to visit and baby sit the
grand kids in Ca.  Lucky us and a break for the very patient and
indulgent Peirce listers.  Thanks and best to all,

Jim Piat  

A quick related thought on the matter of reducing the manifold to unity. 
Maybe this ultimate monotheistic abstraction goes too far.  Perhaps
Peirce realized intuitively in the creative Emersonian sense that "as
simple as possible" was three not one. 

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------------------------------

Date:         Fri, 06 Feb 98 13:38:23 CST                                                                                           
From: Ken Ketner 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Heroin  & history                                                                                                 
Message-ID: <199802061941.NAA27017[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu>

For Everdell: a good initial source article on pharmaco-geschichte                                                                  
(a discipline I just made up ;)  ) is David F. Musto, "Opium, Cocaine and                                                           
Marijuana in American History," special issue of SCIENCITIF AMERICAN                                                                
entitled SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN - MEDICINE, New York: Scientific American Inc.,                                                        
1993, pages 30-37. This might yield bibliographic leads into works more                                                             
suited for your particular problem. ketner                                                                                          

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 15:15:54 -0500
From: Larry Jorgensen 
To: "'peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu'" 
Subject: RE: Porphyry: On Aristotle's Categories/The New List (1)
Message-ID: 

Tom Anderson wrote:
> 
> One of the points Aristotle makes in the Categories is simply that
'being as
> such' is analyzable -- that only when you look at what is in various
> categories does it make any sense -- or more bluntly, 'being as such'
is an
> illegitimate category.  We can only look at the things that are in
smaller
> categories.  I don't have the Aristotle with me right now, but I
believe he
> makes remarks that are very close in spirit to Peirce's "The
conception of
> being, therefore, plainly has no content."  What do you think?
> 

Aristotle would agree with Peirce's statement in the sense that being
categorizes everything.  If it is unity that we seek, Aristotle says it
is found in being.  "Being and unity are the same . . . ."  That is to
say, the statement "one man" extended to "one existent man" adds no new
information.  They say the same thing and in that sense being "has no
content."

The notion that Aristotle's categories are best interpreted in the
context of his metaphysics implies that the categories identify
properties of being and provide, along with the rest of the _Organon_,
the framework with which he may formulate the principles of substance,
essence, necessity and so on.  They categorize things which exist, which
is what I meant by categorizing being as such--poor wording on my part.

I am only just starting to explore this thesis, so my statements of it
are not yet well formulated.  I'm interested in the essay by Moravcsik
you mentioned previously.  I'll look it up.

Your statement, "What he's up to has some relations with Aristotle's and
Kant's
problems (each different from the other)" also interested me.  Have we
yet identified Peirce's problem?  In what ways is he addressing both
Aristotle's and Kant's?

Larry Jorgensen


------------------------------



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