RETURN TO LIST OF AVAILABLE DIGESTS


----------------------------------------
PEIRCE-L Digest 1271 -- January 24, 1998
----------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------
CITATION and QUOTATION from messages on PEIRCE-L is permissable if
the individual message is identified by use of the information on
DATE, SENDER, and SUBJECT: e.g.:
   From PEIRCE-L Forum, Jan 5, 1998, [name of author of message],
   "re: Peirce on Teleology"   
---------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------
If the type is too large and the message runs off the screen on the 
right you can shrink the size of the typeface by use of the option
on your browser.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Since it is mostly in ASCII format You can download the
whole document easily by using the SELECT ALL and COPY commands, then
PASTE-ing it into a blank page in your word processor; or you can
SELECT, COPY, and PASTE individual messages using your mouse.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------


Topics covered in this issue include:

  1) Re: Dedekind and the bootstrap
	by Cathy Legg 
  2) Re: "determines"
	by Cathy Legg 
  3) Question re. Merrell on Peirce
	by gnom[…]ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (Naomi Cumming)
  4) topological logic, reduction thesis etc.
	by Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
  5) Re: slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
  6) No Subject
	by KWells2382 
  7) Re: Context and Continuity-Thermodynamic
	by "H.G.CALLAWAY" 
  8) Re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
  9) Re: slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
	by "H.G.CALLAWAY" 
 10) Re: slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
 11) Who? Me?
	by joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
 12) Re: Who? Me?
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
 13) Re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
	by Joseph Ransdell 
 14) Re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
	by BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 14:26:37 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg 
To: Tom Anderson 
Cc: Multiple recipients of list 
Subject: Re: Dedekind and the bootstrap
Message-ID: 

On Fri, 23 Jan 1998, Tom Anderson wrote:

> Can they actually PRODUCE the pink elephant?  That's way cool!
> 
> Tom Anderson

Hi Tom,

I guess it depends what you mean by "produce". If by "produce" is meant 
not just that no-one can prove that the phenomenon is not there, but that 
it sustains novel future predictions...then no.

I guess that that is the answer to the nominalist's objection.

Cheers,
Cathy.

{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg, School of Philosophy,
A14, University of Sydney, 
Sydney, 2006.

http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}


------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 14:34:20 +1100 (EDT)
From: Cathy Legg 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: "determines"
Message-ID: 

On Fri, 23 Jan 1998 joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com wrote:

> Peirce invariably speaks of the object as determining the sign, which
> determines the interpretant.  The only definition of "determines" that I
> have found is in Vol. 1 of the Writings, where he says in 1865 that "to
> determine is to make a thing different from what it would have been
> otherwise" (p. 217), 

Doesn't that conflict, though, with final causation in the sense that 
we often approach the truth by working out our ideas in greater and greater 
detail (i.e. determining them), when we can give no real sense to the 
possibility that those ideas "would have been otherwise" - at least in 
the long run?

and there is another passage in that volume to the
> same effect.   I think that in general it is just the idea that whatever
> you have to appeal to or refer to in explaining something is a cause of
> it.  This then allows for the possibility of more than one type of
> cause.  I don't think there is any condition under which he would be
> willing to reverse the direction of the determination relation.

Why does this not mean that we "cause" the truth?

Cheers,
Cathy.

{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
Cathy Legg, School of Philosophy,
A14, University of Sydney, 
Sydney, 2006.

http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSSS/Philosophy/People/Cathy/Cathy.html
}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}



------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 22:45:28 +1100 (AEDT)
From: gnom[…]ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (Naomi Cumming)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Question re. Merrell on Peirce
Message-ID: <199801241145.WAA05388[…]ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU>

Thanks to all who responded to my question re. Merrell.  Some comments on
sign and object:

Re. Peirce (5.311) "there is no thing which  is in-itself in the sense of
not being relative to the mind, though things which are relative to the mind
doubtless are, apart from that relation." 

Dave Mills writes: >This passage seems to leave open the question of
whether the object determines the sign or the sign determines the object. 

John Oller responds: >I don't think it leaves that question open. Only signs
can determine objects.

Perhaps it would help to distinguish the "immediate" object from the
"dynamic" object -  the former that which comes to mind when interpreting a
sign (as a First, a possibility), and the latter the "thing in the world" (a
second).   Only signs can determine immediate objects.   In some classes of
signs (the iconic) there may be no dynamic object at all, and they remain
"possibles" or "firsts" (see CP 2.247)   The indexical signs are, however, a
different matter.   Most common examples of indices point to some actual
event as "cause" of the sign.  Peirce's train example is a good one
(comparable to contemporary ambulance sirens perhaps): the long- sounding
whistle changes its pitch as it passes by, with shocking effect (1.335,
1905).   The change in pitch, an index of proximity, is an "objective" event
(the dynamic object of the sign).  As a pointer to position it in some sense
"causes" the active response in which the ("energetic") interpretant of the
indexical sign is formed.  
	Even the (dynamic) object of an indexical sign presents itself as "relative
to the mind" in the sense that it is only known through the sign it
generates, to become an immediate object in the mind of the knower.

Dave Mills writes: > If we know things only as relative to mind, this seems
to imply that the > objects as objects of knowledge are determined by mind,
while still > allowing that the object may exert influence over mind in the
relationship. 
John Oller responds: >Yet, I ask, is it not the case that the influence
material events exert over mind (i.e., over representations formed up by
sign-users) is severely limited to the brute forces that bodily objects
exert upon one another? And, again, is it not the case that our most
abstract signs (the concepts underlying our discourse in words) are
"relatively" less susceptible to such brute forces than are our material bodies?

The everyday comprehension of spoken language involves a sensitivity to what
might be called the "trivial" indices of vocal tension (softness,
trumulousness etc.) in another's speech, which can lead to an iconic
representation of the other-as-timid or other-as-anxious etc..   In cases
like this, could not  a "material event" (vocal tension) be read as
exercising a perhaps involuntary  "influence" over the significations
produced through the speaker's mind?   And could not the hearer's
representation of "other-as-in-state X" involve something like physical
empathy?   I'm just not sure that the signs of a "material" body are always
a matter of brute force, or that the symbolic functions of language manage
entirely to cover the other dimensions of signification in an embodied
setting (where visual and aural icons are involved).   I would agree that
'our most abstract signs (the concepts underlying our discourse in words)
are "relatively" less susceptible to such brute forces than are our material
bodies,' but I wouldn't want to underestimate the complex
psychophysiological phenomena, in which bodily states can at least _seem_ to
be prior to an interpreted signification (hence James's "I cry and therefore
I feel sad" - or something to that effect).

Naomi Cumming
University of Melbourne


------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 18:25:09 +0100
From: Thomas.Riese[…]t-online.de (Thomas Riese)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: topological logic, reduction thesis etc.
Message-ID: 

To Anne-Marie Dinesen, Cathy Legg and all those of you who are 
interested in Peirce's Existential Graphs and topological logic, 
reduction thesis etc.:

It is often said this were not really 'topology' but mathematically 
trivial, simple "graph theory" or "network topology". If you are 
confronted with such outdated arguments, you might perhaps tell these 
mathematicians to visit Doron Zeilberger's homepage 

http://www.math.temple.edu/~zeilberg/OPINIONS.html

and inspect "opinion1.html" with the title: "Topology: The slum of 
Combinatorics OR 'Don't show off too much, your speciality will soon 
be Trivialized'."

Zeilberger certainly is one of today's leading mathematicians and it 
seems as if in mathematics a (silent?) logical revolution is taking 
place. 

There are many more goodies to be found on Zeilberger's homepage; just 
for an example:

"Why is Zeilberger so willing to give up absolute truth? 
The most reasonable answer is that he is pursuing deeper truths.
-- J. Borwein, P. Borwein, R. Girgensohn and S. Parnes, 
Math. Intell. 18(4)(Fall 1996) p.15. "

The gag of course then is that this development can be historically 
shown to go back to Charles Peirce (I mean: with references and all 
that). 
Bill Everdell, how about another volume on 20th/21st Century?! 
I guarantee that it could be deep, funny and extremely astonishing at 
the same time!

Thomas Riese.


P.S. Mathematicians CAN be funny! As a historical fact: Richard 
Dedekind one day got out of bed and had to read his own obituary in 
the newspapers (don't ask me how this can happen). Others might have 
been shocked to death by such an occurrence. He then easily proved this 
to be an error -- by existence!

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 17:40:10 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
Message-ID: <34d4206a.13126221[…]pop3.cris.com>

    1. This paper is based upon the theory already
       established, that the function of conceptions is to
       reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity,
       and that the validity of a conception consists in the
       impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness
       to unity without the introduction of it. 

Why unity?  Multiplicity is so much more stimulating.  There are
few things that are more fun than a ride on the Great American
Scream Machine out at Six Flags.  Thus men seem to be more than
willing to immerse themselves in multiplicity.

And why should conceptions have a function?  They seem to consist
in the random stimulation of nerve cells, such as occurs when
riding the Great American Scream Machine.  The very idea that one
should validate a conception seems absurd.  If it feels good, do
it.

So the more conceptions one has, the better, I say.  Why should
one rest satisfied with a few conceptions when the world is like
a field ready for the harvest?  There are conceptions for every
purpose under heaven.  We should rake them in so as to be
enriched by them.



----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.

Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
         Bill  Overcamp
-----------------------------------

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 12:32:50 EST
From: KWells2382 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: 

Dear John and Andrew,

I thought I had sent this post earlier, but apparently I overlooked it.


In a message dated 1/15/98 6:49:47 AM, you wrote:

<>
I agree with your metaphor that symbols are the "superconductors of meaning"
in the sense that they extend or generalize meaning.  But watch how your
metaphor 'runs down' in this discussion.  Its extension comes at a price--for
example, superconductors actually do follow the laws of physics.  Now I am not
trying to be thickheaded, here.  I do understand the 'spirit' of your
superconductor metaphor, and I think that it is excellent.  But in order to
achieve meaning extension, it must give off meaning entropy (the literalist
confusion).

Moreover, I don't believe that Peirce would be comfortable with the implied
dualism of symbols at their "hypostatic best." It also would run into great
difficulties with P's "Incapacities" as well.

Regards,

Kelley

 

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 18:56:55 +0100
From: "H.G.CALLAWAY" 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Cc: Multiple recipients of list 
Subject: Re: Context and Continuity-Thermodynamic


On Thu, 22 Jan 1998, David W. Low wrote:

> It has often perplexed me why people sometimes seem intent on creating an
> 'oppositional identity' for themselves (environmentalists for example).  It
> certainly yields visibility, but on the other hand, it simultaneously
> creates the situation in which a person or group appears to be behaving
> unreasonably. They appear unreasonable because their visible identity is
> built out of being in a position of opposition to the other party's
> proposition.  Their grotesque appearance is made more monsterous by the
> fact that, if the other party is more powerful, to become visible the less
> powerful opponent has to appear to be very wrong in order to appear at all,
> which to the more powerful party seems like an entirely illogical way to
> behave if they are sure they are already in possession of "the truth".  In
> this sense, the opponent embodies the hecceity of the subject-matter by
> opposing the proposition, but usually gets few thanks, sometimes worse.

This passage concerning "oppositional identity" struck me as very interest-
ting, David. Given the context provided by this thread it was all the more
interesting. But I cannot say I'm very clear on what you say here. I can
imagine two general directions of explication of your talk of an "opposi-
tional identity." I can imagine on the one hand that your talk of identity
here concerns something like "appearance" or identity as a kind of pub-
lic stereotype. This direction of interpretation seems to be called for
where you talk of someone's "visible identity" and how it may appear
unreasonable. Here I certainly sympathize with what you say, and I would
add that I do not think that any viable self-identity can be built on
mere opposition to something or other. But on the other hand, you talk
of identity also may invite a deeper conception of identity, according
to which it really does make no sense to think of self-identity or
identity of a position merely in terms of opposition. Opposition, put
into terms of discourse is a critical attitude. But a significant depth
of criticism depends upon some positive alternative to what is being
criticized.


You continue:

> However, and as Peirce argues in all sorts of ways, to say someone is
> illogical is a special kind of moral argument (CP 8.191) and such a
> position will lead to arguments based in authority, which, fortunately, is
> a method that eventually "chokes its own stream" (CP 2.198). To learn, we
> must assume that our reasoning is more or less fallible - thus, to be
> wrong, and know we are, or in future may be, is the way we go about
> learning something new about the system of ideas were use to get at the
> truth.
> 
> It seems to me that the important factor to consider in regard to
> communicational communities, therefore, is whether or not the people who
> create oppositional identities for themselves do so intentionally (ie,
> pragmatically), the implications of which you bring out nicely in your
> post. I think it is Roberta Kevelson who talks about 'persistent
> objectors' as people who visibly choose not to agree as a means of
> maintaining their freedom to choose. 

When we encounter someone who seems to oppose or criticize without any
background position, then I think it is important to look for and try
to bring out the alternative idea, position, or perspective that may
be there. Nor is this always a simple matter of asking for a clarifica-
tion. Its always possible that there is some genuine alternative which
needs to be developed and elucidated, though it exists in some more or
less implicit form. But if I'm convinced that there is and will be no
articulated alternative, that the person is merely a critic, without
being a critic in the interest of any articulate-able position, then I
think it is quite reasonable to go off distance. However effective
someone may be as a mere critic, if there is no positive view to be
defended, then there is no guarantee that various criticisms will even
be consistent with each other. The value of criticism diminishes insofar
as it is not supported by a positive viewpoint which might be evaluated
in turn. 

So, without having read Roberta Kevelson (who I did once meet, and who
I have only heard good things about), I would say that there are two
sorts of "persistent objectors." The two sorts correspond to my distinction
between positive and negative self-identity. Someone who does have a
perspective to defend is deserving of our respect and attention, and this
no matter how oppositional the person may appear, and no matter how many
criticisms may be made. The question of whether there is a background
position from which criticisms are made is not something we can settle
on the basis of first impressions. The mere critic on the other hand,
certainly is deserving of the respect due to a human being, and beyond
that particular criticisms may be of value to a variety of positions,
but I do not believe that the mere critic deserves the same attention
as someone who criticizes on the basis of a positive alternative.

So, I want to distinguish between two sorts of "oppositional identities"
in reference to your point concerning those who visibly oppose as a way
of maintaining a freedom to choose. For, without distinguishing the two
sorts of opposition, you offer this kind of opposition as a reason
for supporting the concluding passage you quote from Joe's prior posting
in this thread.

> This is why I think you [Joe Ransell] are spot-on
> when you conclude by saying :
> 
> >If I can burden this message with one more implication, I perceive in
> >this the elimination in principle of all authority in such a
> >communicational community. Or to put it the other way around, the
> >insistence that there must always be authority in a communicational
> >community is the same as the refusal to acknowledge that the peer
> >relationship obtains in that community.
> 

There is a kind of authority which comes from mastering a subject of
interest. This kind of authority may or may not be found, in a given
instance, in combination with any social authority or position. I
think that a communicational community is much the pooer for not
recognizing this kind of authority. Concerning the Peirce-l in 
particular, I think of Joe's authority, exercised it directing us
to relevant texts of Peirce, or I think of Tom Anderson's authority
as a mathematician or knower to the philosophy of mathematics (although 
he always claims to be no professional).  I could perhaps mention other
examples. 

So, to me, thinking that we need not recognize any  authority seems a 
mistake, though what you perhaps intended to bring out of the passage 
from Joe's posting is the idea that we need not recognize any source of 
authority which does not arise from the discussions themselves. In
the end, of course, I should add that the authority which arises out of
the discussions has (or should have) a good deal to do with the 
development of positive identity regarding the problems and issues of
interest.

It is crucial to liberal democratic societies that they provide social
support to social criticism. It is equally crucial that the be able to
distinguish between criticism embedded in developed alternatives and
criticism which operates without contextual support.

Howard


H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz


------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 18:15:22 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
Message-ID: <34d52e01.16605300[…]pop3.cris.com>

joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.) wrote:

>substance implies being
>these categories imply being
>Therefore, substance implies these categories

Hmmm...

	s->b
	c->b
	.: s->c?



----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.

Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
         Bill  Overcamp
-----------------------------------

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 19:29:53 +0100
From: "H.G.CALLAWAY" 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Cc: Multiple recipients of list 
Subject: Re: slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)



On Sat, 24 Jan 1998, BugDaddy wrote:

>     1. This paper is based upon the theory already
>        established, that the function of conceptions is to
>        reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity,
>        and that the validity of a conception consists in the
>        impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness
>        to unity without the introduction of it. 
> 
..

> The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
> Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
> dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
> 
> Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*


I really like this quote from _Walden_ which seems very deep to me.
So, I'm always glad to see it appear again. 


	The light which puts out our eyes is a darkness to us.


So, I think, we must each see by our own lights. Here Thoreau seems
to paraphrase Emerson, and I couldn't agree more. We dare not be captured
by any mere authority, however impressive. In fact it is the most impressive
among us who stand most in need to criticism and examination. Here we 
stand to gain the most. But if we allow these bright stars to put out
our eyes, we do not truly benefit from them. As Emerson says, we have
simply "entered into some new church." (Of course it was one of the original
accomplishments of Emerson's life to leave the church of his fathers.)

 
So, (I imagine Emerson leaving the ministry after falling asleep in church
one Sunday morning.)


	Only that day dawns to which we are awake.


A very nice line indeed! How many days will there be to which we will
not be awake? How little they need concern us now. They are most fully
engaged by us when we see them from our own perspectives, not pretending
to some future perspective which we will never have, perhaps. 


	There is more day to dawn.


Surely we shouldn't give up on improvements just yet, though so many
improvements may later be enacted without our help of awareness. Any
here I find my argument with Bill O. There is yet "better and worse"
that we may ourselves find. The proposed improvements may be blinding
to some at first, of course. But there is more day to dawn for them,
too.


	The sun is but a morning star.


So, the light which comes to us is perhaps only a beginning. That
should encourage us to look further. Can we benefit from the 
diversity and variety of "morning stars" without thinking that they
are all just equal in value?  Is every star and every day just the 
same and just as good as every other? If not, we may still aim to 
"unify the manifold."



Howard

H.G. Callaway
Seminar for Philosophy
University of Mainz



------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 20:24:12 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: slow reading: New List (paragraph 1)
Message-ID: <34d943ca.22182947[…]pop3.cris.com>

"H.G.CALLAWAY"  wrote:

>> The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
>> Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
>> dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
 
>> Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

>I really like this quote from _Walden_ which seems very deep to me.
>So, I'm always glad to see it appear again. 

It happens to be the last four sentences in *Walden,* a book that
I dearly love.  I have several signature files and regularly
switch from one to another.  Yet my current selection just
happens to match our subject -- in a way.  Coincidence?

>	The light which puts out our eyes is a darkness to us.

>So, I think, we must each see by our own lights. Here Thoreau seems
>to paraphrase Emerson, and I couldn't agree more. 

Emerson?  Perhaps.  It really is a very reference to a very old
quote, known to the Scholastic theologian-philosophers and
probably going back to the Greeks.  In a way it relates to
Socrates' *cave,* though I don't have the reference at the
moment.

The question was asked why man does not immediately and directly
perceive God, since God should be visible to us?  The answer was
that we are blinded by the light of God's presence.  Thus we see,
like owls, at night.

>We dare not be captured
>by any mere authority, however impressive. In fact it is the most impressive
>among us who stand most in need to criticism and examination. Here we 
>stand to gain the most. But if we allow these bright stars to put out
>our eyes, we do not truly benefit from them. As Emerson says, we have
>simply "entered into some new church." (Of course it was one of the original
>accomplishments of Emerson's life to leave the church of his fathers.)

>So, (I imagine Emerson leaving the ministry after falling asleep in church
>one Sunday morning.)

>	Only that day dawns to which we are awake.

>A very nice line indeed! How many days will there be to which we will
>not be awake? How little they need concern us now. They are most fully
>engaged by us when we see them from our own perspectives, not pretending
>to some future perspective which we will never have, perhaps. 

The day that we wake to is full of multiplicity.  How many
seconds are in a day?  If I recall correctly, 86,400.  And each
of those 86,400 seconds -- or at least all those which find us
awake -- is a veritable torrent of nervous impulses for us.

>	There is more day to dawn.

>Surely we shouldn't give up on improvements just yet, though so many
>improvements may later be enacted without our help of awareness. Any
>here I find my argument with Bill O. There is yet "better and worse"
>that we may ourselves find. The proposed improvements may be blinding
>to some at first, of course. But there is more day to dawn for them,
>too.

There is light outside this little cave in which we exist.  But
to find that light we must crawl through even greater darkness.

>	The sun is but a morning star.

>So, the light which comes to us is perhaps only a beginning. That
>should encourage us to look further. Can we benefit from the 
>diversity and variety of "morning stars" without thinking that they
>are all just equal in value?  Is every star and every day just the 
>same and just as good as every other? If not, we may still aim to 
>"unify the manifold."

Yes, back to the New List, as we slowly crawl from substance to
the categories and then on to being.



----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.

Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
         Bill  Overcamp
-----------------------------------

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 14:41:28 -0600
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
To: peirce-l 
Subject: Who? Me?
Message-ID: <000a01bd2908$7344ae40$94a432ce[…]ransdell.door.net>

I don't think I wrote that, Bill.  Check that message out again and I
bet it was not a statement of mine.

>joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.) wrote:
>
>>substance implies being
>>these categories imply being
>>Therefore, substance implies these categories
>
>Hmmm...
>
> s->b
> c->b
> .: s->c?
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 Joseph Ransdell            or  <>
 Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
 Area Code  806:  742-3158 office    797-2592 home    742-0730 fax
 ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 21:17:47 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: Who? Me?
Message-ID: <34db59e7.27844779[…]pop3.cris.com>

joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.) wrote:

>I don't think I wrote that, Bill.  Check that message out again and I
>bet it was not a statement of mine.

Ah, yes.  You posted the article for Tom Gollier.

>>joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.) wrote:
>>
>>>substance implies being
>>>these categories imply being
>>>Therefore, substance implies these categories
>>
>>Hmmm...
>>
>> s->b
>> c->b
>> .: s->c?
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Joseph Ransdell            or  <>
> Department of Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Lubbock TX 79409
> Area Code  806:  742-3158 office    797-2592 home    742-0730 fax
> ARISBE: Peirce Telecommunity website - http://members.door.net/arisbe
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>




----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.

Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
         Bill  Overcamp
-----------------------------------

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 13:42:25
From: Joseph Ransdell 
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
Message-ID: <3.0.1.16.19980124134225.3fbf48fa[…]pop.ttu.edu>

I don't think I wrote that, Bill.  Check that message out again and I bet
it was not a statement of mine.  

Joe Ransdell 

>joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.) wrote:
>
>>substance implies being
>>these categories imply being
>>Therefore, substance implies these categories
>
>Hmmm...
>
>	s->b
>	c->b
>	.: s->c?
>
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------
>The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
>Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
>dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
>
>Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*
>
>http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
>-----------------------------------
> Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
>http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
>-----------------------------------
>         Bill  Overcamp
>-----------------------------------
>

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 22:58:48 GMT
From: BugDaddy[…]cris.com (BugDaddy)
To: peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
Subject: Re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
Message-ID: <34ca708b.2011386[…]pop3.cris.com>

Joseph Ransdell  wrote:

>I don't think I wrote that, Bill.  Check that message out again and I bet
>it was not a statement of mine.  

Right.  As I said in my previous message, you posted it for Tom
Gollier....

To: Multiple recipients of list 
Subject: re: help with the "Nw List" (from Tom Gollier)
From: joseph.ransdell[…]yahoo.com (ransdell, joseph m.)
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 1997 17:42:05 -0600 (CST)

>This is posted for Tom Gollier
>
>========message from and posted for Tom Gollier=========
>
>Subject:
>            Re: help with the "New List"
>       Date:
>            Mon, 28 Dec 1998 11:23:43 -0800
>      From:
>            Tom Gollier 
>        To:
>            peirce-l[…]ttacs6.ttu.edu
>
>Patrick:
>Thank you for your response on this topic, and you certainly don't
>have to worry about the time it takes to reply.  Too often, for me,
>the topics appear, provoke a barrage of responses, and disappear
>before I ever see them.  Besides, your responses are forcing me to
>dig around, first into Murphey and now into some of Peirce's
>comments on the syllogism, so it will take me some time to respond
>as well.
>I find it interesting that you zero in on Peirce's positioning
>himself between Kant and Hegel in the Draft 2, but you quote only
>his relationship to Hegel, not his disagreement with Kant:
>    ...  The correspondences between the functions of judgment and
>    the categories are obvious and certain.  So far the method is
>    perfect.  Its defect is that it affords no warrant for the
>    correctness of the preliminary table, and does not display that
>    direct reference to the unity of consistency which alone gives
>    validity to the categories. [Draft 2, p.1]
>Kant, for Peirce, apparently erred in beginning with 'judgments' as
>they happen to have occurred and deriving the 'categories' from
>them.  This, in terms of the "New List," would be an instance of
>proceeding from 'substance' to 'being'.  Hegel erred, not in the
>direction of starting from 'being', but in the arbitrariness of his
>result, the fact that he ended up with the "same divisions of
>judgment as were made by Kant."  So, although Peirce did not
>subscribe to "Hegel's logic," he does appear to agree, in opposition
>to Kant, with the direction that logic took.
>The means of movement, the logical relationship which underlies the
>movement in both directions for Peirce, is "prescission," and I
>argued earlier in this thread that 'prescission' (at least in regard
>to the fundamental concepts being discussed in the "New List")
>involves, or can be characterized by, the logical relationship of
>implication.  (There was some objection to putting this relationship
>in terms of "imagination" -- despite Peirce using just that example
>in a number of places -- and I suppose "conceivable" would be
>considered too psychological as well; so, I'll stick with something
>like "never color without space" or just "color implies space" as
>indicative of a purely logical consistency.)  In the particular case
>of the "New List", 'being' can be prescinded from 'the three
>categories', and 'the three categories' can be prescinded from
>'substance' (as well as each other), but not vice versa; and, this
>then amounts to saying "substance implies the three categories,"
>"the three categories imply being," and "substance implies being."
>We end up with:  (1) a series of logical implications running from
>'substance' to 'categories' to 'being' (in the direction taken by
>Kant) and (2) a syllogism:
>    these categories imply being
>    substance implies these categories
>    substance implies being
>working its way back from 'being' to 'categories' to 'substance' (in
>the direction Hegel took).
>There is still a question, however, as to just what kind of
>syllogism Pierce is using in the "New List," and without really
>arguing a textual analysis here, I think we are talking about a
>hypothetical syllogism:
>    substance implies being
>    these categories imply being
>    Therefore, substance implies these categories
>based upon the shared monadic quality of 'being' or the requirement
>of the 'unity of consistency'.  For the idea is to justify the
>'categories' and the 'judgments' made from them in that order and on
>the basis of 'being'.  This particular kind of syllogism, what
>Peirce elsewhere posits as the logical nature of 'abduction', then
>justifies the categories based upon the nature of 'being' (contra
>Kant) but it does so in an abductive rahter than deductive manner
>(contra Hegel).
>In Murphey's case, my impression (and I claim no more for it than
>that) is that he interprets Peirce as retaining the Kantian
>direction and thereby misses his departure from Kant all together.
>Such an interpretation also ignores the fallacy, pointed out in
>their separate ways by both Hegel and Peirce, of trying to base our
>knowledge and categorizations on the implication of "substance
>implies categories."  For the consistency of logical implication is
>a measure of plausibility only, and one such consistent alternative
>is thereby no more plausible than another.  When we talk simply on
>the basis of what 'categories' are logically consistent with
>'substance', we are talking about all the varieties of different
>linguistic categorizaitons, as well as categorizations within a much
>broader definition of what we mean by "language."  Logically, one
>such categorizaiton is as good as any other.  There is no "tendency
>toward truth" with logical implication, such as is found with even
>the weakest form of inference, abduction, for it lacks the
>derivation which links itself to the essential elements of any
>manner of categorizing substance by delineating the characteristics
>of 'unity' itself.  Could we even go so far as to say this Hegelian
>direction in Peirce is what gives the "normative" aspect to his
>logic?
>My feeling is that Peirce was conceptually aware of both directions,
>and keeping them staight is more an heuristic problem for us.  If
>Peirce did confuse them, conceptually as well as stylistically, I
>would say (along with Misak I think it was) that I'm then more
>interested in what he "should" have said.  But I do apologize for
>indulging in this kind of "philosophical mythologizing" to some
>extent.  I find it very helpful to personalize the relationships
>between different philosphers for myself, but I also find it
>peculiarly unenlightening when others do it.  It presumes a common
>understanding of the characters involved which others all too often
>don't share.  Perhaps, though, with this list being more informal
>and Peirce providing a common perspective on both them, the
>references to Kant and Hegel aren't too obscure.
>Thanks again for your thoughtful and encouraging response.
>
>Tom Gollier
>
>
> 
>




----------------------------------------------------------
The light which puts out our eyes is darkness to us.
Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to
dawn. The sun is but a morning star.

Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*

http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/sophia
-----------------------------------
 Life is a miracle waiting to happen.
http://www.cris.com/~bugdaddy/life.htm
-----------------------------------
         Bill  Overcamp
-----------------------------------


RETURN TO LIST OF AVAILABLE DIGESTS

This page is part of the website ARISBE
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/1271.htm
Last modified January 24, 1998 — J.R.
Page last modified by B.U. May 3, 2012 — B.U.

Queries, comments, and suggestions to:
Top of the Page